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ABSTRACT 
 
 
OTTOMAN WAR ON THE DANUBE: 
STATE, SUBJECT, AND SOLDIER 
(1853-1856) 
 
Köremezli, İbrahim 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
 
December 2013 
 
This study analyzes the Danubian front of the Crimean War, which includes 
the military activities in the Ottoman Bulgaria, Dobruja and the Principalities. A 
comparison between Russian and Ottoman military activities in the Balkan theater 
helps to explain the “Ottoman and Russian War of 1853-1856” separate from the 
existing Eurocentric literature. This study not only explains the war as a product of 
interstate politics but also concentrates on the individual participants, both 
combatants and civilians. Logistics, intelligence activities, and prisoners of war will 
be focused on in addition to the battles to discuss the Danubian front from a broader 
perspective.  
There are three main chapters discussing the Danubian front of the Crimean 
War: “before the front”, “at the front” and “behind the front”. However, before 
explaining the battles in particular and the Danubian front in general, the legacy of 
the Crimean War historiography is reviewed and pre-war diplomacy is re-examined.   
Keywords: Danubian Front, Crimean War, Ottoman Army, Russian Army, 
Ottoman Society, Prisoners of War, Military Intelligence   
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ÖZET 
 
 
TUNA’DA OSMANLI HARBİ: 
DEVLET, TEBAA VE ASKER 
(1853-1856) 
 
Köremezli, İbrahim 
Ph.D., Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Supervisor: Doçent Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
 
Aralık 2013 
 
Bu çalışma, Kırım Harbi'nin Tuna Cephesi’ni incelemektedir. Bu cephe 
Bulgaristan, Dobruca ve Memleketeyn'deki askeri harekâtı içine almaktadır. Rusya 
ve Osmanlı Devletlerinin Balkanlardaki askeri harekâtının mukayesesi, "1853-1856 
Osmanlı-Rus Harbi"ni Avrupa merkezli Kırım Harbi literatüründen daha farklı bir 
şekilde tartışmaya imkân tanımaktadır. Bu çalışma savaşı, sadece devletler arası 
politikanın bir sonucu olarak incelememekte, cephedeki bireyi (muharip ve sivil) 
tartışmaktadır. Bu tezde, muharebelerle birlikte lojistik, istihbarat ve savaş esirleri de 
ele alınmış; böylelikle Tuna Cephesi geniş bir perspektiften tahlil edilmeye 
çalışılmıştır. 
Tuna Cephesi üç ana bölümde incelenmiştir: "cephe öncesi", "cephe" ve 
"cephe gerisi". Savaşa geçmeden önce Kırım Harbi tarihyazımı ve savaş öncesi 
diplomasi tartışılmıştır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tuna Cephesi, Kırım Harbi, Osmanlı Ordusu, Rus 
Ordusu, Osmanlı Toplumu, Savaş Esiri, Askeri İstihbarat  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1.The Aim and Scope 
“The Charge of the Light Brigade”, “The Thin Red Line”, heroine Florence 
Nightingale, and hero Eduard Todleben continue to be a part of historical memory 
and history writing. However, no such historical name or concept similarly triggers 
the cultural memories of the Ottoman participation in the Crimean War because most 
of the Ottoman actions in the war have yet to be treated as a historical subject. This 
study concentrates on the Danubian front of the Crimean War, which includes the 
military activities in the Ottoman Bulgaria, Dobruja and the Principalities. While the 
Ottomans’ participation in decision-making and battle maneuvers was not central in 
the Crimean peninsula, the Ottoman commanders, privates, and peasants are visible 
on the Danube and in the Caucasus. Therefore, any narrative of the war without a 
sufficient discussion of the Danubian and the Caucasian fronts would ultimately 
understate the Ottoman role in the conflict. Accordingly, a comparison between 
Russian and Ottoman military activities in the Balkan theater can help explain an 
overlooked aspect of the Crimean War and analyze the “Ottoman and Russian War 
of 1853-1856” separate from the existing Eurocentric literature. 
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One shortcoming of the Crimean War historiography is its narrow perception 
of warfare, focusing on battles and overlooking other important aspects, such as 
logistics, prisoners of war and military intelligence. This dissertation aims to narrate 
the military activities occurring in the Balkans during the Crimean War along with 
their social and political repercussions. It is also an attempt to understand the 
individuals (i.e., soldier, peasant, spy and diplomat) who experienced war in the 
middle of the nineteenth century by concentrating on social, political and military 
issues in a specific time and space in the Ottoman Empire: the Ottoman Balkans 
from 1853 to 1856. Accordingly, by discussing logistics, intelligence activities, and 
prisoners of war, this work brings out some useful information about the Ottoman 
and Russian societies in the 19
th
 century. 
The Crimean War has been perceived as irrelevant because it did not greatly 
alter European political boundaries. However, this confrontation actually had a 
tremendous impact on people’s lives and a long-term social effect in the region. This 
war affected social and psychological boundaries more than the political ones. 
Loyalties changed or were influenced by the ongoing war. Russian Muslims and 
Ottoman Orthodox believers developed mistrust against their respective states and 
the state was more suspicious of its own subjects. Massive migrations after the war 
were a result of alienation from the state, a process promoted by the state to eliminate 
undesired populations, as in the case of the exodus of the Crimean Tatars. Some 
Bulgarians also moved with the Russian army to the southern boundaries of Russia. 
A significant number of Bulgarians, Serbians and Greeks moved Russia throughout 
the 19
th
 century. Such contacts continued to foster the relations between Russia and 
the Ottoman Balkans, which would prepare the ground for the more intimate 
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collaboration between the Russian army and the local Christian population in the war 
of 1877-78.  
Although the focus of the narrative is the Danubian front, the developments in 
other fronts have also been referenced throughout the study. Accordingly, in 
analyzing these wartime developments, the narrative also includes the Russian town 
of Ryazan, where Ottoman prisoners were detained, and a European capital where 
diplomatic activities intensified. Thus, I have tried to place my subject matter in the 
broader context of the Crimean War and the Russo-Ottoman wars.  
Previous studies display inconsistency in the dates and details of the battles on 
the Danube. Even the most basic facts of the war are unclear. For example, three 
different chronologies of the Crimean War offer different dates for the Siege of 
Silistre: 14 April - 23 June
1
, 15 May – 29 June2 and 24 March – 23 June3. This study 
will discuss the inconsistent and contradictory information about the preparations, 
battles and results and will provide a clear and accurate picture of the military actions 
based on the archival documents.  
Thus, this subject matter can contribute to the present literature in two respects: 
elaborating on an overlooked phase of the Crimean War and exploration and 
exploitation of new research materials. This narrative is also helpful for those 
studying the Ottoman army and government in the Tanzimat period by providing 
valuable clues to the function and capabilities of the Ottoman administration and 
military.  
 
                                               
1 Kırım Savaşı’nın 150nci Yılı/150th Anniversary of the Crimean War (Istanbul, 2006), p. 194.  
2 Saim Besbelli, 1853-1856 Osmanlı-Rus ve Kırım Savaşı Deniz Harekâtı (Ankara, 1977), p. 122. 
3 Vostochnaya voina 1853-1856 godov. Novye materialy i novoe osmyslenie (Simferopol, 2005), p. 7. 
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1.2.The Method  
This is a qualitative work where a historical event has been discussed by the 
usage of original materials. Studying the Danubian front requires extensive use of 
Ottoman and Russian archival materials, which have been underexploited by students 
of the Crimean War. The Ottoman documents and secondary materials provide a 
more balanced picture when used in conjunction with the reminiscences of Russian 
and British officers as well as additional primary and secondary sources in Russian 
and English. For instance, Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s letters to the Seraskerlik (War 
Ministry) provide interesting clues about the Ottoman army’s preparations, plans, 
and expectations. Articles, monographs and documents relevant to this study are 
written in several languages. This study cannot repeat all scientific research 
accumulated on this topic. Instead, it will attempt to highlight details of the war that 
have only been studied superficially and aim to correct the historical record on 
several aspects of the Ottoman diplomatic and war efforts.  
Deficiencies in the Ottoman sources usually prevent the student of the subject 
from presenting a balanced picture. Although the Russian sources include detailed 
information on which building a narrative is easy, the Ottoman materials are usually 
scattered and difficult to employ. Thus, sources have generally pushed me to write 
more on the Russians. However, one major aim of this study is to explore the 
unknown and unpublicized aspects of the Crimean War, which has led me to 
research and write more about the Ottomans. In many cases I used the more 
accessible Russian sources in an effort to focus more on the Ottoman experiences.
 Thus, this study is an attempt to present an analytical work on the Danubian 
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front examining the theater in light of Russian and Ottoman archival witnesses and 
published sources.  
 
1.3. The Organization 
The first chapter is devoted to the critical examination of the Crimean War 
literature. In this chapter, the existing literature will be discussed with a special 
emphasis on overlooked aspects of the Crimean War. It is also underlined that the 
existing literature is now more accessible than only a few years ago thanks to the 
digital libraries.  
The second chapter focuses on the pre-war diplomacy, determining perceptions 
in the capital of the Ottoman Empire. This section will briefly mention the conflict 
over the Holy Places and subsequent unsuccessful mission of Prince Menshikov, 
which has been discussed extensively elsewhere. The Russian plans for capturing 
Istanbul will be analyzed with the diplomatic activities to resolve the question of 
Holy Places. Comprehending the military confrontations on the Danube is impossible 
without understanding the elaborate diplomatic circumstances that led to few battles 
in 1853 but eventually evolved into a European war. 
The third chapter discusses the potential and preparations of the rivaling armies 
before the war. The transfer of the Allied forces to the Ottoman lands and their 
encampment in Gelibolu (Gallipoli), Istanbul, Varna, and Balçık and the gradual 
participation of Britain and France in the ongoing war are also explained. The French 
expedition to Dobruja and the planned Ottoman expedition to Bessarabia are also 
important incidents of the Danubian front that require further elaboration. Austrian 
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involvement in the conflict, Russian evacuation of the Principalities, and the 
Ottoman and Austrian invasions of Bucharest and the Principalities will also be 
analyzed.  
The fourth chapter addresses the battles on the Danube. The Danube Front 
includes several military engagements between the Ottoman and Russian forces, 
including Kalafat (27 October 1853), Olteniçe (Oltenitza) (4 November 1853), 
Çatana (Çetate) (6 January 1854), the siege of Silistre (May-June 1854), Yergöğü 
(Giurgiu) (7 July 1854), and several other minor fights.  
The fifth chapter discusses behind the front developments. In this chapter, 
espionage, military-civilian relations and prisoners of war are discussed. The 
relations of the Russian and Ottoman armies with the local population to supply their 
material needs and to obtain the strategic wartime intelligence are the major subjects. 
The interesting stories of the Russian and Ottoman prisoners of war provide insight 
about war’s impact on the life of people behind the front.  
This study is thematic and aims to focus on all aspects of a front (i.e., social, 
political and military). Because the narrative is not chronological, some of the same 
topics are studied from various aspects in different chapters. For instance, the 
Ottoman irregulars are examined in Chapters 3.3. and 5.3.   
 
1.4. The Questions 
Although I have defined a specific topic, it has taken me many years to 
conceptualize and write this dissertation. The lack of personal biographies of the 
commanders is a lacuna in the Ottoman Empire military history and presents a 
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significant challenge to analyzing Ottoman military activities. The lack of sufficient 
studies about Ottoman fortresses and defense systems presents another difficulty for 
historians. Thus, writing about the Ottoman wars is sometimes similar to building 
without the necessary foundations. I frequently became absorbed in my research 
questions. Researching the treatment of prisoners of war, the role and efficiency of 
secret agents, and even the role of the Ottoman government in the declaration of the 
war—a more traditional topic—took more time than I previously anticipated.  
Many military and social aspects of the Russo-Ottoman wars have not yet been 
described. For example, astonishingly little has so far been written on the prisoners 
of war.  Experiences of the Russian prisoners in the Ottoman Empire are valuable 
both for illuminating the Russo-Ottoman conflicts and for understanding Russo-
Ottoman social relations. This dissertation aims to address the following questions: 
What were the motives of the Ottomans and Russians at the beginning of the war? 
Given their confidence in Western support, did the Ottomans actually want a war 
against Russia? What was the nature of the war on the Danube? How efficient was 
the Ottoman army during the first year of the war? Did the Ottoman government 
actually want a military alliance with Britain and France? Did the Ottomans actually 
need Western support to win the war? What kind of effects had the Crimean War on 
the state-society relations? I was not able to articulate adequate answers for all of the 
questions posed throughout the dissertation. However, this dissertation will 
contribute original ideas to the historical record and provide more satisfactory 
explanations of certain aspects of the war than the present literature. 
In many cases, Western and Russian sources make contradictory claims. For 
example, sources disagree about the Ottoman army’s organization and capability. 
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According to Western sources, the Ottoman army was poorly organized and 
equipped and was inferior to its enemy. On the contrary, the Russian sources suggest 
that the Ottoman army was better organized and equipped than the Russian 
counterpart. I hope this study will be useful for assessing the capabilities and 
functions of the Ottoman army in the mid-nineteenth century, which will improve 
our understanding of how the Tanzimat period affected the Ottoman military 
establishment. Accordingly, commanders from various nationalities ranging from 
fugitive Poles and Hungarians to Brits and Italians; new military technology, such as 
the minié rifle; and new methods of conscription will be described to better explain 
the confrontation between the Russian and Ottoman armies on the Danube.  
Correspondence between the Porte, the Danubian army and several embassies 
in the European capitals illuminate Ottoman diplomacy, perceptions and concerns. 
Using Turkish archival materials facilitates the reevaluation of diplomatic activities 
before and during the Crimean War, helping to explain the outbreak of the war and 
establish a more balanced picture of diplomatic activities. Saab and Badem provided 
important evidence about the diplomacy of the Sublime Porte. Saab emphasized the 
rationality of the Ottoman statesmen, which the existing literature almost totally 
ignored; Badem highlighted the personal rivalries of the Ottoman political decision 
makers. Accordingly, this study argues that the consistency of Ottoman diplomacy 
and the relevance of Ottoman concerns, not Ottoman stubbornness or irrationality, 
led to the war. In this sense, the rationality of the Ottoman decision makers explains 
the path to war in 1853 better than their irrationality and fanaticism.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1. The Legacy of the Crimean War Historiography 
The Crimean War as a historical subject has a remarkable literature of 
hundreds of monographs and articles in many languages. Moreover, many primary 
sources such as diaries, letters, and official documents have been published. In his 
1999 bibliography, Fikret Turan cited 657 books.
4
 Although Turan’s bibliography 
includes many studies in various languages, such as German, Arabic, Greek and 
Rumanian, it is far from comprehensive. Only a handful of Russian books are listed, 
and numerous personal accounts are omitted. As for the Russian sources, the 
bibliographic narrative prepared by V. E. Bagdasarian and S. G. Tolstoy is 
comprehensive, but not exhaustive.
5
 Brison D. Gooch’s out-dated article is another 
bibliographic study.
6
 In his book, James Reid briefly evaluated the historiography of 
the Crimean War.
7
 Norman Rich, David Goldfrank and Winfried Baumgart included 
                                               
4 Fikret Turan, The Crimean War Bibliography (Istanbul, 1999). 
5 V. E. Bagdasarian and S. G. Tolstoy, Russkaya voina: stolietnii istoriograficheskii opyt osmysleniya 
Krymskoi kampanii (Moscow, 2002). 
6 Brison D. Gooch, “A Century of Historiography on the Origins of the Crimean War”, The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 62, No. 1 (1956), pp. 33-58. 
7 James J. Reid, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878 (Stuttgart, 2000). 
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useful annotated bibliographies with their studies.
8
 Candan Badem’s recent study 
includes a critical analysis of the Turkish/Ottoman and Russian sources.
9
  
Numerous studies of the Crimean War have still been appearing in different 
languages. Several Crimean War novelties have transformed into separate historical 
subjects, such as the roles of Florence Nightingale and Nikolai Ivanovich Pirogov in 
medical care, Roger Fenton as a photographer, and William Howard Russell as a war 
correspondent. Because sources about the Crimean War are voluminous, researchers 
must be selective in reviewing the literature. Most secondary sources consulted for 
this study are written in English and Russian. Linguistic limitations prevent me from 
efficiently utilizing most sources in French, German, Spanish, Polish and Italian, but 
I have employed several of the most important sources in these languages. 
Turkish/Ottoman sources are rarely used in the narrative because so few of them 
exist. 
 
2.1.1. The First Modern War 
The Crimean War was unique in many respects. Telegraphy, photography and 
new military technology, including ironclad warships and minié rifles, changed the 
nature of warfare so dramatically that the Crimean War has frequently been called as 
the first “media war”, “trench war” and “modern war”. Steam-ships, railways, and 
electric telegraphs enabled activities that had been impossible in previous conflicts. 
Due to technological innovations, the periodical press disseminated information on 
                                               
8 Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War: A Cautionary Tale (1991); David Goldfrank, The Origins of 
the Crimean War (London, 1994); Winfried Baumgart, The Crimean War 1853-1856 (London,1999). 
9 Candan Badem, Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856) (Leiden, 2010), pp. 1-45. 
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an unprecedented scale, which allowed the emergence of a wartime literature. Thus, 
the Crimean War differed from preceding wars in its narration of hostilities.  
Correspondents based at the various seats of war colorfully and immediately 
described battles, and news about incidents on the fronts arrived home quickly. 
Detailed news regarding diplomatic activities in European capitals, comprehensive 
reports from battlefields, and official declarations and letters regularly appeared in 
contemporary periodicals. The Times, The Daily News, The Illustrated London News, 
Hermannstadt Zeitung, Sankt Peterburgskie vedomosti, Severnaya pchela, Russkii 
invalid, Journal de St. Petersbourg, Takvim-i Vekâyi, and Ceride-i Havâdis reserved 
a significant portion of their pages to the coverage of war incidents. Statesmen 
sometimes acquired information regarding opponents from the newspapers before 
official correspondence arrived, and opponents sometimes learned more about the 
enemy from newspaper articles than espionage activities.  
Joseph Archer Crowe and Constantine Guys arrived at the war theater as 
correspondents to The Illustrated London News. Edwin L. Godkin worked for The 
Daily News, N. A. Woods for The Morning Herald, and Charles Duncan and Captain 
Maxwell for The Morning Chronicle. The Times dispatched correspondents to every 
corner of the conflict and played a leading role in the British media, enjoying 
tremendous influence on public opinion. William Howard Russell, one of the Times’ 
correspondents in the field, became the most famous and influential journalist. 
Having arrived in theater in early 1854, Russell was critical of the preparations and 
conduct of the war.
10
 Karl Marx also regularly wrote articles for the New York Daily 
Tribune about the battles and rival armies as well as the Eastern Question in 
                                               
10 His correspondences would soon be published. W[illiam] H[oward] Russell, The War: From the 
Landing at Gallipoli to the Death of Lord Raglan (London, 1855); From the Death of Lord Raglan to 
the Evacuation of the Crimea (London, 1856); The British Expedition to the Crimea (London, 1858).  
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general.
11
 Nikolai V. Berg, who dispatched letters from the Crimean peninsula in 
1855, was the first Russian war correspondent.  
Military personnel were another source of authentic information from the war 
front. Postal service facilities enabled soldiers and sailors to send their simple 
narratives home, describing daily life and often complaining of conditions. 
Lieutenant Nasmyth, a British officer in Silistre, was one of the soldiers who 
dispatched letters to The Times. Many officers also sent drawings of the camps and 
battles, which were often frequently used by The Illustrated London News. Thus, 
people on the home had opportunities to acquire detailed and up-to-date information 
about ongoing fighting.  
 
2.1.2. Early Writings 
Many personal accounts written in English were published soon after the war 
began. Books and articles by British and French officers and others with experience 
relevant to the Eastern Question were popular. Artillery officer Edward Bruce 
Hamley regularly published letters in Blackwood’s Magazine under the title “The 
Story of the Campaign Written in a Tent in the Crimea”. Some of the author’s letters 
were printed in Boston without his permission when he was still in Sevastopol. His 
letters would later be published in London as well.
12
 Hamley was not the only officer 
who found time to write from the front. As participants and observers, Lieutenant 
Colonel John Adye, Major Whitworth Porter, George Cavendish Taylor, and several 
                                               
11 See, Karl Marx, The Eastern Question: A Reprint of Letters Written 1853-1856 Dealing with the 
Events of the Crimean War, edited by Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling (London, 1897).  
12 Maj. E. Bruce Hamley, The Story of the Campaign: A Complete Narrative of the War in Southern 
Russia. Written in a Tent in the Crimea (Boston, 1855); Lieut.-Col. E. Bruce Hamley, The Story of the 
Campaign of Sebastopol Written in the Camp (Edinburgh and London, 1855).  
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anonymous writers described many realities of the ongoing hostilities.
13
 Colonel 
Frederic Robinson published one of the first diaries of the Crimean War.
14
 The letters 
of Somerset John Gough Calthorpe, nephew and aide-de-camp to the British 
Commander-in-Chief, disclosed several details concerning the activities of the 
British Headquarters.
15
 Edward Money described Stratford Redcliffe’s plan to form 
an irregular cavalry force under British command from the başıbozuks under the 
British command.
16
 General György Klapka, the Hungarian national hero and a 
prominent anti-Russian military figure, also penned his observations about the war 
although he was not a participant.
17
 Some battlefield letters, diaries and notes were 
edited and published decades after the war after these young subordinate officers of 
the Crimean War were promoted to be generals, including Lieutenant-General 
Charles Ash Windham’s diary and the letters of Lieutenant (later General) Charles 
George Gordon and Captain (later General) Charles Byndar Beauchamp Walker.
18
  
European officers commissioned in the Ottoman army provided close 
observations of Ottoman warfare. Humphry Sandwith, a British doctor on the 
Caucasian Front, was one of the harshest critics of the Ottoman military 
                                               
13
 A Visit to Sebastopol: a Week after its Fall, by an officer of the Anglo-Turkish contingent (London, 
1856); The Powers of Europe and Fall of Sebastopol, by a British Officer (Boston, 1857);Whitworth 
Porter, Life in the Trenches before Sebastopol (London, 1856); George Cavendish Taylor, Journal of 
Adventures with the British Army, 2 vols. (London, 1856); Lieutenant Colonel John Adye, A Review of 
the Crimean War to the Winter of 1854-1855 (London, 1860); Captain Gleig, The Crimean 
Enterprise: Predictions and Plans (Edinburgh, 1857). 
14 Frederic Robinson, Diary of the Crimean War (London, 1856). 
15 [Colonel John Calthorpe], Letters from Head-Quarters or the Realities of the War in the Crimea, 2 
vols. (London, 1856).  
16 Unfortunately, these forces, which were popularly called as “Beatson’s Horse”, could not find time 
to be tested, and finally disbanded in 1856. Edward Money, Twelve Months with the Bashi-Bazouks 
(London, 1857). 
17 General George Klapka, The War in the East from the Year 1853 till July 1855 (London, 1855).  
18 Charles Ash Windham, The Crimean Diary and Letters of Lieut. General Charles Windham, K.C.B 
(London, 1897); General Gordon’s Letters from the Crimea, the Danube and Armenia, edited by 
Demetrius C. Boulger (London, 1884); Days of a Soldiers Life: Being Letters Written by the Late 
General Sir C. P. Beauchamp Walker, K.C.B during Active Service in the Crimean, Chinese, Austro-
Prussian (1866), and Franco-German Wars (1871) (London, 1894). 
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administration.
19
 Charles Duncan and Colonel Atwell Lake, who served in the 
Ottoman army, also offered stories of the Ottoman war effort in the Caucasus.
20
 
Laurence Oliphant, a British journalist and adventurer who accompanied Ömer Lütfi 
Pasha’s Caucasian campaign to save the Kars Fortress, disclosed a little known 
aspect of the Crimean War.
21
 Polish and Hungarian officers who served in the 
Ottoman army with Muslim names also recorded their experiences such as György 
Kmety’s (İsmail Pasha) work on the defense of Kars.22 The memoirs of one 
European officer in the service of the Ottoman navy, Adolphus Slade (Müşavir 
Pasha), had an insider’s approach to the Ottoman military and government. In his 
memoirs, which were published in 1867 after he was already retired from the 
Ottoman navy, Slade clearly took a pro-Ottoman stance, thereby parting from all 
other British officers in the Ottoman service.
23
  
Through the presence of the Allied military forces and their logistical 
enterprises, “The East” became more accessible to Europeans. Thus, in addition to 
military figures, several non-combatants,
24
 including women, happened to be in the 
Ottoman lands or the Crimea during the war. Lady Emilia Bithynia Hornby, 
Marianne Young, Frances Isabella Duberly, Alicia Blackwood, and Mary Seacole 
wrote about their observations.
25
 The wartime letters of Lady Hornby, wife of a 
                                               
19 Humphry Sandwith, A Narrative of the Siege of Kars (London, 1856). 
20 Colonel Henry Atwell Lake, Kars and Our Captivity in Russia (London, 1856). A Narrative of the 
Defence of Kars (London, 1857); Charles Duncan,  A Campaign with the Turks in Asia (London, 
1855). 
21 Laurence Oliphant, The Trans-Caucasian Campaign of the Turkish Army under Omer Pasha 
(Edinburg and London, 1856). 
22 George Kmety, A Narrative of the Defense of Kars on the 29th September, 1856, translated from 
German (London, 1856).  
23 Adolphus Slade, Turkey and the Crimean War (London, 1867). It was recently translated into 
Turkish. Sir Adolphus Slade, Müşavir Paşa’nın Kırım Harbi Anıları, translated and edited by Candan 
Badem (Istanbul, 2012). 
24 [Henry Jeffreys Bushby] A non-combatant, A Month in the Camp before Sebastopol (London, 
1855).  
25 Marianne Young, Our Camp in Turkey and the Way to it (London, 1854); Frances Isabella Duberly, 
A Journal Kept during the Russian War (London, 1855); Mary Seacole, Wonderful Adventures of Mrs. 
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British diplomat in Istanbul, were compiled into a book published in 1858 in London 
and Philadelphia. The revised version appeared in 1863. Mrs. Young observed the 
allied preparations for war in the Gelibolu (Gallipoli) and Varna camps. She 
described the French and English army camps and depicted the shortcomings of the 
preparatory activities at the beginning of the campaign in 1854. Another important 
female witness was Alicia Blackwood, who administered a hospital at Üsküdar 
(Scutari) upon the invitation of Miss Nightingale. Frances Isabella Duberly, wife of 
British officer Henry Duberly, resided with her husband in camps in Gelibolu and 
Varna and also attended the Crimean campaign.
26
 Her book, first published in 1855, 
sold so successfully that a second edition appeared the following year. 
George Dodd’s book, which contained many details of the hostilities, is an 
example of the accumulation of war information for 1856 alone.
27
 However, the first 
in-depth account of the war in English emerged in the 1860s in the hands of 
Alexander William Kinglake, who accompanied Lord Raglan to the Crimea. 
Kinglake, a well-known writer and orientalist wrote his account over ten years based 
on official documents, particularly the Raglan Papers. Although nine volumes were 
published, unfortunately, his account was incomplete because the narrative ends with 
the death of Lord Raglan.
28
 Whereas Dodd’s history includes every campaign of the 
war, Kinglake concentrated on the key operations in the Crimean peninsula. Crimean 
War historiography followed Kinglake’s example, which marginalized many fronts 
of the Crimean War, as the name of the war itself suggests.  
                                                                                                                                     
Seacole in Many Lands (London, 1857); Mrs. Edmund Hornby, In and around Stamboul, 2 vols. 
(London, 1858); Alicia Blackwood, Narrative of Personal Experiences and Impressions during a 
Residence on the Bosphorus throughout the Crimean War (London, 1881). 
26 Mrs Duberly’s Campaigns: an Englishwoman’s experiences in the Crimean War and Indian 
Mutiny, edited by Evelyn Ernest Percy Tisdall (London, 1963); Mrs. Duberly’s War: Journal and 
Letters from the Crimea, 1854-6, edited by Christine Kelly (Oxford, 2007).  
27 George Dodd, Pictorial History of the Russian War 1854-5-6 (Edinburgh and London, 1856). 
28 Alexander William Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea: its Origin, and an Account of its 
Progress (London, 1885). 
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A noteworthy literature in Russian also emerged, but it took a different shape 
and reflected different content, mainly due to strict censorship and state control over 
publications. With permission from and under the guidance of the Russian 
government, Nikolai Putilov compiled and published news stories, personal letters, 
commentaries, literary works and official documents in 33 volumes from 1855 to 
1859.
29
 Nikolai Dubrovin similarly compiled first hand materials in five colossal 
volumes in the 1870s.
30
 Diaries and notes appeared in the journals and collections, 
and many of them were published as books.
31
 Russkaya starina, Russkii arkhiv, 
Istoricheskii vestnik, Voennyi sbornik, Kavkazskii sbornik, Morskoi sbornik, 
Artilleriiskii zhurnal, Russkii vestnik, Otechestvennye zapiski, Biblioteka dlya chtenia 
published reminiscences of the Crimean War participants. Due to strict censorship, 
publishing unbiased impressions of the war was impossible in the Russian Empire. 
Nonetheless, every war incident was recorded by a Russian participant in the 19
th
 
century.
32
  
Because state sponsorship was a necessity for academic publication, Russian 
monographs about the Crimean War appeared later than Western ones. Modest I. 
Bogdanovich was the first Russian historian to study the Crimean War.
33
 Eduard I. 
Todleben, hero of Sevastopol, headed a committee to prepare the history of the 
Russian defense at Sivastopol. His book was published in Russian and French and 
                                               
29 Sbornik izvestii, otnosiashchikhsia do nastoiashchei voiny, edited by Nikolai Putilov, 33 vols. (St. 
Petersburg, 1855-1859). 
30 Materialy dlya istorii Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopoliya, edited by Nikolai F. Dubrovin, 5 
vols. (1871-1874)   
31 P. Simanskii, Boi pri Chetati 1853 – 25 Dekabria – 1903 (St. Petersburg, 1904); Vospominaniya 
Prokofiya Antonovicha Podpalova, uchastnika v Dunaiskom pokhode 1853 – 4 gg i v Sevastopolskoi 
oborone (Kiev, 1904); Vospominaniya ofitsera voennykh deistviyakh na dunae v 1853 i 1854 godah. 
Iz dnevnika P. B. (St. Petersburg, 1887); A[leksandr] A[leksandrovich] Genritsi, Vospominaniya o 
vostochnoi voine 1854-1856 (St. Petersburg, 1878).  
32 Only just after the battle at the village of Çatana in Little Wallachia a booklet was prepared 
according to the Russian official documents and testimonies of the participants. Opisaniie srazheniya 
pri d. chetati 25 dekabria 1853 g. (St. Petersburg, 1854).  
33 M. I. Bogdanovich, Opisanie ekspeditsii anglo-frantsuzov v Krym, 1854 – 1855 gg. (St. Petersburg, 
1856). 
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was soon translated into German. Todleben completed the study in four years. 
Publication in three languages most likely reflected the Russian desire to have its 
official view widely read and recognized.
34
 Todleben’s study was the first serious 
account of the Russian involvement in the war. In the 1870s, on the eve of a new war 
with the Ottoman Empire, there was a vigorous interest in the Crimean War. 
Bogdanovich’s Vostochnaya voina was the first complete treatment of the Crimean 
War, including all its battlefields and diplomatic activities.
35
 In addition to 
Bogdanovich, Nikolai F. Dubrovin, another officer historian, pioneered the historical 
study of the Crimean War. Dubrovin edited a five-volume anthology of materials and 
composed volumes of books on the war.
36
 The work of Nikolai N. Muravyov, the 
Russian commander who captured Kars Fortress, is still one of the best works about 
the Caucasian front.
37
  
A noteworthy body of literature about the Crimean War emerged in German 
during the war because the German-speaking part of Europe had a significant interest 
in the war, particularly as it affected the Balkans. Most contributors were 
anonymous. Some writers conveyed authentic information on the Ottoman army.
38
 
Andrei N. Petrov’s and Egor P. Kovalevskii’s accounts were translated to German in 
the same year they were published in Russian. 
                                               
34Eduard I. Totleben, Opisanie oborony goroda Sevastopolia, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1863); E. de 
Todleben, Défense de Sévastopol, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1863). Edouard von Todleben, Die 
Vertheidigung von Sebastopol, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1864). 
35 M.I. Bogdanovich, Vostochnaya voina 1853-1856 gg., 4 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1876). 
36 Nikolai Dubrovin, Materialy dlya istorii Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopolia, 5 vols. (St. 
Petersburg, 1871-1874); Trekhsot-soroka-deviati-dnevnaya zashchita Sevastopolia (St. Petersburg, 
1872); Vostochnaya voina 1853-1856 gg. Obzor sobytii po povodu sochinenia (St. Petersburg, 1878); 
Istoria Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopolia, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1900). 
37 N[ikolai] N[ikolaievich] Muravyov, Voina za Kavkazom v 1855 godu, 2 vols.  (St. Petersburg, 
1876-1877) 
38 Der russisch-türkische krieg in den Jahren 1853 und 1854 (Karlsruhe, 1854); Der russisch-
türkische krieg in Europa 1853, bis zum März 1854 (Kiel, 1854); August Prinz, Der russich-türkische 
krieg nach brieflichen Mittheilungen und Originalberichten (Hamburg, 1855); Der russisch-türkische 
krieg in Europa und Asien (Vienna, 1854); Der russisch-türkische kriegs-schauplatz (Vienna, 1854). 
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English and French literature contains few references to the Ottoman war 
effort. However, remarks by the above-mentioned observers about the Ottoman army 
and government offer some clues to understanding the successes and failures of the 
Ottoman war machine. The Russian accounts offer more details about the Ottoman 
participation in the war.  
In 1873, a play with a patriotic tone written by famous Ottoman author Namık 
Kemal about the Siege of Silistre attracted so much popular sympathy in Istanbul that 
the author was exiled to Cyprus. The reminiscences of Ahmed Nafiz Efendi on the 
Siege of Silistre were published in the same year.
39
 Hakkı Tarık Us, editor of the 
Latin alphabet version of these memoirs, convincingly argued that Namık Kemal 
wrote them based on memoirs of an existing officer.
40
 A condensed version of the 
memoirs was printed in a Russian journal in 1875.
41
 Namık Kemal was the first 
Ottoman author who had a real interest in the Crimean War. The first monograph in 
Turkish is Hüseyin Hüsnü’s Saika-i Zafer. This book is an unfinished account that 
only describes events until the Battle of Olteniçe on 4 November 1853.42 Ahmed 
Cevdet Pasha, famous Ottoman historian and statesman, provided some interesting 
details on the Crimean War in his works Tezâkir and Marûzât. Neither of these 
works were intended for publication. The former included the notes of Ahmed 
Cevdet Pasha to be given to the next Ottoman chronicler, Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, and 
the latter was prepared upon the order of Abdulhamid II.
43
 Although Ahmed Lütfi’s 
history includes the Crimean War period, he mentions the wartime events without 
                                               
39 Ahmed Nafiz, Silistre Muhasarası (Istanbul, 1290 [1873]). 
40 Namık Kemal, Silistre Muhasarası: Kalede Bulunan Gazilerden Yüzbaşı Ahmed Nafiz’in 
Hatıraları, prepared and transcribed by Hakkı Tarık Us (Istanbul, 1946). 
41 “Silistriya 1854 g. Zapiski Nafiz-effendi”, Voennyi sbornik, 1875, no. 12, pp. 488-502. 
42 Hüseyin Hüsnü, Saika-i Zafer (Istanbul, 1292 [1876]).  
43 Cevdet Paşa, Tezâkir, edited by Cavid Baysun, 4 vols. (Ankara, 1991);  Ma'rûzât, edited by Yusuf 
Halaçoğlu, (Istanbul, 1980). 
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any personal evaluations or analytic observations.
44
 The only Ottoman officer who 
recorded his memories during the Crimean War is Mustafa Zarif Pasha, who 
commanded the Anatolian army. Unfortunately, however, his recollections were 
mainly devoted to trivial personal experiences and explain little about the war.  
 
2.1.3. Crimean War Literature in the 20
th
 Century 
At the turn of the 20
th
 century, another Russian officer and historian attempted 
a fresh examination of the Crimean War using French and Russian official papers. 
The archival materials used for the narrative were also published in two separate 
volumes. Subsequent scholars have appreciated these published documents, 
particularly during the Cold War, when the Russian archives were practically 
inaccessible. However, Zayonchkovskii’s narrative was left unfinished due to the 
commencement of the First World War.
45
 The Crimean War was a popular Soviet 
historical topic in the 1940s and 1950s, evidently as a result of World War II, in 
which the Crimean peninsula again became a theater of war against a European 
power. Igor V. Beztuzhev, Boris I. Zverev, L. Gorev, and most importantly, Evgenii 
V. Tarle studied the Crimean War.
46
 Tarle’s book, which successfully covers all 
fronts in two volumes, is still one of the best on the subject. In the 1970s, Hadji 
Murat Ibragimbeyli wrote a book about the Caucasian front of the Crimean War 
                                               
44 Lütfi Efendi, Vak'a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, vol. IX, edited by Münir Aktepe (Istanbul, 
1984). 
45 A. M. Zayonchkovskii, Vostochnaya voina 1853-1856, 2 volumes text and 2 volumes enclosures 
(St. Petersburg, 1908-1913). In 2002, this book has been republished in 3 volumes, where text and 
enclosures are together, and documents in French are omitted. 
46 Evgenii Tarle, Krymskaya voina, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1950); Boris I. Zverev, Sinopskaya pobeda 
(Simferopol, 1954); L. Gorev, Voina 1853 - 1856 i oborona Sevastopolya (Moscow, 1955); Igor 
Beztuzhev, Krymskaya voina, 1853-1856 (Moscow, 1956). 
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arguing that the Caucasian people, including the Muslims, served in the Russian 
army against the Ottoman Empire.
47
  
In the West, scholarly interest in the Crimean War was refreshed in the 1930s 
with Harold Temperley’s influential but unfinished diplomatic investigation.48 
However, similar to the Soviet historiography, Western scholars turned to the subject 
only after the World War II. Gavin B. Henderson and Brison D. Gooch re-evaluated 
the origins of the war based on French and the British archival sources.
49
 In addition 
to diplomacy, war theatres in the Crimea also attracted considerable scholarship. 
Philip Warner and Christopher Hibbert described battles on the Crimean peninsula.
50
 
Ffrench Blake made a rare effort in the 1970s to cover all theaters of the war.
51
 In the 
1970s, Ann Pottinger Saab and Paul W. Schroeder explored the Ottoman and 
Habsburg archives, respectively in attempts to explain the origins of the Crimean 
War.
52
 Schroeder portrayed the changes in the opinions of the European decision-
makers during the political crisis, and demonstrated that foreign policy was not 
unanimous throughout the European governments. Although it is a well prepared 
monograph and the first study that combined Western, Russian and Ottoman sources, 
Saab’s study lacks many Ottoman and Russian documents which were not available 
to her at that time.  
                                               
47 Hadji Murat Ibragimbeyli, Kavkaz v Krymskoi voine 1853 – 1856 gg. i mezhdunarodnoe 
otnosheniya (Moscow, 1971).    
48 Harold Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (London, 1936). 
49 Gavin B. Henderson, Crimean War Diplomacy and Other Historical Essays (Glasgow, 1947); 
Brison D. Gooch, The New Bonapartist Generals in the Crimean War (The Hague, 1959).  
50 Philip Warner, The Crimean War. A Reappraisal (New York, 1972); Christopher Hibbert, The 
Destruction of Lord Raglan. A Tragedy of the Crimean War (Baltimore, 1963). 
51 R.L.V. Ffrench Blake, The Crimean War (London, 1971).  
52 Ann Pottinger Saab, The Origins of the Crimean Alliance (Charlottesville, 1977); Paul W. 
Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War. The Destruction of the European Concert 
(Ithaca, 1972). 
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Conversely, Albert Seaton and John Shelton Curtiss were first to introduce the 
heritage of the Russian historiography to the Western academy.
53
 In the Cold War 
environment, Curtiss had limited access to the Russian archives. Although works of 
Seaton and Curtiss were then significant accomplishments, they are now outdated. 
Norman Rich composed his succinct but valuable book on Crimean War diplomacy 
by employing the existing literature, and it is still the most vivid and readable 
summary of the issue.
54
 The first scholarly contribution in French was made in 1855 
by the official chronicler Baron Bazancourt, who lived in the Crimea for five 
months.
55
 This book is the first detailed work of the Allied campaign on the Crimean 
peninsula in any language. Camille Rousset’s three-volume book, which was 
published two decades after the war, is still a classic.
56
  
Hayreddin Bey, an Ottoman bureaucrat, wrote a diplomatic history of the war 
in 1910.
57
 It was not a complete treatment of the subject, covering only the question 
of Holy Places. The author took a pro-Russian tone in his arguments, although he 
mainly used French sources. In the first half of the 20
th
 century, Fevzi [Kurtoğlu] and 
Tevfik Gürel penned their concise military histories of the war.58 The second volume 
of Mesail-i Mühimme-i Siyasiyye is the most serious diplomatic study from the 
Turkish side. Ali Fuad Türkgeldi added a valuable appendix, including many 
relevant documents.
59
 In later years, the most important contributions came from 
                                               
53 Albert Seaton, The Crimean War: A Russian Chronicle (New York, 1977); John Shelton Curtiss, 
Russia’s Crimean War (Durham, 1979). 
54 Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale (1985). 
55 Cesar Lecat Baron de Bazancourt, The Crimean Expedition to the Capture of Sebastopol, 2 vols. 
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materials in order to write a history which would explore the French glory in the War. 
56 Camille F. M. Rousset, Histoire de la Guerre de Crimée (Paris, 1878). 
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59 Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Mesail-i Mühimme-i Siyasiyye, ed. Bekir Sıtkı Baykal (Ankara, 1957). This 
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Turkish General Staff officers. Saim Besbelli narrated the naval aspects of the 
Crimean War, whereas Hikmet Süer discussed the Caucasian front. These works are 
significant due to their use of original archival materials, although they do not meet 
most academic standards of scholarship and analysis.
60
   
 
2.1.4. Recent Studies 
Historians only obtained access to the Russian archives after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. David Goldfrank was the first to write an updated history of the 
origins of the Crimean War in 1994 with new documentary evidence from the 
Russian archives.
61
 It is still the best book on the Crimean War diplomacy in the 
West in terms of its coverage of the Russian archival material by a Western scholar. 
Andrew Lambert discusses the British war strategy by locating the naval operations 
in the Baltic in the broader war planning.
62
 British military historian Trevor Royle’s 
account of the battles on the Crimean peninsula provides a fresh view on the subject 
with proper attention to the Russian sources.
63
 After decades of study in the 
European archives, Winfried Baumgart successfully covers all aspects of the war in a 
succinct way.
64
 The American historian James Reid wrote a critique of the Ottoman 
Tanzimat, where he also addresses the Ottoman Empire’s Crimean War experience, 
emphasizing on the failures of the Ottoman government and army. His account is 
mainly based on memories of Europeans who happened to be in the Ottoman 
                                               
60 Saim Besbelli, 1853-1856 Osmanlı-Rus ve Kırım Savaşı Deniz Harekâtı (Ankara, 1977); [Hikmet 
Süer], Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi. Osmanlı Devri. Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi Kafkas Cephesi 
Harekâtı (1853-1856) (Ankara, 1986).  
61 David Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (London, 1994).  
62 Andrew Lambert, The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy against Russia 1853-56, 2nd edition 
(Farnham, Surrey, 2011). 
63 Trevor Royle, Crimea: The Great Crimean War 1854-1856 (New York, 2000). 
64 Winfried Baumgart, The Crimean War 1853-1856 (London, 1999). 
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Empire, and he claims that the military reformation failed similar to the Porte’s other 
modernizing efforts. This study is important for its concentration on the largely 
overlooked Ottoman irregular forces – the başıbozuks.65 The most recent study of the 
war is by Orlando Figes, a famous British historian of Russia and the Soviet Union.
66
 
It is a well written and readable account but contributes almost nothing new to 
diplomatic or military history.  
Russian academic circles have lacked interest in the Crimean War since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. One rare contribution came from V. N. Ponamarev who 
analyzed Russo-American relations during the Crimean War.
67
 Alan Goutmann, a 
contemporary student of the Crimean War in France, made the most significant 
recent contribution on the French side.
68
 Candan Badem is the first Turkish scholar 
to use the Western and Russian historiography along with Ottoman archival materials 
to evaluate the Ottoman role in the war.
69
  
No recent dissertations have successfully evaluated the modern Ottoman 
army.
70
 Figen Taşkın’s doctoral dissertation and Fatih Akyüz’s Masters thesis 
discuss Ottoman logistics, but the subject matter still needs further elaboration.
71
 
Erdoğan Keleş’s dissertation offers little insight about Ottoman diplomacy and 
                                               
65 James J. Reid, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878 (Stuttgart, 2000). 
66 Orlando Figes, Crimea: The Last Crusade (London and New York, 2010). This work has been 
translated into Turkish as Kırım. Son Haçlı Seferi (Istanbul, 2012). In latest publication the book 
appeared with a different name, The Crimean War: A History (New York, 2011).  
67 V. N. Ponamarev, Krymskaya voina i Russko-Amerikanskoe otnoshenia (Moscow, 1993). 
68 Alain Gouttman, La guerre de Crimée (Paris, 1995). 
69 Candan Badem, The Ottoman Crimean War (1853-1856) (Leiden, 2010). His book is based on his 
PhD dissertation defended in 2007 at Sabancı University (Istanbul).  
70 Ayten Can Tunalı, Tanzimat Döneminden Kara Ordusunda Yapılanma (1839-1876), Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, Ankara University, 2003. 
71 Figen Taşkın, “Kırım Harbi'nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na Etkileri ve İase Sorunu”, Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, İstanbul University, 2007; Fatih Akyüz, “Kırım Savaşı’nın Lojistiği’nde İstanbul’un 
Yeri”, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Marmara University, 2006.  
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warfare.
72
 Andrew C. Rath’s dissertation discusses the naval campaigns.73 
Dissertations prepared recently demonstrate that unstudied aspects of Crimean War 
historiography still exist. Republications of many memoirs, letters, and monographs 
prove that the Crimean War is still a fascinating topic for many people.  
 
2.2. Blind Spots in the Literature 
2.2.1. The Danube Front 
Great academic effort has been employed to determine the origins of the war 
and the campaign in the Crimean peninsula, whereas military engagements in the 
Baltic, the White Sea, the Pacific and the Caucasus have been overlooked. The 
Danubian front is another aspect on which the Western sources provide, at most, 
some concise and superficial information. One exception is Archibald Paton’s 
personal accounts.
74
 An expert on the Balkans and Central Europe, Paton traveled 
along the Danube River during late 1853 when the war was about to start and 
conveyed his experiences concerning the Ottoman army and fortresses. Another 
important observer was Joseph Crowe, correspondent of The Illustrated London 
News.
75
 Having settled in the towns along the Danube during the campaign, he 
dispatched letters and illustrations to London. These records of British officers also 
include interesting details regarding their camp life in Turkey and the performance of 
the Ottoman army.   
                                               
72 Erdoğan Keleş, “Osmanlı, İngiltere ve Fransa İlişkileri Bağlamında Kırım Savaşı”, Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation, Ankara University, 2009. Incomprehensibly, throughout the dissertation he speaks 
of Island of Crimea (Kırım Adası).  
73 Andrew C. Rath, “The Global Dimensions of Britain and France’s Crimean War Naval Campaigns 
against Russia, 1854-1856”, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, McGill University, 2011.  
74 Archibald A. Paton, The Bulgarian, the Turk and the German (London, 1855). 
75 Sir Joseph Crowe, Reminiscences of Thirty-Five Years of My Life (London, 1895), pp. 111-150.  
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Spanish and Sardinian governments understandably assigned missions to the 
East to observe the changes in war technology and tactics and to improve relations 
with the sea powers and the Ottoman Empire. Spanish Queen Isabella II sent General 
Don Juan Prim with a large entourage to the seat of war in autumn 1853. His 
observations were presented to the Spanish government and published in 1855.
76
 
Godfrey Rhodes, a British officer who attended the Spanish mission as an honorary 
member, also penned his memories about traveling from Istanbul to the Danube 
River in a short description of the Ottoman military road to the Danube along with 
towns and fortifications in the Balkans.
77
 The Sardinian government sent Captain 
Giuseppe Govone to the headquarters of Ömer Lütfi Pasha. His letters to General La 
Marmora also include important details about the Russo-Ottoman confrontation in 
the Balkans. Some of his papers later appeared in French in a biographical book 
edited by his son.
78
 
Using Ottoman and Russian materials is a necessity for researchers, who can 
learn little about the Danube Front from the Western sources. Egor Petrovich 
Kovalevskii, a famous Russian traveler, author, orientalist and diplomat, wrote the 
first monograph about military activities in the Balkans in 1853 and 1854.
79
 The 
most important contribution to the subject matter thus far came from another 
General, Andrei Nikolaievich Petrov, who was one of the most productive officer-
historians of Tsarist Russia.
80
 The main deficiency of Petrov’s study is its almost 
                                               
76 General Don Juan Prim, Comte de Reus, Memoria sobre el viaje militar a oriente presentada al 
Gobierno de S.M (Madrid, 1855) 
77 Captain G[odfrey] Rhodes, A Personal Narrative of a Tour of Military Inspection in Various Parts 
of European Turkey (London, 1854). 
78 General Govone, Memoires (1848-1870) (Paris, 1905). 
79 Sobranie sochinenii Egora Petrovicha Kovalevskogo. Voina s Turtsiei i razryv c zapadnymi 
derzhavami v 1853 i 1854 godakh,vol. II (St. Petersburg, 1871). In the same year before the death of 
the author this book was published anonymously.  
80 A. N. Petrov, Voina Rossii s Turtsiei. Dunaiskaya kampania 1853 i 1854 gg., 2 vols. (St. 
Petersburg, 1890). 
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complete reliance on Russian sources. Histories of the Crimean War written by 
Bogdanovich, Zayonchkovskii, and Tarle also include detailed chapters on the 
Danubian theater. The Russian journal for the siege of the Silistre Fortress, which 
included all details of the Russian operations against Silistre, was appended to the 
work of Bogdanovich.
81
 It and Captain Butler’s personal diary are useful documents 
for understanding the siege. 
Captain James A. Butler and Lieutenant Charles Nasmyth, two British officers, 
played significant roles during the siege of Silistre. Both officers had previously 
served in the East India Company army. Butler left a journal that contains a daily 
account of the defense of Silistre from 11 May 1854 until 15 June 1854. He was 
incapable of writing after 15 June because he was wounded on 12 June and died ten 
days later. The journal is available in the National Army Museum in London.
82
 
Fortunately, N. A. Woods, a war correspondent, included this valuable source in his 
book.
83
 Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, a Turkish military historian, used Woods’ book and 
translated the journal into Turkish.
84
 Ahmed Muhtar Pasha’s work will be described 
in greater detail below.  
Memoirs of the Russian officers who served on the Danube provide valuable 
information about the Russian plans, strategies, and conduct of war.  In this respect, 
memoirs of two Russian officers—Pyotr Kanonovich Menkov (1814-1875) and 
                                               
81 “Zhurnal osadnykh deistvii protiv kreposti Silistrii v 1854-m gody”, Bogdanovich, vol. II, 
Prilozheniya, pp. 10-62.  
82 “Journal of Captain J. A. Butler at the Siege of Silistria, 1854”, National Army Museum, London, 
7402/129.  
83 N. A. Woods, The Past Campaign. A Sketch of the War in the East (London, 1855), vol. I, pp. 90-
135. 
84 Ferik Ahmed Muhtar, Kırım Sefer-i Meşhuru Evailindeki 1270 Osmanlı – Rus Tuna Seferi ve Bunun 
Nihayetindeki Silistre Müdafaa-i Kahramannamesi (Istanbul, 1922), pp. 112-185.  
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Pyotr Vladimirovich Alabin (1824-1896)—are of particular importance.85 Menkov is 
famous as the first editor of military journal Voennyi sbornik and military newspaper 
Russkii invalid. Six years prior to this scholarly duty, as a lieutenant colonel in 1853, 
Menkov was assigned to the headquarters of General Gorchakov in Bucharest and 
worked for him in the Principalities and the Crimea. Most importantly, Menkov 
prepared the “journal of hostilities,” observing the military activities more carefully 
than many other staff officers. His memories were a harsh critique of the Russian 
army. These pages were published long after their author passed away. Alabin was a 
captain during the Crimean War and a participant in the battle at Olteniçe. He was 
also critical of the Russian army. The famous Russian novelist Lev Tolstoy, who was 
then a young Russian aristocrat, also served in the Russian army in front of Silistre. 
His letters to relatives are important for revealing aspects of military life and battles 
in the eyes of a young Russian nobleman.
86
 Colonel Baumgarten, the Russian 
commander in the battle at Çatana, recorded in a daybook the movements of the 
Russian troops in the Little Wallachia.
87
 General Nikolai Ushakov also recorded 
memories, including valuable observations about the Russian conduct of war on the 
Danube, particularly the passage of the Russian troops over the Danube River.
88
   
The Ottoman literature, not surprisingly, contains few personal accounts. 
Nonetheless, the memoirs of Michał Czajkowski (1804-1886), famous Polish 
romantic officer and man of letters, highlight the front from the perspective of an 
Ottoman commander. Czajkowski was a member of the Hotel Lambert, the Polish 
                                               
85 Zapiski Petra Kanonavicha Menkova, Vol. I: Dunai i Nemtsy (St. Petersburg, 1898); P. Alabin, 
Chetyre voiny. Pohodnye zapiski v 1849, 1853, 1854-56 i 1877-78 godah, Part II. Vostochnaya voina 
1853-1854 gg. (Moscow, 1892).  
86 Leo Tolstoy. His Life and Work, vol. I (London, 1906)  
87 A[leksandr] K[arlovich] Baumgarten, “Dnevniki 1849, 1853, 1854 I 1855 gg.”, Zhurnal 
Imperatorskogo Russkogo Voenno-Istoricheskogo Obshchestva, no. 4-5 (1910), 1-2 (1911), St. 
Petersburg.    
88 N. I. Ushakov, “Zapiski ochevidtsa o voine Rossii protivu Turtsii i zapadnykh derzhav (1853-55)” 
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liberation organization. He accepted Islam and took the Muslim name Mehmed 
Sadık. He was assigned commander of the Cossack regiment of the Ottoman army. 
He had relationships with several Ottoman bureaucrats and non-Muslim figures. 
Czajkowski’s memoirs were translated into Russian and printed in the famous 
Russian history journal Russkaya starina.
89
 However, his detailed explanations of his 
activities in the Balkans during the Crimean War were only published in Polish.
90
 He 
also collected interesting stories and his anecdotal recollections of his life in the 
Ottoman Empire in a small book, Turetskie anekdoty or Turkish anecdotes.
91
 His 
books include important details about Ottoman society in general and the Ottoman 
army and government in particular. Thus, their translations into Turkish would be a 
welcome contribution. 
In the 1920s, General Ahmed Muhtar Pasha wrote the only Ottoman 
monograph on the Danubian theatre. Interestingly, this book is almost unknown to 
Turkish historians.
92
 The author was a general of artillery and wrote several books on 
military technology, art and history. In addition to Butler’s journal, he used some 
French sources, Kovalevskii’s book, the semi-official newspaper Ceride-i Havadis 
and some archival documents. Ahmed Muhtar Pasha’s narrative ends abruptly after 
                                               
89 Memoirs could only be published in about ten years. Russkaya starina, “Zapiski Mikhaila 
Chaikovskogo”, Vol. 84 (1895), pp. 161-184; Vol. 85 (1896), pp. 163-176, 381-394; Vol. 86 (1896), 
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286, 628-642; Vol. 120 (1904), pp. 222-243, 558-594. 
90 Michal Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadyk Pasza), Moje Wspomnienia o Wojnie 1854 Roku, prepared by 
Josef Fijalek (Warsaw, 1962). 
91 Turetskie anekdoty. Iz tritsatiletnikh vospominanii Mikhaila Chaikovskogo (Sadyk-pashi) (Moscow, 
1883). 
92 Ferik Ahmed Muhtar, Kırım Sefer-i Meşhuru Evailindeki 1270 Osmanlı – Rus Tuna Seferi ve Bunun 
Nihayetindeki Silistre Müdafaa-i Kahramannamesi (Istanbul, 1922). He should not be confused with 
more famous Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha of the 1877-78 War who also wrote on military history. 
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he explains the Siege of Silistre in detail. Works by Kurtoğlu and Gürel also address 
the Danubian front, albeit briefly. 
 
2.2.2. The Rival Armies   
The documentation of the Russian military establishment paved way for a rich 
discourse of monographs Russian and Soviet military historians to develop. In this 
respect, Soviet historian Liubomir Beskrovnyi’s studies are classic for understanding 
the reforms and general performance of the Russian army of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 
centuries.
93
 Recently, a group of American scholars, Bruce Menning, David 
Schimmelpennick van der Oye, and Frederick Kagan, have introduced details of the 
Russian military to Western scholarship.
94
  
The Turkish General Staff has always written most military history in 
Turkey.
95
 American scholars Avigdor Levy and Stanford Shaw opened a path for 
researchers of the Ottoman military reformation.
96
 Virginia Aksan, Rhoads Murphey, 
and Gábor Ágoston have already penned well-written analytical accounts of the 
Ottoman army from the 16
th
 to 18
th
 century. Despite numerous defects in the 
narrative, Virginia Aksan’s latest book on the Ottoman warfare against two major 
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95 Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, vol. III, part 5 (1793-1908) (Ankara, 1978); [Hikmet Süer], Türk 
Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi: Osmanlı Devri Osmanlı-Rus Kırım Harbi Kafkas Cephesi Harekâtı (1853-
1856) (Ankara, 1986) 
96 Avigdor Levy, “The Military Policy of Sultan Mahmud II, 1808-1839”, Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1968; Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New, The Ottoman Empire 
under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807 (Cambridge, 1971).  
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rivals of the empire, the Habsburgs and the Russians, in the 18th and 19th centuries 
is the only compact monograph on the subject.
97
 A new generation of Ottoman 
scholars has emerged whose works describe various aspects of the Ottoman army 
and wars. For example, Tobias Heinzelmann and Gültekin Yıldız have published 
their doctoral researches discussing the process of founding the Ottoman standing 
army based on the Western model.
98
 Mesud Uyar and Edward J. Erickson’s book is a 
good introduction to the Ottoman army and wars throughout six centuries.
99
 Sources 
provide only fragmentary information on the Tanzimat army, which needs further 
research and elaboration.
100
  
Although studies on the Ottoman military have improved, the deficiency of the 
Russian materials is a significant handicap. The comparative studies and cross-
checking by working in different archives are still lacking in the Ottoman and 
Russian military history. Because the Ottoman army appeared weak compared to the 
Russian army, few comparative studies were conducted, and historians must now 
verify facts by working in different archives, particularly in Russian and Turkish 
collections. 
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2.2.3. The Individual in the War: Peasant, Prisoner, Spy, and Emigrant 
The Crimean War has generally been explained as an issue of high politics, 
concentrating only the actions of the decision makers and the high commanders in 
the field. In fact, the individual personalities of the Ottoman military and civil high 
officials who participated in the Crimean War have only been discussed recently.
101
 
Peasants and privates have consciously or unconsciously been ignored or neglected 
in narratives of the war. One of the reasons of the neglect is the lack of sources. 
Because almost no written accounts by the common people, Muslim or non-Muslim, 
have appeared, it is difficult to discuss their attitudes about the warfare. Diseases in 
the British and French armies in the Ottoman Empire and the Crimea were discussed 
in the literature but only as a failure of army logistics rather than as a challenging 
human experience that affected the physical and psychological state of individuals. 
Neither relations between the common people and the ordinary soldiers, nor the 
effects of warfare on individuals have ever been adequately discussed. The 
historiography has either overlooked the motives and activities of Balkan people 
during the Crimean War or discussed Balkan people only in the context of relations 
between the military and local poplulation with a bias toward covering the atrocities, 
lootings, killings and other violent deeds perpetrated by the military. Thus, the 
relations between the army and peasants should be discussed in greater depth to 
understand the national movements in the Balkans and population movements, 
whether forced or voluntary. Another important social aspect of warfare is its 
                                               
101 Badem discusses the corruption in the Ottoman bureaucracy and army, and the fractions in the 
Ottoman governing circles between those people who wanted to secure their own positions and 
incomes in expense of others. See, Ottoman Crimean War.  
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economic repercussions. Although some people became richer in wartime, others 
became poorer.  
These effects of the Russo-Ottoman wars on the Ottoman and Russian 
populations all deserve the attention of historians. The few studies that focus on the 
Balkan population during the Crimean War have been produced by scholars in the 
region. Kofas evaluates Greek foreign policy during the Crimean War.
102
 Florescu 
highlights the role of the Principalities in Russo-Ottoman relations and in European 
diplomacy.
103
 Barbara Jelavich, author of many books and articles on 19
th
 century 
Balkan politics, has written chapters on Bulgaria and the Principalities during the 
Crimean War.
104
 Maria Todorova, another important scholar of the Balkans, 
illuminates the role of the Balkan volunteers in the Russian army.
105
 There is still a 
need for a monograph that comprehensively discusses the people in the Balkan 
region during the Russo-Ottoman confrontations.  
The prisoners of the Russo-Ottoman wars have consistently been overlooked 
by military and social histories. A literature in Russian has recently emerged, 
although no studies have been published in any other language.
106
 Only one 
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monograph addresses espionage activities.
107
 Therefore, chapters in this study about 
the prisoners of war and espionage would fill some important gaps in the 
historiography.
108
 The recollections of the British prisoners held by Russia convey 
significant information that compensates for the lack of Ottoman accounts. The 
intelligence activities of both armies on the Danube are discussed based on materials 
from the Russian and Turkish military archives. Military intelligence of both armies 
still needs further elaboration; changes that occurred throughout the nineteenth 
century and intelligence successes and failures in various Russo-Ottoman encounters 
should be discussed.   
Population movements were one social outcome of the Russo-Ottoman wars. 
The changing boundaries of the two empires led the Christian population of the 
Ottoman Empire to immigrate to Russia, whereas the Muslims of the lost territories 
left their homeland to live in Ottoman Empire. Such population movements from the 
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Elektronnyi nauchnyi zhurnal Kurskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, no. 19 (2011), 
http://scientific-notes.ru/pdf/021-015.pdf.  
107 Stephen M. Harris, British Intelligence in the Crimean War 1854-1856 (London, 1999). There is 
not yet much academic effort employed to understand the Russian military intelligence in the 19th 
century. M[ikhail] Alekseev, Voennaya razvedka Rossii ot Riurika do Nikolaya II, vol. I (Moscow, 
1998); E[vgenii] M. Primakov (ed.), Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki, vol. I (Moscow, 
1996); P. P. Cherkasov, Russkii agent vo Frantsii. Yakov Nikolayevich Tolstoi (Moscow, 2008); A. 
Kolpakidi, A. Sever, Spetssluzhby Rossiiskoi Imperii (Moscow, 2010); E. A. Laptev, Rossiiskii 
diplomat Naiden Gerov i rossiisko-bulgarskoe sviazi (1853-1870 gody) (Ufa, 2011); O[leg] 
A[leksandrovich] Gokov, “Rossiyskaya voennaya razvedka v Bolgarii v 1856-1878 gg.”, Drinovski 
sbornik, vol. II (2008), pp. 152-160; David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, “Military Intelligence” in 
Encyclopaedia of Russian History (New York, 2003), pp. 933-934; idem, “Reforming Russian 
Military Intelligence” in Reforming the Tsar’s Army, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and 
Bruce Menning (eds.) (New York, 2003), pp. 133-151. For domestic intelligence in the Ottoman 
Empire in Tanzimat period, see, Cengiz Kırlı, Sultan ve Kamuoyu: Osmanlı Modernleşme Sürecinde 
“Havadis Jurnalleri” (1840-1844) (Istanbul, 2009); idem, “Coffeehouses: Public Opinion in the 
Nineteenth Century Ottoman Empire”, in Public Islam and the Common Good, Armando Salvatore 
and Dale F. Eickelman (eds.) (Brill, 2004).  
108 A slightly different version of the chapter on the military intelligence will soon be published in 
Middle Eastern Studies with a title “Shpion vs. Casus: Ottoman and Russian Intelligence in the 
Balkans during the Crimean War (1853-56)”. An in depth analysis of the Ottoman prisoners of war in 
Russia, which has been discussed in this dissertation will be published in Turkish in the journal 
Belleten.  
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Crimean peninsula and the Caucasus peaked after the Crimean War in the 1860s and 
continued until the demise of both empires. The literature on wartime emigration has 
recently flourished.
109
 However, issues such as the causes and effects of migrations 
from/to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Crimea throughout the 19th century still 
require further research.  
 
2.3. The Archival Sources 
Britain was the first state to publish official documents about the Crimean War 
on a large scale. Parliamentary Debates
110
, the Annual Register
111
 and Sessional 
Papers (or Accounts and Papers)
112
 are useful for explaining diplomacy and military 
affairs. Significant Crimean War documents also appeared in German as early as 
1855.
113
 However, the best collection of documents has only recently been published. 
Winfried Baumgart has published archival materials on the Crimean War for several 
                                               
109
 For a discussion of the attitude of the Crimean Tatars towards the Allied powers and the Russian 
oppressive measures against the Crimean Tatars, see Mara Kozelsky, “Casualties of Conflict: Crimean 
Tatars during the Crimean War”, Slavic Review, Vol. 67, No. 4 (2008), pp. 866-891; Hakan Kırımlı, 
“Emigrations from the Crimea to the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War”, Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (2008), pp. 751-773. 
110 Great Britain. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vols. 127-132 (London, 1853-54). 
111 The Annual Register (1853 and 1854), vols. 95 and  96 (London, 1854-1855). 
112 Great Britain, House of Commons. “Communications Respecting Turkey Made to Her Majesty’s 
Government by the Emperor of Russia” (Eastern Papers, Part V), Sessional Papers, 1854, vol. 71 
(London, 1854; “Correspondence Respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek 
Churches in Turkey” (Eastern Papers, Parts I-III, VII), Sessional Papers, 1854, vol. 71 (London, 
1854); “Instructions of the British and French Governments for the Joint Protection of British and 
French Subjects and Commerce” (Eastern Papers, Part IV), Sessional Papers, vol. 71 (London, 
1854); “Memorandum by Count Nesselrode, June 1844” (Eastern Papers, Part VI); Correspondence 
Respecting the Relations between Greece and Turkey [March 1853- May 1854], Sessional Papers, 
vol. 72 (London 1854); Accounts and Papers, “Army and Navy”, vol. IX [3 February – 21 March 
1857].    
113 J[ulius] von Jasmund, Aktenstücke zur orientalischen frage, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1855-1859). 
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decades, a long-term project that yielded 12 colossal volumes, containing Austrian, 
Prussian, British, and French documents.
114
  
The papers of John Fox Burgoyne, Frederick Sayer and William Fenwick 
Williams, the defender of the Kars fortress, were published soon after the Crimean 
War.
115
 During World War II, the British navy compiled three volumes of 
correspondence from its naval campaigns.
116
 The first Russian publication of official 
materials on the Crimean War was a collection of diplomatic and military 
correspondence of the Russian Empire during the war.
117
 Zayonchkovskii made the 
major contribution from the Russian archives at the turn of the 20th century. Ali Fuat 
Türkgeldi prepared a three-volume book of materials from the Ottoman Archives, 
which was later edited and published.
118
 The Ottoman Archives of the Prime 
Ministry recently published an archival edition about the Crimean War.
119
 
This dissertation is primarily based on Ottoman, Russian and British archival 
sources. The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry (BOA) in Istanbul and the 
Military Archives (ATASE) in Ankara, which have been used extensively in 
researching this dissertation, preserve documents that are valuable for evaluating the 
modernizing Ottoman army and the Crimean War. Relevant Russian archival 
                                               
114 Winfried Baumgart, Österreichische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs, 3 vols. (München,1979-
1980);  Preussische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs, 2 vols. (München, 1990-1991); Englische 
Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs, 4 vols. (München, 1988-2006); Französische Akten zur 
Geschichte des Krimkriegs, 3 vols. (München, 1999-2003). 
115 [Frederick] Sayer, Despatches and Papers Relative to the Campaign in Turkey, Asia Minor, and 
the Crimea (London, 1857); The Military Opinions of General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, ed. G. 
Wrottesley (London, 1859); The Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, ed. F. 
A. Wellesley, 2 vols. (London, 1873). 
116 Russian War, 1854: Baltic and Black Sea Official Correspondence, edited by D. Bonner-Smith and 
A. C. Dewar (London, 1943); Russian War, 1855: Black Sea Official Correspondence, edited by A. C. 
Dewar (London, 1945).  
117 Sobraniie donesenii o voennykh deistviyakh i diplomaticheskikh bumag i aktov, otnosiashchikhsia 
do voiny 1853, 1854, 1855 i 1856 godov (St. Petersburg, 1858).  
118 Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Mesail-i Mühimme-i Siyasiyye, ed. Bekir Sıtkı Baykal (Ankara, 1957). This 
book was republished in 1987.  
119 Osmanlı Belgelerinde Kırım Savaşı 1853-1856 (Ankara, 2006). 
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materials are scattered throughout several archives. The Russian State History 
Archive (RGIA) and the Russian State Archive on the Military Naval-Fleet 
(RGAVMF) in St. Petersburg and the Russian State Military History Archive 
(RGVIA) and the Archive of Foreign Affairs of Russian Empire (AVPRI) in 
Moscow possess numerous materials relevant to my subject. Unfortunately, I was 
unable to access the AVPRI and RGAVMF.
120
 I also conducted some research in the 
State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) and the Russian State Archive of 
Ancient Acts (RGADA), which also preserve some files concerning the Crimean 
War.  
A register of military orders is useful for understanding army life in the 
Ottoman headquarters in Şumnu.121 A journal of Ottoman military affairs is helpful 
for following the activities of the Ottoman army throughout the war.
122
 Checklists of 
the Ottoman battalions in the ATASE archives are also crucial for explaining the 
Ottoman force numbers, casualties, and recruits. However, restricted access to the 
materials prevents utilizing them sufficiently. Although the modernization of the 
Ottoman army and bureaucracy can be traced in documentary production because 
modernization was an ongoing process, and Ottoman army lists or registers appear 
superficial compared to European army records.  
                                               
120 For the Ottoman related funds in the Russian archives, see, Özhan Kapıcı and İbrahim Köremezli 
“Osmanlı Askerî Tarihçiliğinin Eksik Aynası: Rusya Federasyonu Arşivleri”, Osmanlı Askerî Tarihini 
Araştırmak: Yeni Yaklaşımlar Yeni Kaynaklar, ed. Cevat Şayin and Gültekin Yıldız (Istanbul, 2012), 
pp. 130-155.  
121 Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi [Archive of the Directorate of 
Military History and Strategic Studies of the Turkish General Staff], Ankara, Crimean War Collection 
(hereafter ATASE), “Şumnu. Günlük emir rapor kayıt defteri”, k. 9, d. 5.  
122 Kırım Harbi Hakkında Bir Ruznâme, Library of Turkish Historical Association (Ankara). It is not 
actually a ruznâme (a daily record) of the Ottoman army, but a register of the major military 
encounters. Keleş claims that he could not locate the author of the work. Actually, it is not a book to 
be penned by an author, but only a register written by clerks.  
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The Russian army prepared more specific and detailed records about army 
personnel, which it printed. The orders (prikazy) issued in the armies included 
information about all major developments, i.e., accounts of battles and other military 
activities, personnel assignments and promotions, health conditions, casualties and 
deserters.
123
 The lists in the Russian archives, about the army units, prisoners, and 
supply activities were more detailed than similar Ottoman documents, but not 
necessarily more accurate. One important file from the Russian archives I used is the 
unfinished recollections of Mikhail D. Gorchakov, the commander in chief of the 
Russian army in the Balkans and later, the Crimea.
124
 
In Great Britain, the National Archives (TNA, formerly the Public Record 
Office) possesses rich sources about the Crimean War, in particular under the 
Foreign Office and War Office. This dissertation used some Foreign Office 
documents to explain Allied army movements in Ottoman territory, the diplomatic 
proceedings and the war itself.  
 
2.4. Access to Materials: Personal Experiences and Recent Developments 
Numerous books that were previously difficult to access were recently 
digitized. Several Internet sites and libraries now offer valuable Crimean War 
resources in their online databases. Websites such as Google Books, Archive.org, 
Runivers.ru, and Rsl.ru offer researchers rich collections of digitized books. 
                                               
123 See, for instance, “Prikaz voiskom po 3-go, 4-go i 5-go pekhotnykh korpusov” in 1854, and 
“Prikazy po iuzhnoi armii” in 1855 and 1856.  
124 “Zapiski Gorchakova M. D. o Krymskoi voine, 1857 g.”, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii [Russian Federation State Archive], Moscow (hereafter GARF), f. 728, op. 1 part 2, d. 2518 
(hereafter “Zapiski Gorchakova”). To the best of my knowledge it has never been used before. There 
are one French and two Russian versions of the memoirs in one file, and the second Russian version 
was dated as 1860. Gorchakov died in 1861, and he apparently could not have time to complete his 
“Notes”. 
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Newspapers from the 19
th
 century can be read and downloaded online via various 
providers. For instance, the Library of Hakkı Tarık Us provides free digital copies of 
most Ottoman Turkish newspaper material. Thus, fortunately for students of 
Ottoman and Russian history, many books that I previously copied or photographed 
in difficult conditions are now available online. New digital libraries appear every 
day in the Information Age, so researchers must be careful to locate virtual sources 
before visiting a library or an archive.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE OTTOMAN ORIGINS REVISITED:  
WAR ON WORDS, WAR FOR WORDS 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
For a century and a half, scholars have debated the origins of the Crimean War 
from different perspectives: The Tsar’s desire for further aggrandizement, British 
politicians’ desire to check Russian military superiority over the Ottoman Empire, 
the French Emperor’s cunning maneuvers to dismantle the Vienna system, the 
Porte’s oriental manners and intrigues during the diplomatic crisis, and Austria’s 
rush to preserve the European peace have composed major themes in the literature. 
In this regard, politicians’ moves and countermoves have been carefully analyzed to 
determine which individual is most to blame: Nicholas II, Napoleon III, Abdülmecid 
I or Stratford Redcliffe? The traditional approach to explaining the origins of the war 
is to find a scapegoat. However, neither a specific architect of the war nor a specific 
origin has been agreed upon. The prestige and honor of the Emperors, distrust 
between diplomats, misunderstandings between decision-makers, and even the 
backwardness of communication (there was no telegraphic line connecting the 
European capitals, so most diplomatic correspondence require more than a week to 
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arrive at its destination) all played roles in paving the way for European war. Thus, 
many interconnected causes led to the war, and a search for the most significant one 
is futile and unnecessary. What is clear is that European diplomacy could not manage 
the crisis, and the Great Powers found themselves in an increasingly hostile 
environment, even as all were reluctant to wage war.  
Ottoman diplomacy has been treated in different ways in the literature. A split 
in the Ottoman government, between the conservative war party and the reformist 
pacifists, has often been advanced to explain Ottoman decision-making during the 
Crimean War. However, this is merely a caricature of Ottoman politics and cannot 
explain many decisions taken by the Porte during the crisis. Some historians have 
observed the Ottoman Empire merely as a setting and subject of diplomacy rather 
than as an actor itself. This is partly true. The Ottoman Empire was in decline and 
had difficulty defending its own territories against its northern neighbor. While the 
lands of the Ottoman Empire, particularly Istanbul, were in jeopardy, there was 
rivalry among the European powers to assert greater influence over the Porte. The 
Porte, however, showed itself as an actor in European politics by rejecting the 
Vienna note and declaring war when the great powers were opposed. Some other 
historians have viewed the Porte as an inefficient, corrupt, and irrational oriental 
government that was not and could not be involved European diplomacy. For 
European observers, the most salient characteristic of Istanbul was intrigue, 
treachery, and bribery. The Ottoman bureaucrats pursued only their own profits 
without consideration of the best interests of the state and society. However, the 
Ottoman government pursued a consistent foreign policy indicating that state 
interests could be pursued, despite frequent ministerial changes.  
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This chapter focuses mainly on the Ottoman origins of the Crimean War. The 
primary argument is that the Porte was a rational player during the diplomatic crisis 
and the Crimean War, in its evaluation of European politics, its assessment of 
Russian demands, and its pursuit of the interests of the Ottoman state. The Ottoman 
government can also be viewed as a participant in European politics, at least with 
respect to the Eastern Question. In all diplomatic initiatives intended to resolve the 
diplomatic crisis between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, the Porte made final 
decisions only after careful calculation of the limits of support of the naval powers 
and probable material losses after concessions to the Russians. The rival political 
perspectives and motives of specific Ottoman bureaucrats will not be discussed here; 
rather, a common state policy pursued before and during the Crimean War will be 
sought. Thus, after summarizing the diplomatic activities surrounding this episode, 
with special emphasis on the role of the Ottoman government, this chapter discusses 
whether the Ottoman Empire was a rational and skilled player in European politics or 
merely provided a setting for political rivalry in Europe.  
 
3.2 Dispute over the Holy Lands  
After the Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople) in 1829 and through crisis of the Polish 
and Hungarian émigrés in 1848, there was no diplomatic rupture of importance 
between the Russian and Ottoman Empires. The Ottoman government tried to 
preserve peaceful relations with Russia due to its relative weakness, seeking to 
promote its internal reforms known as Tanzimat. In 1848, the Porte consented to the 
Russian invasion of Wallachia. However, in the following year when the Porte did 
not return the Polish and Hungarian refugees who fought for the Hungarian cause 
42 
 
against the Habsburgs, it risked war with both Austria and Russia. Nevertheless, the 
refugee crisis was peacefully resolved via European diplomacy. It was an important 
diplomatic victory for the Porte against the two major European powers. From 1850 
to 1853, the Porte, now assumed a conciliatory tone in seeking to resolve the crisis of 
Holy Places with France and Russia. However, in 1853, having secured the support 
of the naval powers, i.e., Britain and France, the Porte once again stood steadfast 
against Russian demands, and war could not be avoided.  
The prelude to the Crimean War was a dispute between Orthodox and Catholic 
believers in the Holy Places of Palestine. The holy sites of Christianity were 
carefully divided between adherents of various Christian beliefs who guarded their 
portions jealously. Disagreements that arose from time to time between the various 
Christian branches regarding the shrines in and around Jerusalem revived once again 
in 1850. Slade summarizes the crisis in a colorful way: “It seems very like fiction, 
but it is true, that a key, a porter, and a star were the elements out of which grew the 
late eventful war with Russia.”125 A local affair transformed in time into a matter of 
prestige and influence between two great powers of the time, Russia and France. 
Louise Napoleon, who would be enthroned as the French Emperor Napoleon III in 
1852, aimed to consolidate his power in France and increase French influence in the 
Near East. Accordingly, he voluntarily initiated a crisis over the Christian sanctuaries 
of Jerusalem. On 28 May 1850, General Jacques Aupick, the French attaché military 
to Istanbul, conveyed a letter demanding the full application of the 33rd article of the 
1740 Agreement.
126
 The article concerned the rights and privileges of the Catholics 
                                               
125 Slade, Turkey and the Crimean War, p. 75. 
126 General Aupick to Aali Pasha, Pera, 28 May 1850, Eastern Papers, Part I, p. 4. For the articles 
regarding the religious capitulations of 1740 and their English translation, see Eastern Papers, Part I, 
pp. 5- 7. Türkgeldi quoted the document incorrectly, in a way that suggests that the 13th article of the 
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in the Holy Places, rights and privileges that were not fully observed following the 
French Revolution. Specifically, General Aupick asked for the return of nine 
sanctuaries that the Greeks were then using.  
Russia, however, viewed any concession to France as a loss of its political 
influence in Istanbul and a great blow to Russian policy in the Ottoman lands. The 
French demand, if accepted, would certainly cause a deterioration in Russo-Ottoman 
relations, and thus, the question was not religious or legal but political from the very 
beginning. Stratford Canning was right in his first observations. “General Aupick has 
assured me that the matter in dispute is a mere question of property, and of express 
treaty stipulation. But it is difficult to separate any such question from political 
considerations; and a struggle of general influence, especially if Russia, as may be 
expected should interfere in behalf of the Greek Church, will probably grow out of 
the impending discussion.”127   
General Aupick and his successor, Charles de Lavalette maintained that the 
stipulations of the former treaties could not be questioned, while Vladimir Pavlovich 
Titov, the Russian chargé d’affairs in Istanbul, defended the necessity of preserving 
the status quo. The Russians even threatened the Sublime Porte with a rupture of 
diplomatic relations if there were any changes. In fact, throughout the crisis, the 
Russian government would never agree to a middle ground, and thus, there was no 
sufficient space for diplomatic maneuver. The Porte, on the one hand, assured the 
Russians that the rights of the Greeks would be preserved, and on the other hand, 
assured the French that this concession would be clarified. However, it was nearly 
                                                                                                                                     
treaty was the issue. Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, Mesâil-i Mühimme-i Siyâsiyye, vol. I, prepared by Bekir Sıtkı 
Baykal (Ankara, 1987), p. 2.  
127 Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston, Constantinople, 20 May 1850, Eastern Papers, Part I, p. 
1.  
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impossible to satisfy both parties. In June 1850, Stratford Canning informed Lord 
Palmerston, “The Porte is fully aware of the important political considerations 
involved... It will probably be slow to commit itself to a conclusive answer…”128 He 
was right. The Porte moved slowly and ignored the problem as long as possible to 
resolve it in the future in a more favorable international environment. Accordingly, 
Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha, then Foreign Minister, avoided taking responsibility for a 
decision and postponed an answer.  
In December 1850, as a result of French pressure, the Porte at last proposed a 
mixed commission to examine the question and determine the rights of each party. 
The commission was composed of two French officials, an Ottoman Greek and a 
Muslim. After several meetings, Nicholas I, convinced that the commission would 
settle the issue in favor of the French, wanted its dissolution. The Porte, under 
Russian pressure, then named a commission composed only of Muslim members, 
such as ulema (Muslim theologians and scholars), certain Müşirs, distinguished men 
of law, and other significant personages. Sadık Rıfat Pasha, a prominent bureaucrat 
of the Ottoman reformation (Tanzimat), chaired the new commission. The 
commission, after examining all previous documents relating to the Holy Places and 
seeking a safer resolution, issued its decision on 25 January 1852. Two of the French 
demands were accepted: Catholics would freely enter and worship in the Holy 
Virgin’s Shrine in Jerusalem, and the keys of the Great Church of Bethlehem would 
be handed to them. As compensation, Greeks were allowed to perform in the Cupola 
                                               
128 Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston, Constantinople, 5 June 1850, Eastern Papers, Part I, p. 
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of Ascension (a mosque situated on the Mount of Olives) with other Christian 
sects.
129
 
This arrangement, which appeared to satisfy both parties, was sanctioned by a 
convention (sened) delivered to the Catholics and by a ferman delivered to the 
Greeks.
130
  After Russian complaints, the Porte ordered that the ferman be read in the 
presence of the Pasha, Müfti, Kadı, and Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem. In so doing, 
the Porte offended the French Ambassador, who had asked that the ferman should 
merely be registered. Moreover, the ferman declared that the present state of the 
gates of the Church of Bethlehem would not be changed, but this contradicted the 
document given to France. In the summer of 1852, the French fleet made a naval 
demonstration before Trablus (Tripoli), and a blockade of the Dardanelles by the 
French was under discussion. Under pressure from both France and Russia, the Porte 
made contradictory promises and concessions.
131
 In the autumn of 1852, all Ottoman 
efforts were futile, and eventually the Porte antagonized both parties. Massive 
diplomatic efforts to settle the diplomatic crisis regarding the rights and the 
privileges of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire in the Holy Lands did not 
bear fruit. It was now clear that resolution of the council would cause a deterioration 
in relations with one of the great powers.  
France, again a Napoleonic Empire, took a conciliatory stand through the end 
of 1852. However, the Russian mood in late 1852 was completely different. In 
December 1852, several councils, summoned to decide how to proceed, confirmed 
                                               
129 Goldfrank, p. 85.  
130 For the French original and English translation of the sened, see, Eastern Papers, Part I, pp. 36-38, 
and for the ferman, see, Eastern Papers, Part I, pp. 39-42. 
131 “…eğerçi tarafeyne icra olunan mevaîd yalnız bu anahtar maddesinde birbirine muhalif olarak 
bunun asıl sebebi iki tarafın dahi mütesâviyen Devlet-i Aliyye’yi iz’ac ve tahvif ile vuku’ bulan 
cebirleri”, Mesâil, vol. I, “The Resolution (Mazbata) of Council of Ministers regarding the Holy 
Places in Jerusalem”, pp. 239-253.  
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that the 1740 Treaty gave France a right to a key to the Church of Bethlehem. 
Ozerov, the Russian chargé d’affairs, reported that fear of France in Istanbul was 
greater than fear of Russia.
132
 He further argued that “a heroic remedy was 
necessary” to re-establish Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire.133 Nicholas I 
wished to use the religious dispute to restore, if not increase, Russian influence over 
the Porte. At the end of the year, Russia massed troops on the border of the Ottoman 
Empire. Russian diplomacy would be supported by a demonstration of military force. 
In the formulation of Goldfrank, Nicholas I prepared for a war “over religious 
symbols, an untenable concept of the status quo in a changing world, a manufactured 
insult, and foggy claims of tutelage over the Sultan’s Orthodox subjects.”134 
 
3.3 An Extraordinary Mission: Prince Menshikov at Istanbul  
While the Ottoman government sought to resolve the question of the Holy 
Places, another crisis erupted with Austria over the disturbances in Montenegro. 
Austria responded to Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s military operation in Montenegro with a 
military demonstration and a threat of war. Meanwhile, Field Marshall Count 
Christian von Leiningen was sent to Istanbul to convince the Porte of the grave 
consequences of the Ottoman operation in Montenegro if it did not cease. He 
presented an ultimatum on 3 February 1853 and threatened to leave Istanbul if 
Austrian demands were not met. Neither the military measures nor the representation 
of Count Leiningen were sufficient to frighten the Porte, but Russian support for 
Austria forced the Ottomans to retreat. The Ottomans agreed to evacuate 
                                               
132 Goldfrank, p. 105.  
133 Goldfrank, p. 108.  
134 Goldfrank, pp. 110-111.  
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Montenegro. The Leiningen mission was an example for Russia of a diplomatic 
success achieved through coercive diplomacy.
135
 
In late 1852, Russia prepared to send a mission to Istanbul. The candidates 
were Count Alexei Fedorovich Orlov, Head of the Secret Police and the architect of 
the Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty, and Count Pavel Dmitrievich Kiselyov, brother of the 
then ambassador to Paris, but Nicholas I named a soldier, Admiral Aleksandr 
Sergeyevich Menshikov.
136
 The mission, which was officially announced on 4 
February, was delayed for a few weeks because of Menshikov’s illness. Before his 
arrival at Istanbul, Menshikov visited the Russian army in Bessarabia and the 
Russian fleet in Sevastopol. His large entourage included Artur Adamovich 
Nepokoichitskii, the Chief of Staff of the 5
th
 Army in Bessarabia, Admiral Vladimir 
Alekseievich Kornilov, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and Count 
Dmitrii Nesselrode, the son of the Russian Chancellor.
137
 
On 28 February 1853, Menshikov came to Istanbul on the steam frigate 
Gromonosets (Thunderer) as an extraordinary ambassador. He was greeted by the 
local Orthodox population, some of whom acted as if their savior had arrived.
138
 In 
Bazancourt’s words, by the mission of Prince Menshikov “the religious question is at 
an end; the political question begins.”139 The question was political from the very 
beginning, but the mission showed that the political crisis was deepening. 
 According to diplomatic custom, a new ambassador should make his first visit 
to the Grand Vizier and his second to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, the 
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138 Tarle, vol. I, p. 166. 
139 Bazancourt, p. xx. 
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Prince refused to visit Fuad Efendi, the Ottoman foreign minister known to be 
Francophile, to force him to resign. The Prince’s every act in Istanbul was rude and 
undiplomatic, thereby deliberately escalating the crisis. His very presence in Istanbul 
resulted in panic and instability in the Ottoman government. The Grand Vizier, the 
Foreign Minister, and the Serasker were replaced with individuals more favorable to 
the Russians.  
In addition to the open demand to resolve the Holy Lands issue in favor of 
Orthodox believers, Nicholas I had a secret agenda. Through this mission, he wished 
to sign a secret treaty with the Ottoman government to consolidate his influence in 
Istanbul and guarantee it for the future. According to the Russian proposal, if the 
Ottoman Empire ever required aid against any power, Russia would put its fleet and 
army at its disposal. Menshikov further stated that secrecy must be maintained; 
otherwise, he would immediately leave Istanbul.
140
 The Russian plan failed at the 
beginning of the mission when the Porte made it public. Afterwards, Menshikov 
pursued victory in the Holy Places question through the return of the disputed key, 
and, more importantly, he sought to guarantee Russian protective rights over the 
Orthodox population. The first goal was soon attained through French concessions, 
but the second demand appeared impossible to satisfy the Porte. The Russians, 
however, were determined to have the Porte sign a document guaranteeing their 
religious influence over the Ottoman Greeks.  
The Menshikov Mission was not only a diplomatic initiative, but an act of 
reconnaissance for possible armed conflict. Admiral Kornilov examined the Straits to 
determine whether a successful landing in Istanbul was feasible. Kornilov even 
visited Athens, most likely to consolidate friendly relations between Greece and 
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Russia at a juncture when relations between Russia and the Orthodox subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire were under discussion. As Saab claims, “The Kornilov mission 
underlined Russian influence at Athens and the whole affair confirmed convictions 
that any trouble with Russia was likely to unleash fighting in the provinces bordering 
on Greece.”141 Thus, the revolt of the Greeks in Thessaly and Epirus one year later 
was unsurprising.  
The Russian demands were based on a basic argument that “no fresh rights 
were sought.” The Russians argued that they were only trying to guarantee the rights 
and privileges that were entrusted in previous treaties. However, Russian protective 
rights over the Ottoman Greeks were merely a Russian interpretation or rather 
misinterpretation. The basis of the Russian claims over the privileges of the Greek 
population was the stipulations of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774. By articles 
VII and XIV, the Porte promised to protect the Christian religion and churches and 
recognize the right of Russian protection of a Russo-Greek church to be built in 
Galata. These articles did not specifically state that Russia had any right to protect 
Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire, although this legend was accepted by many 
contemporary politicians and historians.
142
 For instance, Moltke, in his history of 
1828-29 War, criticized the Porte, “They [treaties between the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia] contained within themselves the seeds of future wars; the mere fact of giving 
to a foreign monarch rights of protection over the subjects of the Porte might lend an 
appearance of justice to the most arbitrary attack on the part of that monarch.”143  
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Menshikov’s proposals were unlikely to be accepted by the Ottomans. The 
Porte wanted to negotiate an arrangement regarding the issues of the Holy Lands, but 
there was no point in discussing an agreement regarding the rights and privileges of 
Ottoman Christians with a foreign country. These rights were naturally subject to the 
sovereign will of the Sultan, and thus their status was a domestic matter.  
On 5 May, Menshikov conveyed a draft of a convention, and claimed that he 
would leave Istanbul and break all diplomatic relations unless it was accepted. He 
issued another ultimatum on 11 May this time stipulating a three-day acceptance 
period. Before his departure, Menshikov delivered a draft of a convention dated 20 
May. He first waited in the Gromonosets and then left for Odessa. He would wait in 
Odessa for an affirmative reply for an additional eight days.
144
 The mission, which 
was planned to be short, was prolonged due to Ottoman determination not to yield to 
Russian demands. As tensions increased in the European capitals, Russia limited its 
demands to a formal agreement. Nevertheless, Russia’s coercive diplomacy failed, as 
a final agreement could not be reached. When Prince Menshikov returned to Odessa 
on 21 May, the Russians had achieved nothing but a rupture in relations with the 
Sublime Porte. In his memoirs, Mikhail Gorchakov notes, “The embassy of Prince 
Menshikov accompanied by the staff of the Fifth Army and the Black Sea fleet was 
to have the most unprofitable results.”145 Menshikov’s entourage, agenda and 
manners played a role in this failure, even though the mission was devised to frighten 
the Porte into making concessions.   
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After Menshikov left Istanbul, French and British squadrons arrived at Beşik 
(Besica) Bay at the entrance of the Dardanelles. The moves of the French and British 
squadrons were not just military maneuvers but also political manifestations of naval 
powers. This move signified that Britain and France would come to the aid of the 
Ottomans if the necessity arose.  
 
3.4 The Hot Summer of 1853. The Vienna Note and the Russian 
Occupation of the Principalities  
On 26 June, the Tsar issued a manifesto asserting the necessity of an invasion 
of the Principalities.
146
 In the following week, first Russian troops entered the 
Principalities, where they would remain for more than a year.
147
 Meanwhile, the 
Ottomans negotiated with Britain and France over the specific military aid the latter 
would provide in case of further Russian incursion into Ottoman lands. However, 
Russia, lacking the support of any great power, was reluctant to engage in war. Soon 
after the invasion, Nicholas I expressed his optimism in a letter to Gorchakov: “the 
invasion of Bucharest and our military activities will most likely end soon, for 
England and France will come to an understanding, and together with Austria they 
will persuade the Turks to satisfy our demands… Now, let the forces take rest and 
get ready for their honorable campaign back home.”148 However, Gorchakov would 
                                               
146 For the manifesto, see Sobranie donesenii o voennykh deistviyakh i diplomaticheskikh bumag i 
aktov, otnosyashchikhsya do voiny 1853, 1854, 1855 i 1855 godov (St. Petersburg, 1858), [hereafter, 
Sobranie donesenii], p. 13.  
147 N. K. Schilder, “Zametka o sobytiyakh 1853-1854 gg. (Po povodu stati Feldmarshal Paskevich v 
Krymskuiu voinu)”, Russkaya starina, 1875, vol. 14, no. 10, pp. 380-392. 
148 Zayonchkovskii, vol. II, part I, footnote 2, p. 13. 
52 
 
later write in his memoirs that war was already unavoidable following the invasion of 
the Principalities.
149
 
Russia, being isolated, remained passive in the Principalities without adopting 
a strategy of military advancement. The future policies of Austria and Prussia were 
unclear. A surprise attack on Istanbul was then impossible. Russia therefore pursued 
a wait-and-see policy during the summer. While the European powers were 
determined to solve the Russo-Ottoman conflict, the Porte took measures for possible 
war making preparations to prevent a possible Russian advance. Most of the 
preparations were implemented secretly, to avoid giving Russia any pretext for war. 
Although the Ottomans did not accept any Russian demands, they were reluctant to 
provoke a war, as the nature and limits of Western support were then unclear. 
In the summer of 1853, diplomatic efforts, centered in Vienna, were 
undertaken to settle the dispute between the Porte and Russia. The discussions in the 
capital of the Habsburg Empire took final form on 31 July 1853 in a paper known 
famously as the Vienna Note. This note was accepted by the Russian government. 
The Ottoman Council of 17 members, convened on 14 August, however, did not 
approve the Note. Redcliffe enclosed a list of the members of the council along with 
their opinions about the note. None of the members had voted for acceptance. 
Mustafa Reşid Pasha asked for modifications, while most of the other members 
wanted complete rejection.
150
 In a meeting with Redcliffe, after emphasizing his 
pacifist aims, Mustafa Reşid Pasha claimed the necessity of maintaining contact with 
the war party. “There was no chance of obtaining a majority in favor of accepting 
Count Buol’s note [Vienna Note]. The only way to avoid a complete refusal was, he 
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[Mustafa Reşid Pasha] said, to propose the note with certain modifications.” Reşid 
Pasha further stated that the pressure from the British government for acceptance of 
the Vienna Note would certainly diminish popular sympathy towards Britain and that 
Pasha himself could not prevent such an unfortunate development. The Porte finally 
decided to ask for amendments, and a new draft, called the Turkish ultimatum, was 
sent to Vienna on 20 August.
151
   
The amendments were in turn refused by St Petersburg. The Russians claimed 
that the spirit of the note had been undermined by the Ottomans. In this, they were 
correct. The Ottoman version promised almost nothing to the Russians. Although 
only a few words were altered, the document now declared that the Ottomans had 
never ceased to watch over the maintenance of the religious immunities of the 
Orthodox population. It was also implicitly stated that the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 
did not grant Russia any rights regarding protection of the Ottoman Greeks. 
According to another revision, the Orthodox believers would enjoy the same rights 
and privileges possessed by other Christian sects in the Ottoman Empire. Nesselrode 
argues, “What it was designed to recognize is, that there has ever existed on the part 
of Russia active solicitude for her coreligionists in Turkey, as also for the 
maintenance of their religious immunities; and that the Ottoman Government is 
disposed to take account of that solicitude, and also to leave those immunities 
untouched.” However, the changed note claims that “the protection of the Christian 
religion” was granted by the Porte alone. Thus, the document demonstrated that there 
was no right as to the Russian protection of the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman 
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Empire. According to Nesselrode the Russian right to watch over the strict 
fulfillment of the privileges of the Orthodox believers was nullified.
152
  
The alterations clearly show that the Porte was careful in selecting the words of 
the document to be signed. The Ottomans were reluctant to sign anything so vague 
that it could be interpreted in multiple ways in the future. However, after so much 
diplomatic effort, the amendments in the document were frowned upon in European 
diplomatic circles, “the unwillingness of the Sultan to bend to the suggestion of His 
Allies would offer an unfavourable contrast to the readiness with which they were 
acceded to by the Emperor.”153 No one in the British government understood the 
importance of the alterations:  “Her Majesty’s Government considered the 
modifications to be unimportant, and regretted that they had been proposed.”154 
Clarendon, for example, completely failed to understand the Ottoman revisions: “it 
was on account of a few unimportant words that the Turks wished to introduce into 
an agreement by which they alone were to be bound.”155 The Vienna Note showed 
that the European powers did not understand what rights the Russians claimed to 
possess. The European powers, who prepared the note, only sought to prepare a 
document that would not be rejected by Russia. Therefore, the Ottoman 
modifications were a great blow to the efforts in Vienna. The Ottoman refusal, 
however, demonstrated that the Ottomans would never sign anything that might grant 
Russia some rights over the Ottoman Christians. Although the Ottoman attitude drew 
reactions in the European capitals at first, a Russian document that appeared in 
Berlin newspapers in September 1853 changed the diplomatic atmosphere.  
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On September 20, Clarendon would claim that “Russia puts an interpretation 
on it [the Vienna note] that was not intended by the 4 Powers & who might 
consequently give rise hereafter to the disputes and misunderstandings that we 
intended to guard against by the Note”156 Nesselrode, in his private interpretation of 
the Vienna Note, commented on the Ottoman modifications. Nesselrode interpreted 
the text of the Vienna Note as a guarantee of the maintenance of the privileges and 
immunities of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire. According to the 
Russian Chancellor the Porte must have taken into account of Russia to touch the 
immunities of its Orthodox subjects. This interpretation was soon attacked by the 
British press, and following the so-called ‘violent interpretation’, political support of 
the Ottoman Empire in Europe dramatically increased.
157
 The British diplomats, who 
criticized the Ottomans for rejecting the Vienna Note, admitted the correctness of the 
rejection.  
The Russians were increasingly pacifist in their diplomacy, as they failed to 
secure the support of any European power in a possible war. The plans to invade the 
Ottoman capital were no longer feasible, and thus Russian diplomacy sought a 
peaceful settlement. While the Russians were sought an honorable exit from the 
crisis, on 4 October 1853, the Ottomans declared war on Russia. The riots and 
demonstrations that took place in the Ottoman capital on 11 and 12 September 1853 
were obvious signs of war fervor. However, it was the Ottoman army ready for a war 
rather than the popular zeal that played a critical role in the commencement of 
hostilities. Time was working against the Ottomans. It was difficult to build a large 
army, but it was even more difficult and expensive to maintain the already assembled 
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forces. Clarendon was pessimistic about the situation, “The winter will be passed by 
Russia in preparations for the spring but it will be a period of exhaustion of the 
Turks. The internal elements of dissolution will be actively at work & while we are 
all laboring for integrity & independence Turkey as She now stands will disappear 
from the map of Europe.”158 
The final peace effort occure at Olmütz, where the Russian Tsar met with the 
Austrian Emperor on 27 September. Clarendon openly declared that “Our last card is 
Olmütz, and if that fails we must I fear prepare for war.” In his conversations with 
Franz Joseph, Nicholas I continued to argue that “he seeks to obtain nothing but what 
he is already entitled to by existing treaties & wishes only to maintain the ‘status 
quo’ in religious matters.”159 The Tsar argued that he asked for no new rights, and no 
increased authority. The Russian army would remain passive in the Principalities 
and, as the Russian government maintained, wait until the rights they possessed by 
treaties were secured.
160
 Nesselrode stated to Seymour, “Our position is this: War has 
been declared against us by Turkey; we shall in all probability issue no counter 
declaration, nor shall we make an attack upon Turkey; we shall remain with folded 
arms, only resolved to repel any assault mad upon us whether in the Principalities or 
on our Asiatic frontier, which we have been reinforcing; so we shall remain during 
the winter, ready to receive any peaceful overtures which during that time may made 
to us by Turkey; that is our position.”161 While the unfavorable environment for 
Russia compelled them to adopt an increasingly pacifist policy, the Porte, by 
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contrast, found the international atmosphere favorable to a halt in Russia’s 
aggressive plans, at least for some time ahead.  
While a Russian advance to the south of the Danube would initiate a European 
war, a defensive strategy by the Russians would most likely reestablish peace, as 
both Britain and France did not see any reason for war against Russia unless the 
latter planned an encroachment to the south. Diplomatic activities never ceased, even 
after the declaration of war. Vienna continued to be the center of diplomatic efforts. 
A draft note was prepared by Britain, France, Austria and Prussia to be proposed to 
both Russia and the Ottoman Empire. First, an armistice and peace would be 
established. By this route, the European powers took pains to prepare an honorable 
exit for the Russian Tsar.  
Shortly after the Ottoman declaration of war, the French and British also 
agreed to defend Ottoman integrity and independence. According to the French 
Emperor, “in the first instance the two Governments do not mediate an offensive war 
with Russia, leaving themselves, however, full latitude to act in future as 
circumstances may require.”162 The line of defense should be the Balkans. The 
French government planned: “if the Turks cross the Danube and attack the Russians, 
we should not help them, but if they are beaten and obliged to retire to their present 
position, our fleet would act as far as they could.”163 However, how and when they 
could build such a line of defense was another matter.  
Diplomatic initiatives in the European capitals did not produce any results, and 
the international atmosphere would be fully anti-Russian following the “Sinop 
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Affair” on 30 November 1853. Britain and France were so frightened following this 
naval disaster that they rushed to the aid of the Ottoman Empire to prevent its 
downfall. European diplomacy and the concert of Europe ultimately failed, and war 
became general.  
 
3.5 Illusions of Nicholas I. Gendarmerie of Europe or Conqueror of 
“Tsargrad”? 
In 1853, several alternative plans were discussed in St. Petersburg to resolve 
the Eastern Question to Russia’s benefit. Destruction of the Ottoman Empire by a 
coup de main on Istanbul appeared to be the best alternative for Russia. During the 
reign of Nicholas I, an attack on Istanbul was under constant discussion in military 
circles and by the Tsar himself.
164
 Sevastopol, the Russian military port in the Black 
Sea, had been designed for the future conquest of Istanbul. A surprise attack on 
Istanbul was planned not only to achieve actual conquest but also to enable a speedy 
conclusion of a possible war with the Ottoman Empire, as the Russian campaigns on 
the Danube had been long, devastating and expensive both materially and morally. In 
January 1853, the Russian Tsar supported an operation in Bosphorus and Istanbul 
involving 16,000 men. This proposal was based on Admiral Lazarev’s 1835 plan.165   
However, Nicholas I did not wish to risk his position in Europe for the sake of 
political influence over the Ottoman Empire or even a military conquest of the 
Ottoman lands. The Russian government preferred an agreed-upon destruction of the 
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Ottoman Empire and the reallocation of its territories. The gentlemen’s agreement 
with the Aberdeen government in 1844 was intended to further this aim. In 1853, 
when Aberdeen once again came to power in Britain, Nicholas I reminded Sir 
Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, of his agreement with 
Aberdeen for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. On the evening of 9 January 1853, 
Nicholas I openly stated that England and Russia should reach an understanding 
regarding the Ottoman Empire.
166
 Meeting Seymour again on 20 February, Nicholas 
I emphasized that the Ottoman Empire was dying and that he desired a private 
understanding with Britain. The following day, he further elaborated on his ideas of a 
partition proposing Egypt and Cyprus for Britain. However, Seymour’s replies were 
not satisfactory to the Tsar. These conversations were not long kept secret, and letters 
of the British ambassador to his government were published in the Blue Book in 
1854. 
As the British rejected partition of the Ottoman territories, Nicholas I sought 
new partners for his schemes.
167
 On 29 May, Nicholas I sent a letter to Paskevich 
proposing his ideas for an offensive. “If the Turks stand their ground, I will order a 
blockade of the Bosphorus and the capture Turkish vessels in the Black Sea. I will 
then offer Austria the right to occupy Herzegovina and Serbia. If it does not accept, 
then I will claim the independence of the Principalities, Serbia and Herzegovina… 
uprisings will break out everywhere in Turkey and the last minutes of the Ottoman 
Empire will come.”168 In the spring of 1853, the Tsar asked Menshikov and 
Paskevich about the possibility of an invasion of Istanbul. The report of Menshikov 
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was not optimistic about the prospects of a successful attack on Istanbul. Paskevich 
advised the Tsar to invade the Principalities ‘as a guarantee’ to obtain the demanded 
concessions from the Porte.
169
 Because of the ongoing diplomatic crisis, a sudden 
attack on Istanbul was irrelevant. Thus, the Russians gave up plans for an operation 
on Istanbul. Other plans were also discussed in 1853, including an operation on 
Varna and Burgaz and a blockade of Istanbul.  
To be sure, the Russian Tsar wanted the best possible outcome: it might be an 
invasion of the Balkans and Istanbul or a secret treaty with the Sublime Porte similar 
to the Hünkâr İskelesi. It might also be an agreement that would enshrine a definite 
right of Russia to protect the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, thereby 
increasing Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire. The benefit that would arise 
from the crisis was unclear, but Russia wanted at least something that would 
guarantee its future influence in the Ottoman Empire. The best option was a partition 
of the Ottoman Empire between Russia and a European coalition, similar to the 
partition of Poland in the previous century. However, his miscalculations regarding 
the aims and moves of the other great powers led to an unmanageable crisis and then 
a European war.  
At the beginning of the crisis, Nicholas I was not entirely wrong in pressing the 
Porte as that had become a routine in dealing with the Ottoman Empire. The 
European powers usually bullied the Ottoman Empire when they thought it 
necessary. During the diplomatic crisis, the French representatives used aggressive 
language and even backed their demands with a naval demonstration. Count 
Leiningen, in 1852, and Prince Menshikov, in 1853, followed suit. The fault in the 
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foreign policy of the Tsar lay in his understanding of European politics. Neither 
Nicholas I nor his high officials predicted an Anglo-French coalition. Nicholas I 
wanted to act in harmony with the British government but failed in this strategy, as 
the British followed a policy of preserving Ottoman integrity. The Russian 
government also failed to understand the fears of the Habsburgs that a war in the 
Balkans would be detrimental to their own survival. In the years immediately 
preceding the Crimean War, Russia and Austria worked together very closely, and 
Russia wanted Austrian support for its plans in the Ottoman Empire in return for its 
assistance during the Hungarian revolt. However, the Crimean War revealed that the 
interests of these powers differed fundamentally in the Balkans. Inheritance plans 
with respect to “sick man of Europe” could only be realized with the collaboration of 
one or more great powers. Thus, Russian diplomacy failed.  
During the Russo-Ottoman war, peace remained possible, but the Russian 
assault on the Ottoman fleet at Sinop Bay put a final end to all diplomatic initiatives. 
Thus, the naval battle, which seemed advantageous and prestigious for the Russians, 
would damage the Russian position in Europe as well as in the Near East.  
 
3.6. Ottoman Ir/rationality? Diplomacy of the “Fanatic and Ignorant 
Turks” 
Ironically, the war erupted and transformed into a European conflict when all 
great powers were reluctant to engage in such a conflict. The Ottoman diplomatic 
maneuvers, i.e., rejection of the Russian proposals during the prolonged Menshikov 
Mission (28 February – 21 May 1853), rejection of the European initiative at Vienna 
(summer 1853), the proclamation of war (4 October 1853), and the first fire on the 
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Danube by the Ottoman troops (22-23 October 1853) surprised the Russians and the 
other great powers. These political choices have sometimes been depicted as clear 
evidence of Ottoman aspirations for war. Rich, for instance, argues that “Among 
those statesmen who blocked efforts to arrange a peaceful resolution of the Near 
Eastern crises of the 1850s and who believed in the desirability or necessity of war 
with Russia, those in the forefront were the Turks.”170 Jelavich claims, “Scholars 
have attempted to explain how the Great Powers – Russia, France, Great Britain, and 
the Ottoman Empire – were drawn into a major conflict in which the immediate 
issues in dispute were not clear, and when no government, with the exception of the 
Ottoman regime, wished to fight.”171 According to Goldfrank, “it was the Ottomans 
who initially most eager of all to give battle.”172  
The Russian government abstained from using obsessive language against the 
European powers, while they found the Ottomans to be the only responsible party in 
the initiation of war. Nesselrode claims that the Porte declared war because they 
yielded “notwithstanding the counsels of the European representatives at 
Constantinople, to the impulse of warlike ideas and of Mussulman fanaticism”.173 
According to the Russians, France and Britain wanted peace, but they acted with 
prejudices against the Russian government.
174
 Although there is a common 
understanding that the Ottomans wanted war, it is not clear what the Sublime Porte 
sought from a Russian war. Therefore, many politicians and historians have shared 
the view that the Ottoman government was irrational in its decisions. Europeans 
perceived Ottoman society as well as the government as corrupt and fanatical and 
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thus in need of control and direction. Accordingly, decisions and actions of the 
Ottoman government were frequently portrayed as illogical and uncoordinated in 
both diplomatic correspondence and Crimean War literature. 
With the exception of the Holy Lands crisis, the Russians had no material 
objectives. The quarrel was based on words or expressions concerning Russian rights 
over the Ottoman Greeks. The question was whether these expressions would lead to 
increased Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire and thus challenge Ottoman 
independence and integrity. The European diplomats did not understand why the 
Porte declined the Russian proposal for a guarantee of Russia’s existing rights over 
the Ottoman Greek population.  
Many British politicians had good relations with the Russians, and felt some 
sympathy for Russia. However, the Russian demands, which were seen as normal in 
Europe, were unacceptable to the Porte. Ottoman diplomacy had always sought to 
emphasize that the Russians did not possess the rights they claimed to possess and 
that it was exclusively the Porte’s responsibility to protect Orthodox subjects in the 
Ottoman Empire. A careful examination of the Ottoman amendments clearly shows 
that the Porte worried about Russian intervention through the use of these 
agreements. Nesselrode’s interpretations confirmed the Ottoman concerns. Whether 
any additional rights had been attained by Russia following the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca was unclear. In fact, no such rights had been accorded to the Russian 
government, and granting some rights to Russia over the Orthodox population of the 
Ottoman Empire might affect the well-being of the Ottoman Empire. Such rights 
would also conflict with the Tanzimat program, which envisaged full control of the 
population through reform and a much more reliable and efficient army. Thus, the 
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rejection of Russian demands should not be understood as an Ottoman desire for war. 
While Russia sought a guarantee regarding its alleged rights with respect to the 
Christian Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire, the Porte wanted to show that 
such rights had never existed. Russia, the Porte felt, should not be involved in the 
Ottoman Empire’s problems with its Orthodox population, as this could constitute a 
sustained threat to the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire.  
A British politician portrayed the diplomatic activities as “To fight a battle of 
words over the ‘Independence’ which has no existence in fact.”175 According to 
Seymour there was no point in trying to find the best words for an agreement 
between the two countries, as the Russians - the stronger party - would ultimately 
provide the definitive interpretation. “Had the differences between the Emperor and 
the Sultan been left for settlement by an act to be agreed upon between their two 
Cabinets, the responsibility would have rested with the Porte, while the power of 
interpreting that act would have remained with the stronger of the contracting parties, 
who as has been seen by the construction which they place upon the Treaty of 
Kainardji are not backward in founding very extensive demands upon very slight 
grounds.”176 Seymour, however, argued that if the European powers were party to an 
agreement between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, they could prevent over-
interpretation of the arrangement. Over-interpretation of the Vienna note, he argued, 
would not be possible, as it was prepared by the European powers.  
Ottoman rationality can be seen in the political choices of the Porte. The Porte 
did not accept Menshikov’s proposals, which would have given Russia protective 
rights over the Ottoman Greeks. The Porte did not declare war following the Russian 
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invasion of the Principalities, a decision that was sound, as the Porte then lacked an 
efficient military force. The acceptance of the Vienna note only with alterations was 
also reasonable, as the Russian interpretation clearly showed what was at stake. The 
Ottoman government declared war in the most favorable circumstances, when its 
army was prepared for a defensive. The war was declared in autumn - late for an 
ambitious military campaign and at a time when the security of Istanbul was not 
threatened. In addition, the Ottomans secured British and French political support 
and naval assistance. Therefore, Ottoman diplomacy does not deserve to be criticized 
as fanatical and irrational.  
Another question is whether the Ottomans wanted war with Russia. During war 
preparations, the Sublime Porte did not appear to be eager for war. Throughout the 
reparations of the fortifications, the Ottoman government was always careful to act in 
accordance with the existing treaties.
177
 The most frequent sentiment expressed in 
Ottoman documents before the outbreak of war was that the Empire should avoid 
giving Russia a pretext for war.
178
 Although the passage of Russian warships to İbrail 
was prohibited, the Porte discussed the possibility of not applying the rule in order 
not to give Russia a pretext for war. The rule was applied only after consultation with 
Stratford Redcliffe and a resolution that the presence of Russian steamers and boats 
in the upper Danube would be highly detrimental to the Ottoman defense if war were 
to break out.
179
 Two common and frequently used expressions in the Ottoman 
documents during the diplomatic crisis are “pursuing moderate diplomacy” 
(mutedilâne politika takip edilmesi) and “avoidance of giving any pretext to Russia 
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[for war]” (Rusya’ya bir gûne serrişte verilmemesi). The extensive use of these two 
expressions in both diplomatic and internal correspondence clearly shows the pacific 
and defensive diplomacy of the Ottoman government.  
There is in fact no indication of an Ottoman desire for war for territorial or 
diplomatic gain. In addition, during the war, the Ottomans did not seek to regain 
territory lost to the Russian Empire.
180
 After British and French entry into the war, 
some plans were formulated to establish buffer zones between the Ottoman and 
Russian Empires at the expense of Russia, but such plans were more strongly 
supported by the British and French governments than by the Sublime Porte.  
Indeed, changes by the Porte in the final note to Prince Menshikov or in the 
Vienna note can be seen as conciliatory rather than evidence of Ottoman 
obstinacy/fanaticism/irrationality. However, the Ottoman government was aware of 
what was at stake and pursued a rational policy against rising Russian political 
influence over its subject peoples, a point not well understood by European 
politicians. Although a war was not desirable to the Ottomans, it was an option, 
especially when support of the naval powers was secured. It was better to challenge 
the Russian demands in a favorable international environment than to make political 
concessions that would result in worse outcomes in the future. Accordingly, the 
peaceful moves of the Porte against great power bullying were generally overlooked. 
It should also be noted that, throughout the crisis, most European efforts were 
intended to appease Russia, while the Ottomans were simply taken for granted. 
Temperley was right in stating that “Europe’s diplomats did not understand Turkish 
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psychology.” Actually, they did not even attempt to understand the policy of the 
Porte as “Turkey was not treated by the Powers as on an equality with Russia”.181 
When the Porte was under pressure from one of the European states, it 
traditionally sought an alliance with another great power. During the 1848 crisis the 
Ottoman government secured the support of the naval powers. However, in 1852, 
lacking the support of a great power, the Ottomans yielded to the demands of 
Austria. Thus, during the crisis with Russia in 1853, they once again took pains to 
obtain the assistance of Britain and France. At this time, the Ottomans first enjoyed 
the diplomatic backing of the naval powers and later their military assistance. 
However, Nicholas I was slow to understand the political environment of Europe.  
Changes in offices were occasionally used as a tool of diplomacy in Istanbul. 
Such concessions to the great powers were instrumental in calming the political 
atmosphere and gaining time. Throughout 1853, Russia waited for a change in 
Ottoman foreign policy, but the Ottomans continued to apply a consistent policy, 
despite changes in critical offices. Mehmed Ali Pasha, a war-prone Ottoman 
bureaucrat, and the more peaceful Mustafa Reşid and Rıfat Pashas favored similar 
policies of not giving any significant political concessions to Russia. Clarendon 
added a PS in a letter to Redcliffe where he claimed, “I cannot help fearing that 
Reşid Pacha thinks this a good opportunity for settling matters with Russia & that he 
rather wants war having as he believes France & England to back him but we can’t 
allow of this unless it is necessary & of that we & not he must judge.”182 For political 
reasons, those in the opposition were more hawkish than those responsible for 
governing the state, but there was a unified state policy, and red lines were 
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established by the Ottoman government. Changes in offices in the foreign ministry 
thus brought little alteration to Ottoman foreign policy. 
 Why were Ottoman politicians criticized as irrational? The major reason was 
that no European power really tried to understand Ottoman politics, but viewed them 
through stereotypical lenses. Diplomatic relations were not immune to bias and 
orientalist perspectives. The Ottomans could be cunning at most; wisdom, skill and 
insight were not among the characteristics of the oriental man, whether it be a 
member of the Porte or a layman in the streets of Istanbul. “Great allowance must be 
made for the Turks – they may be ignorant, short sighted, fanatical and treacherous, 
but then they are such as Mahomet makes them and we all admit that they are a 
European necessity, i.e. we want them for our own purposes and as long as we do so, 
we must adapt our means to our end, and not destroy them.”183 Such were the words 
uttered by Lord Clarendon, the British foreign minister. In another occasion, he 
claims why they wanted to settle the diplomatic crisis, “If the quarrel is not settled 
now, we shall have the break up of the Turkish Empire under the very worst 
circumstances for Europe, viz. while 150 000 barbarians are under arms and ready 
for anything. This is a point well deserving consideration.”184  
The orientalist and pejorative language employed in the official documents 
regarding the Ottoman administration has affected the Crimean War literature as 
well. It is possible to find simplified, almost caricaturized, descriptions of Ottoman 
diplomacy in serious monographs. For many students of the Crimean War, the 
functioning of the Porte and its political choices differ from the manners of civilized 
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governments. Temperley, for instance, argues, “… the rules of intercourse between 
civilized states did not apply to Turkey. That strange empire was an exception to all 
rules.”185 Temperley vividly but with a derogatory language portrayed the Ottoman 
Grand Council when it decided war on Russia on 26 September 1853:  
Its members, mostly unemployed pashas and softas, passed to their 
deliberations through the streets crowded with soldiers flourishing modern 
weapons and with bravos flourishing ancient ones, with dervishes praying 
aloud for vengeance on the infidel. It was a fit preparation for an assembly 
unknown to the law, free from rules of procedure, and given over to bigotry 
and to prejudice… As the debates proceeded the naked ugly face of 
fanaticism peered forth. Not a man dared oppose the general feeling.
186
  
 
Thus, the political choices of the Porte were often mischaracterized as resulting 
from fanaticism, ignorance, and corruption in Istanbul. Explaining the protests in 
Istanbul in September 1853 as one significant reason for the declaration of war, 
Temperley claims that the Sultan might have lost the throne if he persisted in not 
declaring war. “The Sultan himself could not then have stopped the declaration… 
His throat might be cut by his own subjects if he showed hesitation.”187 Interestingly, 
while the war fervor in Britain has been discussed as a display of public opinion, 
demonstrations in Istanbul have been portrayed as Turkish, Eastern or religious 
“fanaticism”. Clearly, the Ottoman people were viewed as an archaic community that 
lacked the facilities of modern society. Ottomans, from top to bottom, were not seen 
as part the civilized world. For example, in his memoirs, Pyotr Kanonovich Menkov, 
a Russian officer and participant in the Crimean War, claimed that France bribed the 
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Porte with a million francs and that if the Tsar had offered more, the question of the 
Holy Lands could have been resolved at the outset.
188
  
Sometimes, the Ottoman government and the Sultan were completely 
distracted from the table of diplomacy while Stratford Redcliffe, the celebrated 
British Ambassador to Istanbul, took their place. His experience in the East, 
knowledge about the workings of the Ottoman government as well as his personal 
relationship with high Ottoman officials, including Abdülmecid I, placed him in an 
exceptional position. Stratford Redcliffe thus enjoyed an authority higher than that of 
other European missions and was even known as the ‘Sultan of Sultan’.189 His 
influence and personal capabilities led many to believe that all decisions taken in the 
Ottoman capital originated with him.
190
 Actually, Redcliffe himself might have 
fuelled this understanding. In one of his reports to London, he idealized himself, 
“Perceiving my reserve the [Mustafa Reşid] Pasha was deeply affected; his eyes 
overflowed with tears; forgetful for a moment of his rank he kissed my hand, and in 
the most moving terms implored me not to forsake his country in the midst of 
distress and dangers which it could not avoid without an unworthy sacrifice. The 
scene was to me a most painful one.”191 Clarendon, the British Secretary of State, 
praised Redcliffe’s mission when Menshikov was putting pressure on the Ottoman 
government: “Your task is indeed not a light one, to maintain the independence of 
Turkey, to save Russia from disgrace and to keep the peace of Europe.”192 Mustafa 
Reşid Pasha declared to the European representatives that the Porte could not 
guarantee the safety of Europeans in Istanbul. He even claimed that the Sultan’s 
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throne was threatened by the war party. It is not clear whether he believed in these 
arguments or used them to attract the French and British fleets.  
Such an understanding naturally places the Ottoman government and 
diplomacy in a very passive position, presenting it as a mere playground for 
complicated European diplomacy rather than as actor in its own rights. It is 
interesting that, although the Ottoman government was frequently accused of 
wanting war, the reason for this position was often attributed to a British diplomat, 
Redcliffe. Redcliffe was long criticized for supporting war against Russia; many 
thought that it was he who encouraged the Porte to stand fast against Russia and 
finally declare war.
193
  “With the determination of Lord Stratford, and the cunning of 
some of the Turkish Ministers, it is vain to hope for much progress at Constantinople 
in the interests of peace.” Another document reads, “Most people desire peace but we 
are not on the road to it & unless the Turks are induced to come down in their 
pretension we shall continue to be dragged at their tail. Another misfortune & 
complication is that we cannot feel sure of Stratford’s acting with us for a peaceful 
solution… In short he seems just as wild as the Turks themselves & together they 
may & will defeat every combination coming from the West however well devised it 
may be.”194 Interestingly, Redcliffe, who lived for decades in Istanbul, shared the 
ignorance and pejorative views about the Ottomans characteristic of the other 
European diplomats. First and foremost, he did not wish to learn Turkish. He was not 
happy with life in Istanbul and would have welcomed an assignment to a European 
capital. Thus, his language regarding the Ottomans was little different from that of 
Clarendon. He even believed Christianity could save the people of the East.  
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Another widespread explanation for Ottoman diplomacy during the Crimean 
War was the perceived split in the Ottoman governing circle between Europeanized 
reformists and traditional “old school” members.  The members of the “old school” 
were generally portrayed as pro-war while the reformers were seen as more pacifist. 
However, this generalization cannot explain Ottoman diplomacy, as the dividing line 
between the pro- and anti-war parties was never clear-cut. After the Menshikov 
Mission, on 16 June 1853, Captain Protopopov, commander of the steamer Krym, 
reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the anti-war party in Istanbul. 
According to the report, besides the Ottoman Sultan, Hüsrev Pasha, Rauf Pasha, 
Mustafa Reşid Pasha, Ahmed Fethi Pasha, Hasan Rıza Pasha, Saffeti Pasha, 
Debrohor Reşid Pasha, and Halil Pasha were against a war.195 In the list there were 
both reformers and the so-called old Ottomans. The proclamation of war was nearly 
unanimous in the Grand Council, suggesting that the notion of a split in Ottoman 
decision-making was exaggerated.
196
 The Ottoman policy was neither wholly pacifist 
nor entirely aggressive. Ottoman governance was not always irrational or suffused by 
illogical ideas. The discussions during the Crimean War crisis clearly show that the 
Porte pursued a well-defined policy against Russian demands.  
In the record (zabıtname) of the Grand Council meeting at which war on 
Russia was declared, very harsh language was used against the ulema. In fact, it was 
not just a record but a critical evaluation of the meeting. Some of the clerics indeed 
spoke irresponsibly to the effect that the Ottoman Empire could easily defeat the 
enemy. (hocaların birazı küffarı şöyle kırar böyle biçeriz gibi saçma sözler 
söylemeleriyle) It is clear that the ulema were very antagonistic to the bureaucrats, 
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who were more reserved about war, and did not understand the level of preparations. 
One member of the ulema was unhappy about not declaring war: Was it appropriate 
to not send the troops to fight but leave them to die? Why was war delayed?
197
 Reşid 
Pasha’s answer was clear. He stated that the army had not been ready and that, by 
acting cautiously, the army had found time to prepare. Now the Porte had the 
opportunity to decide whether to fight.
198
 Moreover, it was now clear that the naval 
powers would protect Istanbul if the Russians attacked. Another participant claimed 
that “nonbelievers are all the same people”, asking “how can they help us?”199 There 
was a clear discrepancy between the opinions of the reformist bureaucrats and the 
ulema. However, at the meeting, Reşid Pasha tried to involve the ulema in the 
decision-making asking them what they wanted. Despite the fact that they knew 
nothing about foreign policy, they were made part of the decision-making process, so 
that the ultimate decision would not be questioned by any portion of Ottoman 
society. 
The Ottoman bureaucrats were also not experts in military affairs, often 
pursued their own interests, and some of them were, in some cases, quite ignorant 
men. As Saab discusses, “Mehmet Ali, throughout the crisis, was to show more 
interest in what he conceived to be the justice of the Ottoman cause than in rational 
military predictions. Indeed this attitude was typical of many pious Ottoman 
officials, who felt too much logical consideration called into question the power of 
Allah to give victory to the right.”200 Serasker Pasha did not wish to take any 
responsibility for the war. He was also unclear about the military strength of the 
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Ottoman State. Therefore, there were no clear discussions about the military power 
and financial situation of the Empire. However, it appears that Reşid Pasha and other 
high officials of the Porte were now favorable toward war, and war was declared.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
Previous treaties of the Porte with Russia and France abruptly gave rise to a 
diplomatic crisis. Both states demanded their treaty rights, but grants regarding the 
Holy Places conflicted. These trivial conflicts were not easy to resolve, as both 
powers were reluctant to consent. The overlapping capitulations made to Orthodox 
and Catholic believers became a dangerous problem as neither France nor Russia 
wished to compromise. The Russians, through an extraordinary mission and 
subsequent invasion, sought to obtain what they wanted. The Russian government 
declared that the invasion of the Principalities should not be viewed as aggression 
against the Ottoman Empire, and the European powers generally accepted this 
understanding. Russia waited for a peaceful solution to the diplomatic crisis 
throughout the summer. While the Ottomans accepted the Vienna note with some 
amendments, the Russians found the Ottomans’ amendments unacceptable, and the 
crisis became graver. Thus, the first stone of the fire was set by the French by 
opening up discussion of the Holy Lands, and the Russians escalated the crisis 
through their uncompromising stance. However, it was the Porte that initiated 
hostilities. The destruction of the Ottoman fleet changed the nature of the war. The 
naval assault was perceived as a matter of prestige and honor for Britain and France 
as much as it was perceived as a major defeat for the Ottomans.  
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Anderson, the author of a prominent book on the Eastern Question, claims, 
“The Crimean War was thus the outcome of a series of misjudgements, 
misunderstandings and blunders, of stupidity, pride and obstinacy rather than of ill 
will. More than any great war of modern times, it took place by accident.”201 
Actually, the European diplomacy never lost its pace. Numerous notes and plans 
exchanged hands in European diplomatic circles, but the parties could not find a 
middle ground. As all great powers were reluctant to engage in war, many believed 
that peace would prevail. Even after the declaration of war by the Porte, Cowley said, 
“I confess I do not think matters are made much worse by the declaration of war, 
unless it leads to hostilities, which is hardly possible.”202 However, a few months 
later, the naval powers would follow the example of the Ottomans and declare war 
on Russia. In the spring of 1854, the war had already evolved into a European war. 
Personal relations between European leaders and diplomats and trust in the concert 
of Europe resulted in exaggerated optimism about the prospects for peace. 
The war cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, but failed to resolve 
the Eastern Question. The Russian military might soon threaten the Ottoman Empire 
once again. Therefore, in retrospect, it is commonly accepted that the Crimean War 
was unnecessary and useless. However, although the war resolved little, it was 
waged for something significant. The stakes were high when the European powers 
entered the war. The Eastern Question arose mainly from the strength of Russia and 
the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, combined with the strategic importance of the 
Ottoman territories, especially the Straits, and the fact that they could fall into the 
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Russian hands putting Russia in a very strong position and changing the balance of 
power in Europe. 
Which power was most responsible for the war: was it Russia, with its hawkish 
policy towards the Ottoman Empire in general but a pacifist strategy at the last 
minute, or the Ottoman Empire, which pursed a conciliatory foreign policy in general 
but declared war against a power that had already invaded some of its territories? It is 
a matter of perspective. The Emperor always declared that he sought no new rights 
but wanted only to preserve the existing Treaties and the status quo in religious 
matters. What was the status quo, and what were the already existing rights of the 
Emperor? The European diplomats themselves did not have adequate knowledge on 
these points, as was clear in the preparation of the Vienna note. Russia wanted peace, 
but Russian honor and dignity did not allow the Tsar to make real concessions, such 
as the withdrawal of its troops or a declaration that it did not possess protective rights 
over the Ottoman Greeks. After moving forward, it was too difficult for Nicholas I, 
one of the most ambitious leaders of the time, to step back. What then would be the 
foundation for peace? European states wanted peace, but none was open to 
concession or welcomed the increase in another’s power. Therefore, when the status 
quo was altered or questioned, it was not easy to re-establish it. Nicholas I had never 
been as hesitant, unstable and contradictory with respect to the Ottoman Empire as in 
1853-1854. His acts, thinking and character affected the Russian army as well as its 
war strategy and performance during the battles. Various plans were prepared, 
including the conquest of Istanbul and partition of the empire between Russia and the 
other great powers. In 1853, a diplomatic victory, however, was acceptable to the 
Tsar. The lack of an exit strategy for a proud Emperor was the most important 
obstacle to a peaceful end of the diplomatic crisis.  
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Nonetheless, the Ottoman policy-makers could be viewed as rational actors as 
much as their European counterparts. They may have pursued either their own 
interests by securing top official assignments for themselves or the national interest 
by adopting the policies that they considered best for the Ottoman Empire. However, 
they did not just passively follow the policies dictated by the Europeans. In fact, the 
Ottoman choices proved to be more independent and rational than has been depicted. 
This does not mean that the Ottoman government always selected the right option, 
but there was a decision-making process in which the representatives of the Porte 
sought to determine what policies would be in the best interest of the Ottoman 
Empire. The Ottoman institutions possessed many shortcomings. However, the 
historical evidence shows that the Porte pursued a rational and pragmatic foreign 
policy, even though it led to war and imposed a great financial burden. The Porte was 
not taken seriously during the diplomatic crisis and this was one of the major reasons 
for the war. Ottoman decision making has continued to be overlooked in the 
literature, a significant handicap of Crimean War historiography.  
Researchers such as Saab and Badem, who have scrutinized Ottoman 
diplomacy, have uncovered more evidence about the motives behind Ottoman 
decisions. However, the bulk of the literature on the origins of the Crimean War has 
advanced simplistic arguments that the members of the Porte were irrational or 
passive followers of the policies of Redcliffe. To be sure, European diplomacy failed 
to resolve the crisis between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Instead of arguing that 
Redcliffe or Nicholas I was responsible for the war, it is more reasonable to argue 
that the problem was systematic in origin. The Ottoman government was not taken 
seriously, and there was an exaggerated trust in the concert of Europe which together 
decreased Europe’s problem-solving powers.   
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On 12 June, Russia ceased the diplomatic activities with the Porte, and on 15 
June gave an ultimatum. Nicholas I issued his manifesto for the invasion of the 
Principalities on 26 June. On 1
 
November, Russia declared war on the Ottoman 
Empire.
203
 Nicholas wanted and searched for an honorable exit from the war, but this 
unwanted war generalized. The Ottoman government wanted decrease in the Russian 
influence in Istanbul. However, the Porte, by no means, saw the war as the only 
possible way of attaining this aim. Actually, a diplomatic settlement was what the 
Porte was looking for. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
TO THE FRONT:  
ARMIES AND LOGISTICS 
 
 
Battles are the visible aspects of war. In fact, preparations for the war and 
logistics in wartime are the key aspects of fighting. Successes in battle depend not 
only on the tactics and strategies employed on the battlefield but also many activities 
behind the front. The health and the morale of the soldiers, relations between 
civilians and the army, and the realization of military strategies all necessitated 
efficiency of non-combat activities such as supply, transportation, and 
accommodation. Thus, this chapter will discuss the war preparations of the Russian 
and the Ottoman armies. One section discusses Russo-Ottoman encounters on the 
Danube. Another section describes the terrain and local population, which are 
important for understanding the war activities.   
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4.1. An Ever-Losing Army: Russo-Ottoman Confrontations in the 
Balkans (1768-1829) 
The Ottoman Empire was plagued by the military superiority of Russia from 
the last quarter of the 18
th
 century until its collapse. Neither the age-old professional 
Janissary corps nor the universally conscripted Nizam forces of the 19
th
 century 
proved to be a remedy for the power imbalance. As time passed and the pressure 
mounted further, the Ottoman State was only able to survive through uncompensated 
territorial loses. After each war, either a minority achieved new rights or a certain 
territory was split away. By the end of the 18
th
 century, the Black Sea was no longer 
an Ottoman lake. Akyar, a Crimean Tatar village on the Crimean peninsula, had been 
transformed into the formidable military port of Sevastopol, while the modest 
fortress of Hocabey was styled as one of the most important port-cities of the time, 
i.e., Odessa. Meanwhile, Russia, having already secured the northern coast of the 
Black Sea, sought to move further south. The seizure of the Straits, however, would 
distort the European balance of power. Therefore, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, 
which experienced difficulty in hindering the Russian expansion in the 18
th
 and the 
19
th
 centuries, was one of the foremost subjects of European diplomacy.  
The forward advance of the Russian army into Ottoman lands was also 
reflected in the titles of the Russian commanders. The title of Zadunaiskii, adopted 
by Pyotr Rumyantsev after the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty, well demonstrated the 
Russian army’s first crossing over the Danube. The title of Aleksandr Suvorov – 
Rymnikskii - signified his victory in Rymnik. Grigorii Potyomkin’s conquest of the 
Crimea was also commemorated in his title, Tavricheskii. General Diebitsch was 
honored with the surname Zabalkanskii, signifying the advance of the Russian army 
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to the very outskirts of the Ottoman capital. However, the Ottoman Empire had based 
its strategy on containing the Russian advance. Lacking any offensive potential, the 
Ottomans were unable to rout the invading troops and instead had to wait for their 
retreat. Unfortunately, however, such a retreat was only forthcoming after the 
imposition of very harsh treaty conditions or diplomatic, as well as military, 
intervention by the European powers. Although the Ottomans’ wars with their 
northern neighbor brought humiliation and devastation, Russian military power was 
never sufficiently studied and analyzed by the Ottomans, who devoted all their 
energy to domestic reform.  
The reasons for the Ottoman army’s failures against Russia remain worthy of 
attention to understand and explain the evolution of Ottoman military power in the 
19
th
 century. In this regard, the targets and strategies of both armies will be 
discussed, with particular emphasis on the weaknesses and strengths of the military 
establishments of the two rival empires. 
   
4.1.1. The Battleground: the Danube River and the Balkan Range    
Throughout its conflicts with Russia, the theater of operations was always 
Ottoman territory. The Ottoman Empire, completely on the defensive, had to accept 
the wars on its own lands. In the 18
th
 century, the Russian and the Ottoman armies 
first met to the north of the Black Sea, and in time the front moved south. Prior to 
1774, the border between the two empires was the river Bug. After the Treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca, the new frontiers would be the river Dniestr. Russia acquired 
Bessarabia and the critical fortresses of İsmail, Kili (Kiliya) and Reni after the 
Bucharest Treaty of 1812, and the new frontier was then formed by the Prut and the 
82 
 
Danube rivers. The Treaty of Edirne in 1829 awarded Russia the Danube delta and 
critical rights over the Principalities. The Ottoman fortresses on the left bank of the 
Danube were all destroyed.
204
 Russia thus obtained the control over the strategic 
Danube ports on the Black Sea. Clearly, Russia moved from one river to the next 
after each encounter. The Russian naval forces also grew stronger over time. Russia 
acquired Kılburun, Azak, Kerch and Yenikale in the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty, 
thereby destroying the Ottoman monopoly over the Black Sea trade and becoming a 
direct threat to the Ottoman capital. However, the true Russian threat would only 
materialize after the establishment of the port-cities of Odessa and Sevastopol. In 
brief, Russia - a Black Sea power in 1774 and a Danubian power in 1812 – gradually 
increased its impact in the region throughout the 19
th
 century. Conversely, the 
Ottomans lost land and population due to the devastation of the border provinces as a 
result of years-long wars.  
The Russians were much better able to exploit their experiences in previous 
encounters than the Ottomans. The invading Russian armies consulted the fortress 
plans and maps prepared in previous encounters.
205
 By the 19
th
 century, the Russian 
commanders were already accustomed to the Ottoman Balkans. Mikhail Kutuzov and 
Pyotr Bagration, who fought alongside Suvorov during the 1787-1792 War, were 
prominent commanders in 1806-12. Ivan Paskevich and Karl Schilder served in both 
the 1828-29 and the 1853-56 wars. Eduard Todleben, who was present at the siege of 
Silistre in 1854, was to command the siege works in front of Plevne in 1877. On the 
Ottoman side, Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha was one of the most well-known examples of 
a high level commander who participated in more than one war with Russia. He was 
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the Müşir of the Caucasian army during the Crimean War and the commander of the 
Danubian Front in the 1877-78 War, but he failed in both campaigns. No high-
ranking officer in the Ottoman army was able to successfully apply his command 
experiences in the next Russo-Ottoman war. Although each of the Ottoman wars 
with its northern neighbor brought devastation to the Empire, the Ottoman 
government was unable to remedy its failures to obtain information on the military 
power and strategy of its opponent. Conversely, in addition to the valuable 
experiences of their officers, the historical accounts, maps and intelligence the 
Russians retained were helpful in the next encounter.
206
  
Hostilities took place in Bucak, the Principalities and Bulgaria, as well as in 
the north and south Caucasus. Over time, the Danube became the center of 
hostilities. Having strengthened the defense of Istanbul, the Ottomans designated 
Şumnu their headquarters (meşta-yı hümayun) and dispatched troops to various 
fortresses on the Danube. As the Ottomans allocated troops to numerous entrenched 
positions, the Russians did the same to siege and invest them. The Balkans, a direct 
route to the Ottoman capital, was the most strategic theater. Thus, the Ottomans were 
obliged to improve the organization of their armed forces in this region. 
Undoubtedly, after the enemy crossed the Danube, the Ottoman capital was in a 
grave danger. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the river Danube was as much a 
psychological border as it was a strategic one.  
Under the conditions of the 1829 Treaty of Edirne, the Ottomans lost the right 
to construct fortifications in the Principalities. Thereafter, Moldavia and Wallachia 
were transformed into something of a buffer zone, while the Ottoman defense was 
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primarily organized in Bulgaria. During hostilities, the Russian headquarters was 
located in the Principalities, and the Russians governed the territory. Pavel Kiselev in 
1828-1834 and Baron Budberg in 1853-1854 ruled the Principalities, where the rich 
soil and diverse agricultural products of the region facilitated the supply of the 
Russian army. The Porte and European governments were so accustomed to a 
Russian presence in the Principalities that the Russian invasion in 1853 was never 
considered a casus belli.  
It was not possible to cross the Danube - a wide river with a rapid current – 
except at a few points, such as Rusçuk-Yergöğü, Silistre-Kalaraş, Tutrakan-Olteniçe, 
and Vidin-Kalafat. However, the Russian army generally came by way of Satunova-
Çatal island-Tulça and other routes through Dobruja where the Ottoman army was 
unable to take the necessary precautions. This route lacked powerful Ottoman 
fortifications making it easier for the Russian forces to cross the river via pontoon 
bridges. After the loss of the İbrail and İsmail fortresses the Ottomans did not venture 
to construct a fortress in Dobruja of any significance. They allowed the Russian army 
to move through Dobruja, intending to place the major defensive line in front of 
Silistre, in addition to that running from the Danube River to the Vidin fortress in the 
far west. Absent control of the Black Sea, it would have proven extremely difficult to 
locate and supply a significant force in Dobruja. The southern bank of the Danube is 
higher than the northern bank, and hence easier to defend. The Ottoman fortresses 
were also located on the southern bank. Nevertheless, the most important obstacle to 
an invading army was the Balkan Mountains. Beyond the rugged Balkans, there was 
no other geographical barrier of significance. (For more information on the 
geographical characteristics and defensive peculiarities of the region, see, chapter 
3.2). 
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The Russian army succeeded in several battles against the Ottomans, but 
these victories were not easily won. The wars that began in 1768, 1787 and 1806 all 
lasted more than five years. For the Russians to achieve victory, it was first necessary 
to pass through harsh terrain, lay siege to powerful fortresses, defeat several army 
corps, and then contest diplomatic negotiations. In these wars, the Russians were 
unable to approach Istanbul, and absent a threat to the Ottoman capital, the Porte was 
unwilling to sign an unfavorable treaty. The Russian Empire sacrificed substantial 
blood and treasure in these wars. When explaining the failure to conclude a peace 
treaty in the 1806-12 War, the British historian Anderson asserts: “But the Turks, in 
spite of their military weakness, showed their usual stubbornness when there was any 
question of their having to cede territory.”207 
Therefore, the Russians sought to act speedily and impose a peace treaty on 
the Ottomans. Strategies were developed in St. Petersburg to land a heavy and 
decisive blow on the Ottoman defenses, as the Ottomans had the advantage of 
geographical depth. The Ottomans trusted in their geographic advantage when the 
Janissaries revolted in 1807 and in 1828, when they lacked sufficient time to found a 
new army after the annihilation of the Janissaries.  
As the Russian army drove forward, poor roads prevented rapid movement. 
Meanwhile, the Russian army faced several challenges. Diseases spread among the 
Russian ranks as a result of the change in climate and lack of food and drugs in a 
foreign country, killing more troops than the enemy did. Dobruja, a traditional route 
for the Russians, was not healthy territory. The Russian soldier was not accustomed 
to the culinary tradition of the Principalities and Bulgaria; white bread was hardly 
good for the stomach. Therefore, the cost of the Russian army’s success on the 
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battleground was not a light one. The army of Diebitsch, which had captured Edirne 
in 1829, was in such a bad condition that any advance toward Istanbul seemed 
impossible.
208
 Indeed, in most cases, disease was more of a threat to the Russian 
army than the Ottomans.  
By the 19
th
 century, the geographical depth of the Ottoman state was 
undergoing a steady decline. Each Russian expansion would in turn hasten the 
conclusions of subsequent wars and additional territorial losses. Moreover, steamers, 
trains, the telegraph, and other technological innovations all played a role in making 
the Ottoman capital more accessible. Therefore, the Danubian theater of the second 
half of the 19
th
 century was almost entirely different from that of a half century 
earlier due to changes in logistics and technology. 
  
4.1.2. Military Aims and Strategies  
From the end of the 18
th
 century through the War of 1877-78, the chief 
commonality of confrontations between the Russians and Ottomans was the 
Ottomans’ defensive strategy against a superior enemy. This generalization is also to 
some extent valid for the Crimean War. It can safely be claimed that the Ottomans 
had no strategy to regain any previously lost territory, even after the Crimean War.209  
The aim was simply to stop the Russians on the borders.  
Russia, however, had steadily expanded its territory since the founding of 
Muscovy. The relative weakness of its neighbors played a role in this process. 
Khanates, established after the disintegration of the Golden Horde, were integrated 
                                               
208 Ibid, pp. 70-71.  Chesney, p. 197.    
209 Cevdet Paşa, Tezâkir 1-12, prepared by Cavid Baysun (Ankara, 1991), p. 101.  
87 
 
into the Russian mainland, and a similar fate was shared by various Cossack 
settlements. Subsequently, Poland, Iran and the Ottoman Empire lost territory to their 
expanding northern neighbor. Such expansion also occurred to the east, i.e., in 
Central Asia and the Far East. In a favorable international environment, such as 
during the reign of Catherine II, Russia acquired vast amounts of territory. Moreover, 
the Russians has arrived at the very gates of the Ottoman capital in 1829 and 1877, 
but the threat of Napoleon’s army in 1812 and French and British forces in 1854 
precluded the Russians from waging a war against the Ottomans in the manner they 
would have preferred. The loss of Istanbul would, however, might have distorted the 
valuable balance of power in Europe; therefore, Russia never dared undertake such 
an initiative.    
The aim of Russian Empress Catherine II to establish a Greek Empire, with 
Istanbul as its capital, provides an excellent picture of the relationship between these 
two states. Russian Empress christened one of her grandsons Constantine, planning 
to place him atop the throne of the envisioned Greek state. According to another 
project, Dacia or the Principalities would be united under the suzerainty of Russia. 
This state would be ruled by Grigorii Potemkin, one of the favorites of the 
Empress.210 Although these projects and various plans to capture Istanbul proved 
futile, they clearly displayed the aims and desires of the Russian government. Russia 
considered the newly acquired territories an opportunity to develop agriculture and 
trade and expand Russian culture. The names Özü, Turla and Bucak were replaced 
by Russian or pseudo-Greek names as a clear sign of the 
Christianization/Russification of the northern shores of the Black Sea and the vast 
plains, which were then known as Kipchak steppes. These lands were generally 
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organized under the name of Novorossiya (New Russia), and the borders of New 
Russia were drawn and re-drawn over the course of the Russo-Ottoman wars and 
European diplomacy.  
However, in the Caucasus, the Russians fought not only against the 
Ottomans, but also against Iran on the banks of the Caspian Sea and against 
numerous tribes in the Northern Caucasus. In the Northern Caucasus they advanced 
by erecting fortress-towns, i.e., Mozdok, Groznyi, and Vladikavkaz, which served as 
forward outposts. The construction of the Georgian military highway and the 
protectorate of Georgia further increased Russian influence in the region. Endless 
fights with mountaineers prepared an army of experienced military units. However, 
as the Russians had to retain some of these units in the mountains, they were forced 
to fight the Ottomans with meager forces. Yet victory was always on the side of the 
Russians.  
Each war strengthened the Russians for the next encounter. Conversely, the 
Ottoman government was only able to repair the previously inflicted damage: it had 
to rebuild fortifications, equip them with new guns and weapons, and raise new units. 
The Ottomans lost population and territory and paid large sums in reparations. The 
first stage of the reformation of the Ottoman army, which accelerated after the wars 
of 1768-74 and 1787-92, was to continue until 1826 when the Janissary corps was 
abolished and many of Janissaries were physically annihilated. The military 
reformation accelerated after the establishment of the new army in 1826, continued 
until the collapse of the Empire. However, the Ottomans’ actions were all ad hoc and 
lacked sound military planning in view of possible moves of the enemy. Military 
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units, assigned to a vast region, moved as independent units with hardly any proper 
tactics or organization. Thus each fort was left to its fate during hostilities.  
Obviously, the Russian army better analyzed its enemy. As the battles were 
waged in Ottoman lands, the Russians attached particular importance to ascertaining 
the topography and making contact with the local Christian population, i.e., 
Georgians and Armenians in the Caucasus, and Serbians, Greeks and Bulgarians in 
the Balkans. The Ottomans made scarcely nearly all attempts to research and develop 
precautions against the Russian threat. Several domestic problems hindered the 
Ottomans’ ability to initiate such a project. Only overwhelming necessity in the event 
of an imminent war forced them to obtain information on the enemy, generally 
through contacts in European capitals.
211
 Therefore, there was a clear imbalance in 
the pre-war intelligence efforts of the two antagonists. (See, Chapter 5.1) The 
Ottomans failed to necessary investments in defensive preparations: the forts and 
other fortifications were neglected until war appeared imminent. Therefore, the army 
was not always prepared to respond to a sudden enemy attack. For instance, in 1828 
the Russian army passed quickly over Dobruja, and General Gurko easily captured 
the strategic Shipka pass in 1877.  
In short, the Russian army sought to achieve an easy and quick victory to 
force the Ottomans to come to a favorable agreement. The Ottoman army, in turn, 
strived to halt the enemy but was rarely able to succeed in forming an organized 
order of battle. 
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4.1.3. The Armies 
During the second half of the 18
th
 century, the Ottoman army, composed of 
Janissaries and traditional cavalry units, was no match for the Russian army. 
Protecting the borders of an empire would require a more efficient military 
organization. In 1826, Janissary corps was annihilated, but the formation of a new 
army demanded money and time. Unfortunately, however, subsequent wars did not 
provide such a favorable environment. Although the new Ottoman army was more 
advanced in many respects, the superiority of the Russian army in terms of quality 
and quantity could not be overcome.  
Manpower was the primary strength of the Russian army. As Russia 
expanded, the size of its military increased: they were 446,000 soldiers in 1801, 
597,000 in 1812, and 859,000 by 1850.
212
 The Russian army had expanded to 31,954 
officers and 1,742,343 privates by 1856. When including irregulars, this number rose 
up to 2,500,000. However, most of them were raw recruits with insufficient 
training.
213
 During the Crimean War, Russia was the largest land power in the world 
while having the lowest equipment and conscription expenses.
214
 In the 19
th
 century, 
serfdom facilitated the recruitment of soldiers, while the demand for officers was met 
by the aristocracy, particularly the Baltic Germans. In other words, the Russian army 
had the capacity to pay for the losses of a war, while the Ottomans gradually lost the 
potential to build a large army. Staffing the army was to exhaust the Ottoman 
Muslim population throughout the 19
th
 century.  
                                               
212 John Shelton Curtiss, Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1825-1855 (Durham, 1965), p. 108; 
Lyubomir G. Beskrovnyi, Russkoe voennoe iskusstvo XIX v. (Moscow, 1974), p. 6; Bruce W. 
Menning, “The Imperial Russian Army, 1725-1796”,  in The Military History of Tsarist Russia, 
prepared by Frederick W. Kagan and Robin Higham (New York, 2002), p. 64. 
213 Robert F. Baumann, “The Russian Army 1853-1881”, in The Military History of Tsarist Russia, 
prepared by Frederick W. Kagan ve Robin Higham ( New York, 2002), p. 138.  
214 Chesney, p. 276.  
91 
 
The Ottoman army was numerically small relative to the Russian war 
machine, but interestingly, in battle it often seemed to have superior numbers. This 
was the natural result of the structure and formation of the Ottoman military. The 
bulk of the army was composed of untrained, irregular corps that could easily 
disperse during battle. Those irregulars, who were not punished for disorderly and 
mutinous behavior, would then join new military formations. In short, the appearance 
and disappearance of the irregulars created an inflated image of Ottoman numbers. 
However, the number of men on the battlefield could not lead to victory if they were 
simply unqualified and undisciplined warriors.  
Even after the establishment of the new army under Mahmud II, the irregulars 
continued to be the largest component of the Ottoman forces on the battlefield. 
Moreover, the redif, or reserve troops of the new army, were also inferior to the 
trained nizam forces. Obviously, the Ottoman government was more interested in the 
quantity than the quality of its troops as sheer numbers was a more attainable target, 
especially during the war. However, such crowds assembled under brief time 
constraints were no match for a powerful enemy. These undisciplined troops could 
not hold the line against the discipline and timidity of the enemy, thus also 
destroying the defensive potential of the regulars. This proved important on the 
Caucasus front, where the irregulars could not be efficiently employed in the war 
effort. The difference in the quantities of trained and disciplined troops on the 
battlefield was thus one of the main reasons for the power imbalance between the 
Russian and Ottoman armies.   
Another difference between these two armies was the Ottomans’ desperate 
need for officers. The system of promotion in the Ottoman Empire was essentially 
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based on patronage rather than competence. The Ottoman system for promotion and 
commission was also poorly developed. Therefore, capable commanders were rarely 
promoted to higher ranks. European observers commented that the quality of an 
Ottoman officer decreased as his rank increased, because as personal relationships in 
Istanbul generally determined who would receive higher positions in the army 
command. Prominent figures in the Ottoman capital could be assigned as Serasker or 
Kaptan-ı Derya without any concern for their level of professional knowledge, which 
was a clear sign of a lack of planning by the military hierarchy. Bureaucratic rivalries 
and personal disagreements could frequently be observed in the Ottoman army and in 
the other branches of the bureaucracy. On some occasions, commanders failed to 
come to the aid of their comrades in arms, obviously waiting for their failure. 
Systemic failures prevented development of the skilled and capable soldiers and 
commanders necessary to successfully conclude a war, and instead simply delayed 
the final defeat.  
There were sufficient officers holding the rank of ferik, but the need for 
officers in the lower ranks, i.e., miralay (colonel) and binbaşı (major), was desperate. 
The Military School (Mekteb-i Harbiye) graduated its first class just before the 
Crimean War. Yet throughout the 19
th
 century, officers from the ranks (alaylı) 
comprised the major section of army command.215 Moreover, military theory, 
strategy and history were never taught adequately; graduates thus only had a basic 
understanding of engineering. Attempts were made to compensate for the domestic 
shortage of officers by appointing foreign officers. However, not all European 
officers were as qualified as Helmuth von Moltke and Adolphus Slade. Many of 
these officers were also incompetent figures, if not charlatans. Most important, these 
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officers could not assist in the development of a modern Ottoman military. 
Obviously, the Russian officer corps was much better.  
The Ottomans eventually modernized their army; unfortunately, however, 
they were unable to develop a working modern army. The shortage of officers was 
only one aspect of the problem. There were several other structural weaknesses. For 
instance, Ottoman troops were not organized in a real sense into any formation larger 
than a tabur or battalion. The alay (regiment) and liva (brigade) existed in name 
only. Different battalions were combined according to wartime demands, and 
soldiers were strangers to one another were assembled to form an order of battle. 
There was also little coordination of duties among the various commanders. This 
means of organizing troops, unsurprisingly, caused various difficulties during battle.  
In 1853, the Russian army published a guidebook in Bucharest explaining 
how to fight the Ottomans. The manual, which comprised 33 articles, explained 
several weaknesses of the Ottoman forces in detail: “When Turks attack they 
approach from different directions; they attempt to strike from the rear and wings at 
once. They believe that they can frighten us by striking from different directions, and 
act thus in such a foolish way. Therefore, we always defeat Turks on the 
battlefield.”216 It was emphasized that the Russian forces should be arranged in close 
proximity if possible: “… to protect a position against a Turkish force, which is ten 
times more powerful than ours, is easier than to retreat from a weaker Turkish force 
when they attack like eagles.” According to the Russian command, the easiest path to 
                                               
216 Rukovodstvo dlya boya protiv Turkov (Bucharest, 1853), p. 5.  
94 
 
victory was, to wait for an Ottoman attack and then to repulse it in full battle 
formation.
217
  
In the event, small Russian forces in tight formations easily defeated the 
Ottoman forces, which primarily relied on personal courage. The Ottoman forces 
were numerically superior to the enemy, but in many cases, they broke and gave 
ground when facing regular gun and musket fire. Poorly planned maneuvers and 
grave mistakes on the part of commanders destroyed several initiatives. The Ottoman 
army command’s lack of confidence continued after the establishment of the new 
army. A report sent to Istanbul, dated 1829, stated that an open battle was dangerous 
for the Ottomans.218 Similarly, in 1853, Ömer Lütfi Pasha, the commander of the 
Rumelian army, was warned to exercise caution in every action because the state has 
no other army to protect the Balkan front and the capital.
219
  
As a result of the lack of capable commanders and trained cavalry, the 
Ottomans could not develop offensive operations. Abstaining from an open field 
battle with the Russians, the Ottoman army was thus completely depended on 
fortified defenses. If the fortresses fell, thousands of Ottoman defenders would be 
taken captive and supplies that had been gathered under difficult conditions would be 
handed over to the enemy.     
However, the Ottoman army was better in some respect than its Russian 
counterpart. In the 18
th
 century, for instance, the Ottoman light cavalry was 
unparalleled. In the next century, the power of Ottoman guns gradually increased and 
the Ottoman artillery performed exceptionally in several encounters. In addition, the 
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nizam infantry was always praised for its discipline, courage and strength. Moreover, 
the Ottoman government spent large sums of money when security of the state was at 
stake: The Ottoman army employed the latest military hardware, as minié rifles 
during the Crimean War and Krupp guns in 1877. The Russian army was also far 
from perfect: corruption, favoritism, drunkenness, and gambling were some of the 
major problems in the Russian army command, where incapable officers were 
widespread. Moreover, the Russian army often initiated campaigns without 
completing the necessary planning and preparations: the failures against Iran in 1826 
and the Ottomans in 1828 were the result of such shortcomings.  
The question of why the Ottoman army failed to halt the Russians should be 
answered by considering several variables, military, economic and political. The 
military performance of these two states did not only concern the power and 
capabilities of armies. The active and potential resources of Russia were much 
greater than what the Ottomans possessed; the Russian army was thus supported by 
much greater material capabilities. In a period when central authority was in decline, 
financial discipline was lost, and mismanagement infected many branches of the 
state, degradation in the army was only an aspect of the Ottomans’ systemic troubles. 
A modern army could be established alongside industrial production, technical 
schools, transportation, etc. Therefore, the Ottomans’ newly established army would 
not be able to protect the state.220 
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4.1.4. The Wars 
In the last thirty years of the 18
th
 century, the Ottoman state, not only 
experienced numerous domestic difficulties, but had to wage two long and costly 
wars against Russia. As these wars clearly revealed, without an army capable of 
resisting the Russian threat, the security of state was merely a delusion. The 
reformation and reorganization of the Ottoman army thus accelerated despite the 
domestic resistance of the Ottoman bureaucracy and the janissaries. Yet reactionary 
forces were able to succeed in preventing any substantial military reform for decades.  
The 1768-74 War was a complete blunder for the Ottomans. It was clear that 
the Ottoman army lost the initiative on the battlefield. Moldovancı Ali Pasha was 
defeated before the strategic Hotin fortress in 1769. In the following year, Russian 
forces commanded by General Rumyantsev demonstrated their superiority on the 
battlefield, at both Larga and Kartal (Kagul). According to Russian sources, the 
Russians, who defeated a 50,000 Ottoman infantry and 100,000 cavalry at Kartal, 
comprised only of 25 thousand men.
221
 The Ottoman army under the command of 
old and incapable grand viziers employed improper tactics. Having failed to take the 
necessary precautions before the war or assist on another in wartime, the Ottoman 
forts fell one by one. Lacking reinforcements, and as sorties proved to be failures, 
Hotin, Bender, İsmail, Akkerman, İbrail, and Yergöğü surrendered. Although some 
of the fortresses, such as İbrail, capitulated on the condition of a free exit, most of 
them provided large numbers of prisoners for the enemy. At Bender alone, 12,000 
Ottoman soldiers were taken prisoner. It was the first time that a Russian army 
crossed the Danube River. After the war of 1768-74, the Ottoman government 
assigned much greater importance to the defense of the Danube, and possible 
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crossings were fortified. The fortresses of İsmail, İbrail and Silistre, which were 
significantly improved with advanced defenses, became the keys of the Ottoman 
resistance on the Danube in subsequent encounters.  
Ottoman performance at sea was no better. A Russian fleet, which moved 
from the Baltic Sea and passed Gibraltar under the command of Graf Aleksei Orlov, 
encountered Ottoman battleships in the Aegean Sea. In one of these encounters, the 
Ottoman navy was defeated near the island of Sakız (Chios) and sought shelter in 
Çeşme bay. The Russians destroyed the Ottoman fleet there, which was not only a 
sign of the Ottoman negligence, but also of the Russians’ sound strategic planning. 
The Russian navy proved as much a military threat to the Ottomans as the Russian 
army, despite there being no Russian military port on the Black Sea as yet. 
Moreover, some islands would remain under Russian occupation until the peace 
treaty was signed, and the Russians found time to foster strong ties with the Ottoman 
Greeks. Relations between the Russian army and the Ottoman reaya were to develop 
further during the coming Russo-Ottoman wars, and Russia was to play a major role 
in the emergence of the independent Balkan states. In the 1806-12 and the 1828-29 
wars, the Russian navy would again appear at the gates of the Dardanelles.  
The Russian army repeated its success in the War of 1787-92. It captured the 
fortresses of Hotin, Akkerman, Bender, İsmail and İbrail, where thousands of 
Ottoman soldiers were lost. At İsmail alone, which fell in 1790, more than 30,000 
Ottoman soldiers were slaughtered. Admittedly, the ruthlessness of General Suvorov 
was no less responsible than his successes on the battlefield. The Ottoman forces 
were also defeated in the open, at Fokşan and Rymnik. The Russo-Ottoman 
confrontation had for the first time extended to the Caucasus in a real sense. After the 
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loss of the Crimea, the Ottomans strengthened the fortresses of Anapa and Soğucak 
to prevent any Russian move toward the south. However, these strong forts also 
proved incapable of hindering the Russian advance. Anapa fell, and Battal Pasha’s 
expedition on the banks of the Kuban River ended scandalously. The site would later 
be named after the defeated Ottoman Pasha Battal Pasha, hence - Batalpashinsk. 
After the Treaty of Jassy in 1792, the Porte accepted the Russian annexation of the 
Crimea, and thus the northern shore of the Black Sea was totally lost. 
On the eve of the 19
th
 century, the unparalleled rise of Napoleon changed the 
European map dramatically. He represented a grave danger for both Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire, and they therefore agreed to an alliance in 1798 and in 1805. 
Nevertheless, due to the political volatility of the era, a new Russo-Ottoman war 
broke out in 1806. As in the previous encounters, the Hotin, Bender, Akkerman and 
Anapa fortresses soon fell into the hands of the Russians. The Ottoman forces were 
defeated at Obileshti in 1807 by General Mikhail Miloradovich. Moreover, the 
resistance of the forts of İsmail and İbrail was also broken. The Russian army was 
then active on both the right and left banks of the Danube River. The struggle also 
continued in the South Caucasus. The hostilities in Kars and Ahıska demonstrated 
the wide geographic expanse of the conflict. 
Alexander I, the Russian tsar, assigned several of his commanders to end the 
prolonged hostilities: Miloradovich, Prozorovskiy, Bagration, Kamenskiy and 
Mikhail Kutuzov commanded the Russian army. General Kutuzov, after defeating 
the Ottoman forces in 1811, returned to the north of Danube. In an attempt to rout the 
Russians, the Ottoman forces under the command of Ahmed Pasha crossed the 
Danube into Wallachia. However, unexpectedly for the Ottomans, the Russians 
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captured Rusçuk, cut the Ottomans’ contacts with their rear, and established a proper 
blockade of the Ottoman forces in Slobodze. Having faced the winter cold, 12,000 
Ottoman soldiers were forced to surrender to the enemy. The Russians thus 
neutralized a large portion of the Ottoman army without fighting a battle.
222
 This was 
the last significant move of the Ottomans toward the north bank of the Danube River.  
By 1812, the Russians had captured Rusçuk and Silistre on the Danube, and 
Sohumkale and Soğucak in the Caucasus and thereby demonstrated their strength on 
both fronts. Moreover, the Russian navy, active in the Aegean Sea under the 
command of Admiral Senyavin, appeared in front of the Dardanelles. While one of 
the Russian fleets threatened the Dardanelles, the light fleet active in the Danube 
achieved successes in front of Rusçuk and Silistre. Moreover, an attack on Istanbul 
was discussed as a military option in the Russian capital. However, the prolonged 
war ended in view of the imminent French threat in 1812, and Russia agreed to sign 
the Treaty of Bucharest, by which it acquired Bessarabia and secured Serbian 
autonomy. It was the last war in which the Janissaries fought.  
After a few years Napoleon was defeated and Russian troops were among the 
Allied armies that entered Paris. Russia then acted as the gendarmerie of Europe, and 
suppressed any idea of revolution or change. However, its conservatism did not 
extend to the Ottoman lands. Therefore, and unsurprisingly, the Greek revolt and 
subsequent events ignited a new Russo-Ottoman war. The Ottomans, lacking a real 
army in 1828, were nonetheless able to stop the Russian forces.  
                                               
222 According to Beskrovnyi, a famous Soviet historian, the Russian operation in Rusçuk in 1811 was 
one of the best examples of the Russian tactical and intelligence superiority. Beskrovnyi, Russkoe 
voennoe iskusstvo XIX v., pp. 76- 77. 
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In the spring of 1828, a Russian army of 115,000 men under the command of 
Peter Wittgenstein was deployed in the Principalities. Isakçı and Tulça were unable 
to mount a defense, and the Russians easily crossed the Danube and passed Dobruja. 
Maçin, Hırsova, and Köstence were quickly invaded; the invaders secured 
ammunition and supplies. The fortress of İbrail, however, repulsed the Russians and 
and heavy casualties. The fortresses of Silistre and Varna were also firmly defended. 
The garrisons made several sorties to disrupt the enemy. However, with no 
reinforcements on the way, the defenders ceded İbrail on the condition of free 
passage to Silistre. As the Ottoman navy was destroyed at Navarin in 1827, the 
Russians enjoyed complete control over the Black Sea and were able to provide total 
logistical support to the Russian land army via the Black Sea. Enjoying the support 
of its navy, the Russian army captured the fortress of Varna, where 6,000 Ottoman 
soldiers including Yusuf Pasha were taken prisoner. The capitulation of Varna, 
which cost more than 5,000 casualties, was the Russians’ only significant success in 
1828.  
In 1829, General Diebitsch took command of the Russian army, while the 
Ottoman command was entrusted to Mehmed Reşid Pasha. The Russians were able 
to capture Silistre after only the third siege attempt. A total 6,500 men were taken 
prisoner, and Ottoman casualties totaled approximately 9,000 men, killed and 
wounded. The Russians took more than 250 guns in the capture of this fortress. A 
proper blockade of Şumnu, Ottoman army headquarters, proved difficult, as the outer 
redoubts were spread over an extensive area. Therefore, the Russian army, having 
left some forces before Şumnu to monitor the fortress, preferred to advance. 
Meanwhile, the Ottoman army suffered a heavy defeat at Külefçe, where blunders in 
open battle were evident. The Russians, who could not be defeated in any significant 
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encounter, did not halt until their arrival at the city of Edirne. Moreover, Edirne, 
occupying a strategic location on road to Istanbul, surrendered without making any 
effort at defense. Such was the situation in the Balkans. In the Caucasus, the active 
Russian army comprised only 20,000 men. Such a small force proved sufficient to 
proceed as far as the city of Erzurum. Ottoman military’s performance in the 
Caucasus was much worse than in the Balkans.  
The presence of Russian troops in Edirne caused a panic in the capital. 
However, the army’s ranks, diminished by disease, were hardly capable of posing a 
threat to Istanbul. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Edirne was signed in line with Russian 
demands. This treaty provided for the foundation of a Greek state, and the Ottomans 
lost their rights to the eastern Black Sea coast. Moreover, the control of the Danube 
delta was ceded to Russia. All forts and fortifications north of the Danube River were 
destroyed, never to be re-built. Russia achieved Greek independence, guaranteed 
greater rights for the Serbians, and increased its influence over the Principalities, 
thereby further approached Istanbul.  
This war also demonstrated that the Russians were capable of coming to the 
gates of Istanbul. However, it also revealed that such a daring move could annihilate 
the invading army. The troops, detached from the logistical centers, were subject to 
fatal diseases due to heat and a lack of food and water. Therefore, an invading army, 
having defeated the Ottoman forces and passed through harsh geographical 
conditions, could arrive at the gates of Istanbul with thinned battalions.   
The Russians, who could not be stopped in 1828-29, arrived at Edirne, but they 
also understood that the Ottoman fortresses and the climate of Bulgaria would not be 
easily overcome. It took the Russians two years and tens of thousands of casualties to 
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advance through Bulgaria. With difficulty, Silistre was forced to capitulate, while 
Şumnu remained in Ottoman hands. The surrender of other Ottoman fortifications (as 
in the example of Edirne) was the result of Russian diplomacy or Ottoman failures 
rather than a strategically planned victory. It was clear that Russia needed a large 
army in the Balkans to advance to Istanbul.  
In brief, the Ottomans struggled against an army that was superior in many 
respects. Tactical blunders in battle played a role in Ottoman defeats, and numerous 
defensive advantages could not be exploited to a sufficient extent. Bearing in mind 
that the material capabilities of the Russian government were much greater than 
those of the Ottomans, the possibility of Russian success in a prolonged war was 
high. While Russia could find solutions to its many mistakes and shortcomings by 
sending additional forces or changing commanders, the Porte was hard pressed to 
formulate any strategy that would lead to ultimate success. After the second half of 
the 18
th
 century, each Russo-Ottoman confrontation resulted in the loss of some 
portion of Ottoman territory. Russia not only gained new lands but also imposed the 
material costs of war on the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, each war further weakened 
the Ottomans, and after each one, the Russian army gradually approached nearer to 
Istanbul.  
The Ottoman army, remade after the fashion of the Western military science, 
would find opportunities to prove itself in domestic disturbances. For two decades, 
the Sublime Porte struggled with Egypt under Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Montenegrins, 
the Bosnians, the Kurds and the Druzes. At the end of October 1853, after twenty-
four peaceful years, war erupted between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, on 
the usual fronts of Russo-Ottoman confrontation, i.e., the Danube and the Caucasus. 
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This would be the new army’s first real experience against the empire’s archenemy. 
However, in this case, hostilities would evolve into a European conflict following 
declarations of war by France and Britain on Russia in the spring of 1854. Shortly 
thereafter, in early September 1854, the Ottomans’ allies, who had their own agenda 
of destroying the Russian naval base at Sevastopol, initiated an expedition on the 
Crimean peninsula. Following the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian 
army, all efforts were concentrated at Sevastopol. After the bloody, pitched battles on 
the Crimea (Alma, Balaklava, Inkerman, Gözleve, and Chernaya), a year-long siege 
of Sevastopol, and other minor encounters at Kerch and Kılburun, the Russians 
accepted the peace terms stipulated by the Allied powers at Paris. The Russian threat 
to Ottoman lands ceased for a few decades, and the Ottomans succeeded against the 
Russian army for the first time in nearly a century. Nevertheless, the Crimean War 
was not a classical Russo-Ottoman War, and most of the credit for the victory should 
be given to the French and British armies.  
 
4.2. Theatre of War: A Familiar Geography 
The Principalities and Bulgaria were not terra incognita for Russia or the 
Ottoman Empire. By the mid-nineteenth century, these rival armies had been fighting 
on this landscape for one century and a half. Although these regions were under 
Ottoman rule, St. Petersburg took great pains to study the region, as each war offered 
an opportunity for in-depth research. Advances in topography and statistics would 
only furnish more reliable maps and population surveys in the second half of the 19
th
 
century, and which would not be available until the 1877-78 War. Nevertheless, the 
actual state of the Balkan passes, military highways, and the Ottoman Empire’s 
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defensive preparations were well known to the Russian government by the 
commencement of the Crimean War. 
  
4.2.1. Landscape: Wallachia, Bulgaria, and Dobruja 
The Ottoman army enjoyed numerous advantages at the beginning of the war. 
The proximity and parallel direction of the Danube and the Balkans formed a natural 
military advantage for the Ottoman Empire. Moltke well summarizes the importance 
of geography for the Ottoman system of defense: “The walls of the fastnesses, the 
Danube, and the Balkan, the impenetrable nature of the country, the want of 
subsistence and of means of transport, the climate and pestilence, were the only allies 
of the Turks.”223 The south bank of the Danube commanded the right; it was thus 
easily defended. The Balkans, the most important barrier to the invader, could only 
be traversed through a few passages and practicable roads to move further to the 
south. In the event of a Russian defeat in the Balkan range, active pursuit by the 
Ottoman troops could have cut the Russian army off from its bridges, and it would 
thus be inevitably lost. Therefore, Russia’s aim was to advance across Eastern 
Bulgaria, where the great mountain range ends, as it had reached Edirne in the 
previous war.
224
 
The width of the Danube and the dryness of its banks were important in 
determining where to cross. One of the best crossings on the Danube was from 
Satunova to İsakçı. The Ottomans had also used this route in their northern 
campaigns. İsakçı offered another important advantage for an invading army by 
                                               
223 Moltke, p. 21.  
224 In the next Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, the Russian army was to follow a different strategy 
and move through the highest section of the Balkan barrier.  
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providing cover on both right and left flanks, as it is located between the Danube 
River and the Black Sea.
225
 Throughout Bulgaria and Wallachia, the Danube is 
extremely wide, in many places over a kilometer in breadth. Thus the river could 
only be crossed by means of boats or pontoon bridges. The natural obstacles afforded 
by the river to the passage of troops were supported by a number of Ottoman 
strongholds on the right bank: Vidin, Niğbolu, Ziştovi, Rusçuk, Tutrakan, Silistre, 
Hırsova, Maçin, İsakçı, and Tulça, all situated at points where the Danube might 
otherwise have been crossed.  
As the first barrier to the Russian advance was the Danube River, and the 
Principalities, located to the north of the river, were open to the invading Russian 
troops.  Despite sharing a common religion with the Russians, the Wallachians were 
not pro-Russian as the previous campaigns had demonstrated that a Russian 
occupation was no better than Ottoman rule.
226
 The suppression of the 1848 
Revolution in Little Wallachia also provoked anti-Russian sentiment among the local 
population. Yet with no resistance from the inhabitants, the Russians were confident 
of “the resources to be derived from this province, and thanks to the inexhaustible 
bounty of nature,” as they had been in the previous war.227 During the Crimean War, 
a tolerable supply of corn and cattle for food and an abundance of hay were at the 
disposal of the Russian army. The only exception was Little Wallachia, the west of 
Wallachia between the Aluta River and Hungary, which was not under the Russian 
control because the territory was too remote from the base of Russian military 
operations. 
                                               
225 Petrov, vol. I, p. 127. 
226 Moltke, p. 32.  
227 Moltke, pp. 32-33. 
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Bulgaria, the territory between the Danube and the Balkan range, was as rich in 
supplies as Wallachia. Besides a production of immense crops of corn and other 
grains, there were abundant resources of cattle and sheep. In Bulgaria, the military 
cities, i.e. Şumnu and Silistre, were predominantly Muslim. The region of Deli 
Orman, or the Wild Forest region, also featured a Muslim population that possessed a 
fighting spirit. However, the north of the Balkans, with the exception of the cities and 
fortresses, was principally Orthodox Christian. The local population of European 
Turkey, which was predominantly Orthodox, was always considered an encumbrance 
for the Ottomans. Most of the Slavic peoples of the Ottoman Empire regarded the 
Russian Empire as their protector. This was also one of the main reasons for the war. 
The Emperor Nicholas I did not wish to lose his prestige and power among the 
Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. However, the Russians were unable to 
find an opportunity to play the nationality card in the Balkans during the Crimean 
War. (See, chapter 5.3) 
Bulgaria and Wallachia were wealthy territories, and thus the local populations 
were far from poor. Thus, the armies could be well supplied in the region. 
Cunningham, the British vice-consul at Kalas (Galatz), expresses the financial 
conditions of the Bulgarian peasants. 
The material position of the Bulgarian Christian Peasantry is probably better 
than the position of the Peasantry of any country in Europe. Their cottages are 
sufficiently large and comfortable; it is true they have no furniture in them 
excepting two or three copper pots for cooking and some quilts for sleeping on 
and covering themselves with at night. They are well and warmly clothed with 
home made cloth. They have oxen for the Plough and cows to give milk, 
besides sheep & abundance of Poultry, Fowls, Turkeys, Geese & Ducks, also 
wheat flour for Bread. In no place during my late tour did I observe any 
scarcity of any of these articles. No doubt I was generally lodged in the best 
and richest house in the village, but still I could see the yards of the other 
houses equally well stocked. It must also be observed that the country people 
are all equal, each having his portion of land around the village and cultivating 
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it in families. There are no Gentlemen Farmers and no labourers. No 
proprietors excepting some Turkish Beys.
228
 
 
The climate of Dobruja, the region between the lower Danube and the Black 
Sea, was differed from those in the Principalities and Bulgaria. Thinly populated 
Dobruja, a traditional route of the Russian army to the right bank of the Danube 
River, was experiencing shortages of all types of supplies. The region thus presented 
substantial obstacles for the Russians. As Dobruja was entirely without springs or 
streams, and there was hardly any land under cultivation, it was difficult to find 
water and supplies. On many occasions, this unhealthy region proved more 
dangerous for the Russian army than the Ottoman defenders. According to Chesney, 
the most important impediment to the advance of the Russian army was to supply its 
forces in a country where most of the provinces were thinly populated and the roads 
were generally impracticable. “Therefore”, he notes, “the supply of the army rather 
than the march of the soldier is the question to be solved for a further move of the 
invading army through the Balkan passes.”229 
The variability in the weather conditions had also a treacherous effect on the 
health of troops. Authors of a book on the military geography of the Balkans were 
right in claiming that “The records of the various campaigns in Bulgaria are filled 
with accounts of the decimation of armies by disease.”230 Four seasons had all their 
own threats on the life of the soldiers:  
                                               
228 “Charles Cunningham to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, on the general state of the Christians in 
Bulgaria, Galatz, 9 February 1855”, The National Archives, London (Hereafter TNA) FO 195-444, p. 
338.  
229 Chesney, pp. 53-54.  
230 Lionel W. Lyde and A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, A Military Geography of the Balkan Peninsula 
(London, 1905), p. 68. 
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The low swampy ground in the vicinity of the Danube is unhealthy in the 
summer months; and here, as also in the Balkans, the great difference of 
temperature between day and night would be likely to cause much sickness 
among troops in the field. When the autumn rains fall (September), the 
parched-up country gives forth a steamy heat; and the decaying vegetation 
washed down by the streams pollutes the water and the air. Later in the year, 
when the rain gives place to snow, the climate, though more healthy, becomes, 
especially in the mountains, extremely severe. At all seasons the health of 
troops operating in the country must, therefore, be a source of great anxiety, 
for, unless well fed and well clothed, the men will rapidly succumb to 
sunstroke, diarrhea, fevers, and other ailments.
231
  
 
4.2.2. Balkan Passes and Military Highways  
Throughout the Balkans, the roads were nearly impassable in wet seasons, a 
logistical impediment for both invading and defending armies. Therefore, a military 
operation of any significance could only be carried out in the spring or summer.  
The Greater Balkans, the mountains from the Serbian frontier to the Black Sea, 
had only a few passages through which an army could advance. One of the major 
passes was İhtiman or Trajan’s Gate in the Greater Balkans on the road from 
Belgrade, through Sofia and Filibe to Istanbul. The other significant pass was Dobral 
in Eastern Bulgaria, on the road from Silistre and Şumnu to İslimye and Karinabad. 
The mountain passes in the Greater Balkans, beginning at Tırnova, should be 
considered secondary as they were impracticable for a large army and presented 
difficulties to maintaining the lines of supply and communication.
232
 The handful 
number of passages through the Balkans limited the options available to an invading 
army and increased the ability of the defending forces to mount a resistance. The 
easiest route in terms of geography was obviously through the Little Balkans from 
                                               
231 Ibid. 
232 However, in 1877 in the following Russo-Ottoman encounter, the Russians would use this road and 
capture Shipka pass to avoid having to capture the Ottoman fortresses. 
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Şumnu, Pravadi or Varna. It was the weakest region in terms of natural defenses. 
However, the Ottoman quadrilateral fortresses represented a man-made barrier to 
prevent the movement of any foreign army through eastern Bulgaria. Therefore, 
before marching through the region, the fortresses of Varna and Şumnu needed be 
captured or screened.
233
 In 1828 and 1829, the Russian forces operated along the line 
from Silistre to Edirne. This was the shortest and most direct route to the Ottoman 
capital and seemed the most natural to the Russian army, which was supported by a 
fleet in the Black Sea.
234
 
1. Trajan’s Gate (İhtiman): From Belgrade to Constantinople through Sofia 
and Filibe 
2. Şıpka Gate: From Tırnova to Filibe through Şıpka 
3. Iron Gate (Demir Kapu): From Tırnova to İslimye 
4. Kazan Gate: From Şumnu to Edirne through İslimye 
5. Dobral Gate (Boğaz): From Şumnu to Edirne through Çalıkavak and 
Karinabad 
6. Nadir Derbent (Kırkgeçit): From Varna and Pravadi to Edirne through 
Aydos  
 
 
4.2.3. Fortresses 
As Moltke rightly asserts, “At all events the Turks in Bulgaria could rely upon 
nothing but the fortified towns on the Danube and along the mountainous range of 
the Balkan.”235 However, during the Crimean War, the Ottomans did not have any 
powerful fortresses at their disposal, save Şumnu, that could long resist the Russian 
army. Varna, Silistre or Rusçuk, although they were first-class military fortifications, 
were not sufficiently powerful to halt a resolute enemy for long. The guns in the 
                                               
233 Chesney, pp. 58-61; Yepanchin, vol. I, p. 361.   
234 For the mountain passes, see A. Jochmus, “Notes on a Journey into the Balkan, or Mount Haemus, 
in 1847”, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London, vol. 24 (1854), pp. 36-85. Lyde and 
Mockler-Ferryman, pp. 48-69; Prim, pp. 116-121. 
235 Moltke, p. 36.  
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fortifications were old, and the batteries required repair. Throughout the summer of 
1853, the Ottomans attempted to ameliorate the defensive weaknesses of the 
fortresses.  
Muslim population near the frontiers was capable of bearing arms. The 
Muslims residing in the Danubian fortress towns were also drilled in canonry. 
Artillerymen, who were sent from Gelibolu and Istanbul, tutored them.
236
  
In the numerous wars waged against their time-honored rival, the Ottomans 
lost several of their strategic and powerful fortresses, i.e., Özü, İsmail, Hotin and 
Bender. As the Ottomans were already on the defensive, the fortresses that fell under 
the Russian control lost their strategic importance and played little role in subsequent 
campaigns. The Edirne Treaty of 1829 also forbade the construction of any 
fortifications in the Principalities; therefore, the once powerful fortresses of Ibrail 
and Yergöğü also lost their military significance. Thus by the Crimean War, all of 
the important fortresses in the Balkans were located on the south bank of the Danube 
River. Vidin, Rusçuk and Silistre on the Danube, Şumnu in front of the Balkan 
range, and Varna on the shores of the Black Sea were the key Ottoman fortifications 
during the Crimean War. 
The strongest fortress of the Balkans was Şumnu - a well-fortified entrenched 
camp in a valley, capable of accommodating a large army. Its position, means of 
communication, and armament enable it to guard all the eastern passes. It is 
surrounded, to the north-west and south, by heights and to the east by a marshy 
ravine, which empties into the Kamchik River. Prim states that there were eighteen 
                                               
236 “Bulgaria, Rustchuk, 29 December (From our Special Correspondent)”, The Times, 7 February 
1854. 
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redoubts with 280 guns, of which 210 were high caliber.
237
 Interestingly, Captain 
Rhodes, who visited Şumnu with General Prim, observed that there were twenty-
three redoubts and a deep ditch protecting the town.
238
 There were twenty-five 
thousand inhabitants, most of whom were Muslim. The garrison consisted of twenty-
five thousand Ottoman troops.
239
 There were two barracks in Şumnu, one for the 
infantry, and one for the cavalry, and a hospital, all built of stone.
240
 In the words of 
Macintosh, “Shumla is regarded as the strongest position in the Balkan range. It 
stands at the junction of several roads, which converge in that direction from the 
right bank of the Danube, and at the mouth of the two principal passes over the 
Balkans, as well as at the head of the valleys through which the Pravadi and 
Kamchik rivers flow towards the Black Sea”.241 Şumnu, being in the direct line to 
Istanbul, had hitherto been the usual rendezvous for Ottoman forces. However, 
Şumnu suffers from the disadvantage of being a nearly open town surrounded by a 
chain of redoubts and other defenses, and as a fortified position, required a large 
body of men to defend it. In 1829, the Russian not only cut off communications 
between Şumnu and Adrianople, but also crossed the mountains and marched there. 
However, if the passes had been properly fortified and moderately defended, this 
might have been prevented. Attempts made at that time to invest the city were, after 
considerable loss, forced to be abandoned. 
The fortress of Silistre was located at a highly strategic position. It was on the 
flank of every possible line of operation against the Balkans. However, the fortress 
was below a commanding ridge, and even the interior could be viewed from the 
                                               
237 Prim, p. 188. 
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241 Macintosh, p. 98.  
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surrounding hills. As Chesney notes, “not only was the position bad, the works were 
bad also. The wall was low, the ditches were shallow, the flanking fire ineffective.” 
Therefore, during the Crimean War the main defense was not the fortress itself but 
the outer redoubts, particularly to the east and south of Silistre. One of those was the 
Arab Tabya, and over the course of the military confrontation on the Danube it came 
to play a principal role in Ottoman efforts to resist the Russian advance. According to 
Woods, “the town was ill provided for a siege – its fortifications, constructed in the 
old style, were sometimes ill placed, and always out of repair.”242 A European officer 
described Arab Tabya as “technically speaking, nothing more than a flêche, 
consisting of a front some fifty paces in length, with flanks about the same extent, 
thrown back at a sharp angle. The rear is entirely open, and was never even 
palisaded.”243  
Varna was the most important fortification in the Ottoman Balkans on the 
Black Sea coast. After the war of 1828-1829 the fortress was not much strengthened. 
According to Jochmus, the weakest side of the fortress was the north-eastern angle, 
as it was exposed to a naval attack.
244
  
Rusçuk was one of the three significant Ottoman fortresses on the Danube 
along with Silistre and Vidin. It was the weakest, despite its well developed trade and 
population of 50,000. In the words of a British observer, “Rustchuk has neither the 
systematic fortifications of Silistre, nor the freedom from territorial disadvantages of 
Widdin, and still less the strong natural position of Shumla.”245 Said Mirza Pasha, the 
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governor of the Province of Silistre, also seated at Rusçuk. He was a well-known 
magnate in Ottoman local government. At the outbreak of war, the fortifications of 
Rusçuk were improved, which transformed the town “from an old tumbledown 
Turkish fortress into a European one on the most scientific principles.”246 The 
correspondent of the Times obviously exaggerated the improvement showing the 
euphoria of the time.  
There were seven bastioned fronts, and the citadel and arsenal were located in 
the western section of the Vidin fortress. Kalafat, a tete de pont, was also important 
for the defense of Vidin. Lom, Niğbolu, Ziştovi, Hırsova, Maçin, Tulça, and İsakçı 
were secondary fortresses on the Danube located at elevated sites to prevent any 
Russian passage to the south of the Danube. While the defensive Ottoman army 
enjoyed these advantages in every encounter with the Russians, there were others 
that were of particular use in the Crimean War. For instance, in contrast to previous 
Russo-Turkish wars, Russia did not have a naval preponderance in the Black Sea, 
even following the destruction of an Ottoman fleet in front of Sinop because of the 
entrance of the French and British navies onto the Black Sea. Therefore, the Russian 
command faced numerous problems supplying its army in the Principalities.
247
 
Gorchakov considered the Russians to be in a more difficult situation in 1853 than 
during the previous war, as French and British aid was imminent. According to 
Gorchakov, even if the Russian army were able to arrive at Istanbul, it would not be 
possible to invade the city due to French and British assistance.
248
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4.3. Ottoman and Russian Armies on the Eve of the Crimean 
War: Aims and Potential 
On the eve of the Crimean War, the Russians were well informed regarding the 
details of the Ottoman army. The total military forces, the commanders, and the 
conditions of the fortifications were properly reported to the Russian capital via a 
military agent in Istanbul. There was also a growing body of literature in Russia 
pertaining to the topography of the Balkans and the Caucasus.
249
 Books or booklets, 
especially penned by the European officers who served in the Ottoman army, were 
useful.
250
 Accordingly, by the commencement of the war the tsar and his 
commanders were well-versed with regard to the Ottoman army, the conditions of 
fortifications in the Balkans and military highways to Istanbul. In view of the 
information that they possessed, the Russians considered their military power 
sufficient to march on Istanbul in a favorable international environment despite the 
recent modernization of the Ottoman army.   
By contrast, the Ottomans, throughout two decades of peace, were devoid of 
any mechanism to attain detailed information on the Russian army. The Ottoman 
government might have employed the Ottoman embassies in European capitals or the 
traditional gateway to the European diplomacy—the various diplomatic agents and 
                                               
249 The articles of Ivan P. Liprandi, the Russian military agent in the Ottoman Empire in 1827, and a 
participant of the 1828-1829 war on the Danubian front, included important details on the topography 
and population of the Ottoman Balkans. See, for instance, Obozrenie prostranstva, sluzhivshego 
teatrom voiny Rossii s Turtsiei s 1806 po 1812 god (St. Petersburg, 1854). Although the book was 
originally prepared in 1841, it was only published during the Crimean War. Many other works of 
Liprandi would be published during the 1877-78 war.  
250 The Russian mission in Berlin translated and dispatched to the Russian capital some parts of 
Zustand der Turkei im Jahre der Prophezeiung 1853, a book written by the Prussian officer Hubert 
von Boehn. RGVIA, f. 450, op. 1, d. 27.  
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spies in Istanbul. Nevertheless, the Ottomans did not possess an embassy, let alone a 
military agent, in Russia. The Porte attempted to obtain information regarding the 
enemy forces only after the escalation of the diplomatic crisis in 1853 and intensified 
its activities when the Ottoman borders were threatened by the Russian invasion of 
the Principalities. In fact, the Ottomans, who were eminently preoccupied with the 
reform process and domestic problems, were not in a position to afford sufficient 
energy for the evaluation of the Russian military power, although it was a direct 
menace to the survival of the empire. Accordingly, there was no notable effort to 
translate foreign literature pertaining to the Russian military establishment. The 
future commanders of the Ottoman army might have been familiar with only 
common facts on Russia obtained during their education in the military schools. Such 
an imbalance in information gathering and dissemination may have caused serious 
troubles in a sudden war. Luckily for the Ottomans, the diplomatic rupture before the 
commencement of the hostilities reserved sufficient time to prepare their army and to 
learn more about the enemy. The pro-Ottoman diplomatic atmosphere in Europe was 
also a valuable asset in covering military and intelligence gaps (see, chapter 5.1.). 
With regard to information gathering and data processing, the Ottoman 
performance was poor even in the case of their own army. The lack of a central 
organ, such as general staff to process data produced by various branches of the 
army, was likely the main reason for ambiguity in the operation of military forces. 
This uncertainty might have also been a deliberate choice because it could offer a 
convenient environment for corruption, which was a common practice in nearly 
every branch of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Regardless of the reason, many of the 
commanders were themselves uncertain, if not totally ignorant, of the number of the 
Ottoman troops under their own command. General Lüders, the Russian commander 
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in Wallachia in 1849, sent information regarding the Ottoman troops, which was 
largely obtained from the Russian Foreign Ministry agents and the Russian spies, to 
the Russian Ministry of War. Nevertheless, General Lüders added the inaccessibility 
of any type of useful information through the Ottoman army in Wallachia. Although 
some of the Ottoman commanders did not convey information to the Russians 
because of their mistrust, most officers were themselves ignorant of the formation of 
their own army.
251
 Another example is more striking. Questions regarding the 
number and quality of Ottoman troops were asked to the high-ranking generals in 
one of the grand councils shortly before the Ottoman declaration of war, but the 
generals merely gave vague answers at this critical juncture.
252
 
Consequently, documents containing numbers and comprehensive lists of army 
units were rare in the Ottoman official records. Ironically, the number of Ottoman 
forces could be more safely determined by relying on foreign sources, including the 
Russians. Thus, statistical information given by European authors or in the memoirs 
of European officers serving in the Ottoman army are helpful in analyzing the 
workings of the Ottoman army. For instance, the reports of Count Osten-Sacken, the 
Russian military agent in Istanbul, are among the most reliable sources of results of 
the Ottoman military reformation on the eve of the Crimean War.   
State almanacs (salnâme) included only the top assignments; there was 
unfortunately no other source to give a full list of Ottoman officers during the 
Crimean War. It was only in 1865-1866 that a comprehensive record of the Ottoman 
military command was prepared; in this record, officers including all ranks from 
müşir to mülâzım-ı sâni (lieutenant) together with those officials who were assigned 
                                               
251 RGVIA, f. 450, op. 1, d. 30, l. 2.  
252 Mesâil, pp. 317-319. 
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to military duties were registered.
253
 In fact, without a useful register, it is extremely 
difficult to follow the Ottoman commanders, most of whom shared the same names. 
Even worse, European officers in the Ottoman service were also re-christened with 
traditional Muslim names. Consequently, confusion regarding commanders has been 
common in the military literature. Without any information regarding the regiment, 
titles or appellations, it is nearly impossible to identify commanders. In fact, the 
nicknames were signs of significance to distinguish the Ottoman commanders. 
Furthermore, there is still no noteworthy source to consult for the biographies of the 
Ottoman commanders.
254
 
Although there are separate histories of various battalions of the European 
armies, the formation and activities of the Ottoman battalion remain a mystery. Daily 
check-lists convey only fragmentary information regarding certain battalions or 
regiments in a certain period.
255
 Official reports primarily included vague accounts, 
especially pertaining to the structure of the forces, referring simply to the number of 
battalions rather than the number of soldiers. The military journal of the war was also 
rudimentary and disappointing with respect to explaining the movements of the army 
units.
256
 Most importantly, the muteness of the Ottoman soldier, who left almost no 
diary or reminiscences, makes it difficult to understand and analyze details regarding 
the Ottoman warfare. 
  
 
                                               
253 Salnâme-i Askeriyye, vol. I (Istanbul, 1282 [1865-1866]).  
254 Sicill-i Osmani gives short biographies of the Ottoman commanders, but this information is 
insufficient for any evaluation of the capabilities of the Ottoman military class during the Crimean 
War.  
255 “Ordu-yu Hümâyûn’un birlik ve kurumlarının günlük yoklama ve iaşe mevcud cedvelleri” They are 
available in various files in the ATASE archive.  
256 Kırım Harbi Hakkında Bir Ruznâme, Library of Turkish Historical Association (Ankara). 
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4.3.1. The Ottoman Army of Tanzimat  
The Ottoman military forces during the Crimean War were composed of four 
different branches: regular and reserve armies, contingents, and irregulars. The 
regular army—Muallem Asâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammediyye (Trained Victorious 
Muhammedan Soldiers)—was founded after the annihilation of the Janissary corps in 
June 1826. However, the early period of the first regular army was not a success 
story. As the Mansure army was transformed into the Asâkir-i Nizamiyye-i Şâhâne 
(Imperial Regular Army—this name was officially introduced in 1841) of the 
Crimean War, lessons had already been learned from the defeats against Russia in 
1828-1829 and against Mehmed Ali Pasha, in 1833 and in 1840. By 1834, there were 
two types of military service—regular and reserve—in the example of the Prussian 
Landwehr. The reserve army was named Asâkir-i Redife-i Şâhâne, or simply redif. 
Redif would maintain order in the countryside in peacetime and would fight in 
wartime along with the nizam. Certainly, the new army was the one that the 
Ottomans had long sought. However, in 1853, the process of building a modern 
military establishment remained incomplete, and according to most of the observers, 
the Ottomans were not yet ready to fight against the arch-enemy.
257
   
The annihilation of the janissaries was not completely affirmative for the 
Ottoman state and society. This event revealed a military and social vacuum that was 
difficult to compensate in the short term. Furthermore, the destruction of the 
traditional standing army and the reforms of Tanzimat alienated various Muslim 
groups who would take a reactionary stand. Bosnia, for instance, not only 
                                               
257 Erik Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice, 1844-1918”, in 
Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia 1775-1925, Erik J. 
Zürcher (ed.) (London, 1999), p. 
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insufficiently contributed to the defense of the Empire against Russia in 1828-1829 
and 1853-1856, but also became a troublesome region as a result of several revolts.   
The Ottoman army of the 1850s was a product of an 1843 decree (Tensikât-ı 
celîle-i Askeriyye) and an 1846 law of recruitment (Kur’a Nizamnâmesi). The five 
corps established in 1843 would be followed by the sixth in 1848. Thus, on the eve 
of the Crimean War, the Ottoman government enjoyed a European-style regimental 
army that was composed of six corps, each commanded by a Müşir.258 
 Headquarters 
The 1
st
 (Hassa or the Guards) Army Üsküdar and İzmir 
The 2
nd
 (Dersaadet) Army Istanbul and Ankara 
The 3
rd
 (Rumelian) Army Manastır 
The 4
th
 (Anatolian) Army Harput 
The 5
th
 (Arabian or Syrian) Army Damascus and Aleppo 
The 6
th
 (Iraq and Hejaz)  Army Baghdad and Hejaz 
Ottoman army corps
259
 
 
According to the law of recruitment, 25,000 men would be taken to the ranks 
every year.
260
 The eligible population was divided by lot; some were registered as 
nizam, and the remainder were classified as redif. Redif was to continue to participate 
in annual lots from the age of 20 to 25. The nizam soldier who completed military 
service was liable to be called to active duty in the reserve during the next seven 
years. Consequently, redif units in the Crimean War consisted of experienced 
soldiers along with inexperienced and partially trained men. Reserve troops may 
have been an excellent solution to form a low-cost army. However, the redif system, 
which required efficient management, was difficult to practice in an empire in which 
                                               
258 Karal, vol. VI, p. 162; Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi 1793-1908, vol. V, pp. 201-202; Der Krieg 
gegen Russland, p. 36; M. A Ubicini, Letters sur la Turquie (Paris, 1853), pp. 450-478.    
259 For the military districts of these forces, see, Ubicini, pp.  453-454; Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde 
Anadolu Kentleri’nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı, p. 314; Heinzelmann, pp. 134-135, 275-279.      
260 Fevzi, p. 8; According to another source 30,000 men would be summoned each year, and same 
number would be registered as reserve troops. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi 1793-1908, p. 203.  
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corruption and poor infrastructure hindered all efforts to summon reservists in 
wartime. Consequently, the redif troops acutely lacked training, equipments, and a 
sufficient number of officers; thus, they resembled local militia rather than regular 
forces.
261
 Most of the observers referred to redif forces as militia, and the regular 
forces were simply referred to as the nizam.  
A corps was composed of six infantry, four cavalry, and an artillery regiment 
along with a sapper company. An additional infantry regiment and a cavalry 
regiment were attached to the Guards and the Rumelian Army. However, the sixth 
army was in its infancy and was composed of only four infantry, two cavalry, and an 
artillery regiment. Each infantry regiment had 4 battalions (including a rifle 
battalion) of 8 companies and 815 men each.
262
 A cavalry regiment was composed of 
6 squadrons, each consisting of 120 men. Finally, an artillery regiment was 
composed of 4 battalions, totaling 72 guns and 1,300 men. Nevertheless, in reality, 
the battalions and squadrons rarely attained the envisaged numbers. Graf Osten-
Sacken claimed that the Anatolian army never reached the planned number of 30,000 
men and that the army contained only approximately 20,000 men.
263
  
Serasker Pasha, who was theoretically commander-in-chief of all six armies 
collectively, acted as the Minister of War. He was also the commander of the 
Dersaadet corps.
264
 Each army (ordu) was commanded by a Müşir (field marshal), 
each division by a ferik (lieutenant-general), each brigade (liva) by a mirliva 
(brigadier-general), each regiment (alay) by a miralay (colonel), and each battalion 
                                               
261 See, Çadırcı, “Redif Askeri Teşkilatı”, in Tanzimat Sürecinde Türkiye: Askerlik (Ankara, 2008), 
pp. 41-55. 
262 Godfrey claimed that a battalion numbered from 800 to 900 men. Rhodes, p. 14.    
263 RGVIA, f. 450, op. 1, d. 44, l. 2ob - 3.  
264 Salname 1270, p. 91. In various sources, it is claimed that Serasker commanded the Hassa, but this 
statement is not true. Karal, vol. VI, p. 162; Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentleri’nin 
Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı, p. 314.   
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(tabur) by a binbaşı (major). To each army, an infantry and a cavalry lieutenant-
general, three infantry, two cavalry, and an artillery brigadier-general were entrusted 
to command the troops. The Rumelian Army was commanded by Ömer Lütfi Pasha, 
first müşir and later Serdar-ı Ekrem (generalissimo). Other high commanders of the 
Rumelian Army included Lieutenant-General Abdi Pasha, Lieutenant-General Avni 
Pasha, brigadier-generals of infantry Salih Pasha, Mustafa Tevfik Pasha and Sadık 
Pasha, brigadier-generals of cavalry Ali Rıza Pasha and Mustafa Pasha, brigadier-
general of artillery İsmail Pasha, brigadier-general of redif Şükrü Pasha.265 Each 
army also possessed its own council of 7 members. The council of the Rumelian 
army was composed of Lieutenant-General Çerkes İsmail Pasha, who was the chief-
of-staff (reis-i meclis). Brigadier-General Derviş Pasha, Colonel Hasan Bey, Colonel 
Selim Bey and Lieutenant-Colonel Dilaver Bey, Mehmed Efendi (a clerk), and 
Nazmi Efendi (an accountant) were the members of the council.
266
  
Councils were established in every section of bureaucracy by Tanzimat 
reforms. Under Serasker, there was a high council of 15 members (Dâr-ı Şurâ-yı 
Askerî). This high council administered all types of military affairs throughout the 
empire with the exception of artillery forces, which were under the supervision of the 
council of Imperial Artillery. Nevertheless, the role of the councils in military 
administration was often ambiguous. Sandwith claims, “In the councils of war which 
preceded the engagement each member made his own proposition, and finally went 
into action with no more definite plan of operations in his own mind than that they 
were ‘to fight the Ghiaours’”.267  
                                               
265 Salname 1269, p. 85.   
266 Salname 1269, p. 82. 
267 Sandwith, pp. 121-122.  
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The reformation was conducted under the guidance of the European advisers. 
The Sublime Porte appeared to follow a balance in employing European experts. 
Whereas cavalry and infantry were entrusted to the French instructors to be 
reorganized according to the French system, artillery was modernized after the 
Prussian school.
268
 British officers and engineers were employed in the Ottoman 
factories and in the Ottoman navy. Moreover, hundreds of Hungarians and Polish 
refugees of the 1848 revolution found opportunities to serve in the Ottoman army 
during the Crimean War. Actually, with the understandable exception of the 
Russians, nearly every nationality in Europe served in various branches of the 
Ottoman armed forces in the middle of the nineteenth century.  
Although the battalion was the basis of the Ottoman military establishment, 
divisions and brigades were no more than theoretical classifications.
269
 Sandwith 
rightly commented on the composition and command of the Ottoman forces: “It is 
extremely doubtful if any officer of the Turkish force understood the meaning of the 
word ‘brigade’, much less could they handle one.”270 In peacetime, battalions were 
entrusted with a distinct duty, and they were not relieved from that duty until their 
removal to another part of the country.
271
 In wartime, battalions from different corps 
might be united as tactical units. Battalions, which were united for certain tactical 
reasons, would obviously cause confusion in the number and strength of the troops 
on the battlefield. This problem represented a significant set-back for the Ottomans 
in managing large forces.  
                                               
268 Heuschling, p. 321.  
269 [Hikmet Süer], p. 36.  
270 Sandwith, p. 121. 
271 Rhodes, p. 91.  
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The Nizam forces used percussion-lock, the redif and irregulars possessed 
flintlock, the first and second squadrons of the cavalry used carbines, and the 
remainder had only lances.
272
 New arms of the latest technology were ordered from 
Europe, but a small number of military personnel were lucky to own them. Those 
personnel were riflemen (şişhaneci), who were armed with French minié shortly 
before the war and were instructed by the French officers. Riflemen were conscripted 
generally from the mountainous people and were likely the best sections of the 
Ottoman infantry.
273
 A British observer stated, “The men are armed with rifles made 
at Vincennes, in France, which were received on the 1
st
 August, 1853... General 
Jiffatte Pacha [Most probably Rıfat Paşa, the chief of staff of the Guards] informed 
us that from 60 to 70 men per hundred hit the target at 1000 yards.”274  
The artillery was of two types: foot and horse. The Ottoman artillerymen were 
always exalted for the excellence of their gunnery.
275
 However, the Ottoman batteries 
all along the Ottoman Black Sea coast and in the capital were in terrible conditions: 
“From the Bosphorus to Batoom on the one hand, and from the Bosphorus to the 
Danube on the other, there was not on the coast of the Black Sea, when war 
commenced, a battery deserving of the name, nor a trained artilleryman, except at 
Varna”.276 The Ottomans would pay dearly when their fleet was destroyed in the 
Sinop Harbor, where the old batteries could not protect the battleships as well as the 
city itself. The Russians calculated that the batteries of the Bosphorus were not 
                                               
272 Gürel, p. 7. 
273 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul [The Ottoman Archives of the Turkish Prime Ministry] 
[Hereafter BOA] İ.DH 17241, 17484, 17554. According to Sandwith these men had been recruited 
almost entirely from the zeybeks, mountaineers inhabiting the area south of Smyrna. 
274 Rhodes, p. 13.  
275 The artillery at Kars fortress was chiefly under the command of Tahir Pasha, who was one of the 
graduates of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. Sandwith, p. 271; Adnan Şişman, Tanzimat 
Döneminde Fransa'ya Gönderilen Osmanlı Öğrencileri (1839 - 1876) (Ankara 2004), p. 8.  
276 Slade, p. 142. 
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sufficiently powerful to resist a Russian a coup de main upon the Ottoman capital. 
European observers shared the same opinion.  
The modernization of the army did not prove successful for building a 
competent regular cavalry. The cavalry was mounted and equipped in the European 
fashion, but horses were small, ill-conditioned and poorly groomed. Even worse, the 
imitation of a European-type cavalry system played a role in the destruction of the 
light cavalry tradition.
277
 The army in the Caucasus depended primarily on tribal 
horsemen, who might be used for outpost duty but could not be trusted for charge. In 
fact, the regular cavalry proved no better than the başıbozuks in the Caucasus.278 
Because there were only 6,000 regular cavalry to fight, the mounted police (zaptiye) 
in the Balkans and the Anatolia were called for active service in the Danubian 
army.
279
 According to Dodd, the Ottoman police were well mounted and armed.
280
 
Most of the regular cavalry were also used on the Danube, along with the zaptiyes 
and the Cossack regiments.  
Most importantly, the Ottoman army lacked a commissariat and a working 
chief of staff, which were necessary for any modern army at that time. The army was 
supposed to be modeled on the French system with a chief of staff, but the staff and 
its respective duties were dubious in the Ottoman corps. The staff officers, despite 
their insufficient numbers, were constantly assigned to commanding duties.  
 
 
                                               
277 Sandwith, p. 230. 
278 Sandwith, p. 105.  
279 ATASE, k. 2, d. 6, f. 13; k. 2, d. 7, f. 12.  
280 Dodd, p. 27. 
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4.3.1.1. Numbers of the Ottoman Troops  
“It is impossible to give an accurate account of the number of men the Turks 
could bring into the field against the Russians”, claimed Colonel Moltke on the 
Ottoman army of the 1828-1829 Russian War.
281
 After explaining the allocation of 
the Ottoman troops, Moltke added, “These calculations, however, are based chiefly 
on conjecture.”282 His arguments are generally valid for each and every Russo-
Ottoman encounter in the 19
th
 century.  
The Nizam battalion, the nucleus of the Ottoman army, was always thinner than 
planned. Peacetime troops simply evaporated because of malnutrition and 
diseases.
283
 Domestic disturbances, in which military forces were frequently 
employed, also brought about high death rates. During the Crimean War, 
unsurprisingly, there was a swift decrease in ranks because the Ottomans were not 
good at preserving their troops. In fact, the number of the Ottoman troops on paper 
did not always correspond to the real number. The planned numbers were much 
higher than the actual troops in the field. In some cases, actual numbers might have 
been deliberately distorted.  
Despite the difficulty in determining the exact number, it was certainly the 
finest Ottoman army for decades. At the commencement of hostilities, the Ottomans 
were able to mobilize more than 200,000 men on two fronts; most of these men were 
trained regular soldiers. The best troops, as always, were dispatched to the Balkan 
passes and the Danube fortresses: the great portion of the Guards and the Dersaadet 
                                               
281 Moltke, p. 16.  
282 Moltke, p. 20.  
283 In 1837, the number of soldiers was only 44 % of the total recruitment. Heinzelmann, p. 73.  
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armies would serve along with the Rumelian army in several defensive positions in 
Bulgaria in 1853 and 1854.  
The army of Tanzimat was composed of six corps with their reserves. Each 
army was designed to have 25,000 men but could be increased to 50,000 men when 
reserves were summoned. Therefore, the Ottoman government contemplated an army 
of 300,000 regular troops who would be supported by irregulars and auxiliaries. 
However, by the Crimean War, the Porte was far from attaining this goal. Of the six 
armies, only three—the Hassa, the Dersaadet, and the Rumeli—completed their 
formations. An army of 50,000 men appeared to be an impossible goal even for these 
armies as a result of casualties and desertions.
284
 The reserve system was not entirely 
established by the commencement of the Crimean War. The Anatolian and Arabian 
armies did not possess reserve formations, and the Army of Iraq could not even 
finalize the establishment of regular regiments.  
Count Osten-Sacken attempted to calculate the number of the Ottoman forces 
in 1851 and probably prepared what was likely to be one of the best accounts of the 
Ottoman army. According to the report, there were 8 companies, with approximately 
800 men in an infantry battalion. However, the battalions were incomplete and were 
composed of only 432-576 men. Thus, there were 1,728-2,304 men in a regiment and 
15,000-18,000 men in an army, including the artillery. Count Osten-Sacken argued 
that the regular infantry forces in 1851 were between 62,208 and 82,944 men. The 
cavalry regiments were also incomplete. There were 80-96 men in a squadron rather 
than 200, and there were only 480-576 men in a cavalry regiment which was far from 
                                               
284 In state almanacs, it is claimed that all armies were complete with their eleven regiments, both 
regular and reserve. However, this claim is far from accurate. “… müstesna olan elviyeden maada 
kaffe-i memalik-i Osmaniyye altı orduya münkasım olunup her ordunun bir merkezle çend aded 
mevakii ve piyade ve süvari ve topçu olarak on bir alay muvazzaf askeri ve kezalik on bir alay redifi 
vardır.” Salname 1269, p. 91.  
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the planned 1,200 men. As a consequence, the regular cavalry forces of the Empire 
should have been between 11,520 and 13,824 men in total.
285
 A total of 12,000 men 
were serving in artillery regiments. Thus, there were at most 108,768 regular 
Ottoman troops only two years before the war.  
Count Osten Sacken’s estimations 
Number of a regiment  Total in an army Total forces 
Infantry: 1,728-2,304 
men 
10,368 - 13,824 men  
(6 regiments) 
62,208 - 82,944 men  
Cavalry: 480-576 men 1920 - 2304 (4 regiments) 11,520 - 13,824  
Artillery:   12,000 men  
  85,728 – 108,768 men 
Ubicini’s estimations286 
Number of a regiment  Total in an army Total forces 
Infantry: 2,800 men 16,800 men (6 regiments) 100,800 
Cavalry: 720 men 2,880 (4 regiments) 17,280 
Artillery: 1,300 men 1,300 men (1 regiment) 7,800 
  125,880 men 
Kolb’s estimations 
  Total forces 
  72,180 
  22,737 
  10,408 
  105,325 men 
Effective Ottoman armed forces (Six army corps) 
 
 Number of Regiments Planned numbers Actual numbers 
Infantry 36 regiments 117,360 100,800 
Cavalry 24 regiments 22,416 17,280 
Artillery 6 regiments 7,800 7,800 
Fortress artillery 4 regiments 5,200 5,200 
Engineers 2 regiments 1,600 1,600 
Detached forces 
In Kandiye 
In Trablus 
In Tunisia 
 
4 regiments 
2 regiments 
2 regiments 
 
8,000 
4,000 
4,000 
 
8,000 
4,000 
4,000 
In total 80 regiments 170,376 148,680 
Total Ottoman forces with the exception of the reserve units
287
 
 
                                               
285 RGVIA, f. 450, op. 1, d. 45, l. 7 
286 Ubicini, p. 453.  
287 Ubicini, p. 455.  
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The quantity of Ottoman troops was also estimated in contemporary statistical 
books. Xavier Heuschling repeated the numbers provided by Ubicini but gives more 
specific accounts on the .
288
 Georg Friedrich Kolb, in his book on world statistics, 
argued that he acquired the numbers of the Ottoman army from the Ottoman Finance 
Minister. The numbers given by Kolb are similar to Count Osten-Sacken’s 
information: Nizam infantry 72,180, cavalry and artillery 22,737, and Fortress 
Artillery and Reserve 10,408, for a total of 105,325. He also calculated the Redif as 
consisting of 92,650 infantrymen and 11,177 cavalrymen.
289
 Kolb’s data appear to be 
reliable, although there could be some exaggerations regarding the redif troops. 
Abdolonyme Ubicini gave the most detailed numbers on the Ottoman Empire in 
terms of its economy, society, and army during the Tanzimat period. Ubicini also 
asserted that an Ottoman army was composed of 20,980 men. Interestingly, General 
Prim, the military commissioner of Spain to the Ottoman army, used the information 
on the Ottoman army provided by Ubicini.
290
   
An Ottoman document written during the preparations for the war gave the 
number of regular forces that were intended to be summoned at Şumnu, Varna and 
the Danubian coast as 8,000 artillerymen, 63,934 infantrymen (redif and nizam) and 
10,240 cavalrymen, totaling 82,174 regular forces. According to this document, there 
would be 50,200 men in Istanbul and 26,190 on the Anatolian front, with the regular 
forces totaling 158,564 men.
291
 According to another Ottoman document, there were 
53 infantry battalions in the summer of 1853 in the Balkans. That number would 
amount to 30,000 - 40,000 regular infantrymen.  
                                               
288 Xavier Heuschling, L’Empire la Turquie (1860), pp. 321-334.  
289 B. Kolb, Handbuch der vergleichenden Statistik. Der Völkerzustands und Staatenkunde (Zürich, 
1857), p. 296.  
290 Ubicini, pp. 453- 460; Prim, pp. 70- 82.   
291 ATASE, k. 2, d. 6, f. 17, no date.  
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According to Gürel, the force entrusted to the Balkan front totaled 105,000 
infantrymen, twelve regiments of cavalry (including two Cossack regiments) 
amounting to 8,700 men, 4,300 artillerymen with 40 batteries, 10,000 mounted 
police and 12,000 irregular cavalry.
292
 Captain Fevzi (Kurtoğlu) provided a higher 
number—178,000 men, including 12,000 başıbozuks. The claim of 105,000 
infantrymen by Gürel likely also included the auxiliary forces from Egypt and 
Albania, which consisted of approximately 25,000 men. According to the official 
history of the Turkish General Staff, the regular troops intended to be summoned 
were 138,680 muvazzaf and 138,680 redif, which would be supported by 110,000 
auxiliaries and 61,500 başıbozuks.293  
The army of the Ottomans in the Balkans against Russia’s South Army was 
thus composed of regiments coming from the Rumelian, the Dersaadet, and the 
Hassa armies, both nizam and redif, supported by the auxiliaries, irregulars, and 
mounted police.
294
 Because the Ottomans did not have a solid and clear military 
establishment, it is not possible to know the exact number, but the Ottoman forces in 
the Balkans numbered approximately 140,000 men in total.
295
 It can be claimed that 
there were approximately 100,000 nizam and 50,000 redif troops at the beginning of 
the war. Zaptiye forces, the Egyptian and the Albanian auxiliaries, and the 
başıbozuks from various regions of the Empire increased the number to more than 
200,000 men. The best army units were reserved for the Balkans. Nevertheless, 
wartime changes in troop numbers make it more difficult to speculate on quantities. 
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Notwithstanding the new conscripts, the weakening of the battalions as a result of 
casualties was the reality of the war. In Gözleve, for instance, the Ottoman battalions 
in 1856 composed only 30-40 men rather than a thousand.   
Auxiliaries were important for the war effort, but none of the autonomous 
states actually assisted the central government in practice. For instance, military aid 
from the Principalities and Serbia against a Russian army was unrealistic. However, 
Egypt and Tunis, conveyed valuable support to the Porte. Abbas Halim Pasha, the 
Viceroy of Egypt, stated in his letter that land forces would comprise six regiments 
and would exceed 14,000 men.
296
 In the summer of 1853, there were approximately 
15,000 Egyptian troops in Hünkar İskelesi under the command of Selim Pasha.297 
Egyptian forces, composed of “old warriors”, would initially serve as part of the 
Danubian Army before Silistre and in Dobruja and would subsequently be sent to the 
Crimea. Egyptian fleet also sailed along with the Ottoman sea power in the Black 
Sea. The total Egyptian forces fought in the Crimean War were well beyond 20,000 
men.
298
  
 In addition to the above-mentioned corps, there were some artillery and 
engineer units attached to the Imperial Arsenal (Tophane-i Hümâyûn) and four 
regiments stationed in the fortresses of Dardanelles and Bosphorus. Moreover, 
detached forces were stationed at Crete (8,000 men), Tripoli (4,000 men), and Tunis 
(4,000 men). In addition to the land forces, there was also a thin fleet (ince donanma) 
on the Danube. The Ottoman thin fleet was consisted of 2 steamers, 8 gunboats, 188 
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canoe (chaika) and 85 boats (kirlash). Most of these boats were in Maçin, Rusçuk 
and Vidin.
299
 
Overall, it can be concluded that the most detailed and reliable numbers were 
given by Ubicini. The change in the number of Ottoman forces during the war cannot 
be understood and explained without detailed research on the checklists of the 
Ottoman troops.  
 
4.3.1.2. The Commander-in-Chief  
Insurrections throughout the empire following Tanzimat reforms asked for 
prompt intervention by the new army. In fact, the campaigns against domestic 
disturbances were the only achievements of the nizam army before the Crimean War. 
The author of these victories was Ömer Lütfi Pasha, who successfully commanded 
campaigns in Syria against Druzes, in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1851 and in 
Montenegro in 1852. He also commanded the Ottoman troops in Wallachia during 
the 1848 revolution. Thus, as the field-commander of the Tanzimat reforms, Ömer 
Lütfi Pasha crushed all domestic opposition by showing no hesitance in brutality. 
Having never failed in his missions, Ömer Lütfi Pasha was therefore the best choice, 
if not the only choice, to command the Ottoman army on the Danube during the 
Crimean War. 
Ömer Lütfi Pasha was originally Mihaylo Lattas, an Austrian subject who was 
born in Ogulina in Croatia in 1806. As a frontier guard, Lattas was promoted to an 
ensign. However, in 1828, he ran away to Bosnia for unclear reasons. Soon 
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afterward, in the Ottoman Empire, he was promoted the adjutant of Polish General 
Hrzanowski.
300
 His reputation increased after the suppression of each uprising, and 
before the Crimean War, his popularity was at the peak. Count Osten-Sacken, the 
Russian military attaché in Istanbul, reported to the Russian capital in 1852 that the 
Ottoman government was confident only in Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s military capabilities 
in a war against Russia. The British Foreign Minister Lord Clarendon’s comment on 
Ömer Lütfi Pasha was more striking. Although Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s fame was in 
decline because of the arrival of the British and French commanders (i.e., the Duke 
of Cambridge, Prince Napoleon, Lord Raglan) on the field, Clarendon claimed that “I 
believe that Omer Pacha is the only real General out there and that The Emperor 
[Napoleon III] when he gets to the Crimea would find more practical support and get 
better advice from him than from Raglan or Canrobert”. Cowley, the British 
ambassador to Paris, agreed with the foreign minister: “I think Omer Pacha [is] the 
best General in the Crimea.”301 
General Prim, a Spanish observer of the war, also had a high opinion of the 
talents of Ömer Lütfi Pasha.302 In the Russian sources, however, Ömer Lütfi Pasha 
was portrayed as a cruel and strict commander rather than a skilled commander. For 
example, Kovalevskii argued that Ömer Lütfi Pasha, who lacked sufficient military 
education, never demonstrated his talent of command in a serious battle but simply 
made good use of the circumstances.
303
 Ömer Lütfi Pasha was also negatively 
portrayed by the French Colonel Magnan. According to Magnan, “Omar Pacha was 
the most arrogant and unfit man to command an army that he had ever met with. That 
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he looked upon himself as called upon to be the regenerator and Saviour of Turkey, 
and that his self confidence knew no bounds.”304 
Nevertheless, as a result of his charisma, Ömer Lütfi Pasha had no rival and 
enjoyed absolute control over his army. He was even promoted to Serdar-ı Ekrem 
(commander-in-chief of all Ottoman corps) in 1854 in view of his successes at the 
front. However, Ömer Lütfi Pasha likely had little confidence in the Ottoman 
government. His relations with several prominent figures were less than friendly, 
especially his relations with Serasker Hasan Rıza Pasha. Their disagreements became 
evident following Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s promotion to Serdar-ı Ekrem after the battle of 
Çatana. According to Mehmed Sadık Pasha (Michał Czajkowski), when the 
commanders of the Allied forces convened in Varna in June 1854, the officers of the 
Ottoman army were divided into two factions: supporters of Ömer Lütfi Pasha and 
supporters of Hasan Rıza Pasha.305 Therefore, Ömer Lütfi Pasha must have felt the 
need to be cautious in all of his actions, both in military and in political terms. 
Captain Giovanni Govone, the Sardinian military commissioner of the Ottoman 
army, claimed that when Mehmed Ali Pasha was dismissed from the office of 
Seraskerlik at the beginning of 1854, he refused to submit the plans of Kalafat to his 
successor, Hasan Rıza Pasha.306 It is impossible to understand the validity of this 
argument, but it is true that there were disagreements and frictions in the Ottoman 
governing circle, and among the Ottoman army commanders. In the Russo-Ottoman 
wars, one of the main problems of the Ottomans was the discord and envy among the 
commanders. The name of Ömer Pasha was thus important because of the scarcity of 
talented commanders who enjoyed some authority in the Ottoman army. Without 
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such a leader, the command in the Caucasus was relentlessly chaotic, and the 
Ottomans thus failed in nearly every encounter with the Russians. 
 
4.3.1.3. The Officer  
Andrew Archibald Paton, a British traveler who visited the Turkish strongholds 
along the Danube and the headquarters at Şumnu in autumn 1853, offered the 
following observation: “The Turkish army has excellent extremes: in Omar-Pasha a 
skilful captain, as well as a few men of merit to second him, and troops instinctively 
brave and enduring; but between these two, an ugly vacuum of professional 
ineptitude and corruption.”307 Captain Govone supported Paton: “These poor Turks 
have only Omer-Pacha and brave soldiers.”308 The Ottoman officers were rarely 
praised. Paton quoted a Russian officer who had been a prisoner in Istanbul: “the 
Sultan ought to give all the privates the decoration of the Nishan, and all the officers 
the bastinado”.309 Slade shared the same opinion: “Throughout the war, whether 
ashore or afloat, the men, with nothing to gain, displayed more zeal than the officers, 
with honours and promotion in view”.310 For many observers, the Ottoman officers 
abused their offices at the expense of the lives of their soldiers. The officers were 
portrayed as inadequate and insufficient in their profession and as corrupt and selfish 
in their every act and decision.  
The officer corps was the most heterogeneous part of the Ottoman army. 
Muslim—and predominantly Turkish—peasants were typically conscripted to 
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become privates. A ranker, an Ottoman student who graduated from a military 
college in Europe, or a European adventurer could be enlisted as a member of the 
officer corps. Such an eclectic body would bring about several problems in defining 
and implementing battle plans and tactics. Some of these officers were newcomers 
not only in the Ottoman army but also in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it was 
unlikely that they would be able to command the army and communicate with the 
Ottoman soldiers. Most importantly, the officers, who had diverse world views and 
military aims, did not like one another. Consequently, ad hoc assignments of the 
commanders would be one of the reasons for the failure on the Caucasian front.  
During the reign of Mahmud II, students were sent to Europe to obtain a 
modern education that was deemed essential for commanding newly established 
army corps. Military schools (İdadî) were established in Bursa, Edirne, and Manastır. 
Military High School (Mekteb-i Harbiyye-i Şâhâne) was established in Istanbul, first 
in Maçka and then in Pangaltı. Military High School graduated its first students in 
1848. Although new European-style military schools improved the quality of 
commanders, they were not immune to Eastern practices. The students were the 
relatives of the notable Ottoman officials. These favored youths had the shortest road 
to career aggrandizement and thus had hardly any motive for learning and advancing 
their skills.
311
 Some of these graduates were assigned as teachers at Military High 
School, and at a young age, they taught alongside the European instructors.
312
 One 
lieutenant-general, two major-generals, and one colonel who were under twenty 
years of age were among the scholars in the military school at Istanbul in 1853. 
Mazhar Pasha, one of the young major-generals, would leave the school in 1854 to 
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command a cavalry brigade in Bulgaria.
313
 The military schools were not optimal for 
preparing necessary officers on short notice.  
Mustafa Zarif, subsequently the commander of the Anatolian Army, became a 
ferik in 1845 at the age of 29 without any commanding experience. The assignment 
of the nephew of Ömer Lütfi Pasha was no different. Likely lacking military 
experience, he would be accepted into the Ottoman service as Major Ömer Bey.314 
Nevertheless, during the preparations for war, Ömer Lütfi Pasha openly praised the 
graduates of the Tanzimat schools. He claimed that he was unaware of the 
knowledge and skills of the staff officers. According to the Ottoman commander, the 
education of officers in such a short period was a real accomplishment.
315
 It is 
impossible to understand whether he was sincere in this claim or whether he was 
simply giving compliments.  
Because the modernization of the Ottoman army was an incomplete project, 
capable officers were unfortunately insufficient in number. There were only a few 
military schools to fill the absent cadres; thus, most of the officers continued to 
obtain their commanding positions after service in the ranks (alaylı).316 This two-
footed structure of the Ottoman army would continue to the very end of the empire, 
and it caused contentions and factions from the top of the command to the ordinary 
officers. Accordingly, the dichotomy of mektepli and alaylı, was also visible 
throughout the Crimean War. Most of the alaylı officers were old, brave and 
experienced men of war and did not like the new officers, who had not participated 
in any previous battle but commanded a foreign language and the science of war to 
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some extent. The newly educated Ottoman military elite in turn regarded the rankers, 
most of whom were illiterate, as inferior. Alyanak (the “Red Cheek”) Mustafa Pasha 
was a man of higher education, a learned man, and he belonged to one of the 
prominent families in the Ottoman Empire through marriage. He was a Circassian, an 
honest and honorable man, but he had no commanding experience before the war, 
just as his staff was composed of the finest students of military schools of Istanbul. 
His staff members learned from books and papers but were ignorant of military life 
and the practice of war.
317
  
On the battlefield, there was on the one hand, Kel (the “Bald”) Hasan Hakkı 
Pasha—an old veteran of the previous Russo-Turkish wars.318 Other prominent 
rankers included Çerkes İsmail Pasha and Mustafa Tevfik Pasha, who played 
significant roles on the Danube during the Crimean War.
319
 Both rankers had less 
than friendly relations with the educated commanders. At Kalafat, relations between 
Nazır Ahmed Pasha and Çerkes İsmail Pasha were troublesome. İsmail Pasha was 
the commander of the forces in both Vidin and Sofia.
320
 Czajkowski was also critical 
of the mektebli officers because of their lack of military experience and courage on 
the battlefield.  
Paton, the British correspondent, described İsmail Pasha as follows: “He 
appears forty-five years of age, with sunburnt face and a slight cast of one eye… 
                                               
317 Czajkowski, Moje wspomnienia o wojnie 1854 roku, p. 35. In August, Ferik Alyanak Mustafa 
Pasha was promoted to the rank of müşir and was sent to Batum as the commander of the Batum 
army, despite his failure to stop the Russians in Dobruja. Badem, p.185 
318 He was from Tokat. He was one of the first commanders of the regular army. He was quickly 
promoted to a vizier, but he was subsequently demoted. During the Crimean War, his titles were 
returned to him, and he was sent to the Danube to command some of the Ottoman troops.  
319 İsmail Pasha was a slave of a certain Ottoman Pasha; subsequently, he entered the army and was 
rapidly promoted. He was one of the skillful pashas coming from the ranks. “Ismail-Pacha is the only 
officer whom Turkish pride can really compare for his military talents with the most distinguished 
Generals of Europe.” The Eclaireur, a military journal, vol. II, New York, 1855, p 134. Mustafa 
Tevfik Pasha was a member of Menemenli tribe from Adana.  
320 For the defense preparations at Vidin and surrounding towns under the command of İsmail Pasha, 
see, ATASE, k. 6, d. 18, f. 15, 5 Şevval 1269 [12 July 1853]. 
138 
 
Without having the large strategical views or European attainments of Omer-Pasha, 
he has much natural ability, being not only a man of daring bravery but very clever in 
stratagem within a certain range…”321 Ahmed Pasha, the director of the military 
school in Istanbul and the commander of the Ottoman forces at Kalafat, earned his 
education in Vienna. Ahmed Pasha was, in Paton’s words, “a regularly bred military 
engineer had attended during seven years the classes in Vienna at which his craft are 
taught, and consequently spoke German fluently and correctly; in person he is tall 
and portly, approaching to corpulency with a Roman nose and regular features.” 
Czajkowki called him Bülbül or Duda Ahmed Pasha.322 Mehmed Rıfat Pasha, the 
commander of the troops in Silistre after the death of Musa Hulusî Pasha, graduated 
from the famous military academy Saint-Cyr in Paris. In this rivalry, Ömer Lütfi 
Pasha openly supported the mektepli officers.
323
  
Nevertheless, the most pressing problem in the command was the lack of a 
system of assignment and promotion. Both alaylı and mektepli, who secured 
patronage in the Ottoman capital, could easily rise to the highest ranks of the army, 
but not necessarily in relation to their capacity for commanding. Godkin portrayed 
Mirliva Abdulhalim Pasha, who commanded troops on the Danube, as follows: 
“Halim Pasha is a coarse, uneducated man, who has risen from the lowest grade to 
his present position, like many other Pachas. God knows how.”324 Sandwith 
portrayed Vasıf Pasha, the Müşir of the Anatolian army after Mustafa Zarif Pasha, as 
follows: “I believe he had never heard a gun fired in earnest; he scarcely knew how 
to read or write: his accomplishments were limited to smoking a narguileh and 
gracefully receiving visitors; nevertheless, he was a good man, and one of the best 
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Turkish pashas I ever met with.”325 His description regarding Müşir Ahmed Pasha, 
commander of the Caucasian army, was no better: “His whole faculties were bent 
upon making money. He had in the first place to recover the sums he had already 
expended in bribes at Constantinople, and he had, besides, to make his fortune.”326 
Butler shared the common view of Ottoman officers and recruits: “The men are 
certainly first rate, but the officers wretched, not one of them able to do a thing, and 
thinking of nothing but their own safety.”327  
Some of these imported officers embraced Islam, but many others retained 
their religion and names and worked as hired personnel for short or long periods. 
Ömer Lütfi Pasha was the most famous example of the former, and Adolphus Slade 
(Müşavir Pasha) was an example of the latter. General Williams at Kars was the first 
officer who was admitted to the Sultan’s service with his infidel name, and he was 
called Williams Pasha.
328
  
Indeed, the posts given to the European officers and the Hungarian and Polish 
refugees were viewed as a practical solution to this chronic officer shortage. During 
the war, the command positions in the Ottoman army continued to be filled with 
European officers. A correspondent of The Times reported from Varna on 20 January 
1854, “A Wallachian General, two or three American officers, and several French 
and Swedish officers, have arrived at head-quarters to take service in the Ottoman 
army.”329 Several Americans have been connected with the Ottoman army at 
different times. Major Bonafanti was on active duty at Kars. Major Burr Porter was 
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also serving in the Ottoman army.
330
 The cadres given to the European officers were 
not well planned. Thus, several European officers who commanded the troops of the 
Anatolian army would not bring success in battle. Sandwith drew a gloomy picture 
of European officers at the Kars fortress: “All these exiles united in abusing the 
Turks, for whom they were fighting, and denouncing the opposing clique of Magyar, 
Italian, or any nationality of which it was composed… They were the type of what 
are termed adventurers, yet were there some noble exceptions to this description.”331 
He further made the following claims: “I recognized many who were formerly 
loungers about the door of the Pera theatre”; “Such men as chiboukjis, barbers, and 
the like, were sent as Commander-in-Chief to plunder and ruin an army”; and “A 
certain Perote money-lender, whose profession gives him great influence in the 
capital, is said to have obtained the rank of Colonel for a Polish sugar-refiner and 
horse-dealer, who had been a sergeant in the revolutionary war.” Such figures were 
among the ranks of the Ottoman army on the strategic front and at a crucial time. On 
the Caucasus front, officers were divided into factions.
332
 According to Sandwith, 
anything that was good or that was praised in the Ottoman territory was an 
achievement of the British commander (Guyon or Williams) or consul (Brant).  
Strong debates and disagreements between several Polish factions in Istanbul 
occured. “Numbers of European officers were there in the Turkish service, and 
according to all accounts their behavior was by no means calculated to encourage 
these gallant Mussulmans. Their courage generally was unquestioned, but they were 
split up into little parties at deadly feud with each other. The Poles were perhaps the 
most numerous of these foreigners, and they were accused of courting Turkish favour 
to the detriment of the army by encouraging the Mushir to neglect the advice of 
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General Guyon and others. Some were being accused of Russian spies… Some of 
these foreign officers undoubtedly occupied places for which they were altogether 
unfit.”333 The correspondent of The Times was absolutely right in the following 
claim: “In a military point of view we know no more of Turkey than we do of the 
moon. Not a single English military officer is or has been recently employed 
officially in Turkey. A few may have gone as tourists, having gleaned as much 
information as is usual on such trips – such as the price of eggs, &c; but accurate 
military information, and a knowledge of this very difficult language, would, I fear, 
be looked for in vain.”334  
Although Ömer Lütfi Pasha had no proper chief of staff, he had a crowded 
entourage that included several European officers. At very commencement of 
hostilities, Sardinia and Spain sent their commissions to observe the war. The visit of 
Spanish General Don Juan Prim was brief, but the Sardinian Captain Giuseppe 
Govone remained long with Ömer Lütfi Pasha. The British and French armies also 
had their commissions in the Ottoman headquarters, i.e., Colonel Charles-Prosper 
Dieu and Lieutenant-Colonel John Lintorn Arabin Simmons.
335
   
 Commander Chief of Staff 
Hassa Corps Selim Pasha, Mehmed 
Rüştü Pasha 
Rıfat Pasha 
Dersaadet Corps  Serasker Eyüb Sabri Pasha 
Rumeli Corps Ömer Lütfi Pasha Çerkes İsmail Pasha 
Anadolu Corps Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha 
(Later, Ahmed Pasha, 
İsmail Pasha, Mustafa 
Zarifî Pasha, Mehmed 
Vasıf Pasha) 
Ahmed Pasha (Later 
Abdülkerim Pasha) 
Arabistan Corps Mehmed Vasıf Pasha Davud Pasha (Later, in August 
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1853 İzzet Pasha) 
Iraq and Hejaz 
Corps 
Mehmed Reşid Pasha Selim Pasha 
The top commanders of the Ottoman army on the eve of the Crimean War 
 
Most of the troops of the Hassa and Dersaadet armies were sent to the 
Danubian front. When Ömer Lütfi Pasha was promoted to Serdar-ı Ekrem, İsmail 
Pasha would become the Müşir of Anadolu Corps. However, the army was the most 
unstable with respect to its command. Ahmed Pasha, İsmail Pasha, Mustafa Zarifî 
Pasha, and Mehmed Vasıf Pasha were assigned to the command of the Anatolian 
army during the Crimean War. Some of the commanders were tried for corruption. 
  
4.3.1.4. The Recruit 
The French and English officers did not form a high opinion of anything but 
the recruits of the Ottoman army. According to Govone, “The soldier of the regular 
army is excellent, sober, courageous, and solid, but essentially passive which 
decreases the value of the Turkish army in Europe.”336 The Ottoman soldier was 
regarded as “a raw material which, like everything else in Turkey, had been spoilt as 
much as possible by the genius of maladministration”.337 When better command and 
supplies were provided, they could be among the best troops in Europe.
338
 The 
patience and subordination of the Ottoman soldiers were sources of admiration: “they 
had been ill-treated and abandoned by their officers, plundered of their dues, 
wretchedly clothed and armed, and were many of them twenty-four months in arrears 
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of pay; and yet the desertions were by no means so numerous as might have been 
anticipated. Their patience and long suffering, their sobriety and subordination, were 
beyond all praise.”339 Colonel Chesney argued that there were three merits of the 
Ottoman soldier: “implicit obedience, enthusiasm in the cause of their Sultan, and 
abstinence from the use of fermented liquors.”340 The recruits in the army suffered 
from numerous privations and from the inhumane conduct of their officers: “This 
mean and spiteful conduct towards these unfortunate young Turks was observable in 
all their superior officers, from the Mushir downwards, and was shown in a variety 
of ways. No tents, pay, or rations were given them, and they prowled about the camp 
in rags, fed by the charity of those who pitied their sad condition.”341 The high 
opinion of the Ottoman soldiers from foreign observers would, however, diminish 
after their alleged cowardice in the battle of Balaklava. 
The Tanzimat did not increase the pool of recruits or lighten the burden of the 
Muslim population. Service in the regular armed forces continued to be reserved for 
Muslims. Because the depots for the Ottoman soldier were the lands of Rumelia and 
Anatolia and the ethnically Turkish element was believed to be much more reliable 
than other Muslim subjects of the Empire, the Ottoman regular army was 
predominantly composed of Turkish element. The process of recruitment was not 
always in line with the regulations. “The greater part of the army was composed of 
men seized in their villages, in violation of the usual rules of conscription, and the 
depressed moral state of middle-aged men, torn from their families, was but little 
calculated to carry them gaily through much suffering,” Sandwith continued, “These 
Rediff, as they are termed, were not raised according to law, but were luckless 
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peasants seized haphazard, who consequently were always watching for an 
opportunity to desert.”342 Kadir Bey, who fled to the Russians from the Ottoman 
camp in Kalafat, was an interesting example of the Ottoman recruitment. In his 
interrogation, Kadir Bey claimed that he was from Shamakhi, a town in southern 
Caucasus under Russian rule. He was in Istanbul only for business but was forcibly 
registered for the regular cavalry.
343
  
In many cases, the assembling of redif caused disturbances. In Upper Debre 
(Debre-i Bâlâ), for instance, after the visit of the Ottoman officers to collect the 
reserves, the people who did not want to contribute more soldiers fought with 
Governor Numan Sabit, who was forced to leave town. The women of Debre were 
straightforward in their claim: “You wretch, you have left us and our households 
alone”.344 Obviously, the Muslim population once more suffered heavily from the 
war. 
 
4.3.1.5. The Irregulars (Başıbozuks)  
Raising Başıbozuks, badly reputed irregulars of the Ottoman army, “was not 
only a useful measure, but a time-honoured Ottoman custom.”345 They were 
supposed to act as the vanguard of the regular army, to protect convoys, to harass the 
enemy by cutting off supplies and collecting information and, in short, by performing 
various essential duties that were destructive to regular cavalry.  
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During the Crimean War, thousands of irregulars from various provinces of the 
Empire were summoned. More than 10,000 men were considered to be received in 
the Ottoman capital from Anatolia and Syria shortly after the declaration of war. 
These volunteers, who were granted a new horse in case of loss, would also have 
rations and pay.
346
 Albanians from the Gega and the Toska would assist the war 
effort with 12,000 men.
347
 An enormous force of approximately 50,000 men was 
mobilized in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be charged in the region to be 
employed in case of an uprising in the Balkans.
348
 In fact, the Bosnians, who were 
harshly suppressed by Ömer Pasha in 1851, were unwilling to be a part of the regular 
army. Therefore, the Ottomans could not efficiently use the Bosnian cavalrymen 
during the Crimean War.  
It was not always possible to determine the number of irregular troops and their 
actual strength. Hasan Yazıcı, a sergerde on the Caucasian front, claimed that he had 
2,000 men. However, there were only 800 troops, most of whom were youngsters. 
Such fraud was frequent, as sergerdes could earn a great deal of money by 
exaggerating the number of soldiers under their command.
349
 
Although the regular forces were predominantly Turkish, the Ottoman army 
was ethnically far from homogenous because of the irregulars and auxiliaries. A 
contemporary Russian military expert, analyzing the nature of the Russo-Ottoman 
wars before the Crimean War concluded that the Ottoman army was second only to 
Austria with its heterogeneous character. The author enumerated Albanians of two 
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religions, Bosnians professing three different beliefs, Macedonians, Rumelians, 
Thessalians, Bulgarians, Dobruja Tatars, inhabitants of Deli Orman, Nekrasov and 
Zaporog Cossacks, various peoples of Anatolia and Egypt.
350
 Paton described their 
heterogeneity well: “Along the high street or line of bazaars I saw the shops and 
cafes filled with a fanatical and enthusiastic soldiery, the irregulars in their 
magnificent old Turkish costume, the tall broad shouldered fair complexioned 
Bosniak from his land of hills and heroes, the vivacious but somewhat cut-throat-
looking Albanian, glib in speech, and armed with four pistols often too ready to suit 
the action to the word, the dull, heavy, slow moving Anatolian Turk, talking loud and 
deep, all fellows who know very little of manual and platoon exercise, but who will 
work a gun or stand in a trench without flinching; such tough material as the 
defenders of Arab-Tabia were made of.”351  
Their independent nature was always emphasized. “The strangest figures 
swarm in from the distant provinces to have a cut at the Muscovite. Turbans, lances, 
maces and battle-axes jostle each other in the narrow streets [of Istanbul].”352 
Rhodes, a British officer, described the irregulars in Çorlu on their way to Şumnu 
from Syria: “all armed-chiefly with a short single-barreled gun, two long pistols, and 
a long, straight, broad poignard or sword. Several of them had lances – the stock or 
shaft being made of bamboo. These men had a chief and a drummer, - the latter 
preceding the former, and beating his two little drums at the same time, and singing, 
with great energy.”353  
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The Ottoman irregulars were not always positively caricaturized in Western 
literature.
354
 Their unruly deeds, cruelties, and, most importantly, their 
ineffectiveness on the battlefield were also mentioned. The Russian sources 
portrayed the Ottoman başıbozuks as disobedient and cruel forces who were only 
busy oppressing the local Christian population rather than fighting against the 
enemy. Petrov, the Russian military historian, claimed that “[they] did not have any 
military training and most of them engaged only in plunder.”355 According to Petrov, 
12,000 Ottoman troops in Silistre were largely composed of başıbozuks who simply 
plundered the neighboring villages.
356
  
The privileges of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire were the 
controversy that paved the path to war. Thus, it should be considered a just war not 
only in the eyes of the Muslim population but also from the perspective of the 
Christian subjects. Moreover, the protection of the Ottoman Christians was critical to 
sustain the prestige of the Ottoman government. The possible atrocities of the 
irregulars against the Christian population were imminent threats to the Ottoman 
prestige, which could have led to the cause the loss of Western popular and political 
support. Therefore, the Porte was careful to promote Western public opinion. 
Although the Porte could not always succeed in controlling the irregulars, it 
prominently displayed its effort. In reality, the Ottoman government was careful in 
its employment. The effort to control the irregulars was especially evident during 
their transfer to the war theatre when they could encounter unprotected civilians.
357
 
Irregulars would most likely breed trouble during their transportation to the front and 
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would come at a high cost on the front. Because of their harmful traits, the Porte was 
reluctant to deploy the irregulars unless absolutely necessary. The commanders were 
asked to inform the Porte about the need for assistance from volunteers. Although the 
idea of jihad on which Ottoman warfare was based made the discharge of irregulars 
difficult, they would be sent back if they were perceived as useless. Their 
subordination and devotion to their tribal leader or sergerde represented another 
shortcoming of the employment of irregulars.  
The main task of the irregulars was to monitor the enemy and to enter 
skirmishes when necessary. Because they were the vanguard forces, they acted 
independently from the main body of the army, which gave them the opportunity to 
pillage villages behind the front. One of the reasons for the atrocities of the 
başıbozuks was their perception of the reaya, or the Ottoman Christians.  
During the Crimean War, the başıbozuks in the Danubian theatre were more 
successful than those in the Caucasus. Their usefulness likely correlated with the 
success of the regular army. In particular, the başıbozuks were used for 
reconnaissance activities or served as a patrolling force.
358
 In the famous redoubt 
“Arab Tabia” and during the reconnaissance activities in front of the redoubts, the 
başıbozuks played their role well. In reality, the fighting quality of the irregulars was 
not identical, given to their highly heterogonous nature. Some members of the 
irregulars were better than the others. In the words of Dodd, “The Arnauts, for 
instance, the Albanian Mussulmans, seem to be a fine set of fellows. Scorning the 
European costume, they are yet not so reckless as the volunteers who come in from 
Asia Minor. The Arnaut, with his jacket of fine red cloth or silk, his braided and 
buttoned breast, his white many-folded fustinella ... some of the Albanians are 
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always in the Turkish armies.”359 Despite their unruly and undisciplined 
characteristics, the possibility of their useful employment in the war had never been 
disregarded by the French and the British. Thus, the irregulars were employed in the 
French and British armies, although these initiatives were incomplete because the 
outcomes could not be transferred onto the battlefield (see chapter 6.3. for the social 
outcomes of the Ottoman başıbozuks). 
 
4.3.1.6. The Ottoman Cossacks 
In the 19
th
 century, there was a good number of Cossack populace in the 
Ottoman territory, particularly in Dobruja. In addition to, Potkalı (Zaporozhian) 
Cossacks and heretic İgnat (Nekrasov) Cossacks, there were also various types of 
runaways from the Russian (or Ukrainian) territory, who would live together with 
these Cossack stocks in Dobruja. The number of Cossacks in the Ottoman Empire 
was hardly stable on account of the continuous influx and outflow. However, the 
Cossacks played some role in the Russo-Ottoman wars throughout the 19
th
 century. 
Accordingly, the Ottoman Cossacks constituted an important component of the 
famous (or rather infamous) project of “Sultan’s Cossack” regiment under the 
command of Michał Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadık Pasha) during the Crimean War. 
The Cossacks were also an integral part of the intelligence activities of both 
antagonists on the Danube. Both the Ottoman and Russian armies feverishly 
endeavored to facilitate Cossacks living in Dobruja to collect information pertaining 
to the enemy.  
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The Porte traditionally employed some of its non-Muslim subjects in a variety 
of auxiliary services. Forces recruited from Serbs, Greeks, Orthodox and Catholic 
Albanians, and other hardy mountain peoples of the Balkans were known as 
Martoloses, and they performed such services as guard duty along the frontiers, 
strategic roads, and mountain passes. These forces operated in the Ottoman service 
for centuries. The Ottoman navy also relied on the services of Greek sailors. In the 
modern era, the first non-Muslims to be officially admitted to the regular Ottoman 
armed forces were recruited from the Cossack population of the Dobruja after the 
annihilation of the Janissaries.
360
 The Crimean War witnessed another project in the 
recruitment of Christians. When the number of Christians in the navy was in decline 
because of the lack of trust to the Greek sailors and when the plans of Christian 
conscription were all abandoned, the establishment of Cossack regiments under the 
Ottoman banner was in itself an interesting project. In fact, the man who established 
and commanded these troops was a fascinating figure.  
Michał Czajkowski was born in the province of Volynia (contemporary 
northwestern Ukraine). He was a romantic Polish writer primarily focusing on 
Cossack cultural heritage and a political émigré who was working for the 
establishment of a free Cossack Ukraine. Under the Russian pressure for this 
extradition to Russia, he converted to Islam as Mehmed Sadık Pasha. The Cossack 
regiment, under the command of Mehmed Sadık Pasha, primarily consisted of 
Nekrasov (İgnat)361 and Zaporog Cossacks and Polish volunteers, as well as 
Bulgarians, Greeks and Gypsies. There were at least 100 criminals (hajduks) enrolled 
                                               
360 Avigdor Levy, “The Contribution of Zaporozhian Cossacks to Ottoman Military Reform: 
Documents and Notes”, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vol. VI, no. 3 (September 1982), pp. 373-374.  
361 These men were former Don Cossacks who fled to the Ottoman territory during the first half of the 
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in this regiment. After the initial successes of the regiment many volunteers 
registered, including the famous Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz. At the beginning of 
the war, Nekrasov Cossacks were mixed with the Muslim forces.
362
 These forces 
used primarily for reconnaissance activities. Cossack regiments were first used in 
Dobruja region and subsequently before Silistre, in the Principalities, and in the 
Crimea.
363
 The success of the project also led to the establishment of the second 
Cossack regiment under the protégé of Napoleon III, which would be under the 
command of Graf Wladislaw Zamoyski.  
 
4.3.2. The Russian Army  
The Russian army was predominantly composed of regular troops despite the 
existence of a reserve. The components of the regular forces included the infantry 
and cavalry guards; the grenadiers and six infantry corps; two reserve cavalry corps; 
and detached forces of the Caucasus, Orenburg, and Siberia. The Russian military 
was based on three major institutions: the Minister of War, the commander-in-chief 
of the Active Army, and the main staff. The Minister of War handled personnel, 
supplies, and financial and legal matters, and he commanded the fifth and sixth 
infantry corps. The Active Army, consisting of the four infantry corps located on the 
western frontiers, was under the command of Prince Paskevich. Obviously, Nicholas 
I did not want a powerful commander to control the Russian army alone. The tsar 
himself controlled the guard, grenadier and reserve cavalry corps as well as the 
military formations in the Caucasus, Orenburg and Siberia, thereby having his own 
authority felt in the Russian army.  
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The Russian infantry corps consisted of three divisions, each with four 
regiments. The regiments were composed of three battalions, each containing 1,000 
men. Thus, an army corps included 36 battalions. To these battalions, one rifle and 
one sapper battalion were added. The infantry corps, save the guards, also had a light 
cavalry division of 32 squadrons. The cavalry divisions were composed of four 
regiments, each containing approximately 1,000 men. The light cavalry—the hussars 
and the uhlans—had a saber and carbine. The cuirassiers, the heavy cavalry, were 
armed with a heavy straight sword, but they had no fire-arms. The dragoons, who 
could fight both mounted and on foot, were armed with a musket, a bayonet and a 
light cavalry sword.  
The training of the Russian infantry and cavalry was primarily directed toward 
displays and ceremonial parades that had little meaning on the battlefield. Thus, the 
Russian soldiers did not learn much in terms of the real battlefield tactics and 
strategies. Russia obviously neglected military innovations during the first half of the 
19
th
 century. Russia’s economic backwardness in comparison to the Western powers 
hindered the modernization of the large and expensive army. The never-ending 
campaigns also resulted in an enormous burden on the Russian economy.
364
 The 
glories against the Ottomans and Napoleon convinced the Russian authorities of the 
superiority of their army. Thus, the development of small-arms had been neglected 
for decades, and the infantry acquired percussion muskets only in the 1840s. The 
Russian infantry continued to perceive and use the bayonet as the master of combat 
rather than adapting itself to the latest technology and modern fighting. There was 
strong opposition to the introduction of breech-loading weapons, as they would 
discourage the infantryman from engaging in hand-to-hand combat. In fact, the 
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Russian infantry tradition was futile and outmoded. The soldiers fought in dense 
columns and relied on bayonets.
365
 Tight columns were considered to be useful to 
maintain discipline in large military formations. Furthermore, the Russian army 
training had been directed toward fighting the Ottomans, and fighting en masse in 
tight formations was emphasized to counter the mobility of the Ottoman forces who 
attacked in scattered groups from all sides. The Russian officers and soldiers had 
been so disciplined that they would not take any initiative on the battlefield.  
However, the artillery and field engineers maintained a high level of military 
competence, as they were rare examples of Russian skills on the battlefield. The 
artillery and field engineers had graduated from specialized schools. The Russian 
artillery was exalted by European observers. Thus, firepower was supplied by the 
artillery rather than by infantry in battles. 
The small staff organization in the capital, which coordinated the movement 
and quartering of troops, was the only permanent general staff body in existence.
366
 
The Russian army was scarcely a modern military machine. However, despite its 
poor administration and inadequate resources, the Russian army continued to act as 
an effective military apparatus. Russian soldiers who were poorly equipped, fed, and 
trained stood firm in the battle. Only when the Russians confronted the modern 
European armies in the Crimea in 1854 would the glory and invincibility of the 
Russian army come to an end. 
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4.3.2.1. The Number of Russian Troops 
From 1816 to 1855, forty levies provided 3,158,199 recruits.
367
 Because of 
their long-term service (twenty or twenty-five years) and the harsh conditions of 
military life, it was unlikely that recruits would ever return home. The long marching 
during the Russo-Ottoman wars and the lack of medical care killed the Russian 
soldiers through diseases, particularly scurvy, malaria, and dysentery. The high rate 
of death in the rank and file resulted in a chronic shortage of manpower despite its 
long tradition of being the largest army in Europe. 
Although military statistics and records were highly developed in Russia 
compared with the Ottoman Empire, the number of Russian troops during the 
Crimean War is far from certain. This uncertainty may result from differences 
between the actual and planned numbers or from various bureaucratic mechanisms 
that might have produced different numbers. According to Bogdanovich, there were 
494,000 regular forces, approximately 135,000 reserve troops, and some Cossack 
forces during the Crimean War.
368
 He also remarked that the actual forces were 
smaller than the planned numbers.  
The 
Infantry 
 
The Guards 38 battalions 
38,000 
men 
The Grenadiers 38 battalions 
38,000 
men 
Six infantry corps 300 battalions 
300,000 
men 
The Reserve sapper battalion 2 battalion 2,000 men 
In Total  378 battalions 
378,000 
men 
The 
Cavalry 
 
The Guards 68 squadrons 9,000 men 
7 light cavalry divisions 224 squadrons 38,080 
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men 
1
st
 reserve cavalry corps 80 squadrons 
13,600 
men 
2
nd
 reserve cavalry corps 80 squadrons 
13,600 
men 
2 horse-pioneer divisions 4 squadrons 1,000 men 
In Total  456 squadrons 
75,280 
men 
The 
Artillery 
 
The Guards 
the infantry 
12 batteries 96 
guns 
2,264 men 
the Horse 5 batteries 40 guns 1,138 men 
The Grenadiers 
the infantry 
15 batteries 120  
guns 
2,802 men 
the Horse 2 batteries 16 guns 430 men 
The Field 
the infantry 
72 batteries 864 
guns 
17,084 
men 
the Horse 
12 batteries 96 
guns 
2,580 men 
the Cossack 9 batteries 72 guns 2,000 men 
2 Horse artillery division 
12 batteries 96 
guns 
2,832 men 
In Total  
139 bat. 1400 
guns 
31,130 
men 
  7 sapper brigades  9,808 men 
Russian forces according to Bogdanovich 
 
Zayonchkovskii provided much higher numbers for the Russian army. 
According to a Russian document that was furnished by Zayonchkovskii, the number 
of Russian troops approached one and a half million in 1853.
369
  
Regular Forces 
Active Forces 
 Officer Rank and File 
Infantry 15,382 581,845 
Cavalry 4,983 86,282 
Foot Artillery  
Horse Artillery  
Garrison Artillery 
1,784  
339 
793  
40,896 
8,057 
40,681 
Sapper 364  15,944 
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Different Commands 988  35,302 
Corps of Domestic Guard 2,430  144,934 
Total  27,009  953,948 
Reserves 
Infantry  
736 
121,125 
Cavalry 24,210 
Artillery and Sapper 13,540 
Total   158,875 
Irregular Forces 
Irregulars  3,647 242,203 
Total Forces 31,392  1,365,786 
Russian forces according to Zayonchkovskii 
According to a secret study conducted by the Russian War Ministry in 1870, 
Russia assembled an army of 1,742,343 men with 31,954 officers by 1856. With the 
addition of irregulars and militia, the sum was beyond 2,500,000 men.
370
  
Although different numbers are reported for the Russian army, it was 
certainly the largest army in the world on the eve of the Crimean War. Although 
Russia had difficulties building and transferring reserve troops during the war, it had 
the opportunity to assemble large forces incomparable with any European army. In 
1853, 199,438 reservists were called to duty. Approximately 455,000 men joined the 
army as fresh drafts in 1853 and 1854. In 1855, more than 300,000 militiamen were 
assembled. Thus, during the Crimean War, the Russian army acquired 865,762 newly 
enlisted men and 215,197 reservists.
371
  
 The Russian active army—the main force fighting in the European war—was 
composed of 6 corps, each containing approximately 50,000 men. Three of these 
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corps would be used in the Danubian theatre—the 3rd, 4th, and 5th. In the Caucasus, as 
in the previous encounters, modest forces were mobilized. These forces never 
exceeded 100,000 men during the war. In July 1853, only a modest number passed 
the Prut River: the 4
th
 army, the second brigade of the 15
th
 division, the 5
th
 light 
cavalry division, and the 25
th
, 34
th
, and 37
th
 Don Cossack regiments, totaling 71,869 
men. There were a total of 68 ½ battalions, 64 squadrons, 50 Cossack hundreds and 
208 guns in the Danubian Principalities.
372
 In August and September, the gendarme 
squadron and the 9
th
, 38
th
, and 40
th
 Don Cossack regiments moved into the 
Principalities; from December 1853 to January 1854, the first brigade of the 15
th
 
division, the second brigade of the 14
th
 division, the 5
th
 rifles and the 5
th
 sapper 
battalions, the 3
rd
 army, and the 22
nd
 and 42
nd
 Don Cossack regiments entered the 
area, totaling 75,312 men moving into the Principalities. The last wave came from 
April to June 1854, when the 2
nd
 reserve cavalry corps with two Ural regiments, the 
6
th
 infantry division, the 16
th
 infantry division, the first brigade of the 6
th
 light cavalry 
division and a Cossack regiment, totaling 48,702 men, entered into the Ottoman 
territories.
373
 They were all Russian forces employed in the Balkan theater. Thus, 
from the summer of 1853 to the summer of 1854, a total of 198,485 men entered into 
the Danubian Principalities. 
  
4.3.2.2. The Commander-in-Chief 
Nicholas I not only liked military life but also lived as a soldier. He was 
usually in uniform, and he slept on a camp bed. The Russian tsar likely considered 
himself a commander-in-chief rather than a politician. By 1840, 10 ministries were 
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held by generals, whereas civilian ministers were only used for foreign affairs, 
education and justice.  
Field Marshal Paskevich was certainly the most influential military figure in 
Russia during the reign of Nicholas I. He captured Erivan in 1828, marched to 
Erzurum in 1829, and suppressed the Polish revolt in 1831. He was called Erivanskii 
and Warsawskii to complement his victories. However, most importantly, he was the 
“Father-Commander”, as the tsar called him. Nicholas was under Paskevich’s 
command when he was a grand duke, and Nicholas developed a high respect for 
Paskevich. The tsar relied heavily on Paskevich’s advice and judgment. Enjoying the 
complete confidence of Nicholas, Paskevich expected from other generals absolute 
obedience to his own authority. Count Chernyshev was another important personality 
during the reign of Nicholas. Chernyshev continued to retain the post of War 
Minister in 1827-1853, but he could not enjoy the full power of a Minister of War 
because many functionaries of the army, such as Marshal Paskevich, had direct 
access to the tsar himself. Moreover, Nicholas frequently interfered in military 
matters.  
The major figure in terms of the Danubian front or perhaps for the Crimean 
War in general was Prince Mikhail Dmitriyevich Gorchakov. Initially, he was the 
commander of the Russian armies in the Principalities. After the withdrawal of the 
Russian forces, Gorchakov became the commander of the South Army centered in 
Bessarabia, and he was ultimately the commander-in-chief of the Crimean Army. 
However, his control over those armies was destined to be limited from the start 
because of the continuing role of Prince Paskevich. During the critical siege of 
Silistre, Paskevich literally took the command, and showed that the command of 
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Gorchakov had been only a provisional assignment. Prince Gorchakov lacked 
charisma and initiative to make himself a real commander of the war. He was not a 
capable and determinant commander; the Russian army was terribly lacking in such 
commanders during the Crimean War. The ambitions of Nicholas and the concerns 
of Paskevich caused uncertainty in the Russian plans and activities in the Balkans. 
Gorchakov never enjoyed the actual command of the Russian army when both the 
tsar and Paskevich attempted to direct him in his every action. However, given the 
duration of his command and the key positions that he held, Gorchakov was the first 
and foremost Russian commander in the Crimean War. 
  
4.3.2.3. The Officers 
A Russian officer in the army of Nicholas I may have been a graduate of the 
cadet corps, a volunteer noble or in rare cases—a ranker. During the first half of the 
19
th
 century, military education was expanded, and a large number of officers 
received an education. The War Academy, the Nikolaevsk Engineer Academy, and 
the Mikhailovsk Artillery Academy were the top educational institutions for the 
Russian army. Nonetheless, the officer corps of the Russian peasant army was almost 
entirely composed of nobles, who had almost no formal military education. Thus, the 
great majority of the Russian officers had learned military life and fighting by 
serving in the army. Despite reforms during the reign of Nicholas I, the Russian army 
remained far behind the armies of other European states.
374
 Most importantly, the 
officer corps was poorly educated, especially compared with their European 
counterparts.  
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Unquestioning obedience was one of the main characteristics of the Russian 
army. Suspicions of the tsar about his officers as a result of the Decembrist 
revolution played a role here. This suspicion, in turn, hindered the development of 
the capability of taking initiatives during the fighting. Thus, the Russian officers 
required little intellectual capacity, and this system rarely produced able generals. 
During the Crimean War, there was an insufficient number of able commanders at 
the top commands. Curtiss claimed as follows: “A few able man had risen to 
command—such as Rüdiger, Bariatinskii, Lüders, and Khrulev - but the key 
positions during the Crimean War were held by elderly commanders of little or no 
ability—Paskevich, Gorchakov, and Menshikov.”375 Menkov was also harsh in his 
criticisms of the Russian army command. He accused many Russian commanders of 
being talentless, rude, and arrogant. Although General Osten-Sacken was one of the 
rare exceptions, even well-praised General Schilder was not immune from this 
criticism.
376
 
The Russian commanders, who viewed the troops as their estate, enjoyed 
enormous power over their men. Thus, poor noblemen became officers to use their 
position for economic gain. Irregularities in the army logistics and supply offered 
many opportunities for officers to engage in fraud.  
 
4.3.2.4. The Soldiers 
Russia possessed a peasant army. Serfdom provided the raw material for the 
army. The system depended on a long period of service for serfs. Although it was not 
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an effective and modern military system, the recruitment of the serfs was a response 
to Russia’s need for a large army to be used both in the country and abroad. A 
system of brutal discipline was an inherent aspect of the Russian army. When 
mobilization rose to higher numbers during war, the quality of the recruits 
unsurprisingly declined, as landowners and villages attempted to retain their able 
farmers. A report from 1848 showed that during recent levies, one-third of the 
conscripts had been rejected because they had failed to meet the necessary physical 
requirements. Because the term of military service was more than 20 years and 
because there was no possibility of actually returning the village, self-mutilation 
appeared to be a good solution to escape drafting. 
Because the Russian army was composed of serfs, the soldiers were long-
enduring and docile. However, educating these people was dangerous, as literacy 
could enable them to question the justice of the military system and to protest against 
harshness and corruptions in military life. Thus, nearly all troops were illiterate. 
Official figures from the 1850s showed that in a group of approximately 120,000 
men, only 264 men were able to read or write. Abuses and inequalities were standard 
in recruitment procedures.
377
 Worse yet, the inefficient system of supply made the 
recruits dependent on their commanders. Soldiers were sacrificed in large numbers 
for minor gains by their commanders, who cared little about the men under their 
command. Thus, the Tsarist army lost men at a much higher rate than any of the 
other European armies. The vast majority of Russian soldiers were not killed in battle 
but died from wounds and diseases that may not have been fatal if there had been 
proper logistics and medical service. Every Russian campaign brought enormous 
losses behind the front, as in the 1828-29 war, the 1830-31 Polish campaign, and the 
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1849 Hungarian campaign. In 1849, only 708 men died in the fighting, whereas 
57,000 Russian soldiers were hospitalized. Even in peacetime the average rate of 
sickness in the Russian army was 65 percent.
378
  
 
 
4.3.2.5. The Cossacks 
The Cossacks likely represented the best light cavalry in Europe. They were 
not conscripted as regular soldiers, but they had a military way of life. The Cossacks 
were the finest troops in Europe for outpost duty, and they operated in small groups 
contrary to the Russian infantry. Lord Lucan, the commander of the British cavalry 
in the Crimea, who had been present with the Russian Army during the Russo-
Ottoman War of 1829, described the regular Russian cavalry as being “as bad as 
could be, but the Cossacks could be damnably troublesome to an enemy, especially 
in a retreat.”379 The Cossacks in Bessarabia and the Don Cossacks constituted a total 
force of more than 40,000 men.  
 The Russian army also recruited volunteers from the Ottoman Christian 
population. However, there were only insignificant numbers of these volunteers, as 
Russia did not want to alienate Austria.  
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4.3.2.6. The Muslims in the Russian Army 
Russia possessed a Christian army. As explained above, the burden of military 
service was on the shoulders of the Russian peasants. However, the non-Slavic stock 
of the Russian Empire, who were primarily Muslims were also used in the irregular 
forces. During the Crimean War, the South Caucasian Muslim Cavalry Regiment, the 
Dagestanian Cavalry Regiment, the Caucasian Mountaineer Cavalry Division, the 
Crimean Tatar Light Cavalry Squadron, the Anapa Mountaineer Half-squadron, the 
Caucasian Mountaineer Light Cavalry Half-squadron, and some forces of Lezgis and 
Bashkirs constituted the Muslim contribution to the Russian war effort.
380
 These 
irregulars were used efficiently on the Caucasus front, but desertions were 
widespread among the Muslims in the Balkans. 
 
4.3.3. Rival Armies Compared 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire both had vast geographies with peoples of 
various ethnicities and beliefs. Thus, the major task to be performed by both armies 
was to maintain domestic security and to promote coherence and tranquility in 
society. Accordingly, the regular Ottoman army was often commissioned to protect 
order in many provinces by suppressing those who were unsatisfied with the 
Tanzimat reforms. In the early 1850s, the Rumelian army suppressed the revolt in 
Bosnia and Montenegro, and the Arabistan army subdued the Druzes. Likewise, the 
Caucasus and Poland were the regions that posed the greatest threat to Tsarist rule. 
Nicholas I fought for supreme control in the colossal empire of the world with his 
army and gendarmerie. Thus, a great proportion of the Russian army was reserved 
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for domestic security. The Porte, at the expense of domestic security and order, sent 
all types of military units to the fronts during the Crimean War. The Russian and 
Ottoman military organizations were more suitable for maintaining internal security 
and suppressing disorders than for waging a war on an international scale.  
The Ottoman high command during the Crimean War was the most stable 
command in the nineteenth century for the Danube theater. The confidence in Ömer 
Lütfi Pasha increased with his military successes on the battlefield, although the 
battles were not decisive. By contrast, Russia lacked a self-confident commander 
with a clearly defined strategy. The numerical superiority of the Russian forces 
against the Ottomans was always a great handicap for the Porte to defeat Russia in 
the long term. However, at the beginning of the war, there was scarcely any Russian 
supremacy over the Ottoman troops in terms of the numbers of troops. Rather, the 
Ottomans appeared to be more numerous than their opponents.  
There was a large difference between the forces that exist on paper and those 
that actually appear under arms in both Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This 
difference is apparent primarily because of the widespread corruption in both 
military establishments. The Russian army lacked the logistical capability to 
mobilize troops in wartime. The Ottoman logistics were no better. In fact, corruption 
hindered the effective usage of the sources of both countries. Illness and mortality 
were the primary threats to the effectiveness of the army. Inadequate material 
resources, especially poor nutrition and housing, represented a major threat to the 
troops. Plague, cholera, and various types of fevers were the most common killers. 
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In both armies, relations between the officers and the units under their 
command were similar. Both the Russian and Ottoman officers attempted to 
maximize their economic profits at the expense of the rank and file. 
Tarle claimed that the Ottoman army was better equipped and uniformed than 
the Russian forces.
381
 The recruitment system of the Ottoman army was modern. A 
universal conscription and reserve system was the main pillar of modern armies in 
Europe. Service in the Ottoman army was short, which led to the establishment of 
experienced reserves. The Ottoman Empire, which possessed a narrow pool of 
conscription, needed an efficient system for utilizing the Muslim population. The 
Russians did not have a problem building a large army. However, the problem was 
the need for reserve troops to be used during the war. Furthermore, the Russians did 
not possess efficient logistical operations to transfer troops to the front. The Russian 
social system, which was based on serfdom, did not allow for the establishment of a 
modern competent army; rather, it provided a large pool of recruits who could be 
used comfortably in both peace and wartime. Curtiss rightly argued: “Neither a short 
term of service, nor a system of training that stressed adaptability and individual 
initiative, seemed to be suited to Russia’s needs, in the eyes of the Tsar.”382 
Russia, which had long been undefeated on the battlefield, appeared to be 
invincible. The Ottoman army, on the contrary, had not experienced significant 
success for a long time. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Ottomans were more 
prone to reforming their army. Both armies had their own problems, but the Crimean 
War showed that in the age of industrialization, the armies needed to undergo 
continuous change and adaptation. A static army, such as the Russian army, was 
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destined to be an outmoded military force. The Ottomans were more willing to 
change and modernize, especially in terms of the army. The Ottoman army would 
serve as a necessary and suitable field for modernization in the nineteenth century.  
Both the Russian and Ottoman armies were primarily created as forces to 
protect internal order. The Ottoman army also had the mission of protecting the 
borders. The Russian army had no strong neighbor of which to be frightened. Its 
army also appeared to be sufficiently powerful for the conquest in Ottoman lands. On 
the contrary, the Ottomans demonstrated an urgent necessity to have a modern army 
on the eve of the Crimean War.  
 
4.4. Logistics: A Difficult Endeavor 
4.4.1. Introduction 
Although most war activities were the ordinary details and incidents of camp 
life, with all its harsh aspects, the battles, which took only a few hours or a few days 
at most, were generally more visible aspects of war. Logistics—the movement, 
quartering, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel and the maintenance of 
supply and equipment—were relevant to the whole period of war. To organize the 
armies, assemble them into fighting and marching order, and reserve stores of 
provisions and ammunition were not easy tasks. Armies in the Crimean Campaign 
paid dearly for underestimating the importance of activities behind the front 
activities. One participant in the Crimean War noted that “the fighting portion of the 
Army is the only thing to be taken consideration; and this was the very idea, which, 
entertained in higher quarters, led to such lamentable consequences at the opening of 
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the Campaign.”383 Throughout the Crimean War, logistical failures took more life 
than the battles did. Complex by nature, Crimean War logistics were more 
challenging due to the extensive geography of the war’s location.  
The nature of logistics changed as the conflict evolved from a Russo-Ottoman 
war into an Allied campaign. Each movement of the armies demanded the creation of 
new logistical bases. After the arrival of the British and French troops, first Gelibolu 
and then Varna became the base of operations. The fighting on the Danube soon 
ceased and reinitiated in the Crimea. The logistical bases of the Allied campaign in 
the Crimea were the Ottoman ports. Initially, 80,000 French and British troops were 
assembled in Ottoman territory, which increased to 150,000 as the hostilities 
continued. Therefore, the Porte had two logistical tasks for the Crimean War: to 
supply its own armies and to assist the logistical activities of the allied forces. 
Supplying the army on two fronts was difficult, but satisfying the needs of the Allied 
powers during the war was even more difficult. Provisions (bread, biscuits, meats, 
vegetables, drinks, flour, peas, beans, vinegar, barley, hay, sugar, and coffee), 
ammunition (muskets, shells, and cannon balls), clothing (skin, stockings, gloves, fur 
and undershirts), drugs, and other materials needed for war (tents, wood, and carts) 
were prepared and sent to the front. Shelters, hospitals, and entrenchments were 
prepared and repaired. The burden of the war forced the Ottoman government to take 
its first foreign loan. 
 
 4.4.2. Supplying the Ottoman Army 
                                               
383 Lascelles Wraxall, Camp Life or Passages from the Story of a Contingent (London, 1860), pp. 194-
195.  
168 
 
When the war was a classical Russo-Ottoman confrontation, the Ottoman 
government attempted to supply the assembled troops on the Danube and the 
Caucasus. The Ottomans concentrated approximately 120,000 men on the Danube. 
Fortresses and other fortifications were repaired, and others were built. Troops were 
moved, quartered (ibate), supplied (iaşe) and hospitalized. Buildings intended to 
serve as hospitals, storehouses, and bakeries were built, repaired or rented. The 
Ottomans had the entire summer of 1853 to complete preparations for a possible war. 
Major military depots in the Balkans and Rumelia were located in Silistre, Rusçuk, 
Vidin, Varna, Şumnu, Sofia, Edirne, Manastır, and Gelibolu. The Porte endeavored 
to store materials in these locations shortly before the war.
384
 Kovalevskii made the 
following claim: “The Turkish government, which was prompted by fanatism of 
ulemas and promises of foreign governments, showed great activity and energy in 
gathering and arming its military forces.”385  
The Ottoman soldiers were well provided with excellent tents, which were 
strong, durable, and water-tight, while the Egyptians used old tents during their 
encampment on the shores of the Bosphorus.
386
 There were approximately 25 saka in 
the Ottoman regiments whose task was to provide good water to the soldiers.
387
 
General Prim inspected the rations of the Ottoman soldiers in the Selimiye barracks. 
Brown bread, rice and meat were allocated to the soldiers, who considered it an 
excellent meal.
388
 Prim’s observations were based on formal inspections, and thus 
may have resulted in a high opinion of the Ottoman supply system: “The Turkish 
Government supplies everything to the soldiers, free of cost, viz.: rations, arms, 
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accoutrements, and clothing of every description. Each article is of the best of their 
kind; and great care has been taken to furnish rations of superior quality.”389 
The needs of troops were met via the stores (anbar). Durable materials were 
already stacked in the storehouses and would be distributed from this stock according 
to necessity. The storehouses also provided documents for the need for bread and 
meat that would be supplied by bakeries and butcheries.
390
 Butcheries and bakeries 
were essential in wartime, and their organization and control were important for the 
health of soldiers. The butcheries in Şumnu were transferred out of the city because 
the remants of the animals could have caused disease. Furthermore, the quality of 
bread did not always meet requirements. Bread prepared in Şumnu would be checked 
to determine whether it was sufficiently cooked. Toilets also needed to be cleaned, 
their locations frequently changed, and their grounds required deep digging.
391
  
In addition, vegetables were crucial for the health of soldiers. Therefore, it was 
requested that soldiers be given cucumber. The Ottoman soldiers were also given 
soup twice a week, and when possible, meals from vegetables would be prepared 
twice a week.
392
  
Devoid of a commissariat, the Ottoman logistics depended on the time-honored 
system of contracts by which the strategic task of supplying the army was conveyed 
to trusted or favored contractors.
393
 The aim of contractors was certainly to make 
profit rather than to best serve the needs of the Ottoman soldiers. Supply lines would 
be secured by the military depots in various military quarters and fortifications in 
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which various materials were stored. The system of storing necessary materials did 
not always serve the military interests well, as the products could not be preserved in 
optimal condition. Thus, the supplied materials stored in peacetime were generally 
thrown away and replaced with new materials. Stores were generally stacked with 
necessary materials on the eve of the war, but the logistical department of the army 
was not sufficiently capable of transporting supplies to the front via the poor-quality 
Ottoman roads in wartime. 
The Ottoman soldiers were both drilling and working on the construction of 
redoubts.
394
 After August 1853, when most of the fortifications had already been 
constructed or repaired, soldiers would work fewer hours. Ömer Lütfi Pasha was 
satisfied with the efforts of the Ottoman troops during the fortification work.  
The Ottoman transportation system was one of the worst aspects of the 
Ottoman military. Ottoman carts were used with oxen rather than with horses. 
However, the oxen were scarce and were slow in transporting goods.
395
 The Ottoman 
roads, which were in poor condition, also increased the difficulty of transportation. 
The British commisioner to the Ottoman army portrayed a gloomy picture of the 
Ottoman supply system: “I fear, however, that the Ottoman army cannot undertake 
offensive operations, as they are not clothed sufficiently to enable them to resist the 
cold of a winter campaigning, and the want of money presses hard on them. The 
whole army is on the average eight months in arrears of pay, besides a debt for 
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materials and provisions of about 25,000,000 piastres, making a total debt of about 
50,000,000 piastres.”396 
 
4.4.3. Supplying the Allies: British, French and Sardinian Troops in the 
Ottoman Empire 
The war was waged in the Ottoman and Russian territories British and French 
troops had to meet some of their needs in the land where they resided because 
bringing necessary materials from their home countries was difficult. Locating and 
transporting supplies in an unfamiliar country was challenging. Using carts and 
horses for transportation, purchasing bullocks and vegetables, and even acquiring 
fuel for cooking proved difficult throughout the war. Warm clothing was always 
scarce. Troops were exposed to hard labor without sufficient clothing. Many soldiers 
died because of deprivations. 
Transporting and accommodating troops in barracks and camps throughout the 
empire took several months. The preparations of both the British and French armies 
took a long time. They resided in the Ottoman territories for 5 months before the 
initiation of the Crimean Campaign. During their presence, the Ottoman government 
offered its best as the host country. After the British and French troops arrived, 
Istanbul turned into a large military camp: “The influx of English and French was so 
great, that every street wore a military air. Especially in Pera, the district long 
assigned to foreign residents and visitors, was the presence of the Allies observable. 
The restaurants and drinking-saloons were well patronized… Stiff-laced, of course 
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newly arrived English officers, Frenchmen, wholly given to the arts of war, and 
modestly uniformed members of the Ottoman arm, mingled in the excited 
thoroughfares, and pipes and tobacco were most liberally indulged by all.”397 British 
Sergeant Gowing described Varna after the armies arrived: “At Varna we found 
ourselves mixed up with Turks, Egyptians, French, English, Maltese, Jews, Greeks, 
etc, it was a regular Babel.”398 Soldiers were initially concentrated in camps at 
Gelibolu and Istanbul and then in the Balkans, including Varna, Devna, Aladin and 
surroundings. The presence of the Allied armies in Ottoman territory had social and 
economic impacts as well as political and military implications.   
Before their formal declarations of war, French and British fleets were already 
anchored in Istanbul. Supplying these fleets was a priority for the Ottoman 
government while its army was also waging a war against Russia. In the spring of 
1854, when both France and Britain declared war on Russia, their troops gradually 
assembled in Ottoman territory, and the straits were crowded with Allied vessels. 
The declaration of war was marked by the rapid transfer of significant expeditionary 
forces to the vicinity of the Black Sea. The first French detachment left Marseilles on 
19 March and landed at Gelibolu on 31 March 1854. Fresh divisions continued to 
assemble near Toulon and Marseilles in the following months. Malta served as the 
principal staging post for Britain, and successive detachments of the British Army 
began to gather at Gelibolu and Üsküdar in April and May 1854. The first part of the 
British contingent left Malta on 31 March and disembarked at Gelibolu on 5 April. 
Lord Raglan arrived there on 29 April, and Marshal Saint-Arnaud arrived on 7 May. 
The French took the best houses in the Muslim quarter, forcing the British to be 
content with the hostile Greek part of Gelibolu. British troops were soon sent on to 
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Scutari, where their entire force was eventually concentrated. There the British 
occupied the Selimiye barracks, later to become famous as a British hospital. On 7 
May, approximately 17,500 British troops were located at Scutari and Kuleli and 
4,000 at Gelibolu. By the end of May, the French had 37,000 men and 5,500 horses 
at Gelibolu.  
The Allied troops later moved to Varna to support the Ottoman army in the 
Balkans. Allied forces’ movement to Varna began on 29 May and was completed in 
July. Four British divisions were sent by sea. In June, about 40,000 French and 
15,000 British forces landed in Varna and camped in and around the town. Thus, 
Varna became the new base of operations. Vast stores of food were assembled; 
ponies, mules, carts were collected; and ammunition and forage were stored while 
intensive construction activities were underway. Large supplies of provisions, 
ammunition, war materials, and hospital supplies were hastily sent forward. Varna 
continued to receive soldiers from the Crimea during the campaign, particularly from 
Gözleve.  
The French army consisted of four divisions of infantry, under the orders of 
General Canrobert, General Bosquet, Prince Napoleon, and General Foray. There 
were also eight batteries of artillery. The British army consisted of four divisions. 
The first, under the Duke of Cambridge, was composed of the Guards and the 
Highland Brigade; the second was commanded by Sir De Lacy Evans; Sir Richard 
England commanded the third division; and the Light Division, had Sir George 
Brown for its chief.  
The French had better commissariat and medical departments. French soldiers’ 
military lives were more comfortable than their British counterparts’ experiences. 
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Although British logistics improved during the war, the Ottoman soldier was more 
neglected as the war continued. British and French soldiers received bread or 
biscuits; sugar; rice; fresh or salt meat; vegetables; coffee, cocoa or tea; wine, brandy 
or rum; wood, coal or charcoal; and candles. 
The Allies appropriated the principal buildings of Istanbul for their own 
purposes. Many prominent buildings in and around Istanbul were converted into 
hospitals or quarters for Allied forces. They scarcely left accommodation for the sick 
and wounded Ottoman soldiers. The French were quartered in the barracks of 
Davutpaşa, Maltepe, Ramizçiftlik, Taşkışla, Gümüşsuyu and Gülhane, in the Russian 
embassy, in the military schools, at Maslak and in the neighborhood of St. Sophia. 
The British were quartered at the Selimiye barracks in Scutari.
399
 Many houses on 
the Bosphorus were also rented for the Allied officers and the owners evacuated their 
homes (see, chapter 5.3.). 
As the British and French forces gathered in Ottoman territory, the number of 
sick soldiers unsurprisingly increased. Initially, French hospitals were in better 
condition than British hospitals.
400
 The lack of accommodations in Istanbul forced 
the Allied armies to open new hospitals in other Ottoman cities such as İzmir.  
The Allied forces depended upon Ottoman sources to establish their supply 
lines in the Balkans. Bullock carts (araba) were among the urgent necessities for the 
supply system in the Balkans:  
The roads were too bad to permit our admitting that the wretched wooden 
country arobas would ever be of service in a hasty movement, and yet, when 
we were at last obliged to depend on them, none of them were to be had. For 
the land transport of the British army alone, 13,000 horses were required; and 
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at this time we had very little more than 1200, and what was worse, there 
seemed very little prospect of getting any. Had we attempted an advance 
towards the Danube the troops must have started literally without anything – 
either baggage, provisions, or ammunition. The Turkish government officials 
and Omar Pacha made an effort to help the English over this difficulty by 
sending in 350 arobas with their drivers to Varna.
401
  
 
Lack of carts negatively affected health care during the war: “Owing to the 
want of arobas the efficiency of the medical staff suffered as much.” The Allied 
troops were thus not in no condition to take the field in the summer of 1854. 
Trevelyan claimed that the British forces were totally dependent for arabas upon 
Ömer Lütfi Pasha “who had the entire resources of Bulgaria at his command.402  
Terrible roads hindered the arrival of provisions and caused shortages in the 
armies in the Crimea. “The want of transport to convey provisions materially 
increased all these difficulties; the men round Alydeen seldom got their full rations – 
that is, either the sugar, coffee, or meat were deficient, and on very many occasions 
they had only bread and water for their breakfasts. Even such a simple article as rice 
was not to be had on any terms. Frequently the Light Division was without breakfast 
altogether, and very frequently the men spent their day’s pay, when they had it, in 
buying small black loaves and sour wine at the canteens.”403 The British 
commissioner succinctly described how difficult it was to prepare supplies for the 
army:  
The most unpleasant part was that of having to superintend the butchery for the 
Brigade, for which I had placed under my orders two butchers from each 
regiment... It was not a pleasant job, in the steaming hot Eastern mornings, to 
have to ride down to the shambles and see some twenty oxen or a hundred 
sheep, killed, flayed, cut up, and weighed to a pound, for the three regiments. 
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Oh, the flies! the stench! Every ounce of meat and other stores I had to account 
for with the utmost minuteness.
404
 
Had sixty-one Arabas loaded, and two hundred and four horses, and after the 
usual accidents of carts breaking down, loads tumbling off, etc., and lazy 
Turks, got off at nine o'clock... At twelve o'clock reached the encampment, 
'Gevrekli.'... A most disastrous march, which but for the inefficiency of the 
guide, whom I took care myself to see into the right road, might have been well 
managed.
405
 
 
The British army followed Ottoman customs for procurement. Most of its 
contractors were unreliable.  
The persons who supplied the army with fresh provisions were men 
notoriously unfitted for their posts, and, in addition to their incapacity, were 
not possessed of one-tenth of the capital requisite for buying up the rations. 
One of these parties, and the principal one, was a tailor who had been bankrupt 
at Smyrna only a few months previously. No contracts had been made with 
these individuals for the supply of anything but bread, and even that I was told 
was informal and worthless. Barley, straw, meat, and wood were furnished 
merely upon a verbal promise of payment at some future period.
406
  
 
All the biscuit and forage and nearly all the stores in Varna containing tents, 
soldiers’ clothing, and various field equipment were destroyed in a fire on 10 August. 
The fire and subsequent chaos were described clearly by a British commissariat 
officer:  
I was suddenly interrupted yesterday by one of my Turkish dragoons, who had 
escorted twenty-six carts into Varna yesterday morning, rushing into my tent to 
report that Varna was burnt down, all the Commissariat stores destroyed, and 
his twenty-six carts irrecoverably lost in the confusion. This was startling 
indeed. We certainly had seen a fire the night before in the direction of Varna, 
but had no idea of its extent... On my arrival I found the town, with the 
exception of a small portion in which fortunately was situated the 
Commissariat Office and Treasure, a smouldering heap of ruins, the only 
buildings standing being a solitary mosque tower, a gateway, and the French 
powder magazine. The escape of the latter seems to have been most 
extraordinary and providential. Round it on every side were burning ruins, and 
the very walls were hot with the flames that had encircled it… Our treasure 
was put into carts, and sent off into the fields; and the whole population of 
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French and English, soldiers and sailors, Turks and Greeks, made a rush to the 
gates of the town… Everybody was drunk; champagne was running in rivers. 
The part burnt happened to be just that where all the shops were from which 
one occasionally drew one's supplies of bacon, sherry, porter, and such like 
necessaries; and those houses that were not gutted by the fire were instantly 
ransacked by the French Zouaves, who with a praiseworthy anxiety to secure 
what could be saved, ate and drank everything on the spot.
407
 
 
The choice of campaign locations in Varna was unsatisfactory for the British 
army. Devna was an unhealthy place, revealing a new feature of the campaign that 
became terribly prominent. In late July, cholera broke out at Varna, and hospitals 
were filled with cases within a few days. The epidemic was associated with the rivers 
and lakes linking the camps of Devna, Aladin and Varna. Severe disease spread 
quickly at the new encampment site at Gevreköy. Conditions at the camp at Varna, 
which had remained the site of the Third Division of the British army since its arrival 
from Gelibolu in late June, spread infection to several regiments of the division. 
Yüksekova occupied by the regiments of the Second Division also played a role in 
spreading disease. Blake draws a gloomy picture of the British medical services:  
At the front the soldier, sleeping in wet trenches, with no dry clothes and no 
flooer to his tent when out of the front line, was fed on tiny rations of uncooked 
food, accompanied by coffee madewith green beans, which could not be 
roasted. With no firewood to warm himself or his food, with his clothes worn 
out, he became an easy victim to dysentery, scurvy or cholera.
408
 
 
From 19 September 1854 to 28 September 1855, 188 officers and 1755 soldiers 
in the British army were killed. During the same period, 51 officers and 1548 
soldiers died from wounds, 35 officers, and 4244 soldiers died from cholera, and 26 
officers, and 11425 soldiers died from other causes by the end of December 1855. 
Between December and the end of March, 322 soldiers died of wounds and diseases, 
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bringing the total deaths to 270 officers and 19,314 men. In addition to these 
casualties, 2,873 soldiers died of exposure to cold temperatures, bringing the total 
number of deaths to 22,457.  French casualties in the field or hospitals in the East 
during the campaign totaled 63,000, of which 31,000 occurred in the Crimea and 
32,000 in Istanbul. In February, 19,648 soldiers in the Crimea were ill, of whom 
2,400 died, 1,993 recovered, and 8,738 were sent to Istanbul. Istanbul hospitals 
treated 20,088 ill soldiers, of whom 2,527 died.
409
 
In Gelibolu, a 300-bed hospital located a kilometer from the city met the 
French army’s basic needs. The initial hospital barracks was established upon the 
shores of the Dardanelles near the route of the fleets in May 1854. From 1854 to 
1856, nineteen French hospitals were established at Istanbul in four different types of 
buildings: permanent barracks, Ottoman hospitals, palaces, and wooden barracks 
(i.e., Pera; Dolmabahçe; Military School; Parade Ground; Gülhane; University; 
Davud Pasha; Maltepe; Rami Çiftlik barrack hospital; field hospitals in tents at 
Princess Islands, Kanlıca, Yenibahçe, Maslak; the Russian Embassy; and Sisters of 
Charity). Hospitals in Istanbul were protected from the dangers of war and 
sufficiently near the Crimea for easy communication. The fleet, responsible for 
supplying the army with necessities, also assisted in transporting the wounded and 
sick soldiers from the Crimea to Istanbul. Many of the casualties could never have 
recovered in the Crimea.  
It was at once decided that a hospital for 1200 ailing soldiers should be 
established in a part of this magnificent barrack. However, subsequent events 
rendered Adrianople less important as a military point. A small naval hospital was 
established in Izmir. 
                                               
409 Baudens, p. 174.  
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The first French hospital established at Istanbul was in Maltepe, and it 
continued to be used constantly until 31 May 1856. The central pharmaceutical 
department, entrusted to supply medical services in the Crimea and Istanbul, was 
established on the coast near Beşiktaş. Hospitals at Constantinople were insufficient 
to accommodate increasing numbers of patients with fevers. Only the hospital at Pera 
treated 27,500 soldiers during the twenty-two months of its existence. After the 
Malakhov Bastion was captured, the hospital received 800 ill soldiers in one day, 595 
of whom were severely wounded Russian prisoners.
410
 In the spring of 1855, it was 
decided that wounded French and Russian officers would be lodged in the 
ambassador’s house. When a peace treaty was signed, the French government 
expended large sums to refurbish the palace.  
On 14 September 1854, the three allied fleets met no resistance when they 
disembarked on Crimean soil at Gözleve. The arriving force included 137 cannon 
and 61,200 troops, including 27,000 each French and British troops and 6,000 Turks.  
 
 4.4.4. Russian Logistics 
Russian troops traditionally quartered in the Ottoman territories during wars 
against their southern neighbors. The Russians then attempted to meet supply needs 
through the local population, but they also brought many materials from their 
homeland. The Russians established their stores and hospitals in the Principalities. 
When the Russian army passed over the Pruth River, three months of supplies had 
already been prepared.  
                                               
410 L. Baudens, , On Military and Camp Hospitals and the Health of Troops in the Field, translated by 
Franklin Hough (New York, 1862), p. 144. 
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According to Petrov, the Russian army supplied their troops based on 
voluntary trade with the local population because the Russians were not fighting a 
war in the summer of 1853. Materials were purchased from the local population 
using receipts, and the Russian Quartermaster would later reimburse suppliers. 
Relations between the Wallachians and Russians deteriorated because suppliers were 
not paid adequately or on time for the products they had provided.  
Russian logistics were based on the idea that the war would soon end and the 
Russian army would remain in the Principalities. General Zatler, responsible for 
Russian logistics in the Balkans, described the details of the Russian preparations in 
his book. In the Principalities, Russia planned to rent 4880 carts from villagers (each 
with two oxens). The cart drivers would be paid daily. The Russians established 
magazines and hospitals in many cities of the Principalities.
411
 The diet of the 
Russian soldier differed from the agricultural products of the local population in the 
Principalities, which was a significant handicappe for the Russian supply system and 
the health of the soldiers.
412
  
 
4.4.5. Conclusion 
British and Russian armies, dissatisfied with their commissarariats during the 
war, established investigations to determine who was responsible for ineffective 
supply and health systems. British Commisioner General Filder and his Russian 
equivalent Zatler defended their acts and precautions after the war. Many people 
blamed them for the armies’ miseries. The French were better prepared for war than 
                                               
411 Fedor Zatler, Zapiski o prodovolstvii voisk v voennoe vremya, vol. I (St. Petersburg, 1860), pp. 
192-220.   
412 Petrov, vol. I, pp. 89.  
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their allies. The British had rushed into action almost totally unprepared. 
Transportation and health services failed when they first arrived in the East. They 
had no effective medical staff, and their commissariat was inexperienced and 
undermanned. All tasks were completed on an ad hoc basis. As one author remarked, 
“Lord Raglan had a splendid collection of soldiers; but he could not have marched 
them fifty miles.”413 
 
  
                                               
413 Cassell’s Illustrated History of England 1820-1861, vol. IV (London, 1864), p. 176.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
AT THE FRONT:  
WAR ON THE DANUBE 
 
 
 Considering the bulk of the literature, one may think that the battles in the 
Crimean War have been thoroughly discussed. However, many fights of the Crimean 
War, including those on the Danubian front, have been insufficiently explored. Even 
more unfortunate, most historical studies on the Crimean War provided one-sided 
explanations that depend only or heavily on sources from one participant country. 
British historians have concentrated on English sources, whereas Russian have 
largely utilized only Russian materials. This method of history writing has obviously 
hindered sufficient understanding of military strategies and tactics of rivaling armies 
and assessments of the outcomes of battles. Military reports cannot be viewed as 
texts of solid facts; they are political expressions of battles/fights and possess an 
inherent agenda of propagating successes and underrating failures. In the reports 
from the front, the numbers of enemy forces have been exaggerated, whereas the 
successes of the opponent have typically been underemphasized. Military reports are 
useful only when they are compared with the enemy’s reports and the remarks of 
other observers. This chapter presents a discussion of the fights on the Danube 
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through a critical observation using different archival materials and secondary 
sources. This approach represents the only way to understand what actually occurred 
on the Danube in 1853 and 1854.  
 
5.1. War Plans and Strategies 
5.1.1 First Stage: The Russo-Ottoman War  
The nature of provisions and the allocation of troops along the Danube 
indicated that this war would largely be a defensive war for the Ottomans.
414 
The 
allocation of forces changed during the war, but the Ottomans did not want to 
concentrate their forces to give an open field battle. The Ottoman armed forces 
devoted all their energy to the defense of the entrenched positions on the Danube and 
in Bulgaria. The Ottoman defense was largely based on the triangle amidst the first-
class fortresses of Varna, Silistre and Rusçuk and the fortified camp of Şumnu — the 
headquarters of the Ottoman army. These structures were the backbone of the 
Ottoman defense and were known as Quadrilateral or Kıla-i Erbaa. In July 1853, 
Ömer Lütfi Pasha reported that half of the Ottoman forces would be devoted to the 
fortifications and fortresses along and behind the Danube, and the other half would 
be used as a mobile army stationed at Şumnu.415 According to this strategy, if Russia 
assaulted Vidin or attempted to pass the Quadrilateral, then the allocated forces could 
easily be summoned to lend a hand to any defense line where necessary. At the 
commencement of the war, Ömer Lütfi Pasha enjoyed a force of 40,000-45,000 men 
in his headquarters at Şumnu while the remainder of his forces were allocated to the 
                                               
414 Govone memoires, p. 35. 
415 ATASE, k. 8, d. 3, f. 3/1, 27 Ramazan 1269 [4 July 1853]. 
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many fortresses either on the passes in the Balkan range or on the Danube River. 
Some forces also remained in Edirne and Sofia as reserves.  
In addition to Quadrilateral, Ömer Lütfi Pasha attached special importance to 
Vidin at the extreme left flank. During the war, the fortress of Vidin together with its 
tête de pont — the Kalafat fortification on the left bank of the river in Little 
Wallachia was the most important destination of the Ottoman army, only second to 
Şumnu. In the summer of 1853, the fortress of Silistre had only a humble force of 
approximately 6,000 men, but when the Russian threat over the fortress became real 
in the following year, the garrison would increase to 18,000 men. There were 
approximately 10,000-15,000 Ottoman troops in the fortress of Varna throughout the 
campaign. The fortress of Rusçuk hosted approximately 20,000 men and the 
Danubian fleet. Secondary fortresses in Dobruja (e.g., Tulça, Maçin, Babadağ, 
Hırsova) were defended by a total force of 20,000 men.416  
Place Infantry Cavalry Commander 
Vidin 10 battalions 1 regiment Mehmed Sâlim Pasha 
Atchar (?) 
Niğbolu 
Lezu (?) 
6 battalions 
8 battalions 
6 battalions 
4 squadrons 
2 squadrons 
2 squadrons 
Çerkes İsmail Pasha, 
The vice president of 
the council of the 
Rumeli Army 
Rahova 8 battalions 4 squadrons Ahmed Pasha, Staff 
General of Ömer 
Pasha 
Sistova 
Tırnova 
Lofça 
16 battalions 
2 battalions 
4 battalions 
1 regiment 
1 regiment 
1 squadron 
Menemencioğlu 
Mustafa Pasha 
Osmanpazarı 
Razgrad 
6 battalions 
4 battalions 
3 squadrons 
2 sq. 
Ahmed Pasha 
Rusçuk 10 battalions 4 squ Mahmud Pasha, 
Brigadier General 
Tutrakan 10 battalions  3 squ Alyanak Mustafa 
                                               
416 According to Russian estimates the Ottoman forces were allocated as such: Şumnu 30,000; İsakçı 
18,000; Karasu 14,000; Sistova 10,000; Hırsova 8,000; Rusçuk 15,000; Silistre 5,000; Rahova and 
Niğbolu each 4,000; Vidin about 20,000; Tutrakan, Maçin, Tulça, Varna, Plevne and Orsova about 
16,000, and 5000 men as independent forces. Kovalevskii, pp. 72-73; Petrov, vol. I pp. 121-122. 
Kovalevskii claims that there were about 9,000 men in the fortress of Vidin.  
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Pasha, Lieutenant 
General 
Silistre 10 battalions  1 reg.  Musa Hulusi Pasha 
Tulça 
Maçin 
Karasu 
Babadağ 
Hırsova 
  Hasan Hakkı Pasha, 
Müşir 
Pravadi   Osman Pasha, 
Brigadier General 
Şumnu 28 battalions  4 squadrons Ömer Lütfi Pasha 
Sofia 50 battalions  4 regiments Rıfat Pasha and Rıza 
Pasha, Lieutenant 
Generals 
Bosnia 32 battalions  2 regiments  
In total 175 battalions.  53 regiments  
The allocation of the Ottoman Forces in the Balkans in October 1853
417
  
  
The allocation of forces changed in time when necessary; however, the 
Ottoman army continued to be dispersed throughout a wide region. Dispersing the 
troops over a large territory was a distinctive feature of Ottoman warfare. 
Kovalevskii criticized the Ottomans because they were not able to stand fast against 
a decisive Russian attack with such scattered units.
418
 However, the Ottomans never 
abandoned this strategy, despite its many disadvantages. Reid explains the Ottoman 
rationale:  
Rather than concentrate armies to build greater force, Ottoman generals feared 
the loss of even a small territory to invasion or rebellion, and attempted to 
deploy forces everywhere to hold everything. Part of their problem was the 
factional strife in the officer corps and in the Ottoman government. Such 
factional conflicts made it difficult for a general staff to operate in unity and 
placed a commanding officer in jeopardy for failing to defend any part of the 
empire from loss.
419
  
 
 Another reason for not assembling large armies was that the Ottomans did not 
think of determined offensives on the Russian army. The Ottoman army of the 19
th
 
                                               
417 The table is mainly derived from the information in Prim, p. 191.  
418 Kovalevskii, p. 73.  
419 Reid, p. 257.  
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century was powerful in the entrenched positions but lacked the capability for an 
offensive. (For details, see chapter 4.1.) Russell well summarized defensive skills of 
the Ottomans emphasizing the weakness in command in open battle:   
Behind stone walls, intrenchments, or ramparts, defending a breach, or in the 
dash of a sortie, the Osmanli, with his wild courage, savage fanaticism, and 
disregard of death, which he considers indeed as his passport to Heaven, may 
repel the organized attack of European troops, or carry temporary destruction 
among their ranks; but no one who sees the slow, cautious, and confused 
evolutions of the Turks, their straggling advance and march, their shaky 
squares and wavering columns, can believe they could long stand against a 
regular army in the open field.
420
 
 
  
 Lieutenant-General Alyanak Mustafa Pasha, having entrenched at Tutrakan, 
was initially given the command of the forces at the center of the Danube. In 1854, 
he was assigned to the extreme right and served in Dobruja in Kel Hasan Hakkı 
Pasha’s stead.421 At the beginning of the war, Dobruja was under the command of 
Lieutenant-General Abdulhalim Pasha. Rusçuk, an important fortress on the Danube, 
was entrusted to Lieutenant-General Halid Pasha.
422
 The first-class fortress at Vidin 
and its surroundings composed the Ottoman extreme left. During the preparations, 
the Ottoman units at Vidin were under the command of Lieutenant-General Çerkes 
İsmail Pasha. Lieutenant-General Nazır Ahmed Pasha and Lieutenant-General 
Mustafa Tevfik Paşa were also charged at this flank before the initiation of the 
hostilities. Three high commanders—of whom Ahmed Pasha was in the highest 
commanding position—in Kalafat showed the importance attached to this flank by 
Ömer Lütfi Pasha. According to a correspondent of The Times, Ahmed Pasha was the 
mind behind the forces at Kalafat, whereas İsmail Pasha was the energy behind the 
                                               
420 Russell, The War: From the Landing at Gallipoli to the Death of Lord Raglan, p. 102.   
421 ATASE, k. 5, d. 15, f. 9, 18 Rebîulahir 1270 [18 January 1854]; Czajkowski, Moje wspomnienia o 
wojnie 1854 roku, p. 36.  
422 Paton, p. 73; Pictorial History of the Russian War, p. 42; ATASE, k. 4, d. 10, f. 24. 
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action.
423
 Their relations were far from friendly, however. In the spring of 1854, 
Abdulhalim Pasha was assigned as the commander of the forces at Kalafat. Ahmed 
and İsmail Pashas were likely called back to Şumnu following the Russian invasion 
of Dobruja to assume command during the expected grand battle in case of the fall of 
Silistre.  
A military strategy of defense on the Danube and offense in the Caucasus was 
hardly surprising, as it was typical for the Russo-Ottoman wars throughout the 19
th
 
century. However, Ömer Lütfi Pasha applied a strategy of limited offense on the 
Danube through which he aimed to raise the spirits of his troops without risking the 
Ottoman army. Thus, in contrast to other Russo-Ottoman encounters on the Danube, 
the Ottomans—not the Russians— had assumed somewhat of an offensive mindset 
in 1853. By the autumn of 1853, the Ottomans not only fortified some of the 
Danubian islands but also made preparations for building pontoon bridges. Without 
informing even his own commanders, Ömer Lütfi Pasha secretly investigated the 
quantity of lumber, boats, and ships in the region—necessary materials for pontoons 
on the Danube.
424
 Nevertheless, battles on this front would clearly demonstrate that 
the Ottoman assaults were not part of a grand military strategy.  
Nicholas I had several alternative ideas for a campaign in the Ottoman Empire, 
(see, chapter 3.). However, he did not or could not implement his offensive plans. In 
1853, the Russian government adopted a strategy of staying in the Principalities until 
a diplomatic solution could be found. The Russians entered the Principalities with the 
aim of strengthening their hands on the table of diplomacy. Thus, their only initial 
                                               
423 Der Russisch – türkische krieg in Europa 1853, bis zum März 1854 by a German staff officer (Kiel, 
1854), p 77.  
424 ATASE, Instructions of Ömer Pasha to Süleyman Bey, k. 4, d. 11, f. 11, 5 Muharrem 1270 [8 
October 1853]. 
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war plan was to protect the Principalities against any possible Ottoman assault. In the 
spring of 1854, when the Russian forces advanced, they were too late for a successful 
campaign directed at the Ottoman capital, as the opposing army had already been 
prepared to countermand the Russian advance, and notably, the international 
atmosphere was then completely unfavorable to the Russians. Interestingly, both 
antagonists on the Danube primarily adopted defensive strategies. Thus, military 
developments in the region could hardly solve the problems between the two 
empires, and it appeared that only mediations or interventions of the European 
powers could put an end to the crisis.  
According to Kovalevskii, “Prince Gorchakov had an important but difficult 
task in guarding the enormous line of the Danube from Turno-Severin to the mouth 
of the Danube and to defend the vast region by forces inferior to the enemy.”425 
Having invaded the vast territory of Wallachia and Moldavia, the Russians had 
difficulty maintaining the security of the army against possible attacks. In the autumn 
of 1853, the Russian forces in the Principalities were modest compared with the 
Ottoman army in Bulgaria. Russia dispatched only approximately 80,000 men, who 
constituted the Fourth Army and part of the Fifth.
426
 The number of Russian units 
was small for an invasion of the Principalities, let alone for any offensive toward 
Bulgaria. The Russian army did not even prepare necessary materials to cross the 
Danube River until the end of 1853, as St. Petersburg remained optimistic for a 
diplomatic solution.
427
 The imbalance between the Russian and Ottoman forces 
                                               
425 Kovalevskii, p. 69.   
426 For the order of battle of the Russian army, see the appendices of the following monographs: Der 
russisch-türkische krieg, p. 143-146, Petrov, vol. I, pp. 185-188; Bogdanovich, vol. I, Prilozheniya, 
pp. 6-15. 
427 “Zapiski Gorchakova”, l. 69.  
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clearly demonstrated that the conquest plans of Istanbul—long discussed by the high 
command of the Russian army and Tsar Nicholas I—would not be implemented.428  
In the summer of 1853, Russia clarified that the Russian army would possess 
the Principalities only as a “material guarantee” to force the Ottomans to yield to 
their “just demands.” In his reports to the Emperor, Prince Gorchakov praised the 
tactic of waiting in the Principalities and defending the positions against the Ottoman 
forces.
429
 However, after the war, Gorchakov harshly criticized this strategy in his 
diaries, claiming that the troops merely waited passively without conducting any 
meaningful action. Thus, he considered the wait-and-see policy applied during the 
invasion of the Principalities to be a grave mistake. According to Gorchakov, the 
most appropriate strategy would have been an actual offensive as early as 1852 by a 
coordinated operation of land and naval units. He expressed that declaring war would 
have been preferred over invading the Principalities. The Russian commander 
asserted that the invasion proved to be the least effective option.
430
 Gorchakov also 
accused Austria of betraying Russia. He believed that war could have been averted if 
Austria had shown sufficient support to Russia during the summer of 1853.
431
 
The Porte was aware of the Russian reluctance for war, but preparations were 
made for the worst possible contingency (Rusya Devleti’nin yapacağı şeylerin en 
ağırını göze kestirerek) and for prudence (kaide-i ihtiyata riayeten).432 Ömer Lütfi 
Pasha rightly contemplated that the Russians would passively remain in the 
Principalities to wait for the result of the European diplomacy.
433
 According to the 
                                               
428 Petrov,vol. I, pp. 63-64. 
429 Zayonchkovskii, vol. II, part 1, p. 91. 
430 “Zapiski Gorchakova”, l. 49. 
431 “Zapiski Gorchakova”, l. 41. 
432 ATASE, k. 2, d. 7, f. 30, 14 Ramazan 1269 [21 June 1853]; ATASE, k. 9, d. 7, f. 11. 
433 “...bunlar yalnız Memleketeyn’de durup ba’de yine politika ile icrâ-yı muamele ve müzakere 
edecekleri galip-i zann ...” ATASE, k. 6, d. 18, f. 54. 
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Ottoman commander, the Russians only wanted to cause alarm in the Ottoman 
capital to attain their goals without resorting to an actual war. In his wartime 
correspondences, Ömer Lütfi Pasha confirmed Gorchakov’s views. He argued that if 
Russia had sought a war in the summer of 1853, they would easily have advanced 
into the Balkans against the unprepared Ottoman forces.
 
However, the Russian 
hesitancy to declare war furnished the Sublime Porte with the opportunity to 
organize its army on the Danube.
434
 
The Russian army in the Principalities was commanded from Bucharest. The 
Fourth Army under the command of General P. A. Dannenberg was stationed in the 
Greater Wallachia between Bucharest and the Danube River.
435
 Some of these forces 
were stationed in Dobreni under the direct command of General Dannenberg, 
whereas Lieutenant-General Soymonov’s forces were in Frateshti, and Major-
General Pavlov’s forces were in Budeshti. Subsequently, Soymonov’s troops would 
be dispatched to Yergöğü. Throughout the war, there were frequent fights between 
the Ottoman and Russian troops on the islands in front of Yergöğü (i.e., Radoman, 
Mokan (Mokanoğlu) and Charoy). The last significant battle in the Balkans would 
also occur at Yergöğü.  
The Russian left wing extended from İbrail to Kili. Some forces of the Fifth 
Army were under the command of General A. N. Lüders. In the summer of 1853, the 
forces of Lüders were located in southern Bessarabia. Only some units, under the 
                                               
434 “Saltanat-ı Seniyye’nin asla hazırda mukabele edecek kuvveti olmadığından ol vakt ne sûretle 
tecâvüzü murad etse icrâsına ferceyâb olur idi fakat bazı sebeplere mebnî emr-i muharebede 
mütereddid iken Devlet-i Aliyye-i ebedü’d-devam vaktiyle ve âkılâne davranarak buraca lâzım olan 
kuvve-i askeriyyesini politika ile imrâr olunan eyyâm içinde vakt ve zamanıyla yetiştirip …” ATASE, 
k. 4, d. 11, f. 8. 
435 The west of the River Olt or Aluta was called Little Wallachia, and the east was called Greater 
Wallachia. 
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command of General Engelhardt, were located around İbrail and Kalas.436 There 
were frequent skirmishes between the Russian Cossacks and the Ottoman outposts. 
This region was principally important because of the intelligence activities of both 
parties. The lower Danube was also convenient to cross the Danube. In fact, as in 
previous Russo-Ottoman encounters, the Russian army would cross the lower 
Danube and invade Dobruja before its forward movement.  
On the right wing, in Little Wallachia, the Russian forces were insignificant 
until the arrival of the Third Army. The extreme right of the Russian army was 
stationed near Karakul under the command of Lieutenant-General Fischbach. First 
Major-General Belgard and then Lieutenant-General Fischbach commanded the 
flying forces there.
437
  Subsequently, Adjutant-General Anrep-Elmpt would assume 
the command, enjoying larger forces against any possible Ottoman assault. In 1854, 
the Russian forces in Little Wallachia would be supported by the arrival of the 12
th
 
infantry division under the command of Lieutenant-General Liprandi.
438
  
The major problem for the Russians was that they did not have a master plan. 
There were many ideas and tentative strategies, ranging from a coup de main to 
capture Istanbul to a simple diplomatic solution to save face. Some of these strategies 
were penned by Nicholas I himself, some by Prince Paskevich, and some by other 
top military figures. However, the acts and orders of the Emperor during the war 
were characterized by hesitancy.
439
 One Russian commander criticized the slowness 
and indecisiveness in the military action: 
                                               
436 Petrov, vol. I, pp. 122-123.  
437 Petrov, vol. I, pp. 86-87. The forces of Fischbach were composed of 7 battalions, 16 squadrons, 
and 3 Cossack hundreds. “Zapiski Gorchakova”, l. 58.   
438 For the allocation of the Russian forces, see Kovalevskii, pp. 69-70.  
439 “Zapiski Gorchakova”, l. 108. 
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Slowness in our military movements in the winter of 1853 and the summer of 
1854 was not a result of a shortage in military forces but only resulted from the 
Russian indecisiveness. The Russians had in the Principalities and in the south 
of Bessarabia some 80,000 men and approximately 300 guns ready to act when 
the Ottomans confined themselves in fortresses and when they could no longer 
show up against our more than 10 thousand men.
440
  
 
The Russian army failed to possess complete control in Little Wallachia 
throughout the war. The activities of the Ottoman forces in Kalafat and the 
reluctance of the local population to obey the Russian military government resulted 
in an ineffective Russian presence there. Actually, despite the Ottoman concerns, the 
Russian army could not pose a threat to the Serbian border.  
After the declaration of war, both the Ottomans and the Russians were 
prudent in their actions, but interestingly, they perceived their opponent as more 
offensive than it actually was. The assembling of the Ottoman forces at Vidin and the 
occupation of Kalafat had defensive aims, but the Russians considered them to 
represent an aggression toward Little Wallachia and even toward Bucharest. 
Therefore, the Russians concentrated some of their forces in Little Wallachia, which 
was in turn understood by the Ottomans as preparation for an attack on Vidin to 
establish contacts with Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, not surprisingly, the 
cautious and defensive moves of both parties were perceived by the rival army as a 
step toward an offensive.  
In fact, there were no projects of the Ottoman military command as great as 
marching to Bucharest and ridding the Principalities of the Russian military 
presence. Certainly, any endeavors enduring some risk were borne from Ottoman 
strategic planning. At the beginning of the war, Serasker Pasha warned Ömer Lütfi 
                                               
440 Ushakov, p. 68. 
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Pasha to be painstaking in each and every act.
441
 Ömer Lütfi Pasha was also 
reminded that there was no other army to protect Istanbul.
442
 The security of Istanbul 
was the priority; thus, any strategy that could damage the defense of the capital was 
to be disregarded. Thus, all ostensibly offensive actions of the Ottoman army had an 
underlying defensive motive. The capture of Kalafat was intended to prevent any 
possible ties between the Serbians and the Russian army. The capture of Olteniçe 
aimed only to misdirect the Russian army to facilitate the conclusion of the defensive 
works in Kalafat. Therefore, Ottoman military actions should be understood as an 
active defense aiming to urge the Russian withdrawal from the Principalities. Even 
during the siege of Silistre, Ömer Lütfi Pasha did not take the risk of battle but 
waited for the arrival of the Allied forces. 
In 1854, when the Russians decided to cross the Danube River, the Third Army 
and more units from the Fifth Army accompanied by some forces from the Guards 
were transferred to the scene of the war. Thus, the Russian army in the Principalities 
and on the right bank of the Danube would reach significant numbers exceeding 
150,000 men.  
 
5.1.2 Second Stage: The Allied Campaign 
When the Russians were gradually employing an offensive strategy, the war 
had already been transformed into a European war. This reality could have been 
expected to force the Russian army to act decisively and rapidly, but interestingly, 
                                               
441 ATASE, k. 4, d. 11, f. 29/1. 
442 “Rumeli Ordu-yu Hümâyûnu Devlet-i Aliyye’nin mecmu’-i kuvve-i mevcûdesi olarak bunun ne 
elde ve ne de hesap ve defterde bir kuvve-i ihtiyâtiyyesi dahi olmamağla” ATASE, k. 46, d. 1, f. 16, 
21 Receb 1270 [19 April 1854]. 
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the Russian command continued to act hesitantly. An allied war was not an easy and 
painless task for the Ottoman army. The Ottomans, both the commanders and 
members of the government, found themselves in a difficult environment in which 
they were expected to obey their European friends. Therefore, the Ottoman army 
would play only a secondary role following the French and British involvement in 
the war.  
Command of the British was trusted to Fitzroy Somerset Lord Raglan and the 
French to Marshal Jacques Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, both experienced soldiers but not 
young and energetic. They were given command as a result of their careers, but their 
energy would not be sufficient to see the termination of the war. Saint-Arnaud passed 
away only a few weeks after the initiation of the Crimean campaign, and Lord 
Raglan passed away on 28 June 1855. General James Simpson would succeed Lord 
Raglan, and François Canrobert would assume command of the French army after 
Saint-Arnaud. On 16 May 1855, after Canrobert resigned from his post, Aimable 
Jean Jacques Pélissier was the commander of the French forces. After the fall of 
Sevastopol, Simpson retired from the Crimea, and the command was passed to 
General William John Codrington. Tactics and strategies altered along the changes in 
command. Nevertheless, for most of the allied campaign, there was only one 
significant target—the capitulation of the fortress of Sevastopol.  
There were three armies fighting with the Russians (and four armies when the 
Sardinians participated in the alliance on 22 January 1855), but what was the 
hierarchy of command? Clearly, Ömer Lütfi Pasha was not the commander who 
would assume command of the allied armies. Lord Clarendon congratulated Ömer 
Lütfi Pasha for his patriotism to declare himself ready to serve under the allied 
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commanders for the good of the Ottoman Empire.
443
 Certainly, the Ottoman 
commander-in-chief was not happy to be in a secondary position in a war that had 
been initiated under his own command. It was Saint-Arnaud who, as a result of a 
tacit agreement, would exercise the actual command. The number of French forces 
on the scene, which was far greater than the number of the British forces, naturally 
increased the power of Saint-Arnaud.  
When France and Britain declared war on Russia, they had no plan but to 
protect and save the capital of the Ottoman Empire. The first months of the alliance 
passed without any lucid motive and objective. Although the Crimea was viewed as a 
target from the beginning of the Allied intervention, it became certain only in July 
1854. Meanwhile, the preparations continued for months with a slow pace.  
The naval powers thought that the Russian army would force both the Danube 
and the Balkans by their overwhelming force. Thus, these powers determined to 
secure a base of operations from which they could defend Istanbul, in case of the 
Ottoman retreat from the Balkans. Gelibolu, which was decided to be the base of 
defensive operations, would be the first destination of the allied troops. Sir John 
Burgoyne and Colonel Ardent had been sent to inspect this peninsula. As the allied 
troops began to arrive in March and April, they were employed in building 
entrenchments, known as the lines of Bolayır, and extending from the Gulf of Saros 
to the Sea of Marmora. When the allied forces were concentrating their powers, war 
had already accelerated in the Balkans. Russian troops crossed the Danube and laid a 
siege before Silistre. At that time, according to the common opinion, Silistre would 
not stand long against the Russian forces. The war strategy in May and June was to 
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wait for the advancing Russians and to repel them when they marched on Istanbul. 
At this time, the Russians were proceeding toward the outworks of Silistre. It was 
thought that the Russians would have established themselves in Silistre by the end of 
June and would be able (from Silistre) to act offensively against the Balkans. 
However, they were satisfied with the strength of Şumnu to repel the Russians with 
the help of the allied armies. 
Three commanders-in-chief initially met at Varna to discuss the war affairs. 
The allied commander Marshal Saint-Arnaud and General Lord Raglan came to 
Varna together with Serasker Hasan Rıza Pasha. On 19 May, they held a war council 
during which Ömer Lütfi Pasha expressed his worries regarding the siege of Silistre. 
The Ottoman commander-in-chief informed them that there were 45,000 men in 
Şumnu, which could defend itself from the Russian forces. However, the fortress of 
Silistre, where there were 18,000 men could not hold the place longer than six weeks. 
The remainder of his forces were scattered in detachments. Ömer Lütfi Pasha 
suggested Varna as the point of concentration for the allies. The two generals agreed 
to bring up their troops to Varna. After the conference, Lord Raglan and Saint-
Arnaud drove to Şumnu and inspected the troops and the field works to form the 
camp. The allied commanders considered that with an Ottoman force in Şumnu and 
an allied force in Varna, the Russians, even if they captured Silistre, would hesitate 
to advance into the Balkans with an enemy on each flank. Lord Raglan and Marshal 
Saint-Arnaud returned to Istanbul on 23 May. 
At the request of the Ottoman commander-in-chief, an English division landed 
at Varna early in June. With the Russians being checked in their rapid advance, the 
line of the Balkans might now be held and the fortresses of Şumnu and Varna 
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covered if the enemy should turn on them after taking Silistre, which was still 
considered doomed to fall despite being resolutely defended. The remainder of the 
British army, including the greater part of the brigade remaining in Gelibolu, 
followed the Light Division to Varna, and was distributed on the heights south of 
Varna bay and at various points on and near the Şumnu road, Devna, Aladyn, and 
Manastır—places that, although surrounded by landscapes picturesquely grand, will 
long live drearily in the remembrance of the British army in the Ottoman Empire. 
However, while the allied forces were gradually assembling there, the Ottomans 
stopped the Russian army, and the lines of Bolayır thus became obsolete soon. In 
retrospect, it can be concluded the fear of Russian power was exaggerated (see, 
Chapter 4.4.).  
The Allies wanted to push back the Russian advance in Bulgaria, but they did 
not plan an advance into the Principalities and Bessarabia.
444
 The military strategy of 
the allied powers would be based on an offense that could soon end the war. After 
the abandonment of the siege of Silistre, the previously long discussed target of the 
military port of Sevastopol emerged as a certain and final war aim. This goal 
indicated that the theatre of hostilities would move from the Danube to the Crimean 
peninsula. On 18 July, the Allied War Council formally decided on a campaign in the 
Crimea.
445
 Although the allied powers formed their great designs for an offensive 
war at the beginning of their involvement in the war, they were not long in a position 
to execute them as they lacked an organized army. The Crimean expedition was thus 
initiated only in September 1854, as the Russians found time to prepare their 
defenses throughout the summer of 1854.  
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5.2. First Encounters: The Ottoman Offensive 
5.2.1. To Fight or Not to Fight 
The Russian vanguard forces of 7,000 men (32 squadrons, 6 Cossack hundreds 
and 16 guns) under the command of Adjutant-General Graf Anrep-Elmpt crossed the 
Pruth River via Leovo on 3 July 1853. The first Russian forces would arrive at 
Bucharest by a forced march on 15 July. The main forces entered the Principalities in 
three columns and continued their movement in two columns after their arrival at 
Tekuch. On the right flank, 16 battalions and 48 guns under the command of 
Lieutenant-General Liprandi completed the crossing over the Pruth via Skuluani on 
14 July and arrived at Bucharest on 24 July. In the middle column, the forces of 25 ¼ 
battalions, 80 guns, 7 Cossack hundreds and a pontoon park under the command of 
General Dannenberg crossed the Pruth via Skuluani on 3
 
- 15 July and arrived at 
Bucharest on 27 July. On the left, Lieutenant-General Graf Nirod crossed the river 
via Leovo with the forces of 13 ½ battalions, 32 squadrons, 5 Cossack hundreds and 
56 guns on 4 - 16 July. The invasion of the Principalities was thus complete in three 
weeks.
446
  
General Gorchakov arrived at Jassy on 5 July and at Bucharest on 28 July. The 
invading forces were composed of the Russian 4
th
 army, one brigade of the 5
th
 army, 
the 5
th
 light cavalry division and the 6
th
 Cossack regiment. In July 1853, there were 
71,869 Russian troops in the Principalities.
447
 Subsequently, in the summer of 1853, 
the forces would rise to 22 generals, 1,646 officers, 81,541 troopers and 5,741 non-
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combatants.
448
 There were also local military forces in the Principalities, which 
would act under the command of the Russian invasion army. The Granichari 
(frontier guards) and Drabantsy (mounted militia) were totaled approximately 20,000 
men with 14 guns. According to Gorchakov, these men were well trained but lacked 
“soldierly spirit”.449  
The Russian forces were received cheerfully in both Jassy and Bucharest, 
particularly by the clergy. The best houses were given to the army commanders. 
Gorchakov wrote to Nicholas, “Forces of Your Highness were received in Bucharest 
as liberators”.450 The Russian proclamation to the inhabitants of the Principalities 
declared that fundamental rights would be untouched and that local people would be 
able to occupy their own business under the protection of the Tsar. There would not 
be any additional tax or conscription, and materials taken would be paid according to 
a fixed price determined by the local authorities.
451
 Obviously, the language of the 
proclamation was gentle. However, the reality was different. The control of the 
Principalities passed into Russian hands, while the civil government was under the 
total control of the Russian army. In November 1853, Stirbey and Ghika, the 
Wallachian and Moldavian princes, abandoned their positions and countries. The 
Russians entrusted governance to General Budberg, who would be on the post until 
the invasion of Bucharest by the Ottoman and Austrian forces in the autumn of 1854. 
Martial law was in force, although it was not officially declared. The Wallachian 
vessels were forbidden from navigating in the Danube. The Wallachian landowners 
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and farmers were forced to deliver necessary articles to the Russian army, and in case 
of refusal, the Russians were authorized to employ force.
452
  
General Gorchakov placed a greater portion of his forces near Bucharest with 
vanguard forces on the River Arjis and waited for a diplomatic solution. There were 
also four surveillance forces: at Kalas, against Silistre, against Rusçuk, and on the 
borders of Little Wallachia. The Cossack and Wallachian posts conducted 
reconnaissance on the Danube River. The borders of Bessarabia from Reni to the 
banks of the Danube were protected by the forces of General Lüders composed of 16 
battalions and 8 Cossack hundreds. The Russian army and the Danubian flotilla had 
to watch all the lower and central parts of the Danube and to protect the 
Principalities, avoiding any conflict with the Ottoman forces.  
St. Petersburg considered that the invasion of the Principalities would be 
sufficient to enforce the Porte to accept Russia’s “just demands.” In one of his 
reports from Odessa, Prince Menshikov claimed that the Ottoman Empire, lacking 
both financial and military resources, would collapse even without any hostile step 
from the Russian Empire. The Russian intelligence also indicated that the Porte was 
unprepared for war. All the forces in European Turkey included 70,000 men, and 
only 18,000 of them could be assembled in Bulgaria and on the banks of the Danube 
River. The fortresses were in poorer conditions, and were not furnished with 
necessary supplies and military provisions. While the European diplomacy attempted 
to solve the Russo-Ottoman conflict, the Porte took measures for a possible war. 
Provisions and armaments were feverishly prepared, and fortifications were repaired 
and strengthened (see, chapter 4.4.).  
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The Russian invasion of the Principalities was not perceived as a casus belli by 
the Porte and the European powers. However, Russia’s passage to the right bank of 
the Danube River or movement over the Caucasian boundaries would result in 
immediate commencement of war. Therefore, both sides contented themselves with 
firing on boats sailing in the Danube or on the pickets erected along the Danube. 
Neither the Ottomans nor the Russians wanted to accept the responsibility for 
officially initiating the hostilities. Orders were sent to the borders not to fire before 
the enemy. Admiral Slade and many others found such orders illogical:   
The Capitan Pasha concluded the interview by giving Mushaver Pasha a 
written order to abstain from firing first in case of meeting the enemy. “Are we 
not at war?” asked the latter. “We are,” he replied; “but such is the Porte's 
order.” Mushaver Pasha excused himself from undertaking to comply with it, 
since the first broadside from a ship in position might decide an action. “That is 
your affair,” replied the chief. “I have given you the order and that suffices 
me.”453 
 
 
The obscurity in the mind of the Russian soldiers in their pickets on the 
Danube was likely deeper than that of their enemies. The Russian soldiers could not 
understand why they could not pass the Danube River.
454
 In case of an attack from 
the other bank of the river, the Russians were ordered not to retaliate but only to 
defend their positions. Thus, hostilities opened reluctantly, with minor fights on the 
Russian pickets along the Danube. The first fight occurred during the night from 22 
to 23 October when a small Ottoman detachment crossed the river from Tutrakan and 
killed a Cossack at Olteniçe. On 23 October, a small Egyptian detachment also made 
its way to the right bank of the river at Hırsova and killed some Cossacks. However, 
the first significant fight occured on 27 October: it was a skirmish between the 
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Ottoman fortification at İsakçı and two Russian steamers that were attempting to pass 
to the upper Danube. On the same day, another battle occured on the Caucasus front, 
after which the Ottoman army captured the Russian fortified town of Şekvetil (St. 
Nicholas) on the Caucasian border. These events marked the first acts of war, but in 
the Crimean War literature, there remains some controversy regarding the 
commencement of the Crimean War; thus, it is appropriate to discuss here how the 
hostilities began.  
On 4 October, the Ottoman Grand Council decided on war against Russia, and 
on 8
 October, Ömer Lütfi Pasha sent an ultimatum to General Gorchakov asking for 
the evacuation of the Principalities. On the same day, the Şumnu garrison paraded 
together, swore fidelity to the Sultan, and listened to the Ferman declaring war on 
Russia.
455
 After the oath, the commanders read the order of the day to their men.  
To The Imperial Soldiers! 
When we fight our enemy, be always firm and courageous on the field of 
battle! Never basely turn your back to him: but, to avenge ourselves, we will 
sacrifice both our bodies and souls. This is the Koran!! We have 
sworn to this,— on the Koran! You are all Mussulmans, and I have not the 
slightest doubt, but that you are prepared to sacrifice yourselves in defence of 
your religion and of the Throne. But, should there be among you, one, who has 
a dread of war, let him say so! Fear, is a sickness of the heart. It 
would be highly dangerous for us to present ourselves before the enemy, with 
such men in our ranks, whom we could employ elsewhere, in the hospitals, and 
in other services. But whosoever, after this, runs away from the battle field,—
let him know that he will be shot. On the other hand, let those brave men, who 
devote themselves in defence of their religion and of the empire, remain firm at 
their post; —that they may unite their hearts to God;—that they may love their 
religion;—that they may prove themselves brave; and God will, without doubt, 
give them the victory! 
Soldiers! Purify your hearts; and then put entire confidence in God. Fight; and 
sacrifice yourselves as your ancestors have done;—and remember, 
that the country and the religion which they confided to your charge, you are 
bound to transmit, entire, to your children. 
You know that the object of our present life is to serve God worthily, 
and the Sultan; and, by these means, to gain Heaven. 
                                               
455 Temperley, p. 364; Rhodes, pp. 92-94.  
203 
 
Soldiers! Every man of honour ought thus to think, and act according to these 
sentiments. So may God assist you, 
Amen.
456
 
 
The Ottomans set fifteen days as a time frame for a positive answer after the 
letter was handed to Gorchakov. The letter underlined that a negative reply would 
naturally initiate hostilities. 
While the Sublime Porte has exhausted all means of conciliation to maintain at 
once peace and its own independence, the Court of Russia has not ceased to 
raise difficulties in the way of any such settlement, and has ended with the 
violation of treaties—invading the two principalities of Moldavia and 
Wallachia, integral parts of the Ottoman Empire. True to its pacific system,  the 
Porte, instead of exercising its right to make reprisals, confined itself even then 
to protesting, and did not deviate from the way that might lead to an 
arrangement. Russia, on the contrary, far from evincing corresponding 
sentiments, has ended by rejecting the proposals recommended by the august 
mediating Courts—proposals which were alike necessary to the honour and to 
the security of the Porte. There only remains for the latter the indispensable 
necessity of war. But, as the invasion of the Principalities, and the violation of 
treaties which have attended it, are the veritable causes of war, the Sublime 
Porte, as a last expression of its pacific sentiments [efkâr-ı muslihânesinin 
asâr-ı hayriyyesi], proposes to your Excellency, by my intervention, the 
evacuation of the two provinces, and grants for your decision a term of 15 
days, to date from the receipt of this letter. If within this interval a negative 
answer shall reach me from your Excellency, the commencement of hostilities 
will be the natural consequence.
457
 
 
The letter was received by General Gorchakov on 9 October and was answered 
the following day. The Russian commander-in-chief replied that he had no authority 
to enter any bargaining to evacuate the Principalities.
458
 In his own words, “On 27 
September [9 October], I received Omer Pasha’s letter in which he requested the 
evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia, with notification that hostilities shall 
otherwise begin on 11 [23] October. I replied him that I have no authority either to 
negotiate or to evacuate the Danubian Principalities. The Emperor approved the 
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answer and entrusted me with the duty to repel the Turkish attacks without crossing 
to the right bank of the Danube.” 459 When should the hostilities begin: on the very 
same day of the arrival of the Russian answer, fifteen days after the dispatch of Ömer 
Lütfi Pasha’s letter or fifteen days after the arrival of the Russian answer? Gorchakov 
claims that the Ottomans initiated hostilities earlier than the termination of the given 
period. According to the Russian commander, hostilities should only be initiated on 
24 October, as he received the letter on 9
 
October. This claim shows the official 
Russian view, and Russian historiography repeated the argument that the Ottomans 
did not wait until the expiration of the given period.  
However, the date when Gorchakov replied to the Ottoman ultimatum can also 
be viewed as the legitimate initiation of hostilities. According to Badem, the war 
officially began when Gorchakov’s letter arrived. In any case, there was no Ottoman 
document claiming 9 October as the official commencement of war. The Porte 
preferred to wait until the end of fifteen days after the dispatch of letter, which would 
have been 23 October. Temperley argued that Reşid Pasha received Gorchakov’s 
dispatch on 18
 October and declared it as “the beginning of war”. He further stated 
that on the following day, Redcliffe learned that “instructions had been sent to Ömer 
Lütfi Pasha to begin hostilities without delay”. By the night of 21 October or the 
morning of 22 October, Ömer Lütfi Pasha would have received the orders from 
Reşid Pasha to initiate hostilities.460 Meanwhile, upon pressure from the Western 
powers, the Porte extended the duration for another week.
461
 This letter, which was 
sent to Ömer Pasha on 19 November, identified a new deadline if the hostilities had 
not already been initiated. The Porte also warned Ömer Pasha to wait for the new 
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instructions before opening hostilities.
462
 The new deadline was Sunday, 30 October. 
Therefore, it is clear that the Ottomans considered the previous deadline to be 23 
October rather than 9 or 24 October. However, the message arrived eleven hours 
after the commencement of hostilities.
463
 Redcliffe argued that Ömer Pasha initiated 
the hostilities although he had already received the order to suspend hostilities. 
However, the letter arrived at Varna on 22 October and at Şumnu only the following 
day. Therefore, it was impossible for Ömer Pasha to suspend the hostilities on the 
Danube, which had already been decided. As such, hostilities were initiated on the 
night of 22 to 23 October. Ömer Pasha obviously did not want to lose time to initiate 
hostilities.
464
  
 
5.2.2. First Fights 
The Ottoman forces crossed the Danube with small forces of 20-40 men to 
attack the Russian positions. At Tutrakan, a small unit crossed the river and killed a 
Cossack.
465
 Some Egyptian soldiers also landed on the left bank of the river Danube 
at Boğazköyü to attack a Cossack picket and killed a few Cossacks.466 The first 
serious encounter occured on the following day between an Ottoman battery placed 
on an island before İsakçı and the Russian light fleet, which was composed of two 
steamers (the Prut and the Ordinarets) and eight gunboats under the command of 
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Captain Varpakhovskii destined to Kalas from İsmail.467 At 8 o’clock in the morning, 
when the steamers approached İsakçı, the Ottoman battery began to fire.  
According to the Russian sources, their losses were insignificant, although the 
attempt was a complete success. A total of 14 men, including Varpahovskii, the 
commander of the fleet, were killed, and 60 men were wounded. 
468
 The Ottomans, 
however, reported severe damage inflicted on boats and steamers. Their estimates of 
the Russian losses varied, but were much higher than the Russian accounts.
469
 
Actually, both sides exaggerated the casualties on the ranks of the enemy after each 
and every battle on the Danube.  
Ömer Pasha believed in the necessity to conquer strategic points on the left 
bank of the river before the arrival of the Russian Third Army, after which he 
contemplated that any attack on the Russian positions would be much more 
difficult.
470
 The Ottoman attacks on the Danube were primarily arranged to prevent 
any probable Russian strategy over Serbia. Ömer Pasha explained his plan as 
follows: “…because the prevention of such a Russian design and practice is the most 
important task … without neglecting already prepared precautions and without haste 
… [we will] attempt fake offensives along the Danube and two real ones where the 
Russians are weak and cross the river by means of bridges...”471 Ömer Pasha also 
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considered the moral effect of offensive actions against the Russians upon the 
Ottoman army.
472
  
The Porte feared a sudden Russian attack, Russian contact with Serbia and 
Montenegro, and subsequent provocations for a popular revolt. Therefore, the 
Ottomans gradually increased the number of their forces at Vidin and 
surroundings.
473
 Ömer Pasha did not want to rely solely on the Vidin fortress and 
ordered his troops to fortify the island in front of the fortress and to capture the town 
of Kalafat on the left bank of the river. As early as the summer of 1853, the possible 
entrenchment of the island, which was then underwater, was under discussion. It was 
also declared that, if necessary, a letter could be sent to General Gorchakov to 
explain the necessity of the fortification for the security of the Ottoman fortress.
474
 
However, on 15 October, when the war was then imminent, the Ottoman units under 
the command of Mehmed Sâlim Pasha, the military governor of Vidin, commenced 
the reinforcement of the island without any communication with the Russian 
General. On the night of 15 to 16 October, 300 men landed under the command of 
Hüseyin Pasha, and on the following day, there were approximately 2,000 men who 
entrenched themselves on the island. Meanwhile, there were also intensified 
preparations in the Vidin fortress to cross the Danube to the left bank. Referring to 
the Ottoman invasion of the Kalafat Island, Petrov argued that the Ottoman hostilities 
began without any formal declaration of war.
475
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On 27 October, Lieutenant-General Çerkes İsmail Pasha arrived at the island 
and prepared the Ottoman forces for an attack over Kalafat. . Early in the morning on 
the following day, 10,000 Ottoman soldiers under the command of İsmail Pasha 
seized and fortified the town. The Ottoman cavalry was dispatched to the 
neighboring villages, and a bridge was erected between Kalafat and the island.
476
 
According to Paton, a British journalist who visited Kalafat only a few weeks after 
its capture, the town became “one of the most remarkable fortified camps in modern 
times.”477 Vast material resources of Little Wallachia were then under the service of 
the Ottoman army, which would otherwise be used by the enemy. Over time, the 
Russian forces in Little Wallachia significantly increased, but until the first days of 
1854, there was not any serious encounter in this flank.  
 
 5.2.3. The Battle of Olteniçe, 4 November 1853 
 The Ottoman intelligence in Wallachia, however, convinced the Ottomans 
that the Russians would assault Kalafat soon. Ömer Pasha, having calculated that he 
was too distant to help Kalafat, projected an assault on Olteniçe to misdirect the 
plans of the Russian headquarters.
478
 Through this approach, he aimed to gain some 
time to strengthen the entrenchments at Kalafat. All the preparations were performed 
with top secrecy. On 31 October, a battalion and approximately two hundred rifles 
along with four guns were dispatched by means of small boats to the island opposite 
of Tutrakan. The troops under the command of Halid Pasha commenced the erection 
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of a battery on the island.
479
 On 1 November, Lieutenant-General Mustafa Pasha, the 
commander of the Ottoman forces at Tutrakan, landed at the island and entrenched it. 
A corps, which had concealed itself from the enemy owing to the fog, had also been 
assembled at Tutrakan under the command of Ömer Lütfi Pasha.480 The Ottoman 
forces were highly careful not to disclose the operation in any way to the Russian 
spies. Batteries were established in both the island and the town of Tutrakan. 
Powerful guns were located in strategic positions commanding the Wallachian banks 
of the Danube.  
 The quarantine at Olteniçe was a well-built stone-work. On 2 November, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Kütahyalı Hüseyin Bey, with two infantry battalions, three pieces 
of cannon and 100 mounted police, captured it with the help of the artillery fire from 
the right bank of the river.
481
 This quarantine was strengthened, and approximately 
8,000 men were immediately located there. Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s report was 
informative about the capture of Olteniçe.  
Without loss of time, 400 workmen, under the direction of staff-officers, 
commenced raising fortifications, for which purpose 2000 gabions had been 
already prepared. On the 3rd, again other troops were sent to fortify the 
position. As soon as the Imperial troops had landed on the left bank of the 
river, the Russians, quartered in a large village, at about an hour's distance, 
turned round and began to retreat. A body of cavalry was despatched to 
reconnoitre, and having encountered at Oltenitza an outpost of Cossack 
cavalry, they killed five, and rejoined our lines with a loss of three men. We 
found at Touzla, on the left bank, a great quantity of boats, which we sent to 
Turtukai. The number of boats at our disposal having facilitated the 
construction of the bridge, we were enabled without delay to place in the 
fortifications twelve large guns which were brought from Shumla. On the 3rd, 
at 4 P.M., three battalions of Russian infantry, with eight cannon, a regiment 
of cavalry, and a party of Cossacks, entered the village of Oltenitza. Our 
troops, posted within the works constructed on the left bank, waited them 
                                               
479 Rhodes, pp. 103-104.  
480 Petrov, vol. I, pp. 135-137. 
481 Ömer Lütfi Pasha’s report was quoted in many contemporary books. Dodd, pp. 37-38; Chesney, p. 
341; The Annual Register, p. 299. According to Rhodes, who was one of the observers of the battle, 
three infantry battalions, five rifle companies, and 80 irregular cavalry captured the quarantine. 
Rhodes, p. 104; According to Hüseyin Hüsnü, there were one infantry battalion, one artillery company 
and 6 guns. Hüseyin Hüsnü, pp. 121-128. 
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firmly. This same night I caused to be constructed a bridge at the confluence 
of the Arjish with the Danube, and flanked it with redoubts. Yesterday, 4th 
November, at six A.M., we began to perceive the movement of the Russian 
forces. As soon as their march was well defined, I caused to be embarked and 
carried to the lazaretto a reinforcement of one battalion. The evening before, I 
had placed on a level piece of ground a battery of guns calculated to face any 
attack which might be made.
482
  
 
  
 Gorchakov estimated that the Ottoman forces between Rusçuk and Tutrakan 
included approximately 40,000 men. The concentration of enemy troops not far from 
Bucharest caused Gorchakov to panic, and he ordered General Dannenberg, the 
commander of the Fourth Army, to drive back the Ottomans.
483
 The Russian forces, 
which were composed of a brigade (eight battalions), six squadrons of Uhlans, three 
Cossack hundreds and two batteries under the command of Major-General Prokofii 
Yakovlevich Pavlov, commander of the 11
th
 infantry division, assaulted Olteniçe on 
Friday, 4 November.
484
 The engagement started at dawn of that day and lasted four 
hours. The attacks were repeated three times despite the powerful Ottoman cannonry 
from both the right bank of the river and the island. Ömer Lütfi Pasha provided a 
summary of the fight: 
They advanced, supported by the fire of their artillery; and at the same time 
two battalions, with two guns, came on threatening our left flank. Having 
commenced the assault, another stronger division consisting of six battalions, 
with four guns, and having in the rear three regiments of cavalry supporting 
and outstripping their left flank took its position, and formed in two lines, 
with artillery, horse and foot, into echelons, attacking our right flank. After an 
exchange of a few shots, the centre gave the assault, whereon they charged 
both our wings. The centre attacked three different times, and each with a 
fresh battalion, twice on the left and once on the right. A well-directed fire 
from our fortress at Turtukai soon dispersed their right column; and the centre 
gradually fell back, after having suffered severely, and half its number hors 
                                               
482 The Annual Register, p. 299.   
483 “Zapiski Gorchakova”, l. 60. 
484 Sbornik izvestii, p. 26. According to Ömer Pasha, the Russian force was composed of 20 infantry 
battalions, 3 regiments of cavalry, and one Cossack regiment with 32 guns. BOA İ.HR, 114/5554-1, 8 
Safer 1270.   
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de combat. The battery of the island, also, mounted with powerful guns, 
menzil top, and commanded by Khalid Pacha, did admirable execution on the 
enemy's right wing. The Russians advanced with coolness and resolution 
almost to the brink of the trench, and on this account their loss was 
considerable, amounting to 1000 men killed, and double the number 
wounded. The engagement lasted four hours from noon till four P. M.; and 
during this interval, the wagons never ceased to carry off their dead; and 
twenty were observed heavily laden even after the conflict. With a view of 
facilitating this duty, as long as it lasted, we abstained from molesting the 
enemy, and from firing a shot; but found, nevertheless, 800 dead bodies on 
the field. A private carriage, moreover, was remarked, and from the pains 
taken in the search, we conjecture it must have been destined to receive the 
body of a general officer. At five P.M., a total confusion ensued in the 
Russian ranks; their lines were completely broken, and their retreat 
precipitate. An hour later, some few rallied in the neighbouring villages, but 
the remainder fled in disorder. Some of our men pushed forward in pursuit of 
them beyond the lines, but were summoned back by trumpet to their own 
quarters. Our loss amounted to 106 men. We found on the field of battle 500 
muskets, sacs, cartridge-boxes, equipments, etc.
485
 
 
 The Ottoman accounts regarding the statistics of the battle were highly 
different from the Russian accounts. Ömer Lütfi Pasha reported that the Russian 
losses were one thousand killed and two thousand wounded, while the Ottoman 
losses were only 106 men.
486
 A fresh news from the front stated that the Russian 
losses were, 153 killed and 655 wounded.
487
 According to later and more reliable 
numbers, the Russian losses included 236 men killed, including 5 officers, and 734 
wounded including 39 officers.
488
 Ömer Lütfi Pasha stated that the Ottoman 
cannonry halted to allow the Russians to carry their casualties. The Russian sources 
claimed that this ceasefire occurred only because of the exhaustion of the Ottoman 
cartridge. Although the Russians advanced almost to the brink of the trench, General 
Dannenberg, who watched the fight from New Olteniçe, ordered the Russian forces 
to retreat. He thought that even if the attack were successful, the position could not 
                                               
485 The Annual Register, pp. 299-300. 
486 Petrov, vol. I, p. 145; Dodd, p. 38; ATASE, k. 4, d. 11, f. 51/1, 16 Safer 1270; Hüseyin Hüsnü 
inflated the Russian losses to 4, 800, Saika-i Zafer, pp. 120-134.  
487 Sobranie donesenii, “Izvestiya s Dunaya”, 5 November 1853 [17 November 1853], pp. 26-27.  
488 RGVIA VUA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5461.    
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be maintained in possession
 
because of the strength of the Ottoman cannonry. 
According to Petrov, the order of retreat came only when the Russian forces would 
defeat the enemy.
489
 This battle was also likely the reason for the failure of General 
Dannenberg to assume a key command position during the Crimean campaign. 
 The Russian intelligence from Istanbul provided information indicating that 
Hasan Pasha and Mustafa Pasha, the Ottoman commanders at Olteniçe, were killed 
during the battle.
490
 However, this information was incorrect. In fact, Mustafa Pasha 
was not killed, and Hasan Pasha did not participate in the encounter. Several 
participants in the battle were soon promoted. Among them, Kütahyalı Hüseyin Bey, 
who was wounded from his hand and who would subsequently be known as 
Parmaksız (Fingerless), was promoted to Colonel.  
 After this battle on account of an Ottoman offensive toward Bucharest, the 
Russian forces in İbrail and Bessarabia were transported to Greater Wallachia and 
were concentrated between Budeshti and Negoeshti to thwart any Ottoman 
advance.
491
 However, Ömer Lütfi Pasha considered that the mission was already 
accomplished and directed his forces to retreat to the left bank of the river on 12
 
November. The Ottomans let fire the Olteniçe quarantine and the bridge on the Arjis 
River. The island was evacuated on 16 November and in the following day Ömer 
Lütfi Pasha with his staff left Tutrakan for Şumnu.492 Kalafat was already fortified, 
and the forces at Olteniçe were hardly in a position to defend against a powerful 
Russian attack. However, some forces remained at the island before Tutrakan. 
Paton’s conclusions for the battle of Olteniçe were likely attained in a conversation 
                                               
489 Petrov, vol. I, p. 144. 
490 Sobranie donesenii, “Izvestiya s Dunaya”, 25 November 1853 [7 December 1853], pp. 31.  
491 Petrov, vol. I, p. 147. 
492 Rhodes, p. 113.  
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with Ömer Lütfi Pasha: “… in this action the design of Omer Pasha was to give 
elbow room to Ismael Pasha at Kalafat: to distract and confuse the Russians about 
the real point at which a push was to be made, and at the same time to give 
confidence to his own troops; in all which he was fully successful.”493  
 Gorchakov did not believe that the affair at Olteniçe was simply a part of the 
Ottoman military planning. He claimed that the Ottoman forces had already invaded 
Kalafat two weeks ago and that there were no Russian forces with the exception of 
some cavalries and that that there was no such tactical operation over Olteniçe. Ömer 
Lütfi Pasha was only propagating his command and the power of his army. To justify 
his retreat, “he publicized his attempt on Oltenitza as a diversion of our attention 
from Little Wallachia, thereby having the opportunity to strengthen Kalafat.”494 The 
Russian command explained this retreat with the concentration of the Russian forces 
around Olteniçe and the effect of the Russian attack on 4 November, after which the 
Ottomans understood the difficulty of an offensive against Bucharest. This retreat 
was portrayed as recognition of the Russian strength in the Greater Wallachia by the 
Ottoman high command.
495
 “This retreat was a sign for the effect on them [the 
Ottomans] of the battle of 23 October [4 November]”.496 In another encounter, the 
Russians repelled an Ottoman attempt to cross the Danube in front of Rusçuk. 
Although the Ottomans reported that it was merely a fake attempt to misdirect the 
Russian forces, the Russians did not buy this explanation and reported that they 
managed to repel an Ottoman offensive.  
                                               
493 Paton, p. 82. 
494 “Zapiski Gorchakova”,  l. 61-62. 
495 “Zapiski Gorchakova”,  l. 61-62; Petrov, vol. I, p. 149. 
496 Sbornik izvestii, p. 27. 
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Reports of the entrance of the Ottoman forces in Bucharest circulated in the 
European cities after the battle of Olteniçe.497 Many people thought that the real 
target of the Ottoman army was the capital of Wallachia, and they even considered it 
highly possible. For instance, Dodd claimed that only the heavy rains prevented the 
Ottoman army from pursuing the Russians from Olteniçe toward Bucharest.498 
Obviously, the same battle was understood quite differently in different circles. The 
lack of information and the subjectivity here played a role. During the war, official or 
unofficial reports from the front not only aimed to inform the government and the 
people but were also part of the internal and international propaganda.  
During November and December, several minor fights occured on the 
Danube; some around the islands in front of Yergöğü and Rusçuk, some in Little 
Wallachia, and some on the Lower Danube, especially on and around the Byndo 
Island. These events marked the only exchange of fires between the pickets and 
between the cavalries, especially the Russian Cossacks, who were observing the 
activities of the enemy and conducting reconnaissance activities. The next serious 
encounter occurred on 6 January 1854 in a village in Little Wallachia, which is not 
far from Kalafat. 
Although several scenarios were discussed in Russia for a popular revolution 
in the Balkans, throughout the war, these theories were not put into practice, likely 
because of the desire to preserve good relations with Austria. Thus, many of the 
Russian students of the Crimean War believed that the friendship of Austria cost 
them heavily.
499
 However, the Ottoman presence at Vidin and Kalafat with such a 
strong force always troubled the Russians on account of a possible attack through 
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499 Petrov, vol. II, p. 21. 
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Little Wallachia.
500
 Gorchakov noted that in late November, the Ottoman forces in 
Vidin increased to 25,000 men. Kalafat became a real fortress in time. In one of his 
reports, Ömer Lütfi Pasha explained the defensive capacity of the town in detail. 
According to the report, there were ten infantry battalions, including rifles amounting 
to 5,600 men, seven cavalry companies, approximately 400 mounted police and 
approximately 500 irregular cavalry with 28 guns. Six battalions of infantry, three 
batteries, and one cavalry regiment were also ready at the Vidin port to cross the 
river if necessary. Moreover, approximately 1,000 irregulars were recently prepared 
and were to be sent to Kalafat. Having claimed that the fortifications of Kalafat could 
only be captured by a force of 50,000 men, Ömer Lütfi Pasha added his hope for the 
realization of such a Russian attack.
501
 This correspondence not only shows the 
confidence of the Ottoman commander-in-chief with respect to his forces but clearly 
demonstrates the concern of Istanbul for the security of Kalafat and Vidin. This letter 
calmed and pleased both the Ottoman government and Sultan Abdülmecid.502 
 
 5.2.4. The Battle of Çatana, 6 January 1854 
 Shortly after the new year began, Kalafat was again informed of a possible 
Russian assault. According to the Ottoman intelligence, 25,000 men from Bucharest 
united with another 10,000 men in Karayova [Craiova] and entered the neighboring 
villages of Kalafat.
503
 Although the Russian forces were not as numerous as the 
Ottomans believed they were, the Russians considerably increased their forces in 
                                               
500 Petrov, vol. I, pp. 153-154. 
501 “... doğrusu Rusyalunun bu gelişini bayağı arzu ederiz.” ATASE, k. 4, d. 12, f. 13, 11 Rebiulevvel 
1270 [12 December 1853]; See also, ATASE, Ahmed Pasha to Ömer Pasha, k. 46, d. 1, f. 1/2, 14 
Rebiulevvel 1270 [15 December 1853]. 
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503 ATASE, k. 5, d. 14, f. 12 
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Little Wallachia by the arrival of the 12
th
 division under the command of Liprandi. 
The command of the Little Wallachian forces also changed hands and was entrusted 
to Graf Anrep-Elmpt. According to Ahmed Pasha, such a Russian presence in Little 
Wallachia would at least result in the isolation of the Ottoman units from the local 
population. In fact, the increase in forces was actually portrayed in the Russian 
literature only as a measure against the local population, who were then prone to a 
revolt, rather than as preparation to drive the Ottomans from Kalafat.
504
 In 
December, villagers from a few places, such as Salchiya and Kushmir, revolted 
against the Russian military governance. The Russian army wanted to suppress the 
local population by sending additional forces to the region.
505
 Gorchakov claimed 
that he had no plan to invest in and capture Kalafat but that his only aim was to 
prevent the Ottoman activities in Little Wallachia. He believed that it would be 
difficult to capture Kalafat but even more troublesome to defend it.
506
 
 On 31 December, the Ottoman forces attacked the Russian positions at 
Çatana; however, it was not a decisive attempt, and the forces soon retreated. This 
attack most likely was an attempt to assess the strength of the enemy. The real 
assault would be realized during the Russian Christmas on 6
 
January 1854. The plan 
was initially a coordinated attack on a few villages in three groups. However, the 
reconnaissance activities showed that the Russians were more powerful than 
previously envisaged, and only Çatana was targeted by the Ottoman units.507  
 Actually, the Russians were caught unprepared because such a significant 
Ottoman offensive under the harsh conditions of winter was rare in the Russo-
                                               
504 Petrov, vol. I , pp. 157-159.  
505 In January and February 1854, the Russian forces continued to attempt to suppress the revolts of 
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506 “Zapiski Gorchakova”, l. 66. 
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Ottoman wars.
508
 The attackers were composed of thirteen battalions of infantry, 
three regiments of cavalry, 300 mounted police and 28 guns. Detaching some forces 
at Maglavit and Gunya as a reserve, the Ottomans arrived at Çatana on 6 January 
1854. Although their forces were not ten times smaller than the Ottoman forces, as 
Petrov claimed, the Russians in Çatana were undoubtedly inferior to their enemy, 
comprising only three battalions under the command of Colonel A. K. 
Baumgarten.
509
 İsmail Pasha, with six battalions of infantry, seven rifle companies, 
two regiments of cavalry, 300 mounted police, and twelve guns, assaulted the 
Russian position. Ahmed Pasha waited outside of the village with five battalions of 
infantry, one regiment of cavalry and ten guns to prevent any assistance. After İsmail 
Pasha was wounded, Mustafa Tevfik Pasha assumed command. After six hours of 
battle, Major-General Belgard and Major-General Jigmont arrived at the scene with 
nine battalions of infantry, one battalion of rifle, two regiments of cavalry and 
sixteen guns. Ahmed Pasha prevented this Russian force from entering the village, 
and, after a battle of one and a half hours, forced them to retreat. According to 
Petrov, these new forces only aimed to save Baumgarten’s units, and when they 
retired, the target was already realized. After the battle, the Ottoman troops returned 
Kalafat. 
 The Ottomans reported the Russian losses in the thousands. Ahmed Pasha, 
the commander of the operation, reported that more than 2,500 Russians were killed 
and that the number of wounded should be approximately twice that number.
510
 A 
few days later, more confident about the numbers, he then claimed that 4,000 
Russians were killed and that such a number was wounded. He added that 
                                               
508 Petrov, vol. I, p. 162. 
509 The Ottomans believed that the Russian forces at Çatana included four infantry battalions, one rifle 
and two hussar companies, four Cossack hundreds and six guns. 
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Baumgarten, the Russian commander at Çatana, was greatly wounded and had 
recently died.
511
 In fact, Baumgarten was easily wounded during the battle. 
According to the Russian sources, their losses comprised 835 men killed, including 
22 officers, and 1,190 men wounded, including 32 officers. The Russians estimated 
the Ottoman losses at approximately 3,000 men.
512
 The rival armies may have been 
more reliable about their own losses, whereas their estimates of the enemy casualties 
tended to be exaggerated. Although the official numbers are conflicting and 
unreliable, the encounter was undoubtedly one of the bloodiest of the Crimean War. 
 The difference in the official reports was also reflected in the monographs. 
The numbers of the losses and the strength of the warring parties notably differ in the 
literature. For example, Tarle claimed that the Russians had to confront an enemy 
that was twice as large and even three times larger in the battles of Olteniçe, Çatana 
and Yergöğü.513 Similarly, there is an imbalance between the Russian and Ottoman 
forces in the Turkish sources. Therefore, it is necessary to find a balanced picture by 
examining the data conveyed by the warring parties.  
 In this battle, two hundred Russians who were captured during the battle were 
killed by the Ottoman soldiers. The Ottoman commanders defended themselves by 
claiming that they could not stop the soldiers because of their anger resulting from 
the battle of Sinop, in which thousands of Ottoman soldiers fell. Seraskerlik stated 
that this action constituted an unacceptable act of war and should not be repeated.
514
 
After the battle, reinforcements were sent to Kalafat as a precaution for a possible 
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Russian attack.
515
 Those participants of the battle who showed bravery were 
generously awarded with orders, swords and other gifts on both sides.
516
 
 
5.3. Silistre: The Ottoman Defensive 
5.3.1. Introduction 
All the battles thus far explained were surprise Ottoman attacks. In the first 
phase of the war, the Russians, who waited for a diplomatic solution, adopted a 
defensive strategy. The crossing over the Danube by the Russian forces might 
provoke a war not only with the Ottoman Empire but also with Britain and France. 
Thus, for a more aggressive strategy, the Russians at least needed the German 
powers on their side. However, after the battle of Sinop, when an allied campaign 
against Russia proved to be a real possibility, the European diplomacy further 
weakened. At this juncture, despite the failure to obtain the support of the German 
powers, Nicholas I ordered the Russian army to move forward as far as possible into 
the Ottoman Balkans before the British and French forces arrived at the war theatre. 
The Russian offensive was initiated in 1854. Despite the Tsar’s orders and 
encouragements, the Russian troops continued to act slowly and hesitantly on the 
Danubian front. While the Russians were advancing, the resolute Ottoman defense 
endeavored to stop them. However, this effort differed from the previous encounters, 
as the European powers gradually took the side of the Ottomans, and the war was 
transformed into a European war.  
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When it became clear that the war would not end soon, the Emperor 
reinforced his army, increasing its strength by up to 150,000 men, with an immense 
force of cavalry and more than 500 guns. According to the plan of operations, the 
Russian forces would be concentrated in the opposite bank of Silistre while holding 
the Ottomans in check at Kalafat. Accordingly, some forces would remain in 
Dobruja, while the main body would cross the Danube from Kalaraş and join the 
troops coming from the lower Danube around Silistre. In 1854, the Russians’ first 
target was the Ottoman fortress of Silistre, which was twice occupied by the Russian 
army, in 1810 and in 1829. However, the rest of the strategy was rather unclear and 
would take shape based on the course of events. Certainly, holding the fortress of 
Silistre was a necessity for the Russian army to operate in Bulgaria. Silistre would 
serve as a base for advance operations and as a link with the rear of the army. 
Without such a foothold, the Russians could not manage their logistic operations on 
the right bank of the Danube River. After the fall of Silistre, the Russians would 
either capture or mask Varna and would force Şumnu to pass through the Balkans 
upon the plains of Rumelia. 
 
5.3.2. The Passage of the Russian Army over the Danube  
During the first months of 1854, the Russian forces implemented their plans for 
passage to the right bank of the river. The passage would be realized through 
Dobruja as in the previous Russo-Ottoman encounters on the Danube. However, 
while some of the Russian forces were attempting to control the Dobruja region, 
others aimed to control the rear of the Russian army. The first Russian troops on the 
right bank of the Danube were those who entered into Dobruja; however, as these 
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forces proceeded to the fortress of Silistre and provided the security of a safe 
passage, the main forces would cross the river in front of Silistre. Therefore, the 
Russians aimed to capture the islands before Rusçuk and Silistre to control all forms 
of movements through the river and to provide security for the Russian army.  
General Lüders invaded the island of Byndo. The Russian troops passed over 
the Danube and drove the Ottomans out of the fortified positions in the Dobruja 
region. Between 20 March and 2 April, the entire peninsula was cleared of the 
Ottoman forces, while General Lüders had concentrated his troops on Babadağ. 
Three days later, the Ottomans were driven from Karasu (Chernavoda), and Mustafa 
Pasha, retreating toward Varna, left free passage for the enemy. Thus, the Russians 
passed the river with complete success, although they moved slowly. However, the 
region that they entered was a malicious area, and they had lost many men in 
Dobruja from malaria, want of water, and a defective commissariat. Although 
command of the right bank in Dobruja was obtained, the army emerged shaken in its 
morale. Meanwhile, some forces were dispatched to Olteniçe and Yergöğü. Under 
the command of Schilder, the Russians captured the islands in front of Yergöğü and 
inflicted serious damage on the Ottoman fleet in Rusçuk after a bombardment on 9-
15 February.
517
 Russian forces were also assembled in Kalaraş, opposite the fortress 
of Silistre.  
On 5 March 1854, Knyaz Paskevich was assigned as the commander-in-chief 
of the Russian army on the Danube.
518
 Paskevich was pessimistic about a Russian 
offensive. First, he considered that the line of operations was too extensive and that 
his right flank was too distant from his center near Bucharest. He observed two 
                                               
517 For details of the operation, see Sbornik izvestii, no. 47 “News from the Danube 16 [28] February 
1854”, p. 70. 
518 GARF, f. 728, op. 1, d. 2237. 
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dangers that menaced his rear and right flank: the Austrians in the Carpathians, and 
the Ottomans at Kalafat. The British and French armies approaching the Ottoman 
land constituted another problem hindering a successful campaign in the Ottoman 
Balkans. These threats to the Russian army would lead him to exhibit indecisiveness 
in his every command. Thus, despite all his previous successful campaigns against 
the Ottoman and Persian armies, Paskevich would play a negative role for the 
Russian army in 1854. In his letters, the Tsar always urged his favorite commander 
to act rapidly and added his confidence in his army to capitulate the fortress. 
Paskevich, however, was reluctant in all his actions. First, he left the front under the 
pretext of being wounded, and then convinced the Tsar to raise the siege.  
On 10 May, the Ottomans occupied Karayova. The Russian columns assumed 
a defensive position behind the Aluta. General Dannenberg commanded this right 
wing, with Generals Liprandi and Soymonov under him. The right wing of the 
Russian army would then simply aim to prevent the Kalafat army from attempting to 
interfere with the siege of Silistre. The remainder of the Russian army on the left 
bank was at Yergöğü, at Olteniçe, and at Kalaraş; on the right bank, two divisions 
were in the Dobruja, and the corps of General Lüders was marching up the right bank 
of the Danube to join in the offensive movement against Silistre.  
 
5.3.3. The Siege of Silistre  
The Russians crossed the Danube River in three columns on 23 March 1854, 
and it was only halfway through May when the fortress of Silistre was besieged. The 
Russians moved slowly, but they were successful in bringing a larege army to the 
right bank of the river. The fortress could not stand against such a formidable army 
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without waging an open battle. Thus, all observers considered the fall of Silistre to be 
unavoidable, but the discussion turned around how long the fortress could resist.  
 Ömer Lütfi Pasha thought that Varna could be defended by naval force, but 
Silistre should necessarily be devoted to a knowledgeable and able commandant.
519
 
After the outbreak of the war, the fortress was entrusted to Musa Hulûsi Pasha, the 
director general of the Ottoman Arsenal (Reis-i Meclis-i Tophane-i Âmire).520 He 
actually prepared most of the defense works on the Danube in the summer of 
1853.
521
 Grach Pasha, a Prussian, was his right-hand man in Silistre. Therefore, the 
siege of Silistre could also be portrayed as a struggle between two German engineers: 
Grach Pasha (Friedrich Grach) and General Karl A. Schilder, the famous Russian 
commander who was responsible for the siege activities. Schilder was optimistic 
about the fall of the fortress. In Menkov’s words, “he promised everyone that the 
fortress would soon fall.”522 Grach Pasha was also criticized, as Schilder was. 
Captain Butler, a British officer in Silistre, stated that Grach Pasha wanted to 
abandon the Arab Tabya at the beginning of the siege, but the redoubt would be 
famous as the backbone of the defense of Silistre.  
The Russian army before Silistre was composed of 77 battalions, 68 squadrons, 
27 Cossack hundreds and 266 guns. By the end of the siege, the Russian forces 
increased to as many as 90,000 men. According to General Schilder, there were only 
                                               
519 “...Silistre kalesi ise düşmana en yakın mevki bulunmasıyla daha ziyâde itinâya şayân ve bu cihetle 
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Turk, and when I was informed that he was of Jewish extraction it occasioned me no surprise.” Paton, 
p. 85 
521 ATASE, k. 6, d. 18, f. 32, 13 Şevval 1269 [20 July 1853]. 
522 Zapiski Menkova, vol. I, p. 215.  
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7-8 thousand regular forces in Silistre.
523
 The Ottoman forces, wrote Petrov, were not 
more than 12,000, an important portion of whom were irregulars.
524
 The Russian 
observations were generally correct. At the beginning of the invasion of the 
Principalities, there were only six battalions of infantry at Silistre, which was 
sufficient at that time according to Musa Pasha. He asked only for some cavalry and 
a company of artillerymen.
525
 Over time, the Ottoman forces at Siliste gradually 
increased. Ömer Pasha described the Ottoman forces as consisting of ten battalions 
of infantry, a sapper regiment (four companies), two rifle companies, three hundred 
mounted police, and four companies of cavalry, and he added that two battalions and 
eight hundred irregular cavalry were also sent because the battalions in the fortress 
were not in full formation. There was also a significant number of irregulars before 
the fortress amounted to 10,000 men under the command of Giridizâde Mehmed 
Pasha for the reconnaissance activities. In addition, the Ottoman Cossacks would 
serve before Silistre. In another letter, Ömer Pasha estimated the forces in the fortress 
as consisting of 15,000 infantrymen and 3,000 cavalrymen, who enjoyed a sufficient 
amount of ammunition and provisions. According to the Ottoman commander-in-
chief these forces were sufficient for the defense of Silistre.
526
 On 19 May 1854, 
Ömer Lütfi Pasha informed Saint-Arnaud and Lord Raglan about the Ottoman 
forces: he claimed that there were 18 thousand in Silistre, 45 thousand in Şumnu, 
26,000 in Varna, 15,000 in the garrisons along Danube, and a total of 104,000 
men.
527
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After his visit to the Turkish camp at Şumnu, Saint-Arnaud observed that the 
Ottoman forces were poorly armed and dressed and, even worse, without shoes but 
generally competent in the war and maneuvering well. Horses were small but strong. 
The artillery could be regarded as the best part of the army. Its health services were 
by far the worst; doctors and drugs were highly insufficient.
528
 
Before the siege, the first target for the Russians was to gain possession of the 
islands below the fortress of Silistre. To facilitate this objective, they brought a 
flotilla of gunboats from Kalas and under their protection constructed bridges from 
the left bank to the islands and from the islands to the right bank. Despite the 
opposition of the Ottoman outposts and the gunfire from the fortress, the Russians 
were masters of the river by the end of April. The Russians then threw up batteries 
on the islands, and having secured the bridge, the forces moved to the right bank of 
the river to conduct the siege operations. Approximately 30,000 men who passed 
over the bridge from Kalaraş joined with 40,000 men coming from Rassova under 
Lüders. On 13 April, the Russian forces invaded the islands before Silistre fortress, 
i.e., Çıplakada (Naked Island) and Hopa. The pontoon bridge between the Çıplakada 
and the left bank of the Danube was completed on 24-26 April and to the right bank 
on 16 May. The forces under the command of General Lüders arrived in front of 
Silistre on 16 May. On this very day, the first skirmishes occurred between the 
Ottoman and Russian forces. The next day, preparatory activities for the siege were 
conducted. While the Russians conducted reconnaissance activities, defenders 
attacked the Russian lines from the Arab Tabya. During the siege, such attacks were 
regularly repeated to prevent the trench and mine works of the enemy (20 and 25 
May; 3, 10, 14 and 15 June).   
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While the Russians were preparing to invest in the fortress of Silistre, the allied 
forces concentrated their troops in Gelibolu and Istanbul. Meanwhile, the Austrian 
government ordered mobilization of the army. At such a juncture, Nicholas I wanted 
his forces to advance as far as possible, and to force the European powers to attain an 
honorary peace. However, his forces were slow. Nicholas I could not understand the 
reason for the slowness, and he sent several letters to Marshal Paskevich to act more 
rapidly. Not all Russian commanders were as pessimistic as Paskevich. In April 
1854, Lüders wrote to the War Minister that after the advance of the Russian army to 
Silistre, the fortress would soon be surrendered as a result of their fear of the Russian 
army.
529
 As early as September 1853, General Lüders claimed that it was possible to 
capture the main walls of Silistre in 14 days.
530
  
On 17 May, General Schilders, who was on the scene when the fortress of 
Silistre was captured by General Diebitsch in 1829, then assumed command of the 
siege operations. Therefore, he was well aware of the strong and weak points of the 
fortress. Although Silistre was a small fortress, the outer works placed it into such an 
extensive field that only a large army would suffice to perform the siege operations. 
In this case, however, the siege was never transformed into a proper blockade. The 
Russians assaulted the fortress only from one side. Some regions were only partially 
patrolled by the Russian cavalry, and the Ottomans were thus able to obtain strategic 
assistance from the outside throughout the siege. “The investment was so imperfect 
that General Cannon, an Englishman in the service of the Port, contrived to pass 
between the Russian covering armies, and enter the place, to the great joy of the 
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besieged.”531 Throughout the siege, the Ottoman garrison continued to enjoy its 
connection with the Ottoman army in Şumnu.  
The defense primarily relied on several bastions surrounding the fortress. In the 
summer of 1853, Silistre was by no means in a situation to defend itself.
532
 However, 
until the initiation of the siege, several redoubts were completed. In 1829, the fortress 
fell as a result of the Russian assault from the south. Now, there was a stone fort 
called Mecidiye Tabya, as well as earthen forts, Arab Tabya and Yılanlı Tabya.533 At 
the beginning of the siege in the Arab Tabya, the first line of defense, there were 
three Egyptian battalions and 6 guns under the command of Miralay Mustafa Bey.
534
 
Over time, this force increased to approximately 3,000 men with Albanian and 
Anatolian irregulars, and they would be commanded by Mirliva Kütahyalı Hüseyin 
Pasha, the hero of Olteniçe.535 
Before the siege, considering the outer fortifications, Musa Pasha confidently 
claimed that “the Russian may come when they choose, we are ready for them, - 
thanks to Prussian science”.536 However, during the siege, in all his letters Musa 
Pasha underlined the necessity of outside assistance, without which the fortress could 
not stand long. On 21 May, he claimed that the Russians numbered 60,000 and that 
their number was constantly rising. Silistre could not resist against such a formidable 
force without relief from the army stationed at Şumnu. Having underlined that this 
siege was more alarming than the previous sieges, Musa Pasha wanted a force of 
                                               
531 Cassell’s Illustrated History of England, vol. IV, p. 173. 
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approximately 25,000 - 30,000 men to prevent the Russian siege operations. The next 
day, he repeated the necessity of assistance. In a reply, Ömer Pasha only stated the 
need for the assistance of the Allied powers and added that the forces under the 
command of Giridizâde Mehmed Pasha were sufficient to disturb the enemy. On 28 
May, Ömer Pasha suggested that cavalries be sent from the fortress to impede 
Russian mine works and wanted the fortress stand fast until the arrival of the Allies. 
According to Ömer Pasha, the French and British forces would be ready to assist to 
the Ottoman war efforts in 20 days.
537
 
General Schilder thought that the eastern front was the weakest side of the 
defense. Menkov harshly criticized Schilder’s siege works. He claimed that there was 
no logic or aim in the siege works conducted by General Schilder.
538
 Paskevich, who 
was certain of the arrival of Ömer Pasha to relieve Silistre, did not completely invest 
in the fortress, with an overwhelming part of his army in a fortified camp, and he 
decided to assault Arab Tabya rather than take the advice of Schilder. Battles 
occurred primarily around the Arab Tabya and Yılanlı Tabya.   
The Russian bombardment began on 16 May. It was destructive for Silistre 
because there were no shelters where the soldiers could escape from the nonstop 
bombardment. The artillery fire from the Danubian islands was beating the outer 
works of the fortress. After the termination of the siege, the British officer Calthorpe 
observed the Arab Tabya: “it had been so completely battered about by the Russian 
cannon, shot and shell, that the old outer line of the work could not be 
recognized.”539 On 18 May, Russian reconnaissance activities resulted in a fight; the 
Ottomans reported that in this fight, 45 men were killed among the Ottoman ranks 
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while 200 Russians fell.
540
 The following week, Ottoman forces again raided the 
Russian positions.
541
 On 20 May, Prince Paskevich crossed the Danube, and 
inspected the attack. The Russian parallels gradually came nearer to the fortress, and 
the Russians continued to move forward and to explode their mines. The first serious 
battle occurred on 29
 
May in the Arab Tabya. In this bloody encounter, Russians not 
only failed to capture the fortress, but also suffered 1,000 casualties, including the 
commander of the operation Lieutenant-General Selvan. On 3
 
June, Russian troops 
moved to the region between the Mecidiye fortification and the Aflotar and Kalopetri 
villages. Kalopetri was in the left flank of the Russian forces and Aflotar at the 
back.
542
 Defense of the Arab Tabya was again forced on 3 June
543
 and 9 June
544
, but 
all efforts were in vain. As Nolan claimed, “indeed, the siege of Silistria was the 
siege of the Arab Tabia.”545  
Captain Butler claimed that there would be “no measure of importance to be 
undertaken without our being consulted.”546 According to Butler, Grach sought the 
abandonment of the Arab and Yılanlı Tabyas, as he believed that they were not 
defendable. Butler’s journal proceeded in this manner day after day, recording the 
devastation and death caused by shelling. Bombardment was daily business at 
Silistre. Musa Pasha was killed on 2 June as a result of the heavy Russian cannonry. 
Subsequently, Mehmed Rıfat Pasha assumed command. Schilder was also killed 
when he was controlling mine works on 13
 
June. Paskevich left the scene under the 
pretext of being wounded. How he was wounded and how he explained it to the Tsar 
and others was ironically explained by Menkov. Menkov’s reminiscences at least 
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signify that many participants in the siege did not believe in his story of being 
wounded.
547
  
During the siege, neither the Allied forces nor Ömer Pasha himself appeared in 
front of Silistre. Some forces with ammunitions and provisions on 2 June, and a more 
powerful force on 12 June under the command of Behram Pasha (General Cannon) 
arrived at Silistre.
548
 Behram Pasha’s force was composed of 4 battalions of infantry, 
1 battalion of chasseurs, 400 Arab cavalry, and 6 mountain pieces with mules. Ömer 
Pasha calmed both Musa Pasha and the Ottoman government in declaring Silistre 
would not fall soon
549
, but he hastened the allied assistance, claiming that Silistre 
could not stand long.
550
 Actually, the defense of Silistre and the retreat of the Russian 
army astonished the European powers.   
Knyaz Bebutov was stationed in Kalipetri, and the link between the fortress 
and Şumnu was eliminated by 16 June. Under the command of General Gorchakov, 
the siege continued until 20
 June 1854, when Paskevich’s order for retreat arrived.551 
After several insisting reports from Paskevich regarding the necessity of the 
abandonment of the siege and the retreat of the Russian troops due to the danger 
posed by the Austrian troops on the flank of the Russian army as well as the 
possibility of assistance from a strong Turkish-British-French army to Silistre, the 
Tsar finally gave orders according to the wishes of Paskevich on 13
 
June. Parallel to 
this order, on 18
 
June, Paskevich happily sent a letter to Gorchakov from Yassy 
seeking the abandonment of the siege. Paskevich frankly stated that “our wish was 
                                               
547 According to Bogdanovich and Petrov, Paskevich was wounded on 9 June, but Menkov claimed 
that the incident occured on 3 June. Zapiski Menkova, vol. I, pp. 162-164. 
548 Silistre Muhasarası, p. 87; Petrov, vol. II, p. 160, 168-169. 
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realized”.552 Zayonchkovskii rightfully remarked that the Tsar did not give a 
categorical order to lift the siege. Nicholas I ordered as follows: “lift the siege if the 
fortress has not been fallen yet when this letter has arrived or if it is not clear when it 
may fall”. According to Zayonchkovskii, it was Paskevich who was responsible for 
abandoning the siege at the very moment when a successful assault could be 
undertaken.
553
 
Actually, for that same day, 20-21 June, a promising assault was planned on 
the Arab Tabya, which had partly been destroyed by the Russian mines. It was 
General Belgard who would undertake the assault. According to Menkov, the assault 
was planned to be undertaken on 19
 
June, but because of the heavy rain, it was 
postponed for one day. On 22 June, the Russians opened tremendous fire on the 
place from all their batteries. When daylight dawned on 23, the Ottomans noticed 
that the bulk of the enemy army had already crossed the Danube and had encamped 
around Kalaraş. The siege was at an end.  
The retreat began on 23 June, and in two days, the Russian forces were again at 
the left bank of the Danube River. On 26 June, the pontoon bridges were completely 
lifted under the cannonry of both sides. According to Russian sources, the cost of the 
siege was approximately 400 killed and 1,800 wounded.
554
 Ömer Pasha wrote to 
Saint-Arnoud that the garrison of Silistre losses included only 1,500 men killed and 
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wounded.
555
 The Russians had not only lost a significant number of men in front of 
the outworks of Silistre, but they also had lost prestige. 
One aspect of the siege of Silistre was the emigration of Bulgarians. According 
to the proclamation of Knyaz Paskevich in the Bulgarian language, the Bulgarians 
were armed. In the siege camp, arms were distributed to the Bulgarians. When the 
Russians lifted the siege, Bulgarian villagers with their family members, belongings 
and livestocks attempted to escape from the vengeance of the Ottomans and crossed 
to the left bank of the Danube with the Russian army. By 24 and 25 June, the number 
of families who crossed the river reached 5,000. Such a large number of emigrants 
restrained the crossing of the armed forces; thus, further emigrants were not 
allowed.
556
 Those who remained were advised to go to Tulça, where there were 
Russian forces under the command of General Nikolai Ushakov.
557
  
The river crossing was completed by the Russian army on the night of 25 June 
to 26 June.
558
 Although the Russian sources did not give any credit to the Ottoman 
army, the treacherous policies of Austria and the hesitancy of the Russian army 
command were portrayed as the two major reasons for the Russian failure on the 
Danubian front.
559
  
Toward the end of February 1854, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to 
St. Petersburg to withdraw the Russian forces from the Principalities. Without any 
satisfactory answer from the Russian government, Britain and France concluded an 
agreement of alliance with the Ottoman government on 12 March. On 27 March, the 
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naval powers declared war on Russia, and the first troops landed in Gelibolu on 31 
March.  
A Russian operation in Bulgaria would not be easy; Paskevich was generally 
right to be concerned. The Russians would certainly lose men in the pestiferous 
Dobruja, and as long as the Ottomans held Kalafat, the Russians were never secure 
on their right flank. More importantly, the Russian army had no security in the 
northern flank, as Austrians could move across the Russian line of communications. 
Thus, although the Tsar could mobilize 150,000 men in the Balkans, this number 
might have been insufficient for a successful campaign. Nicholas I did not hesitate to 
confront these dangers. He obviously believed in the success of the Russian army 
more than his commanders at the field.  
In 1854, the Russian army repeated the mistake of 1828; throughout the siege, 
the Russians were not able to eliminate communication between the town and Ömer 
Pasha in Şumnu. Although some reinforcements could be sent to Silistre because of 
the inefficiency of the siege, the Ottoman army again failed to come to the help of a 
besieged town. The fate of Silistre differed from that of Kars only because the 
Russians chose to retreat rather than to continue their siege and assaults. The reason 
for the retreat was not the forthcoming help to Silistre but the threat of Austria from 
the rear of the Russian army.  
Bombardment had become a daily affair. Butler’s journal recorded the 
devastation and death caused by shelling. The explosive shell had a tremendous 
destructive capability compared with the former non-explosive shells. In both Kars 
and Silistre, the Russian assaults failed. This outcome showed the increasing 
defensive capacity of the fortifications as a result of the destructive capacity of the 
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new technology armament. However, the Ottomans could not always utilize this 
advantage against the enemy, in failing to assist the fortified towns during their fight 
against the Russian army. Kars of 1855 and Plevne of 1877 are celebrated examples 
of such failures.  
 
5.4. Russia’s Retreat from the Principalities 
As one Russian officer claimed, “the year of 1854 ended sadly for Russia.”560 
The Russian forces not only failed to advance in Bulgaria but also retreated from the 
Principalities. After the failure of the siege of Silistre, the Russians rapidly crossed 
the Danube back to the right bank. On 29 June, the Russian headquarters moved to 
the village of Maya-Katarji-lui (?). The rearguard forces were under the command of 
Anrep-Elmpt. As the Russian offensive was at an end, a fresh Ottoman offensive was 
likely to be launched. The retreating Russians were frightened of an Ottoman assault 
from behind.  
Many Russians found the reason for the failure in the ‘treachery of Austria’. 
The Austrians, who were assisted by the Russian army during the Hungarian revolt 
in 1848, signed an agreement with the Porte aiming to oust the Russian forces from 
the Balkans. On 14 June, the Porte and Austria signed the convention of Boyacıköy, 
whereby Austria would occupy the Principalities temporarily. By the summer of 
1854, the Russians considered that a war with Austria would be inevitable if they 
insisted on remaining in the Principalities.
561
 According to this agreement, Austria 
not only posed a threat against Russia during its offensive but also played an 
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intermediary role in not allowing the hostilities in the Principalities to be prolonged. 
The retreat of the Russian army would be followed by a joint invasion of the 
Principalities by Austria and the Ottoman Empire. On 1 August, the Russian army 
departed from Bucharest. The Ottomans entered the city on 8 August under the 
command of Halim Pasha.
562
 
  
5.4.1. The Battle of Yergöğü, 7 July 1854 
In late June, General Soymonov, Commander of the Russian troops in 
Yergöğü, reported an increase in the Ottoman troops in Rusçuk. An increase in 
Ottoman vessels on the mouth of the Lom also indicated the possibility of an 
Ottoman attack on Yergöğü. On 4 July, Gorchakov sent Khrulev to Yergöğü to 
organize the batteries to prevent any possible assault. However, General Dannenberg, 
Commander of the 4
th
 army who was responsible for the forces in Yergöğü and its 
vicinity, did not allow Khrulev to proceed to Yergöğü on the same day. Dannenberg 
only dispatched batteries on 5
 
July, at a time when the Ottomans had already invaded 
Mokanoğlu (Makan) Island. The following day, Dannenberg sent Khrulev to 
Yergöğü, but it was too late to situate the artillery in the best way.563 
According to the Russian sources, Ömer Lütfi Pasha, who planned an attack, 
assembled more than 30,000 men at Rusçuk.564 In fact, it was not the Ottoman 
commander-in-chief who planned the assault. Ömer Lütfi Pasha had scarcely reached 
Şumnu when he learned of the conflict on the Danube. The assault was realized 
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under the command and initiative of Hasan Hakkı Pasha.565 Many British officers 
were also in Yergöğü including sappers Anderson and Swann; Lieutenants Meynell, 
Hinde, Arnold, Burke, and Ballard; Captain Bent; Colonel Ogilvy; and General 
Cannon. They also seemed to support an offensive operation.
566
 
On 7 July 1854, the Ottomans attempted to land on the islands and the right 
bank of the river with the help of a heavy bombardment. Hand-to-hand fighting 
erupted between the Ottoman and Russian forces. Some troops crossed the river to 
Mokanoğlu in front of Rusçuk whereas others joined them by marching to the left 
bank. The Ottoman units landed and took up a position on the island. The steady fire 
of the Ottoman rifles initially repelled the Russians, who gained ground in time. The 
Ottomans would have been swept into the Danube had reinforcement not arrived at a 
critical moment. The Ottomans were reinforced from Rusçuk and had 5,000 troops 
on the left bank. The fight lasted for ten hours. When the sun set, the Ottoman troops 
stood masters of the left bank and victors in one of the most hotly-contested fights.
567
 
According to the Russians, the enemy forces failed in their attempt, which cost them 
six thousand men, killed and wounded.
568
 The Ottoman reports also exaggerated the 
losses of the enemy, claiming five to seven thousand casualties, whereas their own 
losses were insignificant. Thus, the Ottomans perceived the battle on the islands of 
Kama and Mokan as a victory, after which they invaded Yergöğü.569 In fact, it was a 
bloody but indecisive battle and did not furnish any significant military outcome for 
the Ottomans.
570
 Yergöğü was the final significant armed encounter on this front. 
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Eventually, the Ottomans did not pursue the enemy troops further and instead waited 
while the Russians gradually evacuated the Principalities. 
 
5.4.2. The Plans for an Operation into Bessarabia 
Ömer Lütfi Pasha wanted the operations on the Danubian front continued and 
an offensive directed at Bessarabia. However, the Allies thought an operation to 
capture Sevastopol was more realistic to conclude the war with a glorious victory. 
The Crimean campaign gave the initiative for the war to the Allied commanders. The 
presence of the Allied forces in Varna had a moral effect on the Ottoman army rather 
than providing military support. In fact, the Allies did not want to waste their forces 
to help the Ottomans. Only the fall of Silistre and an advance of the Russian armies 
might have forced them to act in the Balkans.   
Because Ömer Lütfi Pasha clearly did not want to fall into a secondary 
position, he did not take command of the Ottoman forces after the Allied landing in 
the Crimean peninsula. Having stayed at Şumnu, he waited for an opportunity for the 
Ottoman army to fight against the Russians. However, when more Ottoman forces 
were requested in the Crimea, he had no other choice but to take command at 
Gözleve. During his presence in the Crimea, he continued to seek other military 
operations in which he would enjoy the full command. The opportunity emerged in 
the Caucasus, where he sought to save the fortress of Kars, but he was late in 
initiating the campaign.  
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5.4.3. The Failed French Campaign in Dobruja 
The French initiated a military campaign into Dobruja. Although it failed, it 
was an interesting attempt. Its aims were to reconnoiter the Russian forces, move the 
forces, and, most importantly, prevent the spread of cholera among the ranks. 
However, the result was a catastrophic annihilation of the troops sent into this 
unhealthy territory. The başıbozuk units, who included approximately 2000-3000 
men under the command of General Yusuf, moved from Varna and arrived at 
Dobruja via Pazarcık and Babadağı. The French divisions under the command of 
General Canrobert were transferred via naval vessels from Varna to Köstence. While 
the forces of Ushakov in Dobruja were retreating, the başıbozuk units under the 
command of General Yusuf attacked. The başıbozuks returned from Dobruja in a 
miserable situation, and the only positive result of the operation was the information 
that no significant Russian forces were left in Dobruja. In the end, half of the army 
remained active, while the other half was either hospitalized or killed. 
Lord Cardigan and a light cavalry were sent to patrol as far as the Dobruja. 
They rode through a desolate country for seventeen days and saw no enemy. 
However, after undergoing great privation from the lack of food, water, forage, and 
shelter, they returned, having lost 280 horses. The Russians were far away across the 
Danube, and even if the Allies had wanted to follow them, they lacked 
transportation. 
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5.4.4 The Ottoman Forces in the Principalities 
On 6 August the Ottoman columns coming from the Danube and the Aluta met 
at Bucharest. On 8 August 1854, the first Ottoman forces under the command of 
Halim Pasha entered Bucharest.
571
 Ömer Lütfi Pasha also arrived at the capital of 
Wallachia twenty days after the occupation of the city by the Ottoman troops. He 
gloriously entered the city.
572
 The Ottoman army occupied Wallachia with the forces 
of more than 50,000 men by October 1854: In Bucharest 25,000, in Rusçuk 15,000, 
in Kalaraş about 10,000, in Slobedze and in Tsendere 3,000. There were 2000 men in 
İbrail under the command of Mehmed Sadık Pasha. There were totally 55,000 
Ottoman forces in Wallachia. On 6 September, the Austrian forces entered 
Bucharest.
573
  
Considerable friction developed between the Ottoman and Austrian forces 
because both armies tried to occupy more territories of Wallachia. Worse, the 
Ottoman and Austrian military commands issued proclamations calling the 
inhabitants to obey their own orders. Similar problems also occured in İbrail and 
Kalas.
574
  
The main Russian forces that left Bucharest in late July arrived at Skuliani on 
16 September.
575
 Kishinev was then the headquarters of Russia’s South Army. From 
27 July to 16 September, Russia evacuated the Principalities and crossed the left side 
of the Prut River in preparation for the defense of Sevastopol. On 1 November 1854 
the last Russian forces on the right bank of the Danube also crossed the river to 
                                               
571 Baumgart, p. 104. 
572 “Zapiski Mikhaila Chaikovskogo”, Russkaya starina, 1898, no. 12, p. 676.  
573 Baumgart, p. 106. 
574 Baumgart, p. 106. 
575 Zapiski Menkova, vol. I, p. 183, 193.   
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Bessarabia.
576
 Minor fights between the Allied powers and the Russian Cossack 
continued until that time.  
The peaceful occupation of the Principalities and the transfer of Anglo-French 
troops to the Crimea removed the danger of war continuing in the Balkans. The 
Austrians were successful in encouraging the Russian troops to evacuate the 
Principalities. According to Baumgart, Austria was therefore the sole power 
responsible for preventing a European war: 
Austria’s pressure on Russia to evacuate the Principalities and their subsequent 
occupation by Austrian troops not only removed the danger of war in south-
eastern Europe, but also of an Austro-Russian war, which would almost 
automatically have entailed the entry of Prussia and the rest of Germany into 
the war, and probably that of other countries in Europe like Sweden. Thus 
Austria’s stand prevented the Crimean War from developing into a European 
and even a world war.
577
  
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
Parallel to the euphoria of the time, a British author portrayed the warfare on 
the Danube using an obvious exaggeration: “The campaign on the Danube in 1853-4 
will ever remain an honourable memento for the Turks. Theirs were the efforts; 
theirs the strategy; theirs the danger; theirs the success; and theirs also should be the 
praise.”578 Although it is clearly an overstatement of the Ottoman success, it can 
safely be claimed that the Ottomans had long fought well against their colossal 
neighbor. The Ottoman tactics were clear and feasible. It was first necessary to hold 
strategic positions on the right bank and on the islands. Ömer Lütfi Pasha also aimed 
to demoralize the Russians with minor battles. It is not clear whether the Ottomans 
                                               
576 Otstavnoi, “Vospominaniya o voine na Dunae v 1853-54 godov”, Voennyi sbornik, 1860, no. 8, p. 
438; Zapiski Menkova, vol. I, p. 184.  
577 Baumgart, p. 106.  
578 Dodd, p. 30. 
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could have succeeded to that extent without the intervention of the Great Powers 
against a more resolute Russian power. However, the Ottoman Danubian army 
showed that they possessed the potential to stop the Russians.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
BEHIND THE FRONT  
ARMY AND SOCIETY 
 
 
 Modern war has been conducted both by professional armies and civilians 
who happen to be on the front and assist the fighting troops by participating in many 
wartime activities. Civilians are both actors in and victims of fighting. This chapter 
narrates the developments behind the front in the Balkans. It discusses the social 
aspects of the Crimean War that the historiography has generally neglected. One 
section is a general observation about relationships between civilians and the military 
during the war. Wartime intelligence activities are also explained in this chapter 
because the contributors to espionage were generally unprofessional civilians. 
Another section focuses on the prisoners of war, who were mostly soldiers, but their 
life in captivity is more social history than military history.  
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6.1. Ottoman and Russian Intelligence in the Balkans during 
the Crimean War 
This section offers a comparative analysis of the Ottoman and Russian military 
intelligence activities in the Balkan front of the Crimean War. When necessary, the 
spying activities in other fronts will also be pointed out. 
  
6.1.1. The Setting 
The newly invented telegraph - one of the most important innovations for 
communication and intelligence - began to be used in the Balkans only in 1855 when 
the Russian forces had already left the scene. To be sure it was difficult to convey 
intelligence via traditional methods. Moreover, the peculiarities of the Balkan 
topography reduced the chances of information arriving at its destination in due 
course. The landscape of the Ottoman Balkans, especially the seasonal changes of 
the River Danube, was a significant handicap for necessary communication. The 
river was such a hardy geographical barrier that in the nineteenth century, an army 
could only pass the Danube at certain locations and time periods. Locating the 
possible passage points and discovering the defensive or offensive preparations of 
the enemy were thus major themes of reconnaissance and vital subjects of 
intelligence reports. Nevertheless, the logistics and the communication of the 
Danubian theater were far better than those of the Caucasus.
579
 A letter from Istanbul 
could arrive at Şumnu, the headquarters of the Ottoman army, in two days. The roads 
                                               
579 Without a telegraph, a message from Colonel William Fenwick Williams, British commissioner in 
the Kars fortress, could be received by Lord Clarendon, the secretary of state in London, after a 
month, and a reply required another month. Therefore, when a letter arrived at its destination, it was 
possible that the circumstances had already changed. 
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were far better and the destinations were closer. Steamboats between Varna and 
Istanbul made it easier to communicate with the army. The tatars (messengers) were 
likely more numerous and better trained. Overall, that theater could endanger the 
capital of the Ottoman Empire, and any mistake could cause grave results.  
The positions and policies of other European powers were of great importance, 
as alliances might dramatically shift the balance in the forthcoming war. Therefore, 
the Russians and the Ottomans permitted economic transactions in the Balkans so as 
not to alienate other states. As a result, several channels of information were possible 
at least until the spring of 1854, when France and Britain declared war on Russia. 
Afterwards, the Ottomans unsurprisingly enjoyed a more favorable international 
environment, while the Russians utilized previously established contacts in the 
Ottoman lands.  
In fact, the characteristics of the local population offered large-scale 
possibilities for information-gathering. Espionage was employed not only to observe 
the movements and targets of the enemy but also, importantly, to understand the 
attitudes and possible conduct of the inhabitants of the related regions. Accordingly, 
the Christian Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire constituted an essential 
instrument as well as a major subject of espionage activities. The cosmopolitan 
populations of Dobruja, Bessarabia, and several cities on the Danube provided a 
convenient environment to identify collaborators. Both armies were able to locate 
friendly populations in the Balkans who might transmit useful information. While 
several Bulgarian çorbacıs (notables) notified the Russians concerning the 
developments in the Ottoman army quarters, there were some pro-Ottoman local 
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elites in Wallachia, particularly in Bucharest, who informed the Ottomans about the 
Russian army stationed in the Principalities. 
 
 6.1.2 Channels of Information 
The use of intelligence agents was not novel for either the Ottomans or the 
Russians. In addition to war-time intelligence activities, both Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire had a tradition of employing intelligence-gathering for domestic security for 
centuries. Janissaries played the role of the military police and conducted domestic 
surveillance.
580
 After the termination of this traditional Ottoman institution, the 
Tanzimat reforms needed the careful observation of public opinion.
581
 Domestic 
surveillance was finally institutionalized by the establishment of the Turkish police 
(Zaptiye) in 1844. During the Crimean War, the Ottoman government accelerated its 
intelligence activities for “investigating the attitude of the Christian subjects”.582 
Agents were sent out in plain clothes to patrol public places. Sitting in pubs, 
coffeehouses and churches, they tried to understand the opinion of the Christian 
subjects regarding the ongoing war, and they reported their findings to the Ottoman 
government.
583
  
Russia also had a long tradition of surveillance and control of its own 
population. The Oprichnina and Tainyi Prikaz in the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries were 
probably the roots of the famous Russian secret police organization Tret’e Otdelenie 
(Third Section of His Imperial Majesty’s Own Chancellery), which was established 
                                               
580 Ágoston, p. 79.  
581 Cengiz Kırlı published about 1300 agent reports sent within 1840-1844. Kırlı, Sultan ve Kamuoyu. 
582 “istitlâ-yı ahvâl-i raiyyet” BOA, A.MKT.NZD 112-113. 
583 “meyhane, kahvehane ve kiliselerde birlikte oturup musahabet esnâsında” Same document. 
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in 1826. The Third Section was under the direct control of the tsar, and it was one of 
the pillars of Nicholas I’s regime. The Russian secret police sent out spies, 
investigators, and gendarmes throughout the country to monitor every perceived 
threat from distrusted segments of the society, such as revolutionaries, Muslims, 
Poles, Old Believers and foreigners.
584
 After its founding, the Russian secret police 
initiated foreign missions as well.
585
 During the Crimean War, the Third Section had 
several contacts with the Orthodox population of both Istanbul and the Balkans. 
However, the Russian state was unable to utilize these established ties to ignite a 
popular Christian revolt in the Ottoman territories.  
Moreover, Russia was more interested in and better informed about the rival 
army. Russia sent not only a permanent ambassador to Istanbul but also a military 
agent. During peacetime, Colonel Count Osten-Sacken, the Russian military agent, 
sent detailed and accurate reports regarding the Ottoman army corps and its 
fortifications.
586
 The Ottomans, on the other hand, had only a rudimentary 
knowledge of the Russian army and government. Therefore, Russia, which was 
better prepared for a possible war, was more familiar with its opponent’s power. One 
significant and certain advantage for the Ottomans was that any possible war would 
be waged on its own territory. They also did not seem to have any revanchist policy 
                                               
584 For classical works on the Russian Police, see Sidney Monas, Third Section: Police and Society 
under Nicholas I (Cambridge and Massachusetts, 1961); Peter Stansfield Squire, The Third 
Department: The Establishment and Practice of the Political Police in the Russia of Nicholas I 
(Cambridge, 1968); For a recent treatment, A. G. Chukarev, Tainaya politsiya Rossii: 1825-1855 
(Moscow, 2005).  
585 Kolpakidi and Sever, p. 277; Some influential Russian nobles living in the European capitals were 
also in cooperation with the Russian Secret Police and the Russian Foreign Ministry. For instance, 
Yakov Nikolaievich Tolstoi and Daria Khristoforovna Lieven who enjoyed friendships in the 
European high society frequently informed the Russian government regarding the political 
developments. For the activities of Tolstoi in Paris during the Crimean War, see, Cherkasov, Russkii 
agent vo Frantsii. Yakov Nikolaievich Tolstoi, pp. 351-385. For Lady Lieven, Primakov (ed.), Ocherki 
istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki, vol I, pp. 115-121.  
586 See, RGVIA, f. 450, op. 1, d. 45-55.  
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towards Russia. However, this fact did not excuse the Ottomans from learning more 
about the Russian army, which posed a direct threat to the Ottoman throne.  
There were three basic means of learning about enemies during the war: spies, 
prisoners of war (or deserters), and reconnaissance (especially the patrol of irregular 
cavalry). Nevertheless, the sources of information were not limited to these three 
categories: rather, a European consul, a trusted merchant
587
, a local notable or even a 
passer-by could well be a source of information. In the Balkans, such a diverse and 
intensive flow of information resulted in volumes of reports, notes and letters, 
whether accurate or misleading.  
Diplomatic missions were inherently a part of the intelligence business. 
Invaluable information could be attained through long-established connections in 
different parts of Europe. Accordingly, the missions in European capitals as well as 
in several Balkan cities participated in the information-gathering and -disseminating 
activities. The Russians and Ottomans had friends to approach for information. 
While the Greek consuls
588
 readily assisted Russia, the consuls of the European 
powers generally assisted the Ottomans in their intelligence search.
589
  
Ordinary merchants were also very useful. For instance, Stan Baiculescu, a 
merchant from Bucharest, visited the Ottoman territory; upon his return, he informed 
the Russian headquarters about the Ottoman army.
590
 Arslan, an Ottoman merchant 
and resident of Tulça (Tulcea), was interrogated three times by the Russian 
authorities when he was in Kalas for his own business. He was asked about the 
                                               
587 See, for instance, ATASE, Crimean War Collection, k. 2, d. 7, f. 26; k. 8, d. 3, f. 1; GARF, f. 109, 
First Expedition, op. 28, d. 170, ch. 3.  
588 The Greek consul in Kalas informed the Russians. RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5443.  
589 ATASE, k. 4, d. 11, f. 25; k. 4, d. 11, f. 17-2. 
590 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5459, l. 354 ob. (voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal) 
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Ottoman forces in Tulça and İsakçı (Isakcea).591 Prisoners of war and deserters were 
another important source of valuable information. They could at least give the 
numbers and location of the enemy forces, if not the strategy and aims of the 
opponent.  
While the Ottoman government’s relations with Russia were becoming more 
tense, it asked the local authorities to “secretly and in a suitable fashion” ask people 
visiting the other bank of the Danube River about the state of affairs and the enemy 
activities.
592
 Although other sources might have provided a considerable amount of 
information, they needed to be validated by more reliable mechanisms such as the 
institutionalized espionage network. Commanders and governors in the region thus 
dispatched their spies to the field. Immediately following the failure of the 
Menshikov Mission, the commanders and governors in the Balkans initiated their 
search for information regarding Russian activities. The governor of Vidin, 
Lieutenant-General Mehmed Sâlim Pasha; commander of the forces in Babadağ, 
Brigadier-General Yusuf Pasha; commander (Muhafız) of the Quadruple 
fortresses,
593
 Brigadier-General Mehmed Pasha; and civil governor (Müdîr) of 
Silistre, İbrahim Ağa594 were asked for new information by the central government. 
The prominent Ottoman officials in the Balkans, Said Mirza Pasha, the Governor of 
Silistre, and Ömer Lütfi Pasha, first commander of the Rumeli (Third) Army and 
later commander-in-chief of the Ottoman armies, also dispatched their agents to 
collect information.
595
 Eventually, during the hostilities numerous spy reports were 
                                               
591  BOA, İ.DH 281- 17615. 
592 ATASE, k. 2, d. 6, f. 19. 
593 Silistre, Varna, Rusçuk and Şumnu. 
594 In other documents, he was called Kaymakam İbrahim Bey. Later, he would be promoted to Pasha.   
595 They were warned that the investigation should be kept confidential so as not to provide Russia 
with a pretext for a war. 
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handed for evaluation either to the Ottoman army command in Şumnu or to the 
Ottoman government.  
Numerous Ottoman officers collected information, but it was not their primary 
obligation. Therefore, any coordination among the commanders seems to be dubious. 
On this strategic front, however, the Ottoman government employed another high 
official, whose mission was limited to the collection of information. On May 29, just 
after the diplomatic rupture with Russia, Colonel (Miralay) İslâm Bey, a member of 
the Naval Council (Meclis-i Bahriye azâsı), was assigned to the Lower Danube.596 
He was described as an able man who was competent to perform the duty of a tahkîk 
memuru, or an investigator. He likely had an adequate knowledge of the terrain 
where he was sent. İslâm Bey played a key role as an intermediary between various 
anonymous agents in Dobruja and the Porte. Having arrived at Tulça on June 7, he 
promptly began to search for new information, and he sent his first letter just three 
days after his arrival. In this letter, he openly argued that it would be impossible to 
obtain information from Bessarabia and İsmail due to strict Russian control: “To say 
nothing about the Ottoman subjects, even the Europeans cannot be sent from here 
[Dobruja] to the Russian territories”.597 Although his activities were limited to the 
towns of İsakçı, Tulça, Maçin and İbrail, his duty was to directly and regularly post 
reports to the Ottoman capital until the Russian invasion of Dobruja. However, he 
did not have the responsibility of organizing the information-gathering in the 
Balkans. Rather, his assignment reflected the need or the desire of the Porte to have 
its own corridor to the information gathering.
598
   
                                               
596 Initially, Brigadier-General of Artillery (Mirliva) Hüseyin Pasha was considered for this mission, 
but due to his illness, İslâm Bey was assigned. BOA, İ.DH 272-17020.  
597 Miralay İslam Bey to Serasker, ATASE, k. 8, d.3, f. 2. 
598 His career after the invasion of Dobruja is not clear. 
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The Russians, on the other hand, turned to the governor-general of New Russia 
and Bessarabia, General Annenkov; the commander of the Russian Third
 
Army, 
General Osten-Sacken; and General Lüders, the commander of the Fifth Army, for 
fresh information. The cities of Odessa and İsmail were open gates to information 
regarding the neighboring empire. Russian commanders received various letters from 
the right bank of the river. In war-time, spies were in contact with a certain Captain 
Mikhailov and Colonel Brynza, the former in İsmail and the latter in Kili. These two 
Russian commanders acted as intermediaries between the agents and the Russian 
quarters.  
 
6.1.3.  In Search of “Able and Reliable Men” 
Secret agents were the most interesting elements of information gathering. 
Ottomans called their agents “secret investigator” (tahkikat-ı hafiyye memuru, 
hafiyye memuru), “investigator” (tahkikat memuru, tahkik memuru), or “spy” (casus), 
and the Russians termed them “secret agent” (tainyi agent) or “spy” (lazutchik, 
shpion). The words casus and shpion both possessed negative connotations; thus, 
they were generally used for the enemy agents.
599
 To find confident and able men in 
a hostile territory who could provide information was of utmost importance. Agents 
did not have any formal training. In fact, neither the Russians nor the Ottomans had a 
                                               
599 To be sure, the negative connotation of the spy or casus was not new. For instance, there was a 
similar difference between the words for the secret agents in the Venetian usage. As Madunić claims, 
“The Venetians of the 17th century used varieties of terms: spia, spione, confidente, esploratore, 
messo, persona espressa, agente segreto etc. In the 17th century, the word spia held derogatory 
connotations and was mainly used for the persons in the service of the enemy who were operating 
under secrecy within one's territory. When referring to its own spies sent into enemy territory in order 
to obtain some information, Venetian sources would usually use words like: esploratore, persona 
espressa, or messo”. Domagoj Madunić, Secret War: Venetian Intelligence and Espionage Activities 
during the War for Crete (1645-1669), article presented at the conference “Power and Influence in 
South-Eastern Europe, 16-19th Centuries” (Sofia, 2010).  
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central bureaucratized intelligence agency. Therefore, the employment of spies can 
be described as ad hoc rather than planned or systematic. An “able” man was of 
course familiar with the territory, the people and the language and knew how to 
gather information without revealing himself. For instance, the Serasker wanted the 
Ottoman commanders on the Danube to “dispatch truly trustworthy and reliable 
agents who are intimate of language [of the region] in the suitable dress…”600 İslam 
Bey was able to bypass the quarantine with such a reliable agent:  
Although the quarantine of the other side prevents [us] from getting constant 
intelligence in the Principalities and the neighborhoods, a reliable and able man 
who has a Prussian passport and [therefore] who cannot be intercepted 
whatsoever have been found and sent in disguise to investigate adequately the 
situation of the aforementioned place [Wallachia].
601
 
 
 
Previous work with diplomatic figures, past friendships, and good references 
were important criteria for a “reliable man”. Nevertheless, it was often difficult to 
combine the qualities of “able” and “reliable”. People who had contacts in both 
Bulgaria and the Principalities were generally cosmopolitan figures and could work 
for anyone. Such people were likely to benefit from the crisis environment in the 
Balkans and possibly worked as double agents in the region.  
There were a certain number of salaried Ottoman agents. According to an 
Ottoman document, agents in Istanbul were paid a total of 10,000 kuruş monthly, 
which was deemed to be insufficient during wartime. Some other agents collected 
allowances in accordance with their contributions to the information gathering; for 
this purpose, 20,000 kuruş in total were reserved by the State Treasury.602 There 
                                               
600 ATASE, k. 2, d. 6, f. 19.  
601 ATASE, k. 8, d. 3, f. 3/1.  
602 BOA, İ.DH 293-18463. 
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were also agents employed and paid by the local authorities in different regions of 
the Empire. In short, the number of agents employed and their cost to the Ottoman 
government are impossible to determine.
603
 It can be argued that numerous agents 
were used and that their cost was above dispute considering the value of information 
in wartime. However, the Russian army and the Russian secret police also deployed 
reliable agents to the Balkans. Many Ottoman subjects, especially Jews, Greeks, 
Bulgarians, Serbians and Montenegrins, assisted Russia with information from the 
right bank of the Danube River. They were rewarded for their assistance. The 
number of the Russian agents and their cost are also uncertain.  
Both sides took pains to break through the enemy lines; however, they also had 
to prevent the outflow of intelligence from their quarantines. Neither collecting nor 
communicating the acquired information was easy. It was especially difficult on the 
Danube. To escape from the quarantines, secret meetings were arranged and special 
signs, such as lighting a cigarette, were designated. Sometimes, a man would leave a 
letter at a predetermined location in daylight to be taken by the Russians crossing the 
river at night. The man who placed the letter would be remunerated.
604
 On dangerous 
routes, the correspondence was written in code or using special signs as a 
precautionary measure.
605
 Although it is unlikely that the critical army codes were 
shared with spies, some of them used ciphers in their assignments.  
 Spies were specially treated and rewarded in the ranks, but they were not 
respected by the enemy. Traitors have always been treated with contempt, so both 
                                               
603 According to Kırlı, an agent received 600-650 kuruş monthly in the 1840s. If the salary remained 
unchanged, there might have been 16 salaried Ottoman agents. Kırlı, Sultan ve Kamuoyu, p. 8. 
604 “Governor of Silistre to the Sublime Porte”, BOA, HR.MKT 66-29. 
605 Humpry Sandwith, a doctor who worked for the Ottoman army on the Caucasian front, claimed in 
his memoirs, “Each night we send out men, sometimes officers, to Erzeroom, disguised as peasants, 
carrying notes in cipher rolled up and put into quills, which they carry in their hands and drop if 
surprised by Cossacks”. Humpry Sandwith, A Narrative of the Siege of Kars (London, 1856), p. 299. 
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antagonists expressed their distaste for spies. Spying was a dishonorable act (fezahât-
ı azîme), and the Ottomans called the captured spies “disgraceful persons” (eşhas-ı 
rezile).
606
 Traditionally, harsh punishments were applied to the spies. The Ottomans 
executed some of them by shooting.
607
 The rest were either sentenced to forced labor 
(in the State Shipyard, the State Farm, etc.)
608
 or exiled to an Anatolian city (Adana, 
Bolu) with their families.
609
 Those who were executed were considered to be spies 
not just in word but in act as well (kavlen ve fiilen casusluk eyledikleri).
610
 The 
Ottomans seem to have used this categorization with respect to punishing 
espionage.
611
 Why did those people accept a task that was punishable by death? 
During the interrogation of the Russian spies, the Ottoman officer explicitly asked, 
“It is evident that no one will serve for anyone for free abandoning his own business.  
For this [service] what did the Russian colonel give or promise you?”612 Money of 
course played a role, and agents were no doubt rewarded financially. Nayden Gerov, 
who was educated in Odessa, was a potential ally for the Russian army.
613
 He sent 
several informative letters from Bulgaria in wartime.
614
 In return, he would be the 
Russian consul in Filibe (Plovdiv) immediately after the war. Religious or national 
affiliations were also important. A Montenegrin or Greek could be a natural ally of 
Russia, but for a Cossack or a local Jew, it was not problematic to collaborate with 
either of the armies. To be sure, efficient intelligence efforts by the Crimean Tatars 
for the allied armies in the Crimea connected with their love and respect for the 
Ottoman state.  
                                               
606 BOA, İ.MVL 301-12273. 
607 BOA, İ.DH 290-18253. 
608 BOA, İ.DH 286-17951. 
609 BOA, A.MKT.MVL 77-37; BOA, HR.MKT 77-87; BOA C.AS 521-21762. 
610 BOA İ.DH 283-17758. 
611 I could not identify any spy punished by the Russian army during the Crimean War. 
612 ATASE k. 4, d. 11, f. 43/2. 
613 See, the first chapter of Laptev, Rossiiskii diplomat Naiden Gerov i rossiisko-bulgarskoe sviazi. 
614 Pisma iz Bulgarii, pisannye N.G. (Odessa, 1854). 
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 6.1.4 Spies at Work: Casus vs. Shpion 
The Nekrasov [branch of Don Cossacks] and the Zaporozhian Cossacks in 
Dobruja were used by the Ottomans in irregular forces, especially for collecting 
information through reconnaissance.
615
 Ironically, Dobruja Cossacks were also 
potential sources of information for the Russian army; they provided the Russian 
commanders with information concerning many developments on the right bank of 
Danube. Cossacks of the Ottoman army were traditionally intermingled with the 
Crimean Tatars living in Dobruja. According to the Russians, this was a 
precautionary measure to prevent their possible contact with the Russian army.
616
 
Indeed, deserters from the Cossack regiments, which were not negligible in number, 
provided information for the Russian forces.
617
 It was not easy to prevent contact 
between the local Cossack population in Dobruja and the Russian army and its 
espionage network. Yet it was also not easy to distinguish perfectly who was 
working for whom in Dobruja. Russian General Ushakov, for instance, openly 
uttered his cynical stance concerning the Cossack spies:  
It is true that such information was primarily conveyed to us by Nekrasovtsy 
who were famous with their jugglery and indisposition to Russia. Perhaps, they 
even surrendered us deliberately for money that they would receive from 
Turkish commanders in exchange for exaggerating the difficulty of crossing 
[Danube River] to Machin, around which located many rich Nekrasov villages, 
as well-known, [this place was] always an asylum for our run-away heretics.
618
  
 
 
                                               
615 Avigdor Levy, “The Contribution of Zaporozhian Cossacks to Ottoman Military Reform: 
Documents and Notes”, p. 377.  
616 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5399, l. 184. 
617 ATASE, k. 4, d. 11, f. 43. 
618 Ushakov, p. 66. 
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Some Cossack spies were captured and punished by the Ottomans. Yani 
Hulebi, a local notable of İsakçı, was seized together with Yani Tace, Lifuraş, and 
Cossack Yakov of Tulça while conveying a letter to the Russian commander of 
Sünne (Sulina). They admitted their crimes during interrogation.619 After several 
months, another Cossack spy group was captured. Cossack Andrushka and Cossack 
çorbacı Zaharko, who were alleged to be spies “in act and in word”, would be 
hanged in Şumnu. Seven additional Cossacks620 who were alleged to be “spies just in 
word” were deported to Adana in southern Anatolia together with their families.621  
According to General Ushakov, Bulgarians were much more trustworthy than 
the Cossacks. In his memoirs, the Russian general claims that “Bulgarians, who were 
more dedicated to us [Russians], were passionate in this work [espionage]”.622 He 
further argues that the Bulgarians conveyed factual information despite the danger of 
offering such a service due to the common belief that they would be quickly 
emancipated from the Turkish yoke by the Russian army.
623
 In April 1855, 
prominent Bulgarians and Greeks of Tulça who were members of the Tulça 
committee, Dimitraki, Hristaki, Sütraki and Papa Dimitri and the Jew Avram, were 
incriminated for working for the Russians in disguise.
624
  
Spying for the Russians was not limited to the Dobruja region. A famous 
example was Raicho Nikolov who was later a Bulgarian hero of the 1877-78 war.  
Nikolov, then a 13 year-old boy, informed the Russian headquarters about the 
                                               
619 Of these spies Grigory Muntanu died, and some others (Cossack Nikita, Yaybule) escaped. 
ATASE, k. 4, d. 11, f. 43; BOA C.AS 880-37783.   
620 Aktor Todi who was brother of Zaharko, Simyon Otobri, his brother Zaharko Otobri, Cossack 
Bearded [Sakallı] Dimitri, his friend Dimitri, his friend Ivan, Cossack Yefim.  
621 They arrived at Adana in July 1854 while their family would be sent later. BOA, C.AS 521-21762. 
622 Ushakov, p. 66.  
623 Ibid, p. 104. 
624 BOA, A.MKT.UM 188-40. 
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Ottoman preparations to cross the river Danube.
625
 Despite harsh punishments, 
Ottoman Christians did not stop working for the Russian army during the Crimean 
War. Mihalaki Georgiy Abram Ayoş, a Bulgarian merchant who was a resident of 
Ziştovi, was doing business in Yergöğü. He used his trade links to visit the Rusçuk 
quarantine to pass letters to a certain Simyon Zulutuş who was a clerk of Hacı Tanas, 
a tradesman in Rusçuk. A captured letter, written in special signs and expressions, 
disclosed their espionage for the Russians. After being interrogated, Simyon and 
Mihalaki were sent to the headquarters of Ömer Lütfi Pasha.  
The Russians aimed not only to attain information about the enemy forces but 
also to plant seeds of a revolt in the Balkan Peninsula. A visit by Feliks Fonton, a 
Russian diplomat in Vienna, to Serbia and the Principalities in the fall of 1853 was 
obviously designed to obtain information regarding the possibility of anti-Turkish 
uprisings. Egor Petrovich Kovalevskii, another Russian diplomat, carried out his 
mission to Montenegro in late December and early January to prepare a revolt in 
both Montenegro and Serbia when the Russian army crossed the Danube.
626
 Russians 
were able to identify collaborators from different sections of the Ottoman society. In 
Istanbul, Baron Alexandre Paul Delesnor (?), a Wallachian aristocrat, was accused of 
spying for Russia. Interestingly, his application for assistance to the Ottoman zaptiye 
to find two high-ranking Russian spies who were suspected of being in Istanbul was 
accepted by the Ottomans. However, he soon proved to be a part of an organization 
that was preparing a revolt in the Balkans. He had connections with both General 
Gorchakov and General Orlov and acted together with others: Ciriaco Constantinu, 
Count Meteka, Mehanevich and Rodoslevich. Fortunately, agents of the Ottoman 
                                               
625 E. V. Belova, “Balkanskie volontiory v Russkoi armii”, Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, vol. 9 
(2006), p. 57. 
626 Schroeder, pp. 138-139; BOA, HR.MKT 63-100.   
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police, Nikola Palimari, Antuan Ciriacidis and Nikola Arka, disclosed the Russian 
espionage activities in Istanbul.
627
  
Not only the Russian army but also the Third Section (Tret’e Otdelenie) 
dispatched spies to the Ottoman territories. False passports were prepared and false 
addresses were given to those spies to mail the information that they collected. 
Merchant Konovalov, a Russian subject, and Vilenika, an Austrian subject, sent 
information to a predetermined false address in Odessa. Konovalov was given a 
Greek passport as Joachim Afanasia and was sent to Greece, and Vilenika via Vienna 
and Trieste arrived at Istanbul.
628
 Marko Grimberg, a Jew and a resident of Babadağ, 
worked as a Russian agent in Dobruja and was given the right to relocate to 
Bessarabia after the Russian troops crossed back over the Danube River.
629
 A Greek 
spy sent by the Third Section served in Tulça in May 1853.630 Denkoğlu, a merchant, 
dispatched information that he acquired from Vienna by way of the Mihalkovich 
brothers and Georgiy Simyonov.
631
  
Baron Delesnor was not the only person to work for both sides. The above-
mentioned Andruşka was first assigned by the Ottomans to collect information on the 
left bank of the Danube. During his trial, he defended himself by saying that he was 
caught by the Russians and forced to collaborate with them. The Russian command 
was warned about a certain Radovich. He was a Jewish merchant in Dobruja who 
pretended to be a Montenegrin and conveyed misleading reports to the Russians 
while in fact working for the Ottomans.
632
 Therefore, it was difficult to determine the 
                                               
627 BOA HR.MKT 79-48.  
628 GARF, f.109, First Expedition, op. 29, d. 402, ch. 6, l. 1-4 and other pages.  
629 GARF, f.109, First Expedition, op. 29, d. 421, l. 1-2. 
630 GARF, f.109, First Expedition, op. 28, d. 170, ch. 1, l. 1-3 
631 GARF, f.109, First Expedition, op. 28, d. 170, ch. 1.  
632 See his reports from Tulça directed to General Lüders. RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5399, l. 353-354. 
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extent to which the reports and the agents were reliable. Eventually, most of the 
reports were products of and dispatched by disingenuous people.   
All of these individuals represent the intensive espionage activities in the 
Ottoman territories. The Russians were by no means acting in a completely alien 
territory. The Russian army had contacts in the region who were prepared to 
collaborate. They were able to organize the Christians to discover the movements of 
the Ottoman forces. Although the Russians exploited Cossacks, Bulgarians and 
Greeks in their intelligence efforts, they were unable to provoke a popular revolt 
among the Balkan Christians.
633
 The international conjuncture did not engender an 
appropriate environment for a popular revolt in the Balkans. 
Both powers wanted to attract the local population. Propaganda activities 
behind the front line were crucial to garnering the sympathy and the support of the 
local population for the war efforts. The ethnic and religious affiliations of people 
were of the highest importance both as a tool and as a target of intelligence activities. 
The Ottomans sought to attract the anti-Russian elements to their side. The Ottoman 
army utilized the local population of Wallachia and Moldavia to gather intelligence 
regarding the moves and plans of the Russian forces. The Ottoman propaganda even 
provoked an anti-Russian revolt in Little Wallachia.
634
 The Ottoman 
counterintelligence might also have been effective in the Balkans. For instance, 
according to an Ottoman report, “Rano from Filibe, who will wander in these lands 
[Filibe, Pazarcık and Sofia] to nullify intrigues and provocations …”.635 The 
Ottoman agents were active in the cities where military quarters were located and 
                                               
633 BOA, A.MKT.UM 151-39; 151-95. 
634 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5429, l. 237.   
635 “İbtal-i asâr-ı fesad ve tahrikâtı için bu havâlide dolaştırılmak üzere Filibeli Rano’nun …” BOA 
İ.HR 105-5143. 
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where armed forces were deployed. They were also employed at the Greek borders, 
in Serbia and in Istanbul to disclose and to avert the activities of the Russian spies.
636
  
 
6.1.5 Nature and Content of Secret Reports  
“According to information received from agents” was the most common 
expression to initiate a report.
637
 The various written or oral information was 
compiled to form a compact report. The agents generally included the sources of 
intelligence in their statements to emphasize the authenticity of the information: “I 
have heard from our friend Karabet, who is a merchant and a Russian subject”, “a 
trustworthy merchant” or “a person who can be trusted” were some common phrases 
in the introductory portions of the intelligence letters.
638
 
Both the Ottomans and the Russians tried to learn more about the geographical 
peculiarities of the front, manpower, health, provisional conditions and allocation of 
the enemy forces, as well as the plans and strategies of the opponent. Topographical 
information was given priority in the summer of 1853. In addition to the activities of 
the enemy armies, the peculiarities of the terrain and the local population were at the 
center of military intelligence. Both armies were familiar with the theater of war, i.e., 
Bessarabia, the Principalities, Bulgaria, Rumelia, and other possible scenes of action. 
These regions had been battlefields between the two powers since the beginning of 
the 18
th
 century. The seasonal changes of the Danube River were of utmost 
importance in understanding the military activities of the enemy troops in the 
                                               
636 BOA, A.MKT.NZD 110-77; A.MKT.UM 155-77; A.AMD 70-94; HR.MKT  63-100.  
637 In Turkish, “tahkikat memurlarından alınan havâdise göre” and in Russian, “Po svedeniem ot 
lazutchikov”.    
638 “Rusya tebaasından dostumuz olan Karabet bazergândan işittim”; “Doğru söyler bir bezirgân 
demiş”; “Sözüne itimat olunur birisi…”. 
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Balkans. Therefore, commanders along the Danube informed the central command 
regarding preparations of the enemy troops and the possibility of their passage across 
the river. Changes in the depth and width of the Danube as well as the conditions of 
the islets were constantly reported.639 The Prut and the Seret Rivers were also the 
subject of reports, especially at the very time when the Russians concentrated their 
troops in Bessarabia to invade the Principalities in May-June 1853 and when the 
Ottoman army was planning an operation targeting Bessarabia in the summer of 
1854.640  
The intelligence efforts principally aimed to learn about the activities of the 
enemy in advance. The most important question for the Ottomans and Russians was 
whether the enemy troops would cross the Danube: when, at which point, with how 
many troops, and for what purpose. Therefore, one of the important subjects of the 
reports was the position of the enemy’s pontoon bridges.641 The preparation of boats, 
wood or other necessary materials for pontoon bridges was carefully observed. 
Moreover, the number of enemy troops and their every activity near the possible 
points of passage were constantly reported by the informers.  
The ethnic, religious and cultural peculiarities of the region as well as of the 
enemy troops were important subjects according to the reports. Russian documents 
always refer to the European elements of the Ottoman army, as well as to the ethnic 
origins of the soldiers and the commanders. The Polish, Hungarian, Cossack, 
Albanian elements were always emphasized, and frequently exaggerated, in the 
                                               
639 Before crossing the Danube in the first months of 1854, the Russian troops collected detailed 
information about the convenient points of passage. RGVIA, Commander of the Fifth Army to War 
Minister, 16 [28] December 1853, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5443, l. 5.  
640 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5443, l.152-170. 
641 See, for example, RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5399, l. 336, 353. 
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secret Russian reports.
642
 A certain informer claimed, “...a Polish legion of 200 men 
and a Hungarian battalion crossed [the river] from Vidin to Kalafat while Italian 
renegades of 250 men were left in the [Vidin] fortress”643 This dispatch obviously 
overstated the revolutionary elements in the Ottoman army. Perhaps such reports 
were used to attract Austria to the Russian side. The Italian revolutionary Apoloni, 
the Polish renegade Antoni Aleksandr Illinskii (Mehmed İskender Bey), and the 
famous Polish romantic author Michał Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadık Paşa) were some 
of the names frequently encountered in the intelligence reports. Some reports 
revealed the Slavic elements in the Ottoman army who could perhaps be utilized by 
the Russians. As an agent asserted, “some 35,000 Turkish forces, in which there are 
many Lipovans [Nekrasov Cossacks] and volunteers, entered Wallachia from 
Silistre”.644 The reports also described the differences and potential discrepancies 
among the Ottoman armed forces:  “On the 4th [16th] of this month [October] after 
the parade oath-taking ceremony took place for the regular forces and Tatars [in 
Tulça], but not for Albanians and Nekrasov Cossacks”.645 Such reports might have 
been used to understand the loyalty and discipline in the Ottoman forces and for 
determining the weakest sections of the Ottoman forces in terms of commitment to 
the cause. Ottomans, in turn, showed their interest in the Muslim elements in the 
Russian army.
646
 Ottoman spies also investigated possible future acts and the conduct 
of the local population, particularly the non-Muslims.
647
  
Intelligence reports explicitly depicted, and perhaps exaggerated, the weakness 
of the enemy forces.
 The Russian spies argued, “these forces are very poorly dressed 
                                               
642 See, for example, RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5415, various papers.   
643 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5429, l. 54. 
644 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5443, l. 179 ob. 
645 RGVIA, General Lüders to General Gorchakov, 9 [21] October 1853, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5399, l. 
336. 
646 “[T]wo hundred Circassians and some Tatars also arrived in Yergöğü.” ATASE, k. 8, d. 3, f. 18-2.   
647 BOA A.MKT.NZD 112-108; A.MKT.NZD 139-2; A.MKT.NZD 114-107. 
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and suffer from insufficient food”.648 In another report, it was claimed that, “in 
Silistre there is insufficient bread, food prices increased extremely; death rate is 
high..”. 649 An Ottoman document argued that “there are more than 30,000 newly 
enlisted soldiers in the Russian army who do not have any kind of training and even 
are devoid of weapons”.650 The spies might have exaggerated the weaknesses of the 
enemy, thinking they would be better rewarded in exchange for good news.  
Although the above-mentioned spies and their activities demonstrate a high 
level of information gathering, the contemporary witnesses drew a gloomy picture of 
the quality of their own espionage efforts. Doctor Sandwith complained that the 
Russian spy service was much better than the Ottomans: “the spy-service, like every 
other branch of the Russian army, was complete; and the Armenians of Kars 
furnished them with all the information required, of the state of the Turkish army”.651 
He further claimed, “we have no trustworthy spies whatever; the few peasants who 
bring us information are more than suspected, while the Armenians of the country 
are devoted to the enemy’s interests”.652 Captain Lintorn Simmons, British 
commissioner to the Ottoman Headquarters in the Balkans, was also pessimistic. He 
complained that Ömer Pasha’s intelligence on the Russian movements and order of 
battle was “chiefly obtained from newspapers”.653 Ushakov seems to be aware of the 
overestimation of the allied command regarding the Russian espionage: “Marshal 
Saint-Arnaud thought … that our agents were many, and they were almost under 
each and every stone”. He remarked that “it was [actually] difficult for us to attain 
                                               
648 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5429, l. 98. 
649 RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5443, l. 101.     
650 BOA İ.HR 103-5044. 
651 Sandwith, p. 127. 
652 Ibid, p. 258. 
653 Harris, pp. 1-25. The author describes the reports of Simmons as full of erroneous and misleading 
information and thus unsatisfactory.  
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trusted information regarding the state of affairs and the preparations of the Anglo-
French troops”.654  
The failures in supplying the armies and at scenes of battle in many cases 
emanated from inadequate intelligence efforts. For this reason, contemporary 
witnesses drew gloomy pictures of their own information gathering activities while 
exaggerating the success of their opponent. There was also a myth concerning 
Ottoman agents’ activities in the Caucasus.655 According to the Russians, the 
Ottomans were covertly organizing all of the Caucasians’ efforts against the Russian 
Empire.   
It is clear that Russia was much better prepared than the Ottomans for a 
possible war in terms of information-gathering. Russia had the advantage if its army 
had moved quickly in the summer of 1853.
656
 However, given the static nature of the 
conflict, the Ottomans had sufficient time to formulate their plans and strategies for 
the Danube theater. The Ottoman army also pressed its territorial advantage. The 
Ottoman commanders knew the territory and the people better than their adversaries. 
Moreover, the theater of war was distant from the Russian capital, posing a 
disadvantage in terms of logistics and intelligence.  
 
6.1.6 Assessing Information  
During the Crimean War, the headquarters served as the central body for 
collecting information. Both the Russian and the Ottoman armies had the personnel 
                                               
654 Ushakov, p. 122. 
655 “Secret Turkish agents among the Circassians with the titles of Serasker [sic] Pasha” Ushakov, p. 
27.  
656 Ömer Pasha admitted that if Russia had wanted a war in the summer of 1853, the Ottomans would 
have been caught unprepared and most probably have been defeated. ATASE, k. 4, d. 11, f. 8. 
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to gather information but not to assess it. Gathering information was of little use 
unless it was also evaluated and analyzed. Therefore, it is important to determine 
whether the army commanders succeeded in evaluating the strategic information.   
In the Balkan theater of the Crimean War, there must have been a massive 
accumulation of information, which might have assisted the commanders in 
determining the capacity of the enemy forces and formulating their own strategies. 
Yet, the quantity of reports could affect the quality of intelligence only if they were 
cross-checked. In other words, if the information was not sorted and analyzed, it 
would not be useful. The target proved to be quantity of information rather than the 
quality. Reports were generally as lengthy as possible, and all types of gossip were 
included. There was hardly any system of separating the useful and reliable 
information from the flawed or trivial. Colonel Brynza or Colonel İslam Bey may 
have been talented men to make use of agents in the region as well as to avert the 
intelligence activities of the enemy; however, they did not act as an intelligence 
bureau. Instead, both the Ottomans and the Russians employed traditional ways of 
spying and gathering information without any systematic way to assess them. 
How many of these reports provided useful and correct information can only be 
understood after a careful comparison of what they said with what really happened. 
The battles at the Danubian front might be regarded as a positive sign of the Ottoman 
army’s acquisition or utilization of information. To compare the intelligence 
activities of the two armies, we can analyze three strategic moves of the Ottomans in 
the field: the battles of Kalafat, Olteniçe and Çatana. In all of these cases, the 
Russians were misinformed about the Ottoman strength and strategy and failed to 
understand the nature of the assaults and the aim of the enemy; thus, they were 
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caught unprepared. These Russian failures might also be a result of counter-
intelligence activities and the caution of the Ottoman command under Ömer Lütfi 
Pasha. He often did not disclose his strategies even to his own circle until the 
moment of the operation. The Russians failed at the Silistre fortress when they raised 
the siege after 40 days. Having assumed that the fortress would fall within a few 
weeks, they obviously underestimated its strength. The Ottoman concerns about a 
Russian assault on Vidin also proved to be exaggerated. The Russians never prepared 
such an offensive in wartime so as not to damage the country’s relations with 
Austria. Such Ottoman considerations must be based on previous experiences or 
logical judgments rather than on wartime intelligence.  
 
 6.1.7. Conclusion 
Documents demonstrate that there was a constant flow of information 
concerning the potential, power, and possible plans of the enemy. The political 
environment made diplomatic and economic transactions in Bulgaria and the 
Principalities possible and thus limited the capability of both sides to avert spying 
activities. The heterogeneous character of the population of the Danube made it easy 
to find people disposed to collaborate. The Ottomans were primarily in search of 
information from their own territory and people. While the Russians were searching 
for information in a foreign country, their previous information regarding the 
territory and their established contacts with the local population made the geography 
sufficiently familiar. However, the Ottomans were in an advantageous position at the 
beginning of the hostilities when the war was taking place in its own territory. The 
international position of the Russian and the Ottoman governments favored the latter 
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as well. The Russians were perceived as the offensive party, while the Ottomans 
were defending their own rights and territory.   
Information regarding the terrain, the local population and the enemy troops 
were the principal targets of surveillance in the Balkans. The Ottomans seemed to 
have no difficulty in finding and employing spies at the Danubian front. The 
heterogeneous character of the population increased the possibility of finding and 
conveying information to and from the Ottomans. The gradual professionalism of the 
Russian espionage networks that were established and utilized by its central 
government organs, i.e., the ministry of war, the ministry of foreign affairs and the 
secret police, is also obvious. The Russians had an established network on the 
Ottoman soil prior to the Crimean War. The Russian enlargement strategies toward 
the Ottoman Empire necessitated the collection of every type of intelligence about 
the Ottoman political, social, economic and military structure and well-being. It was 
not only conducted by the Russian embassy and its agents but also by the Russian 
War Ministry, that is, military agents in Istanbul. Russian military agents posted very 
detailed reports that included topographical, ethnographical, and statistical 
information. The Ottoman military reformation and the defense system of Istanbul 
were intensively reported to St. Petersburg. Such reports were possibly products of 
trusted informers in strategic positions in the Ottoman capital. Although the Russian 
army was unable to utilize pre-war information in this case, better-organized 
information-gathering and processing in the 1870s was to help the Russians to arrive 
at the gates of Istanbul.  
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6.2. Prisoners of War 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the experiences of the Russian prisoners 
of war (POW) in the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman prisoners held in Russia during 
the Crimean War. As the prisoners of war from different theaters shared similar 
experiences, it is not possible to confine the story to those who were captured on the 
Danubian front. Thus, although there will be some emphasis on prisoners from the 
Danubian front, the narrative is a general one.  
As mentioned in previous chapters, diplomatic activities and peace initiatives 
never ceased during the war. In such circumstances, it can be claimed that the 
prisoners of the Crimean War were in many respects more fortunate than prisoners in 
previous wars. The Russian official correspondences showed that the POWs were 
well treated. The published reminiscences of the POWs themselves supported this 
argument. The Porte also exhibited benevolence in line with the European practice, 
but it is difficult to argue that the Russian prisoners were always welcomed by 
Ottoman society.  
 
6.2.1. Ottoman and Allied Prisoners of War in Russia  
6.2.1.1. Prisoners of War under Russian Law 
By the 18
th
 century, thanks to the progress of diplomacy and international law, 
prisoners of war in Russia received better treatment than they had before. Prisoners 
of war were no longer considered slaves. They were supplied with food and clothing, 
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and remaining in Russia was voluntary.
657
 The emancipation of POWs without 
ransom or any sort of obligation was accepted a general rule in the Russo-Ottoman 
treaties.
658
 However, it would be overly optimistic to imagine that all regulations 
were scrupulously applied in all circumstances. The Ottoman ambassadors to St. 
Petersburg claimed that Muslim POWs were forcibly converted to Christianity.
659
  
By the 19
th
 century, the notion of the POW was clarified by more detailed rules 
and regulations. During the Napoleonic Wars and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-
12, as previously, various rules were issued regarding the treatment of the POWs. 
During the war of 1828-29, a detailed statute (polozhenie o plennykh) was prepared 
for the first time in Russia.
660
 The statutes issued during the Crimean War and the 
War of 1877-78 were somewhat revised versions of the 1829 statute. In the mid-19
th
 
century, the treatment of POWs remained unsystematic as international humanitarian 
law was in its infancy. Nevertheless, there was a legal text that clarified nearly every 
aspect pertaining to imprisonment in Russia.  
At the outset of the Crimean War, the War Ministry had asked the Russian 
Foreign Ministry how to treat prisoners in accordance with European law. The letter 
drafted in response, including numerous quotations from international jurists, and a 
clear understanding of POW status was advanced, “… today the essence of captivity 
in war is restricting the independence [of the POW] to prevent his return to the rival 
                                               
657 See, various articles in Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (Hereafter PSZ) regarding the 
POWs of the Russo-Ottoman wars of 1736-39, 1768-74 and 1787-92. 1st series, vol. XI 8030, 8434, 
8435; vol. XIX 13450, 13839, 14095; vol.  XX 14238, 14444; vol.  XXI 15263; vol. XXII 16176; vol. 
XXIII 17023. 
658 Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, vol III, part 5 (Ankara, 1971), pp. 311-312. The 13th century is 
erroneously cited instead of the 18th. 
659 Şehdî Osman Efendi, ambassador to the Russian capital from 1757 to 1758, and Abdülkerim 
Pasha, ambassador to St. Petersburg from 1775 to 1776, sought the return of the Ottoman prisoners, 
but the Russians refused the Ottoman demands claiming that the Ottoman prisoners had all voluntarily 
accepted Christianity. Faik Reşit Unat, Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnâmeleri, 4th edition (Ankara, 
2008), pp. 107-111, 129-132. 
660 PSZ, 2nd series, vol.  IV (1829), 2977. 
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country and his continuing participation in the war”.661 The Russian government 
attempted to follow European understanding and practice on the matter, and the 
relevant regulations were thus issued. 
In the first months of the Crimean War, before the preparation of the new 
statute, certain arrangements were already put into practice. One of them was the 
order of Mikhail Gorchakov, in which the Russian commander-in-chief described the 
rations to be given to the prisoners when they were in Russian quarters and in transit 
to Russia’s borders.662 Vasily Dolgorukov, the War Minister, also issued an order 
explaining the rules pertaining to the transit of prisoners into the Russian interior.
663
 
By December 1853, when it was already obvious that there would be no rapid 
conclusion to the war, a commission was founded to prepare the new statute. The 
statute was finalized by 29 March 1854 and printed as a booklet on 26 April.
664
 
General Aleksandr Andreyevich Katenin, who was the head of the commission, 
assumed the responsibility to ensure the application of the new rules. Subsequently, 
when Britain and France declared war on Russia, new arrangements would also be 
issued regarding the treatment of French and British prisoners of war.  
The statute was composed of 46 articles in 4 chapters: definition of the term 
POW; the transfer of POWs to Russian cities; their pay, rations and 
accommodations; and general rules. The POWs were divided into two categories: 
                                               
661 RGVIA, f. 1, op. 1, tom 7, d. 21249, l. 37 as quoted in Milovidov, “Inostrannye voennoplennye i 
rossiiskoe obshchestvo v gody Krymskoi voiny”, p. 29. 
662 “The Order to the 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies. The Quarters at Bucharest”, 20 December 1853[1 
January 1854], RGVIA, f. 9196, op. 4-257, d. 4, l. 254. 
663 Knyaz Dolgorukov to the Commander of the Gendarmerie, 22 December 1853 [3 January 1854], 
GARF, f. 109, op. 359 ch. 1, l. 7-8ob.; Knyaz Dolgorukov to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 22 
December 1853 [3 January 1854], Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv [Russian State 
History Archive], St. Petersburg (hereafter RGIA), f. 1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 18-19. 
664 Knyaz Dolgorukov to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 22 December 1853 [3 January 1854], RGIA, 
f. 1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 29; PSZ, 2nd series, vol. XXIX (1854) 28038, pp. 261-268; Polozhenie o 
plennykh (St. Petersburg, 1854). 
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voluntarily surrendered deserters and captured soldiers. Foreigners assigned to the 
Ottoman forces were included in the first category, even if they were noncombatants. 
The prisoners were also divided into four groups in line with the Russian military 
hierarchy: nizhnie chiny (ranks and file), ober-ofitsers (corporal to captain), shtab-
ofitsers (lieutenant to colonel), generals (pashas and higher ranks). The pay, rations, 
and accommodations of the POWs were unsurprisingly commensurate to the 
prisoner’s rank.  
The statute divided the captives into three groups. The prisoners of war who 
were first concentrated in the quarters would be sent to the headquarters together 
with a detailed register. The registers included the prisoner’s name, religion, 
nationality, unit, rank, and the location and battle where they were captured. A copy 
of the register would also be sent to the Inspector Department of the War Ministry. 
According to the statute, the belongings of prisoners, which had been taken, would 
be held throughout the war.
665
 Every fifty prisoners would select an elder to preserve 
the tranquility of the group during the journey into the Russian interior. When they 
were transported in territory encircled by enemy forces, a translator would also be 
employed to maintain improved communication between the prisoners and the 
guards.
666
 In this manner, the prisoners were transferred to Russian borders (Reni, 
Leova and Skuliani on the river Dniester) and placed into quarantine.
667
  
The reception of the POWs at the Russian frontier and subsequent transfer to 
the towns where they would be imprisoned constitute the second stage. Tatar 
                                               
665 Polozhenie o plennykh, articles 4. However, some prisoners’ belongings were stolen during the 
war. Royer, pp. 17-18. 
666 Polozhenie o plennykh, articles 9 and 10. 
667 Polozhenie o plennykh, articles 8, 12 - 20. 
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translators would also be brought on the journey.
668
 The prisoners would rest in 
houses or prisons on their way. The high-ranking officers, who advanced in small 
groups in carts, were lightly guarded and were permitted to rest in the houses of local 
notables.
669
 After the long and difficult journey, the prisoners finally arrived at the 
towns where they would be held either until the end of the war or, if they were 
fortunate enough, until the conclusion of a prisoner exchange agreement.  
Throughout their captivity, the POWs were under the surveillance and control 
of three pillars of the Russian State: the War Ministry, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and the Secret Police. These institutions, at least in theory, regularly informed 
each other about the prisoners. The Ministry of War was the first institution to learn 
of the prisoners from the front.
670
 While the governors of the provinces would be 
informed of new visitors in advance, they, in turn, were required to send regular 
reports to the Inspector Department of the War Ministry each month.
671
 The Russian 
government clearly took pains to ensure that rules were properly obeyed. Thus, the 
Russian government did not attempt to merely control the prisoners but also those 
who were responsible for them. There was a common understanding in Russia that 
“the prisoner is state property” and “someone will have to answer for anything 
unpleasant that happens to prisoners”. This understanding was the best guarantee for 
the POWs against any misbehavior on the part of Russian officials.
672
 Therefore, 
such expressions as “I will send a letter to St. Petersburg” or “I will complain to the 
Tsar” could often resolve the prisoners’ problems.673 Yet many unexpected issues 
                                               
668 Polozhenie o plennykh, article 21. 
669 Polozhenie o plennykh,  article 7 and 21.  
670 Polozhenie o plennykh, article 5.  
671 Polozhenie o plennykh, article 38.  
672 Milovidov, “Inostrannye voennoplennye i rossiiskoe obshchestvo v gody Krymskoi voiny”, p. 159.  
673 The Prisoners of Voronesh, pp. 131-133, 152.  
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may have arisen in Russia, where transportation and communication was insufficient 
and misunderstandings or misconduct could only be addressed after a long delay.  
Other articles of the statute and their practice/malpractice will be highlighted in 
the relevant sections of the chapter.  
 
 6.2.1.2. The Number of Prisoners of War during the Crimean War  
The Russian army, which was by and large on the defensive, could capture 
only a limited number of prisoners, with the exception of those who were taken at the 
Caucasus front. On the Danubian front, the Ottomans generally emerged victorious, 
such as at the battles of Olteniçe, Çatana and Yergöğü. Many of the Ottoman soldiers 
were taken prisoner at Dobruja during the passage of the Russian army over the 
Danube River. Other prisoners were seized during the reconnaissance activities of 
the Russian Cossacks. The Russians were rarely successful in the battles on the 
Crimean peninsula, i.e., Alma, Balaklava, Inkerman, Gözleve and Chernaya. They 
captured only a small number of enemy soldiers in the outpost duties in Sevastopol. 
However, the Caucasus front presented a different record, as Russian success on the 
battlefields and the capitulation of the fortress of Kars delivered thousands of 
Ottoman soldiers into the hands of the Russian army.  
As the POWs, who were captured on different fronts, were sent to the Russian 
interior through different routes, and importantly, the belligerents supported the 
exchange of prisoners during wartime, it is difficult to determine specific numbers of 
the POWs. However, the most reliable data can be found in the surveys of the 
Inspector Department of the War Ministry. According to records from 1856, 
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throughout the war, the Russian army captured 47 British officers and 595 soldiers, 
72 French officers and 1353 soldiers, and 4 Sardinian officers and 63 soldiers. 
According to the same records, the number of the Ottoman POWs was incomparably 
higher, reaching a total number of 958 officers and 11,431 soldiers.
674
  
Most of the Ottoman POWs were captured in the Caucasus; approximately 
8000 were the defenders of Kars and the rest had participated in the battles of 
Ahıska, Başgedikler and Kürekdere.675 Only approximately 400 soldiers fell into 
Russian hands on the Danubian front.
676
 Approximately 300 Ottoman sailors were 
captured in naval battles. The number of Ottoman POWs captured on the Crimean 
peninsula is unclear. Because the Ottoman troops did not actively participate in allied 
efforts, especially after the battle of Balaklava, and only served in secondary roles, 
the Ottoman prisoners were likely to be small in number and much fewer than the 
French and British prisoners.  
Those returning home via Odessa included 832 Ottoman officers and 9146 
soldiers, while 127 officers and 1800 soldiers lost their lives in Russia.
677
 The 
number of Ottoman casualties in the Russian captivity was nearly equal to the total 
number of British, French, and Sardinian POWs, demonstrating the gravity of the 
human loss in the Ottoman ranks. Moreover, the Ottomans once again lost a 
substantial number of men in captivity as during previous wars with Russia for the 
                                               
674 This record does not include certain high-ranking officers such as Vice Admiral Osman Pasha and 
General William Fenwick Williams. RGVIA, f. 395, op. 325, d. 40, l. 127-129 as quoted in 
Milovidov, “Inostrannye voennoplennye i rossiiskoe obshchestvo v gody Krymskoi voiny”, p. 154.  
675 Muravyov, vol. II, p. 224; “General Williams to Clarendon, 29 November 1855, Kars”, Papers 
Relative to Military Affairs in Asiatic Turkey, and Defence and Capitulation of Kars (London, 1856), 
pp. 340-341. 
676 RGVIA, f. 9196, op. 4-257, d. 1, l. 1-50. This list does not include deserters. They were 380 men, 
of which 10 were officers. There might be another register for deserters.  
677 Milovidov, “Inostrannye voennoplennye i rossiiskoe obshchestvo v gody Krymskoi voiny”, p. 154. 
274 
 
Russians never possessed the logistical capacity to supply health care, food and 
clothing to thousands of Ottoman prisoners. 
The Russians, however, lost approximately 8000 men and women (both 
soldiers and civilians) as prisoners, most of whom were captured after amphibious 
operations. The Russian soldiers captured in the Crimea were first brought to 
Istanbul to be treated. Later, they were sent either to Britain or France. However, the 
number of prisoners who were detained at Istanbul for some time was not negligible. 
In the summer of 1855, there were approximately 3500 Russian soldiers on the island 
of Büyükada (Prinkipo) alone. Russian soldiers captured by the Ottoman army were 
held at the Imperial Shipyard in the Golden Horn or at the state farm in Kütahya.678 
 
6.2.1.3. The Nature and Phases of Captivity during the Crimean War 
The first soldiers to fall into Russian hands were those who fought on the 
Danubian and Caucasian fronts, but a long journey awaited them before they would 
arrive at their places of exile. The first guests of the Russian towns were the 
prisoners captured in naval engagements on the Black Sea.  
In November 1853, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was chasing Ottoman 
battleships. First, a small merchant steamer Medar-ı Ticaret,679 was captured by the 
Russian steamer Bessarabiya.
680
 There were seven Ottoman subjects (4 Muslims and 
3 Orthodox Christians), 7 Englishmen, 1 Italian and 1 Montenegrin, a total 16 men 
                                               
678 BOA A.MKT.NZD 159-80, 8 Zilhicce 1271[22 August 1855]; BOA HR.MKT 96-28, 28 
Rebiülevvel 1271 [19 December 1854]. 
679 The Russian sources claim that the steamer was used for the transportation of troops and 
ammunition during the war. RGADA, f. 11, op.1, d. 1257, l. 1.  
680 Zverev, p. 45. 
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from the Medar-ı Ticaret.681 On the following day, in the first ever battle between 
steamers, the Pervaz-ı Bahri, an Ottoman-Egyptian steamer with ten guns, was 
captured by the Russian steamer Vladimir, which possessed a larger crew and better 
guns.682 After a three-hour battle, Said Pasha, the captain of the steamer, lost his life 
along with 2 other officers and 19 sailors, while 18 sailors were wounded. The 
Russians captured 134 men, alive and dead.683 The Russian Emperor renamed the 
Pervaz-ı Bahri the Kornilov and rewarded the crew with ranks, orders and monetary 
prizes.684 In the early morning of 19 November, the Russian fleet and its booty was 
welcomed at the Sevastopol harbor by an excited crowd, but the severely damaged 
Pervaz-ı Bahri sank in front of the harbor.685  
Shortly after these minor fights, on 30 November, the most important 
encounter between the Russian and Ottoman naval forces in the Black Sea occurred. 
The battle of Sinop was a disaster for the Ottoman fleet. Thousands of the Ottoman 
sailors were killed, while many others were wounded. Only a small number of sailors 
                                               
681 Victor Ivanovich Baryatinskii, a Russian officer, reports the ethnic origins of the persons on the 
Medar-ı Ticaret. There were two English engineers, a few Maltase, and Greeks, a Montenegrin, an 
Italian, Turks, and Arabs. Vospominaniya V. I Baryatinskogo (1852-1855) (Moscow, 1905), p. 105. 
Derviş, Mustafa, Ahmed, Davud and Yorgi were passengers. The crew was composed of eleven 
personnel. The War Minister to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 16 [28] January 1854, RGIA, f. 1286, 
op. 14, d. 1755, l. 42-42ob.  
682 Frigates under steam power played an important role in the Crimean War in terms of both logistics 
and battles. Baryatinskii, who was aboard the Russian steamer, summarized the battle. Vospominaniya 
V. I Baryatinskogo, pp. 46-56.  
683 Three lieutenants, one English machinist, one Arab engineer, 3 warrant officer, one doctor, one 
commissar (?), one imam, one guide, 10 yunker (?), 5 sergeants (unter-ofitser), 121 sailors, 2 servants 
composed the crew. There were 151 men with Said Pasha. 17 sailors were probably lost during the 
battle. The first report of General Menshikov who was then in Sevastopol informed St. Petersburg that 
there were 130 prisoners. Subsequently, the the detailed reports of Admiral Nakhimov and Admiral 
Kornilov arrived at the Russian capital. Admiral Kornilov, who was aboard the Vladimir during the 
battle, claimed that it was not possible to obtain precise information from the prisoners concerning 
Ottoman casualties. Finding a Turkish speaker in the Russian army would not have been difficult, but 
the prisoners did not know any language other than Arabic, and hence a translator was needed. 
Materialy dlya istorii Krymskoi voiny i oborony Sevastopolya, prepared by Nikolai F. Dubrovin, vol. I 
(St. Petersburg, 1871), pp. 138, 143-145. Knyaz Baryatinkii expressed that the Russians and the 
prisoners joked with one another. Vospominaniya V. I Baryatinskogo, p. 54.  
684 Sobranie donesenii, p. 30.  
685 Vospominaniya V. I Baryatinskogo, p. 56; Marx, in his column in New York Daily Tribune, stated 
that the Pervaz-ı Bahri sank in front of Sevastopol, but he believed that the steamer was captured in 
the battle of Sinop.  Karl Marx, Eastern Question, prepared by Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward 
Aveling (London, 1897), pp. 223-224. 
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were taken prisoner and brought to Sevastopol. Patrona (Vice Admiral) Osman 
Pasha, commander of the Ottoman fleet, and wounded in the leg, was also among the 
prisoners. Colonel Ali Mahir Bey, the commander of the Fazlullah, and Lieutenant 
Colonel Ethem Bey, the captain of the Feyz-i Bari, Major Yalovali Hasan Bey, and 
Lieutenant Kasımpaşalı Halil Efendi were other captured officers.686  
As a result of Russian superiority in the Black Sea, hundreds of prisoners were 
brought to Sevastopol. Having left the wounded prisoners in hospital, the rest were 
sent to Odessa on 8 December. On the following day, 298 prisoners arrived at 
Odessa, of whom 22 were non-Muslims. With the exception of the non-Muslim 
prisoners and 5 Egyptian officers, the prisoners would wait for a long time for a 
prisoner exchange. Moreover, the first prisoners of war in Russia from the naval 
powers were also sailors. The Tiger, a British steamer, lost its way in front of Odessa 
and was forced to surrender. The British sailors were more fortunate than the 
Ottomans, as most of them would be exchanged within a few months, while only 
thirty of them would be sent to the Russian interior. 687 
The first convoy was composed of 271 Muslim privates. These prisoners were 
guarded by a powerful force comprising 1 officer and 74 privates. On 2 January 
1854, they left Odessa for Oryol.688 Meanwhile, small convoys were assembled for 
the Christian prisoners, and 7 non-Muslim Ottoman subjects were sent to Kursk, 7 
British, 1 Italian, and 1 French to Kaluga, and 6 Austrians to Kiev. The places where 
                                               
686 Ivan Konstantinovich Ayvazovskii, the famous Russian painter of Armenian origin, interviewed 
the wounded officers in Sevastopol and painted Osman Pasha and Ali Mahir Bey (his name was 
rendered Adil Bey on the painting). This painting was printed in Russkii khudozhestvennyi listok. 
Materialy, vol. I, p. 204; Badem, pp. 126-128. Interestingly, Nakhimov and Menshikov did not 
mention the number of prisoners in their reports. Dodd mistakenly claims that all of the Ottoman 
officers were killed during and after the battle. Dodd, p. 60. 
687 The crew was composed of Captain Giffard, 24 officers and 201 sailors.  Dodd, p. 114.  
688 Governor of Novorossiya and Bessarabia to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 11 [23] December 
1853, RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 25.  
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the prisoners would be sent were almost certain. (These towns will be mentioned in 
the following section.)  
There were certain routes that the prisoners would take. The prisoners taken 
during naval battles were initially sent to Odessa, from which they would arrive at 
Poltova and Kursk, and finally in the town in which they would ultimately reside. 
Those captured at the Danubian front would first be dispatched to Skuliani, Leova or 
Reni, on the Russo-Ottoman border, and then would be sent into the Russian 
interior.689 Prisoners who were captured in the Caucasus would arrive at 
Novocherkassk guarded by a Cossack Yasaul and via Voronezh would arrive at the 
towns in the north. The prisoners who were taken during the battles on the Crimean 
peninsula would take the road passing through Orkapı (Perekop), Melitopol and 
Kharkov.  
At the beginning of the journey, overcoats and boots were given to the 
prisoners.690 The clothing of the Caucasian prisoners was completely ruined by the 
time they reached Voronesh. Here, new overcoats, boots and trousers were prepared 
for them.691 Colonel Lake notes that the fur coat, boots and hats that he received were 
of the best quality.692 However, not every officer enjoyed the same treatment. Knyaz 
Viktor Ivanovich Bariatinsky claims that he had given his own overcoat to Joseph 
Guilhem Lagondie, a French officer who required one.693 Similarly, many prisoners 
reported that they were left without garments and could only acquire clothing by 
courtesy of goodhearted people. Walsh says that the only garment they received was 
                                               
689 RGVIA, f. 9196, op. 4-257, d. 4, l. 257. 
690 Polozhenie o plennykh, article 32. An 1855 law described the clothing given to prisoners in detail. 
PSZ, 2nd series, vol. XXX (1855), 29036, pp. 155-156; The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 47.  
691 Gendarme Commander of the Voronezh Province to Graf Orlov, 13 [25] December 1855, GARF, 
f. 109, 1. expedition, d. 359 part 1, l. 22-23; Gendarme Commander of Voronezh Province to Graf 
Orlov, 14 [26] January 1855,GARF,  f. 109, 1st expedition, d. 359 part 1, l. 24. 
692 Colonel Atwell Lake, Kars and our Captivity in Russia (London, 1856), p. 261. 
693 Vospominaniya V. I. Baryatinskogo, p. 24. 
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boots and an overcoat, and only after the exchange of prisoners did they receive 
another overcoat and a hat.694 The lack of clothing must have been very difficult for 
the rank and file.  
In his memoirs, Sergeant George Newman explains the journey of the prisoners 
through Russian lands in a most detailed fashion. Newman’s convoy, which began its 
journey in November 1854, was not exclusively composed of British and French 
prisoners. The Crimean Tatars, who were accused of aiding the allied armies, were 
also in the convoy but faced worse conditions. These convicts were destined to go 
Siberia being chained their feet.695 The prisoners of war, however, with no 
information regarding the crimes of these individuals, were unhappy walking with 
the ‘criminals’, as they thought that this was dishonorable for soldiers.696 This convoy 
encountered another group of prisoners containing 100 Ottomans. These Ottoman 
soldiers were captured after the storm of 14 November 1854 that found them in a 
British vessel.697     
The rank and file walked while their belongings were carried on carts. These 
carts were often forcefully commandeered from villages along with their drivers.698 
The treatment that villagers received from Russian soldiers was not very gentle.699 
The prisoners, who could advance approximately 30-40 kilometers daily, often fell 
sick and were left at the hospitals along the way.700 Some died in hospitals, while 
those who healed would join another convoy and continue on their way. The length 
of the prisoners’ journey changed according to the durations of the stops made along 
                                               
694 “A Peep behind the Scenes”, p. 193. 
695 The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 52. 
696 Ibid, p. 47. 
697 The allied forces lost many ships and sailors in the storm. Newman gives the name of transport as 
Culloden. Ibid, p. 63.  
698 Ibid, p. 52. 
699 Ibid, pp. 50, 52. 
700 The Prisoners of Voronesh, pp. 44, 71.  
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the way. For instance, the prisoners who arrived at Kharkov included a certain Ali 
from Mardin. He had been captured at Gümrü eight months previous, and he already 
had a good command of Russian before he arrived at his destination.701  
When they could not reach a town or village, they were billeted in the small 
prisons on the way. These were unclean, one story buildings with two rooms.702 
When the prisoners arrived at villages or towns, they stayed in houses in groups of 
four or five. Although they generally preferred the houses where they could enjoy 
hot meal and a bed, they were not always welcomed by the reluctant landlords.703   
Quarrels and fights broke out among groups that proved unable to share the 
rooms.704  Many things, important and trivial, could instigate a fight. In one case, 
after a fight between Ottoman and British soldiers, the latter forced the Ottomans to 
walk behind them. According to the British soldiers, the cause of the fight was that 
the Ottoman soldiers had sat on the former’s bread in the cart.705 There were also 
fights between the guards and the prisoners. A quarrel between Russian guards, who 
wanted to rest, and French prisoners, who wanted to proceed, became a significant 
fight. The British prisoners helped their allies, while the Ottomans watched. After 
this incident, 1 French and 2 British prisoners, and 7 Russian guards were injured 
and were carried on the carts to the next stop where they were left in a hospital.706 In 
some cases, Russian villagers also intervened in the fights.707 The fights took place 
not only along the way, but also in the towns. The major reasons for the frequent 
                                               
701 Ali’s skill with the Russian language surprised the correspondent of Moskovskie vedomosti. Ali 
informed the correspondent about the Ottoman prisoners in Kharkov. F. Zaytsov, “Nepriyatelskie 
voenno-plennye v Kharkove”, Sbornik izvestii otnosyashchikhsya do nastoyashchei voiny. 
Prilozheniya, prepared by Nikolai Putilov, vol. XXV (St. Petersburg, 1856), pp. 21-22. 
702 The Prisoners of Voronesh, pp. 37-38. 
703 Ibid, pp. 44 
704 Ibid, pp. 103-104.  
705 Ibid, p. 98. 
706 “A Peep behind the Scenes”, p. 195.  
707 The Prisoners of Voronesh, pp. 108-110. 
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fights were the undisciplined actions of the prisoners, the overreactions of the 
Russian guards, and most importantly intoxication on both sides. The Ottomans 
however seem to have been less prone to fight compared to their allies.  
The notables of the towns showed their hospitality to the prisoners. They not 
only visited the prisoners, but also invited them to their homes for a meal. The wants 
of the prisoners were often satisfied by Russian notables, as well as German colonists 
and French and British nationals residing in Russia. These people brought clothes 
and food, and presented luxuries such as fruits, sugar, tea and tobacco. They also 
cared for the wounded and ill.708 The Crimean Tatars also treated the allied prisoners 
well. They offered their food although the Tatar food was incompatible with the 
Western palate. They provided some goods without asking for money, and even gave 
money to the prisoners.709 However, we are as yet unaware of the details of the 
relationship between the Ottoman prisoners and the Muslim residents of Russian 
towns.710  
In contrast to the above-mentioned hospitality, the local population was 
sometimes unfriendly to their guests. The Russian peasants did not receive the 
prisoners with the hearthy provided by the Crimean Tatars. They likely perceived 
them as enemies of the fatherland or simply the cause of the recruitment of their sons 
and husbands, and hence they occasionally expressed their anger with curses and 
spitting.711  
                                               
708 Ibid, pp. 36, 42, 134-138; “Pisma Frantsuzkogo ofitsera o bytnosti ego v plenu u russkikh”, 
Sbornik izvestii otnosyashchikhsya do nastoyashchei voiny. Prilozheniya, vol. 25, p. 34; Kelly, p. 119.    
709 The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 67. 
710 As will be mentioned below, the Russians were careful not to send the Ottoman prisoners to towns 
where there was a considerable Muslim population. Actually, the Russian government was always 
sensitive about the relations between the Ottoman population and the Muslims in the Caucasus and the 
Crimea.  
711 The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 68. 
281 
 
The most noteworthy behavior of the Russians was curiosity. The local people, 
especially the women, approached the buildings where the prisoners were living and 
watched the free show late into the night.712 Colonel Lake described their arrival at 
Tbilisi: “… every window was filled, and every street crowded. Be it, however, fairly 
admitted, that while I never before witnessed curiosity so general and eager, there 
was nothing disrespectful or offensive in the conduct of the multitude which had 
assembled to have a good look at the English prisoners… A portion of the crowd that 
had followed us through the streets, remained fixed at the door, and did not disperse 
until nearly dark.”713 The French attracted more visitors than the Ottomans and 
British. The major reason was likely that the Russian notables and officers possessed 
a good command of French.714 
The comfort of the captivity varied in accordance with the rank of the 
prisoners. High-ranking officers travelled in carriages, received more money, and 
even possessed servants. The officers arrived at their destinations in a few weeks, 
while the privates’ journey took several months.715  Of course, such comfort was not 
always granted. The brichka, which was carried by six horses, was comfortable716, 
but the telega - the Russian post cart - made the terrible Russian roads unendurable 
for many officers.717 The lack of horses and carriages forced the officers to endure 
long waits in the Russian towns. On occasion, the officers were lodged in the prisons 
along the way.718   
                                               
712 Ibid, p .39. 
713 Lake, pp. 254-255.  
714 The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 44.  
715 Colonel Richard Kelly states that they traveled from Akmescit to Ryazan in twenty-six days. 
Meanwhile, they rested for three days in Yekaterinoslav, three days in Kharkov, and two days in 
Voronezh. Kelly, p. 125. 
716 Lake, pp. 251-252.  
717 Kelly, p. 122.  
718 Lake, p. 252.  
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The officers quartered in hotels or the houses of local notables when they 
arrived in the towns. Some British officers stayed in Lady Razevich’s house when 
they were in Akmesçit (Simferopol). Captain Frampton, Lieutenant Duff, Lieutenant 
Chadwick and Lieutenant Clowes stayed in the hotel “Peterburg” in Kharkov before 
they arrived at Ryazan.719 The officers from Kars stayed in Karl Morigi’s hotel in 
Tbilisi, while the hotel costs - approximately 1,000 rubles a month - were generously 
paid by the Russian government.720 
Throughout the war, many convoys of prisoners passed through the Caucasian 
mountains, a very difficult journey. The Kars garrison likely endured the most 
difficult journey. The hungry and exhausted units first arrived at Gümrü and then at 
Tbilisi. It took hours simply to arrive at the Russian camp in the proximity of Kars in 
cold and snowy weather, and many prisoners perished at the outset of the journey.721 
Fortunately, the Russian army was kind and hospitable to the defenders of Kars. 
Colonel Lake claims, “We were better treated, however, by the Russians than by the 
climate.”722 The Russian officers wanted to learn everything about life in the Kars 
Fortress and insisted on offering champagne in their own tents.723  
To be sure, the officers of Kars enjoyed a more comfortable captivity than the 
rest of the army. Colonel Lake and Captain Thompson always accepted invitations in 
the Russian towns and conversed and drank vodka with the landlords. Accordingly, 
they joined a party in Vladikavkas and paid a visit to the house of Father Andrei in a 
small Russian village. As the occasions arose, they watched opera and ballet 
                                               
719 Zaytsov, “Nepriyatelskie voenno-plennye v Kharkove”, pp. 17-19. 
720 Lake, p. 255. 
721 Ibid, p. 242. 
722 Ibid, p. 247. 
723 Ibid, pp. 244- 245. 
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performances. These British officers voyaged apart from Lieutenant-General 
Abdülkerim Pasha, but they occasionally crossed his path.724    
The wounded officers and sailors of the battle of Sinop were sent into exile 
after receiving medical treatment. In summer 1854, Osman Pasha, Ali Mahir Bey, 
Hasan Bey and Halil Efendi were sent to Moscow under the guard of the Dniepr 
reserve battalion.725 Ahmed Hadmiadus and Hasan Veli were assigned as their 
servants. These Ottoman naval officers were the highest ranking prisoners in Russia 
until the fall of the Kars Fortress. Therefore, the Russian government attempted to 
provide a comfortable journey for them.  
The treatment of Polish and Hungarians in the allied armies was substantially 
different from that received by the other prisoners. The Hungarians and Poles who 
took up arms against Russia would be treated as renegades and traitors. The Austrian 
subjects captured on the Danubian front would be directly sent to Austria, while 
those who were captured in the Caucasus would be handed over to Austria after their 
arrival at Kiev. The Polish soldiers would be imprisoned in Kiev and tried by a 
military court.726 Therefore, the Polish officers in the Ottoman army were more 
cautious than their colleagues to avoid being captured by the enemy. Similarly, the 
Ottoman Cossacks were likely to be ill treated. Years after the Crimean War, on 27 
March 1858, Mehmed Sadık Pasha forwarded a petition of the elders of the Dobruja 
Cossacks to the Porte, according to the which, Danila Fedorov and Feodosii Danilo 
had been sent to Siberia where they lived in captivity in chains. Thus, the elders 
                                               
724 On the journey of Lake and Thompson from Tbilisi to Penza, see, ibid, pp. 265-311. 
725 Ethem Bey was not among them. General Annenkov to the Minister of Internal Affairs, RGIA, f. 
1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 132. Colonel Ali Bey was cited as a captain in the Russian document. BOA 
A.DVN, 109-40. In the Russian documents, the name Hasan is rendered as Gasan according to the 
Russian pronunciation.   
726 I did not encounter any Polish or Hungarian prisoners in the files that I have studied. There might 
be separate registers for the Polish and Hungarian prisoners.  
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asked the Porte for an exemption for these two Cossacks from all taxes and ground 
works.727   
The most important aspect of captivity for the prisoners was likely the pay and 
rations that they received. According to their ranks, the prisoners received certain 
amounts of rations on the way to the Russian borders.728 If the Russian commander 
considered it necessary, the prisoners would also receive some money for the 
luxuries, such as coffee, tea, sugar and tobacco.729 In the statute, the allowances given 
in Russia were explained simply and clearly. A shtab-ofitser would receive 50 
kopecks, an ober-ofitser 20 kopecks, and the privates and sailors 9 kopecks.730 The 
prisoners could now spend their money to prepare their own meals. Thus, it can be 
claimed that second stage of their journeys in Russia passed in better conditions than 
the first. Nonetheless, these allowances were less than both what had been given in 
the previous Russo-Ottoman War and what would be given to the allied French and 
British soldiers during the Crimean War. According to another rule adopted in 
October 1854, a French or British private would receive 20 kopecks daily, an ober-
ofitser 75 kopecks, and a shtab-ofitser 150 kopecks.731 The European soldiers 
received three times higher pay than what was determined in the Statute. Apparently, 
the costs of the Europeans were considered to be higher than those of the Ottomans. 
Perhaps because of their small numbers they could be paid more than the Ottomans. 
                                               
727 “Ocherk istorii staroobryadtsev v Dobrudzhe. Prilozheniya”, Slavyanskii sbornik, vol. I, St. 
Petersburg, 1875, p. 620.  
728 An Ottoman private would receive a 1 ¾ pound biscuit or 3 pounds of bread, a quarter pound of 
wheat, 5 zolotinok of salt and half a pound of meat. An Ober-ofitser, a shtab-ofitser and pashas would 
receive one pound of meat. If one of these products were insufficient, then another one would be 
given.  Polozhenie o plennykh, article 26.   
   1 pound = 96 zolotinok ≈ 409 grams 
729 The privates would receive 1,5 kopecks, an ober-ofitser or a foreign officers 6 kopecks,  a shtab-
ofitser or a foreign doctor 12 kopecks and pashas would receive 24 kopecks. Polozhenie o plennykh, 
article 27. Those prisoners who were sent by sea would receive rations according to the statute for 
Russian sailors. Polozhenie o plennykh, article 30.   
730 Polozhenie o plennykh, article 31. 
731 PSZ, 2nd series, vol. XXIX, 28611a, 8 October 1854. 
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Whatever the reason, the adoption of a new rule for the allowances of the French and 
British soldiers is meaningful to understand the differing Russian perceptions of the 
Ottomans and the Europeans.  
Prior to the adoption of this rule, some arrangements had already been made. 
Lieutenant Royer, one of the first British prisoners of war, explained the motivation 
for and necessity of these arrangements:  
The Government had, in the first instance, to find a person who would contract 
to furnish the necessary rations to the men; but as the Government allowance 
for prisoners was calculated on a scale adapted only to satisfy Turks, it was 
insufficient for the artificial wants of more civilized beings. On the first 
evening the men had only wine and bread, both of which however were served 
out in sufficient abundance and of excellent quality. The table of the officers 
was more liberally supplied with meat and vegetables.732 
 
Royer believes that, after the increase in their rations, the Russians provided 
them with meat, soup and bread. He attests that although the pay increased from 15 
to 50 kopecks for the officers and 25 kopecks for the sailors.733 Another British 
prisoner, Sergeant Walsh, argues that their pay increased in response to the demands 
of the British government.734 
The pay of the European prisoners was a good amount in Russia, where food 
was cheap. This money was not only enough for food but also spirits – one of the 
basic sources of their happiness. However, it will be optimistic to argue that the 
prisoners were always treated in line with the regulations. The British prisoners in 
Akmesçit received just a quarter pound of meat, some potatoes and onions, and one 
pound of bread instead of cash. What is worse, some of their rations were stolen by 
                                               
732 Royer, pp. 24-25.  
733 Ibid, p. 25.  
734 “A Peep behind the Scenes”, p. 194.  
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the Russian cook. The British prisoners complained to the authorities.735 The animals 
of the peasants, especially the Crimean Tatars, were bought for small sums, and the 
rations of the prisoners were supplied as such.736 Thus the Russian soldiers found a 
way of making extra money. Similarly, in the Russian cities the pay was given late, 
or not given at all.737 To be sure, the Ottoman prisoners faced similar or worse 
injustices than the European prisoners experienced. The Ottoman prisoners, who 
received less pay than their allies, would likely have faced significant difficulties 
when they could not receive this money.  
The prisoners arrived at their destinations after several months of travel. The 
provinces where the prisoners were sent were all located in central Russia.738 The aim 
was to keep the prisoners far from the front, and easily control them. The prisoners 
were also intended to live among a population that as devoted to the Russian 
government, and the negative perceptions of the local population should be limited.739 
Therefore, the provinces were far from the frontiers and predominantly populated by 
Russians and thus were safe and controllable. It can be underlined that there was an 
endeavor to prevent any meetings between Ottoman prisoners and Russian Muslims. 
Accordingly, when it was necessary to select new towns for the accommodation of 
Ottoman prisoners, the Russian Interior Ministry, War Ministry and Directorate of 
                                               
735 The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 42. 
736 Ibid, p. 66.  
737 “A Peep behind the Scenes”, p. 199; The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 53. 
738 In the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806-12, the Ottoman prisoners were kept in Voronezh, 
Yekaterinoslav, Poltava, Tambov, Kharkov and Kherson provinces. Thus, they were allocated in the 
southern provinces of Russia into a wide geography. In the war of 1828-29, the prisoners were 
planned to be sent to the provinces of Volynskaya, Vilenskaya, Minskaya and Grodnenskaya in the 
west of Russia to work in the forced labor while only the sick and the elder ones should be sent into 
the central Russia. PSZ, 2nd series, vol. IV (1829), 2977, article 38. However, the prisoners were sent 
just to the provinces of Kiev and Minsk. In the war of 1877-78, about 70,000 Ottoman prisoners were 
distributed into forty Russian provinces. Poznakhirev, “Kurskaya guberniya i Turetskie 
voennoplennye voin XIX veka”, p. 153. 
739 Ibid. 
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Communication and State Buildings updated each other.740 Accordingly, no prisoners 
were sent to the towns on the Volga basin. There were no prisoners held in the 
southern cities of Russia, such as Minsk and Kharkov, most likely because it would 
have been easier to escape.  
As new states declared war on Russia as the war continued the number of 
prisoners in Russia and the number of towns hosting the prisoners increased. 
Although there were only a few provinces mentioned in the Statute, more than ten 
Russian provinces hosted prisoners. At the beginning of the war, all Muslim 
prisoners were intended to be held in Oryol, and later it was considered more 
appropriate to hold the officers separately in another town, Tula.741 The Christian 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire were to be accommodated in Kursk. The Europeans 
commissioned in the Ottoman army would be sent to Kaluga and Ryazan. The 
officers and the privates would live separately in one town.742 However, all of these 
arrangements would change in time. When the French and British Empires declared 
war on Russia, it was decided that the British officers would be sent to Ryazan, 
privates to Voronezh, the French officers to Kaluga and the privates to Tambov. The 
soldiers commissioned in the French and British armies but who were of other 
nationalities would be sent to Kostroma. The Sardinians, who were the last to declare 
war, would also be sent to Kostroma.743 
The host towns continued to change during the war. The Ottoman privates who 
were in Oryol were sent to neighboring towns in the summer of 1854. According to 
                                               
740 General Katenin to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 14 [26] August 1854, RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 
1755, l. 149ob. 
741 Dolgorukov to the Gendarme Commander Graf Orlov, 24 November [6 December] 1853, GARF, f. 
109, 1. expedition, d. 359 part 1, l. 1; Dolgorukov to Gendarme Commander Graf Orlov, 12 [24] 
December 1853, GARF,  f. 109, 1. expedition, d. 359 part 1, l. 3.  
742 Polozhenie o plennykh, article 23. 
743 The Minister of Internal Affairs General Bibikov to Governors of Provinces, 17 (29) July 1855, 
RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 572. 
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this new arrangement, 100 men were left in Oryol, while 70 were placed in 
Smolensk, 65 in Penza, 65 in Yaroslavl, 65 in Kursk, 65 in Vladimir and 70 in 
Tambov.744 After the arrival of the prisoners of the Caucasian battles, the number of 
prisoners in the Russian interior increased dramatically. The allocation of prisoners 
in the summer of 1855 was as such: the officers were accommodated in Tula, while 
the privates were sent to various towns in the provinces of Oryol, Smolensk, 
Yaroslavl, Kursk, Vladimir, and Vologda.745 When the Paris Peace Treaty was 
signed, the distribution of the Ottoman prisoners was as such: in Orlov 436, in Kursk 
281, in Vologda 202, in Penza 194, in Yaroslavl 184, in Vladimir 168, in Smolensk 
69, in Tula 69. The prisoners of Kars were not included in these numbers.746   
As mentioned above, the officers were accommodated in Tula, Kaluga, and 
Ryazan, towns that are near Moscow. The accommodations of Pashas were not 
clarified. When necessary, the War Ministry would determine a convenient town.747 
Vice-Admiral Osman Pasha, Colonel Ali Mahir Bey, and Major Yalovalı Hasan Bey, 
who were captured during the battle of Sinop, and Hafiz Pasha and Abdülkerim 
Pasha who were captured after the capitulation of Kars Fortress were sent to 
Moscow. Vasıf Pasha, who was ill, was left in Tbilisi. The famous British 
commander of Kars, General Williams, and his lieutenant Teesdale and Secretary 
Churchill were sent to Ryazan, while Colonel Lake and Captain Thompson were 
dispatched to Penza. Lake and Thomson lived in Penza until the peace treaty. 
                                               
744 General Katenin to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 14 [26] August 1854, RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 
1755, l. 149. There was also a plan of leaving hundred prisoners in Oryol while allocating the rest of 
them as such: Kaluga 50, Yaroslavsk 25, Vladimir 25, Nizhniy Novgorod 75, Simbirsk 50, Tula 50, 
Kursk 50, and Ryazan 75. Apparently, this plan was later subjected to some minor changes. General 
Katenin to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 20 July [2 August] 1854, RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 
143. 
745 Minister of Internal Affairs General Bibikov to the governors of the provinces, 17 [29] July 1855, 
RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 572.  
746 Poznakhirev, “Kurskaya guberniya i Turetskie voennoplennye voin XIX veka”, p. 154. 
747 Polozhenie o plennykh, article 25.  
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However, General Williams and the officers under his command remained a bit 
longer in Tbilisi because of his illness. General Williams began his journey after the 
peace treaty, and he went directly to St. Petersburg in response to the kind invitation 
of the Russian tsar. Later he returned to Britain via Paris.748 
According to the Statute, prisoners should be held in state buildings. If there 
were no such buildings available, it was then necessary to find another house that 
was convenient. As a result of the increase in the number of prisoners, if any problem 
arose the Governor was to inform the Minister of Internal Affairs of the situation, 
and Minister of Internal Affairs should determine a solution with the Minister of 
War.749 The Ottoman prisoners who were sent to Yaroslavl stayed in military 
barracks. British prisoners in Voronezh stayed in different large buildings. Newman 
describes the building they stayed in as a large house with large rooms, a balcony 
and a courtyard. The beds were erected on the walls just before the arrival of the 
British prisoners.750 Some prisoners were accommodated in a dormitory.751 For the 
sailors of the Tiger who stayed in Odessa, a school building was used. The only 
problem was that the beds were too small for the sailors. The officers stayed in 
another building, which was likely most comfortable.752 
Shopping, preparing and enjoying their meals were the prisoners’ most 
important occupations. A Russian observer underlined the ability of the Ottoman 
soldiers to cook, and stated that they often cooked mutton.753  Prisoners spent their 
                                               
748 Muravyov, vol. II, p. 229; Dodd, p. 468.  
749 Polozhenie o plennykh, article 55.  
750 The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 156.  
751 The Gendarmerie of Moscow to Graf Orlov, 16 [28] November 1854, GARF, f. 109, 1. expedition, 
d. 359 part 1, l. 3. 
752 Royer, p. 30.  
753 F. Zaitsov, “Nepriyatelskie voennoplennye v gorodakh Trubchevske i Koroche”, Sbornik izvestii 
otnosyashchikhsya do nastoyashchei voiny. Prilozheniya, vol. XXV, p. 23. 
290 
 
rest of the time playing cards, instruments, performing exercises and reading 
books.754  The Muslim prisoners prayed and read Qur’an.755  
Prisoners faced bureaucratic embezzlement and thefts. The corrupt Russian 
bureaucracy might offer undesired surprises. In this regard, Colonel Ali Nazım Bey 
and Egyptian Adjutant Ahmed Abdul attempted to correct the bureaucratic mistakes 
from which they suffered.  
Ahmed Abdul sent a letter to the governor of Tula and explained that he was 
receiving 25 kopecks, which was less than what his colleagues received. Happily, his 
pay was corrected to 50 kopecks in early August 1854.756 British soldiers also 
suffered from underpayments. Newman claims that they learned from the French 
prisoners during the journey that their allowances should be 20 kopecks. Until then, 
they had received just 10 kopecks.757 The difference in pay between the European and 
the Ottoman prisoners might result in confusion. However, such errors could also 
have been made intentionally by Russian officials to make money. 
There were also mistakes in the allocation of the prisoners to the Russian 
towns. When the Russian army passed the Danube in three columns, one column 
passed to Tulça where Ali Nazım Bey, the Colonel of the third regiment of the 
Rumelian Army, was captured. Ali Nazım Bey was the commander of Tulça and 
played a role in investigating Russian spies.  Although the forces in Tulça made a 
good defense, they were far weaker than the Russian forces and the defensive line 
soon fell into Russian hands. Ali Nazım Bey was in the battery on Çatal Island and 
                                               
754 See, The Prisoners of Voronesh.    
755 Zaitsov, “Nepriyatelskie voennoplennye v gorodakh Trubchevske i Koroche”, p. 23.   
756 In the same letter, he mentioned that he met with Grand Duke Konstantin, the son of the Russian 
Tsar, during Konstantin’s travel to Egypt. Thus, he stated his wish to pay a visit to St. Petersburg as 
the Egyptian prisoners of the steamer Pervaz-ı Bahrî. We do not know whether his wish was granted. 
General Katenin to Minister of Internal Affairs, RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 138. 
757 The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 122. 
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was captured there. He was one of ten officers captured by the Russian South Army. 
The list stated that he was from Anatolia.758 On 7 April, Ali Nazım Bey was sent to 
Russia from İsmail, but he was sent to Oryol instead of Tula.759 Ali Nazım Bey 
arrived at Oryol in April, but he was still waiting to be sent to Tula in late June.760 
The Ottoman Colonel might also have received a private allowance until his rank 
was adequately understood. This example not only showed the language barrier 
between the Ottoman prisoners and the Russian guards, but also the difficulty of 
remedying a bureaucratic mistake. There were likely many such mistakes. Another 
example was the mistaken dispatch of a French lieutenant to Voronezh, as if he were 
a British soldier.761 
According to the statute of the POWs in the War of 1828-29, prisoners, with 
the exception of the sick, elderly and deserters, could be assigned to work in 
fortresses, channels, etc.762 Article 41 of the statute of 1854 reads that the prisoners 
could be assigned to state works, and they were paid the 2/3 of the pay of a private 
for their labor. The deserters could not be forced to work, but if they wished they 
could find a job under the guidance of the civilian authorities.
763
 In contrast to 
previous wars, the prisoners were not forced to work in the fortresses or arsenals, but 
                                               
758 RGVIA, f. 9196, op. 4-257, d. 1, l. 10. The Russian commander Nikolai Ivanovich Ushakov, who 
narrated the battle of Tulça, renders Ali Nazım Bey incorrectly as Ali-Kazım Bek. N. I. Ushakov, 
“Zapiski ochevidtsa o voine Rossii protivu Turtsii i zapadnykh derzhav 1853-55”, Devyatnatsatyi vek. 
Istoricheskii sbornik, vol. II (Moscow, 1872), p. 71. He was promoted from the ranks. After the war 
he was promoted to a Brigadier General and received the order of Mecidiye. Mehmed Süreyya, claims 
that Ali Nazım was a mirliva during the Crimean War and was wounded and killed in Köstence. This 
information is wrong. Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, prepared by Nuri Akbayar, transcribed by 
Seyit Ali Kahraman, vol. I (Istanbul, 1996),  p. 271. 
759 Military Governor of Oryol to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 6 [18] April 1854, RGIA, f. 1286, 
op. 14, sv. 1, d. 1755, l. 89.  
760 Inspector Department of the War Ministry to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 12 [24] June 1854, 
RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 122. 
761 The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 192. 
762 PSZ, 2nd series, vol. IV (1829), p. 481.  
763 Milovidov states that this article was never practiced, and the prisoners were not forced to work 
during the Crimean War. This information is incorrect. Milovidov, “Inostrannye voennoplennye i 
rossiiskoe obshchestvo v gody Krymskoi voiny”, p. 150.  
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only in municipal works. Although such labor seemed easy, the Ottoman soldiers 
certainly did not enjoy it. 
When the number of the Ottoman prisoners in Oryol increased, the municipal 
authorities considered their labor necessary to control them, and with the permission 
of the Ministry of War they were assigned to clean the roads of Oryol.764  This 
decision was primarily intended to guard the prisoners more securely and preserve 
public safety rather than to make use of the prisoners. However, it was not easy to 
force them to work. The Ottoman prisoners declined to perform such a job. In a 
petition, they explained that they were soldiers and knew no other profession. They 
expressed their wish to be assigned to the fortresses rather than to work in front of 
the Russian people.765 Obviously, the Ottoman soldiers did not think this job 
compatible with the honor of a soldier. Moreover, they likely did not wish to work in 
front of people who were antagonistic to them, or at least the Ottomans perceived 
them as hostile. When the efforts to convince them did not help to solve the problem, 
their resistance to work was even reported to the Russian Tsar. Nicholas I wanted the 
prisoners to be allocated to neighboring towns and work in accordance with the 
articles of the Statute under the guard of battalions in detention units. The Tsar 
openly stated that the prisoners would be forced to work if they resisted.766   
The Ottoman prisoners in Smolensk also performed public works. However, 
these prisoners, most of whom were Kurds, did not object to their assignments.767 
                                               
764 The Gendarmerie Commander of Oryol to the Commander of Gendarmerie and the Secret Police 
Graf Orlov, 16 [28] July 1854, GARF 109 1. expedition, d. 359 1. part, l. 9-22; The Governor of 
Oryol to Minister of Internal Affairs,  16 (28) July 1854, RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 133-136.  
765 The Governor of Oryol to Minister of Internal Affairs, 16 [28] July 1854, RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 
1755, l. 133. 
766 Minister of War to Minister of Internal Affairs, 26 July [7 August] 1854, RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 
1755, l. 133. 
767 K. Mikeshin, “Kurdy v Smolenskoi gubernii”, Sbornik izvestii otnosyashchikhsya do nastoyashchei 
voiny. Prilozheniya, vol. XXV, pp. 29-30. 
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While the Ottomans were assigned to such forced labors, the Europeans were treated 
differently. The British soldiers, although they did not have to work, found a way to 
earn money. The sailors in Voronezh worked in transportation and earned a good 
amount of money.768 There were likely other prisoners in Russian towns who worked 
voluntarily or were forced to.  
There is also no evidence regarding prisoners who might have joined the 
Russian military army. Apparently, the Russians were not particularly enthusiastic 
about assigning prisoners to the military, whereas many Polish and Jewish prisoners 
captured by the Allied forces fought against the Russians.769 
 
6.2.1.4 The Rights of the POWs  
The prisoners had the right to hold property. According to the statute, the 
prisoners’ possessions were taken, but not appropriated. Their belongings were put 
into the provincial treasury and returned when the prisoners were released. 
Moreover, when necessary some of the prisoners’ belongings might be returned 
while they were in captivity.770 However, it is not possible to argue that the prisoners’ 
property was always well protected. Personal effects on the British steamer Tiger 
were looted. The belongings of a British officer were also stolen by a Russian soldier 
when he was captured. They were returned to the British officer when the Russian 
                                               
768 The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 181. 
769 Boris P. Milovidov, “Russkie voennoplennye v gody Krymskoi voiny”, Vestnik molodykh 
uchenykh, no. 2 (2002), p. 31.  
770 Polozhenie o plennykh, article 5 and 46. 
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soldier was punished.771 The Russian soldiers, who received their salaries irregularly, 
often resorted to robbery.772   
According to the Statute, wounded or sick soldiers could enjoy healthcare 
services like the Russian soldiers. The British prisoners expressed their satisfaction 
with the treatment they enjoyed in Russian hospitals.773 Therefore, although it is not 
clear how many prisoners were treated in Russian hospitals, at least they were likely 
well treated.  
The prisoners were free to follow their rituals unless they broke the public 
order.774 The Muslims were permitted to perform their funerals according to Islamic 
principles.775 They could perform their daily prayers and read the Qur’an. However, 
to be sure, this does not mean that the Russian authorities helped the prisoners to 
perform their prayers. The Russians did not assign any clerics.  
The correspondences among prisoners were allowed as long as their letters 
were controlled by the governor of the province.776 Prisoners occasionally sent letters 
to their families, which was certainly one of their primary requests. Royer expressed 
that they could freely write letters as long as they did not concern any political 
issues.777 These letters were first translated into Russian and read by the officials. The 
British officer Kelly complained that his letters, which would be published after the 
Crimean War, were received by his wife after an excessive delay.  
                                               
771 “A Peep behind the Scenes”, p. 189.  
772 Mrs. Henry [Frances Isabella] Duberly, Journal Kept during the Russian War (London, 1855), p. 
305.  
773 Ibid  
774 Polozhenie o plennykh, article 45.  
775 Poznakhirev, “Evolyutsiya polozheniya Turetskikh voennoplennykh v Rossii v kontse XVII – 
nachale XX v.”, http://scientific-notep.ru/pdf/021-015.pdf. 
776 PSZ, 28522b (3 September 1854). 
777 Royer, p. 30. 
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When the officers of the Pervaz-ı Bahri were brought to Sevastopol, they 
wanted to send letters to their relatives. Letters, which were sent to Istanbul, first 
arrived at the Russian Headquarters on the Danube. On 19 November 1853, one 
report to the commander of the Egyptian fleet and 13 letters to their families were 
delivered to General Gorchakov via the Russian military port in Sevastopol. On 13 
December, the letters were given to Robert Gilmour Colquhoun, the British consul in 
Bucharest.778 A few days later when he was on his way to Istanbul, Colquhoun 
delivered them to Said Pasha, the governor of Silistre.779  The letters arrived at their 
destinations only after changing hands many times. Vice-Admiral Osman Pasha’s 
letter to his son arrived at Istanbul via the Prussian consulate in Odessa.
780
 A letter 
from Molla Hafiz Mansuroğlu to his family would be sent from Tula to the 
Principalities after it was censored by the Interior Ministry.
781
 Another letter written 
by the Egyptian prisoners, in which they narrated their captivity, will be explained 
later.
782
 The letters typically arrived at their designations despite the difficulties and 
extraordinary conditions of war.  
 
6.2.1.5 Back Home 
Captivity ended with prisoner exchange agreements concluded during or after 
the war. However, as an exception, prisoners were occasionally released under a 
gentleman’s agreement that they would not participate in the war again. The first 
                                               
778 RGVIA f. 846, op. 16, d. 5429, l. 248; BOA A.MKT.NZD 109-107, 25 Rebiülahir 1270 [25 
January 1854]; BOA A.MKT.UM 151-9, 24 Rebiülahir 1270 [24 January 1854] 
779 ATASE, k. 4, d. 12, f. 19/2. 
780 BOA HR.MKT 109-91, 4 Şevval 1271 [20 June 1855].  
781 The Military Governor of Tula to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 22 February [6 March] 1854, 
RGIA, f. 1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 71. 
782 “The letters of the captive officers and doctor of the Egyptian steamer Pervaz-ı Bahri”, RGIA f. 
970, op. 1, d. 991, l. 1-5.  
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prisoners who returned their homelands were the prisoners in the second category, as 
the crew of Pervaz-ı Bahri and the non-Muslim sailors of Medar-ı Ticaret.783 Such 
releases also took a long time thanks to the Russian bureaucracy and the vast 
geography of the Russian Empire. In January 1854, it was declared that the captivity 
of the crew of Medar-ı Ticaret had already ended, but their release would be initiated 
after their arrival at the towns of their imprisonment.
784
 Alexander Cleland and 
Archibald Morrison, who were captured aboard the steamer Medar-ı Ticaret, arrived 
at Kursk on 12 February. The military governor of Kursk expressed that they would 
first be sent to Moscow, and via the British consul they would pass through Warsaw 
and Vienna to arrive at Istanbul, where their families resided.
785
 Michael Bell, the 
chief engineer of the Pervaz-ı Bahri was asked if he wanted to remain in Russia. Bell 
and his friends Anderson and Baker would be released in a few months after their 
capture.786 
First major prisoner exchange took place in 1854 between the crew of Tiger 
and the Greek battalion, who were captured in the battle of Balaklava.787 However, 
the exchange only became formalized in the spring of 1855 when an agreement 
between the allied powers and the Russian army was concluded. In late May 1855, 
the text of the agreement was received by Alexander Strogonov, the governor general 
of New Russia and Bessarabia. According to the treaty, the port of Odessa on the 
Black Sea and the port of Libava (Liepāja) on the Baltic would be used during the 
                                               
783 The Pervaz-ı Bahri officers to General Aleksandr Andreyevich Katenin, RGIA, f. 970, op. 1, d. 
991, l. 5. 
784 Dolgorukov to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 16 January 1854 [28 January 1854], RGIA, f. 1286, 
op. 14, d. 1755, l. 42. 
785 Their names were written in the Russian document as Archibald Marison and Alexander Klilen. 
The Military Governor of Kursk to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 2 [14] February 1854, RGIA, f. 
1286, op. 14, d. 1755, l. 65; Correspondence Respecting the Privileges of Latin and Greek Churches 
in Turkey, part 7 (London, 1854), p. 929.   
786 The conditions of English engineers soon appeared in the newspapers.  
787 [William Burckhardt Barker], p. 163; Royer, pp. 57-58; Milovidov, “Russkie voennoplennye v 
gody Krymskoi voiny”, p. 29.   
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exchanges.788 After an exchange, if their health conditions permitted, the soldiers 
would once again participate in the war. Therefore, as a result of the need for 
technical personal during the war, the belligerents gave special importance to the 
exchange of skilled personal.789 However, the number of prisoners may not have been 
able to affect the course of the war. Thus, the exchanges were conducted for 
humanitarian reasons more than any tactical aims. Moreover, detainment of prisoners 
was costly and required guards. Thus, from the commencement of the war, the 
parties were willing to exchange prisoners.  
Although the Ottomans began to discuss a prisoner exchange and its conditions 
in November 1854, agreement was concluded until the following year.790 Agreements 
would be concluded via the mediation of Austria. According to the agreement, one 
general would be equal to thirty privates, and a lieutenant or an officer who was 
equal to the rank of a captain of a battleship would be equal to fifteen privates during 
the exchange. The exchange did not include deserters or refugees, who could be 
charged with treason.
791
 The Treaty of Paris included an article that reads, 
“Prisoners of War shall be immediately given up on either side”. It was also stated 
that those who helped to the enemy would be forgiven. This decision might have 
been taken to protect the Crimean Tatars from any Russian oppression after the 
war.792  
                                               
788 Knyaz Aleksandr V. Meshcherskii, “Zapiska o razmene v gorode Odesse plennykh voiny 1854-56 
godov”, Russkii arkhiv (St. Petersburg, 1899), p. 441.   
789 Duberly, p. 301.  
790 BOA A.MKT.NZD 121-72, 29 Safer 1271 [20 November 1854]; Translation of the letter sent from 
Count Nesselrode to Prince Gorchakov dated 19 April 1855. İ.HR, 125-6292, 26 Safer 1272 [7 
November 1855]. 
791 BOA A.AMD 62-44, 1271 [1854-1855]. 
792 “… kendi tebaalarından olup da düşmana müsaid suretle muharebe-i hazıra vukuatından hissedar 
olmuşları cümleten afv-ı umumî ile afv ederler. Şurası dahi mahsusen mukarrerdir ki düvel-i 
muharebe tebaasından olup da muharebe esnasında diğer bir muharip tarafın hizmetinde bulunmağa 
devam etmiş olanlar dahi afv-ı umumî-i mezkûrun şümûlü olacaktır.” Paris Peace Treaty, article 5.  
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The number of Russian prisoners in the hands of the French was larger than the 
number of French prisoners in Russia; therefore, some Russian prisoners were 
exchanged for Ottoman prisoners. Osman Pasha was exchanged for Yakov 
Andreievich Bodisko, who was captured by the French in Bomarsund.793 In October 
1855, along with Osman Pasha, Colonel Ali Bey and 35 other officers arrived at 
Istanbul.794 After their arrival at Istanbul, the Ottoman prisoners were sent to their 
homes. However, it was difficult to bring the Ottoman prisoners from the Russian 
interior to Odessa. Thus, the exchange took a long time for the Ottoman prisoners, 
who were much more numerous than the French, British, and Sardinians.795  
The Porte paid the salaries of the prisoners and their costs to travel home. The 
main problem was to determine whether they had deserted. In this regard, 100 
prisoners taken from the Kars Fortress received 250 piastres each.796 Ahmed from 
İlbasan and the driver Kirkor were also paid 500 piastres each.797  Davud, who was 
taken aboard the steamer Medar-ı Ticaret was also given 200 piastres for his travel 
expenses.
798
 If the need arose, some portion of the salaries of the Ottoman soldiers 
was paid to their families during their captivity. When the above-mentioned 
Kasımpaşalı Halil Efendi was a prisoner in Russia, half of his salary was given to his 
                                               
793 Translation of the letter sent from Count Nesselrode to Prince Gorchakov dated 19 April 1855. 
BOA İ.HR 125-6292, 26 Safer 1272 [7 November 1855].  
794 BOA HR.MKT 124-78, 12 Safer 1272 [24 October 1855]; BOA A.DVN 109-40, 29 Safer 1272 [10 
November 1855]. Osman Pasha wanted the exchange of 156 prisoners taken at the battle of Sinop 
with the Russian prisoners kept in the Imperial Arsenal. 28 in the Avnillah, 100 in the Nesim-i Zafer, 
22 in the Fazlullah frigates and 6 of them were taken in the Necm-i Efşan corvette.  Badem, p. 123, 
footnote 61. 
795 Milovidov, “Russkie voennoplennye v gody Krymskoi voiny”, p. 29.  
796 BOA A.AMD 68-52, 1272 [1855-1856].  
797 BOA A.AMD 69-80, 1272 [1855-1856]. 
798 BOA A.MKT.NZD 180-28, 22 Receb 1272  [29 March 1856].  
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parents.799 Other families might also have enjoyed such benevolence on the part of 
the Ottoman government. 
 
6.2.1.6 Some Stayed in Russia 
After the war, the Russian Interior Ministry asked the provinces if any 
prisoners remained in Russia.800 Not all prisoners had returned to their homelands. 
There were wounded and sick prisoners, and some prisoners wished to remain in 
Russia. Selim, Ali, Said and Şerif had lost their lives in Podolia when they were on 
the way to the Ottoman Empire.801 Ultimately, hundreds of Ottoman soldiers died in 
the Russian Empire. 
According to one of the reports of Knyaz Meshcherskii, the officer responsible 
for the exchange of prisoners, there were 44 who wanted to remain in Russia.802 The 
prisoners were asked why they wanted to stay. Some responded that they wanted to 
become Christians, and others expressed their wish to escape punishment by staying 
in Russia. Some of these prisoners were legionnaires who fought in the allied armies. 
These men likely wanted to try their luck in Russia. Some others were deserters who 
were from the various non-Muslim Ottoman communities, most of whom were 
drafted into the Ottoman Cossacks. They likely believed that they would be punished 
if they returned. Those who stayed in Russia were either deserters or individuals who 
no longer wished to serve in the army. It is not likely that there was any other reason. 
                                               
799 BOA I.MVL 308-12809, 3 Şevval 1270 [29 June 1854].  
800 RGIA, f. 1286, op. 17, d. 244, l. 12-13. 
801 The Governor of the Province of Podolya to the Minister of Internal Affairs, 7 [19] July 1857, 
RGIA, f. 1286, op. 17, d. 244, l. 76. 
802 The Governor of Novorossiya and Bessarabia to the Commander of the 2. Army, 22 June [4 July] 
1856, RGVIA, f. 9198, op. 3-262, d. 10, l. 1-6.    
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The Ottoman soldiers had to apostatize to remain in Russia. Halil, the sergeant 
of Anatolian Dragoon division, who was captured at Kars, Bilal, only thirteen years 
old when he was captured at the battle of Sinop, Ali Atoiy, one of the sailors of the 
Pervaz-ı Bahri and Ali (baptized by Nikolai Gavrimov) and Valim (baptized by 
Vasilii Konstantinov) were some of the prisoners who accepted the Orthodox faith.803   
According to these regulations, all of the deserters of foreign powers and those 
Muslims who converted to the Orthodox faith could become Russian subjects and 
remain in Russia. They would have one year in which they could travel in Russia to 
find a job and a town in which to live. Meanwhile, they would have a temporary 
passport. If they failed in these requirements, and could not claim acceptable reasons, 
their passports would not be extended.804  
The prisoners would not pay tax or be eligible for the conscription for ten years 
after they were granted Russian citizenship. They would not be charged for their 
petitions. The Russian government sought rapid and easy resolution of the prisoners’ 
problems. The prisoner could be a craftsman, but there was no obstacle to performing 
any other profession. They could be a state peasant or serve in the army. They were 
also provided with accommodations.805 Nonetheless, it seems that there was no real 
encouragement to settle them in Russia. There was no mention of a respected 
profession or a guaranteed income. The Russian government did not take a negative 
                                               
803 RGIA, f. 1286, op. 17, d. 244, l. 38 ob., 80 and 101.  
804 RGIA, f. 1286, op. 17, d. 244, l. 65, article 10.  
805 “The rules approved by His Majesty which will be applied to the deserters of the foreign armies 
who stayed here after the past war”, RGIA, f. 1286, op. 17, d. 244, l. 65, article 4. Although the title 
denoted only deserters, the rules included all the prisoners who wished to remain in Russia.  
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stance regarding the prisoners of war citizenship, but did not encourage them either. 
The only exception was the settlement of the technical personnel as shown above.806 
 
6.2.1.7. Social Life in Russia and the Relations between the Ottoman 
Prisoners and Russian Society 
While there were people who helped the prisoners by giving them food and 
clothing and showing mercy and sympathy, there were also people who made fun of 
them, cheated them, beat and even killed them. Ottoman prisoners were occasionally 
regarded as the major reasons for fires or diseases. Thus, they did not always live 
safely among the local population. The prisoners, especially the officers, enjoyed 
better relations with the local notables than the ordinary people. In short, there were 
positive and negative aspects of the relations between the prisoners and the host 
nation.  
An anecdote of a certain Ottoman soldier, who had participated in the 
construction works of the French army and was captured by the Russian Cossacks, is 
a good example of Russian perceptions of the Ottoman prisoners: 
- Hey Turk, did you come to fight, can you understand whom you are fighting with? 
Is that the war that you want?  
- Why are you having fun with him? Do you think he came voluntarily? He also had 
his commanders.  
- We know that. 
- What do you know? Look my friends, he is almost naked, barefoot …   
- … He is also a man even though he was not baptized…807  
 
                                               
806 The engineers of the Pervaz-ı Bahri and the Medar-ı Ticaret were given to choice to stay in Russia 
or to leave. In the 17th and 18th centuries the Ottoman and the Crimean Tatar prisoners were sent to 
Tula to work in the weapon industry. However, the skilled ones were only a small part of all prisoners. 
Therefore, the prisoners were generally used in the hard labor or agriculture. On the other hand, the 
Ottomans encouraged the staying of the Muslim prisoners taken from the Russian army in the 
Ottoman Empire.  
807 P. Turbin, “Plennyi Turok”, Voennyi sbornik, no. 4 (April), 1864 (St Petersburg), p. 393.  
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The Russian soldiers, who were themselves in need of many things, found 
clothing and even obtained a pipe for the Ottoman prisoner.808 They did not regard a 
Muslim prisoner as their equal, but pity overcame anger.   
Russian manners were also positively portrayed in the reminiscences of the 
British prisoners. An English prisoner in Odessa says that “it is indeed but justice to 
add, that throughout our stay in Russia, both from high and low, great and small, we 
experienced unvaried and uniform kindness, which it would be more than invidious 
to deny”.809 Royer was pleased with the Russian treatment: “the kindness we had 
already experienced sufficed to assure us that no unnecessary harshness or severity 
of treatment was intended by our civilized enemies.”810 High officials, particularly 
Baron Osten-Sacken, the commander of the Russian Third Army and his wife, and 
Annenkov, the Governor of Odessa paid close attention to Royer.811  Colonel Lake 
says, “our late foes, the Russians, are a generous and hospitable people.”812  
Such affirmative expressions could also be found in official British documents. 
General Williams writes in one of his letters to Lord Clarendon, British Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, “I have already told your lordship of General Mouravieff’s kindness 
towards myself and my party; but his humanity and benevolent treatment of the poor 
famished garrison of Kars will gain for him the respect of the civilized world, and 
must tend to lessen, if not eradicate, the animosity which for more than a century has 
existed between Russia and Turkey, especially on the part of the latter.”813 Captain 
Montagu, who returned to his army after a prisoner in July 1855, expressed his 
                                               
808 Ibid 
809 [William Burckhardt Barker],  p. 38.  
810 Royer, p. 50.  
811 Ibid, p. 28. 
812 Lake, p. x. 
813 Dodd, p. 468 
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satisfaction with Russian hospitality.814 Two British soldiers in Petropavlovsk on the 
Pacific Ocean were also well treated.815    
Some prisoners experienced more than a routine life in Russia. Lake’s 
expressions are clear: “My diary at Penza is such a repetition of pleasant parties, kind 
attentions, and all that is agreeable to remember, that I fear I shall shock the minds of 
well-regulated people who probably think that a prisoner should have been 
consistently miserable, or that an Englishman should never admire, or, if he does, 
should not laud, the graces of Foreign Society.”816 At first glance, Lake’s expressions 
are not an exaggeration. The prisoners in Odessa celebrated at parties until the early 
morning, danced with the beauties of Odessa, and sometimes after too much drinking 
with Russian officers continued to enjoy themselves on the streets of Odessa. It 
seems that captivity was not such a horrible experience for some of the prisoners.817 
The Ottoman prisoners were also happy with their treatment. Lieutenant Royer, 
on his way to St. Petersburg, met with four Ottoman officers in Tula who were 
captured on one of the steamers in the Black Sea. One of the Ottoman prisoners was 
speaking in broken English. They were likely the wounded officers of Pervaz-i Bahri 
who were sent captivity in the Russian interior after receiving medical treatment. 
Royer claims, “They had been about three months in this place, and evinced no 
desire to return to their country, expressing themselves quite satisfied with the 
friendly treatment they experienced at the hands of their enemies. Indeed I have since 
been assured that one of these men, at St. Petersburg, actually burst into tears when 
                                               
814 “James Simpson to Lord Panmure, 4 August 1855, Sevastopol”, London Gazette, 16 August 1855, 
no. 21763, p. 3113. 
815 “Rear-Admiral H. W. Bruce to Admiralty, 15 June 1855, Petropavlovsk”, London Gazette,11 
September 1855, no. 21780, p. 3403. 
816 Lake, p. 317 
817 [William Burckhardt Barker], pp. 57-58. 
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his release was announced to him!”818 Although captivity was difficult for the aged 
Vasıf Pasha, the Russian ballet eased some of his pain. “The Mushir, after his arrival, 
accompanied us one evening, and his habitual gloom for a time vanished while 
witnessing Madame Petrova’s admirable impersonation of character, in a language 
which none of us understood, or while gazing admiringly on the many-twinkling feet 
of Mesdemoiselles Sankoffsky, Gregoriova, and Ivanovna.”819 
However, the relations between the prisoners and the local population were not 
always good. In December 1854, when the new Russian conscripts were walking in 
front of the house where the Ottoman prisoners were lodged, the conscripts made 
signs to harass the prisoners. The angry Ottomans then followed them with sticks, 
and one of them even attacked a Russian conscript with an axe.820 Another source 
explains a more dramatic event. If the information regarding the massacre of two 
hundred Ottoman soldiers is true, we do not yet know the details of this tragedy.821  
 
6.2.1.8 The Ottoman Prisoners in the Eyes of the Europeans 
First hand sources or interpretations are always important to reconstruct a 
historical event – correctly or incorrectly - centuries later. The Ottomans (more 
correctly the Tunisians) were made scapegoats for the failure in the battle of 
Balaklava, and throughout the war they were accused of cowardice. This was 
because that the British constructed the story one-sidedly, and the voice of the 
Ottomans could not be heard. Sergeant Newman explained the opinions among the 
                                               
818 Royer, p. 115. 
819 Lake, p. 257 
820 GARF, f. 109, 4. expedition, op. 194, d. 189, l. 2 as quoted in Poznakhirev, “Evolyutsiya 
polozheniya Turetskikh voennoplennykh v Rossii v kontse XVII – nachale XX v.”, http://scientific-
notep.ru/pdf/021-015.pdf.  
821 The Prisoners of Voronesh, p. 168.  
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British soldier well: “We soldiers despised the whole of the Turkish race for their 
cowardice in running away from the batteries at Balaclava and letting the Russians 
right in upon our lines and thereby bringing on the battle of Balaclava when so many 
of our light cavalry were killed and taken.”822 While the viewpoints of the British 
soldiers affected the perceptions of the Ottoman soldier during and after the war, the 
Russians were fairer in their assessment of the Ottoman defense of Balaklava.823 The 
allied soldiers did not regard the Ottomans as their equals; they were frequently 
affronted and saw them as inconceivable foreigners, if not savages. Such negative 
opinions and feelings also affected the relations between prisoners.  
While the battle of Balaklava played a role in establishing the idea of the 
“cowardly Turk”, the obedient and submissive character of the Ottoman soldiers 
reinforced it. The Ottomans, who worked in the rear, carried cargo and wounded 
soldiers. Thus, one French prisoner called the Ottomans a nation of “pack 
animals”.824 Allied soldiers made no attempt to conceal their insults and contempt. 
They did not want to share a place with the Ottomans and wanted to be apart from 
their Muslim allies.825 However, despite all sorts of clashes and fights, the French and 
British were friends who shared same destiny and shared similar enjoyments. 
Sergeant Walsh, who was captured at Inkerman, met the sons of Nicholas I, the 
princes Nicholas and Mikhail. According to Walsh, the Russian princes classified the 
prisoners into three categories in which the British were the first class, the French the 
second and the Ottomans the third, and the prisoners would be treated in accordance 
                                               
822 Ibid, p. 98.  
823 This biased attitude, which could also be seen in the Crimean War literature in English, has only 
recently changed. Robert B. Edgerton, Death or Glory: The Legacy of the Crimean War (Boulder and 
Oxford, 1999), pp. 168-169; Badem, p. 42. 
824 Zaytsov, “Nepriyatelskie voennoplennye v gorodakh Trubchevske i Koroche”, p. 24. 
825 The Prisoners of Voronesh, pp. 88-89, 98-99, 240.   
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with this categorization. The Princes most likely wanted to pay a compliment, but to 
the British sergeant this classification was a normal and natural one.826 Sergeant 
Walsh compared the prisoners from different nations: “the French are too polite to 
kick a row, the Turks too frightened, but the English are neither one or the other. 
Whenever they think they are insulted or imposed upon, they resent it in grand style, 
no matter the odds against them.”827 Lieutenant Royer’s comparison of the Ottomans 
with the Russians also revealed the European perception of the Ottoman soldier: 
“Indeed the sympathy everywhere shown us was remarkable; and the conduct of our 
civilized enemies afforded a striking contrast to that of our barbarous allies, to whose 
assistance our country has generously proceeded. While staying at Constantinople we 
were often spat upon in the streets by the Turkish children, who certainly would not 
have felt such an abhorrence of us, if it had not been instilled into them by their 
parents, who no doubt expressed in private the feelings which were thus aped and 
reflected by their little counterparts.”828  
One of the British soldiers in Odessa went to the opera with an Ottoman. The 
British expressed his astonishment: “I was much amused at the conclusion of the 
opera (which was really very fairly executed), when I asked him how he liked it? ‘Eh 
kardash,’ said he, ‘it is all very well, but at the end of it we go home, and there 
remains nothing in our hand for our money’” This Ottoman soldier was Ahmed 
Efendi. He was sent to France, learned some French, and served in France as a sailor. 
He was captured when he was under the command of one of the Pashas in the battle 
of Sinop. His portrait drawn by his British comrade is expressive:  
Ahmed Effendi, whom I had frequently met in society, was a prisoner like myself, on 
parole, and there was no likelihood of his breaking it, for he certainly was better off as 
                                               
826 “A Peep behind the Scenes”, p. 192. 
827 Ibid, p. 200.  
828 Royer, p. 50.  
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a prisoner than he would have been had he been free, and serving on board a Turkish 
man-of-war. In this situation the salary that is allotted to a man is never paid, and 
though living in the midst of abundance, he is often suffered to be without the 
necessaries of life… He was kindly treated, found in everything he required, and 
allowed to visit the first people in the city, who received him hospitably and with 
generous feeling. He was a wretched little man in appearance, one of the degenerate 
race, of whom you see too many in Constantinople, thin and lank in face and body, 
and whose bandy legs are now rendered more conspicuous in the ridiculous costume 
they have adopted, and which they consider as a fair imitation of the European dress; 
their coats are made without a seam in the back, and this brings their awkward high 
shoulders and their arms more into notice; and they wear no waistcoat, although this 
‘buttened-up coat’ is generally left open to show their dirty coloured cotton shirt, 
covered by a little short scant beard of two or three inches length, which is generally 
red, with very bare cheeks. This race is called by the Turks ‘Cusa,’ and is considered 
to be the cleverest of all the family tribe of Tartaric breed… I used to see him at all the 
parties, and although he had never been able to adopt the feelings of a gentleman, he 
had at least the outward semblance of a quiet, harmless individual, which was all that 
was required to ensure him protection and polite attention.
829
  
 
The contempt and disrespect of soldiers from two major countries of civilized 
Europe regarding their “oriental and barbaric” ally, and the curiosity and respect of 
the Russians, the eternal enemy of the Ottomans, towards Ottoman prisoners 
composed an interesting and ironic contradiction. Approximately 100 Ottoman 
prisoners who fell into enemy hands after the battle of Kürekdere, most of whom 
were Kurds, were sent to small town Roslavl in Smolensk Province. An article 
published in the newspaper Severnaya pchela included important details regarding 
these prisoners. They were religious people who regularly read the Qur’an and 
performed their prayers. They rose early and helped beggars or ladies who were 
carrying water. They even risked their lives to put out a fire in the town. Thus, these 
faithful and sober people enjoyed the love and respect of the local population.830 
 
                                               
829 Ibid, pp. 144-147.  
830 K. Mikeshin, “Kurdy v Smolenskoi gubernii”, Sbornik izvestii otnosyashchikhsya do nastoyashchei 
voiny. Prilozheniya, vol. XXV, pp. 27-31. 
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6.2.1.9 An Exceptional Captivity: The Adventures of the Officers of the 
Pervaz-ı Bahri 
Some prisoners were more fortunate than others. It can be claimed that the 
officers experienced a better life during captivity than the privates and the 
Europeans’ captivity was far more comfortable than the Ottomans’. For some, 
captivity even became an enjoyable vacation. Therefore, the experiences of the 
officers of the Pervaz-i Bahri deserve to be treated as an interesting case of captivity. 
Their experiences were hardly typical, but they were also not unique. One of 
the special guests of Nicholas I was Lieutenant Royer, the captain of the Tiger. 
Royer was hosted in the best way in every city that he visited, and he ultimately 
arrived at the Russian capital. After a trip around the city, he paid a visit to the Tsar. 
He then left St Petersburg for home. Before his departure, Dolgorukov, the Russian 
War Minister, asked for a favor. Royer would explain to the British public that the 
Russians were not a barbaric nation. The British officer fulfilled Dolgorukov’s 
request in his reminiscences, which he published just after his arrival in Britain.831 
This book was criticized by the anti-Russians in Britain, as the author highly praised 
the Russians.832 There were also other Europeans who visited St. Petersburg. One of 
them was Joseph Guilhem Lagondie, a French officer who was captured on 19 
September 1854.833  In the very end of the war, General Williams was accepted by 
Alexander II, who most likely wanted to hear some authentic information regarding 
the defense of the Fortress of Kars.  
                                               
831 Royer, p. 176.  
832 Dodd, p. 115; [William Burckhardt Barker], pp. 39-42. 
833 Vospominaniya V. I Baryatinskogo, pp. 23-24; Englische Akten zur Geschichte des Krimkriegs, 
vol. III, p. 597.  
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The first prisoners who were invited to the Russian capital were the Ottoman 
officers. Captain Hacı Abdullatif, Captain Emrullah, Lieutenant Osman, Lieutenant 
Hassaneyn
834
and Lieutenant Doctor Jadullah Efendi were granted an audience by the 
Russian Tsar. These officers were old, and Jadullah Efendi was an Ethiopian.835 
After the first battle between the steamers, the Russians captured the Pervaz-i 
Bahri, which was heavily damaged. On 19 November 1853, after two days’ voyage 
on the Black Sea, the crew of an Egyptian steamer arrived at Sevastopol.836 During 
this voyage, the prisoners were treated well. The sailors were offered soup, while the 
officers had their supper with the Russian captain. The Russian officers asked 
questions about the battle. The prisoners relaxed after this intimate and cordial 
conversation.
837
  Knyaz Baryatinskii, a Russian officer, reported that the 
conversation was jovial. After the meal, everyone cheered up and traded jokes. The 
Russian officer claims that anger could easily become sympathy and friendly feelings 
under certain conditions.
838
  
This interest and attention paid to the Ottoman prisoners increased in 
Sevastopol. They were served food and drink, visited by the notables, and received 
medical treatment. 20 Ottoman soldiers were soon healed. Eleven privates, Captain 
Ahmed and Lieutenant Hacı Ahmed were left in the hospital of Sevastopol. The rest 
                                               
834 The name of this prisoners passes differently in the Russian documents: Gassanin, Gassaneyn, 
Gusseyn. This should be a result of different pronunciations of the name Hassaneyn by the Russians.    
835 Sbornik izvestii otnosyashchikhsya do nastoyashchei voiny. Politicheskii otdel, vol. IV (St. 
Petersburg, 1854), p. 164. Captain Yaronovetskii writes that the only doctor was an Arab. This 
expression shows the extent to which he was remote from the prisoners. For the Russian officer, the 
other prisoners should be Turks. Thus he used the word Arab instead of Negro. Captain Yaronovetskii 
to Colonel Brynchaninov, 19 [31] December 1853, GARF, f. 109, 1. expedition, d. 359 part 1, l. 5.  
836 “Izvestiya s Chernogo Morya”, 17 November 1853 [29 November 1853], Sobranie donesenii, p. 
27.  
837 RGIA, f. 970, op. 1, d. 991, l. 1ob.-2. 
838 Vospominaniya V. I Baryatinskogo, p. 54. Similarly, the Russian sailors who killed thousands of 
Ottomans in the battle of Sinop, gave their overcoats to the prisoners. Materialy, vol. I, p. 204. 
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were transferred to Odessa. In Odessa, the officers were provided with houses, 
servants and a cook. Moreover, the officers attended parties given in their honor.839 
The journey of the Egyptian officers from Odessa to Moscow took eighteen 
days. The governor of Moscow hosted the prisoners in his own home. The prominent 
figures of Moscow, especially the women, showed a great interest in the prisoners. 
The prisoners rested in Moscow for one night, and the following day they continued 
their journey by train.840 The last phase of journey took 22 hours, and they were 
received at the railway station by Colonel Petrovich. On the same day, the prisoners 
paid a visit to General Katenin and War Minister Dolgorukov.841  
Dolgorukov was sincere when he said, “do not feel yourselves as prisoners, 
you are but our guests.” They accommodated in a house with servants and a cook as 
in Odessa. Colonel Petrovich was careful in fulfilling their requests. In two days’ 
time, their clothing for the ceremony was prepared. Along with evening dress, they 
were given shoes, boots and gloves.842 
The prisoners characterized the time in St Petersburg as follows: “We had ten 
peaceful days as guests.” They were then presented to the Tsar. The Tsar was cordial 
to the prisoners. “Although you are my enemy, I like soldiers. You fought a lot. I 
wanted to see you and so called you here. In five to ten days, after you have travelled 
throughout the capital, I will send you home.”843 
Prisoners visited various buildings in St Petersburg such as palaces, schools, 
the fortress, the admiralty, arsenal and royal mint. They attended operas and ballets 
                                               
839 RGIA, f. 970, op. 1, d. 991, l. 2. 
840 The train departed Moscow at 11:00 A.M. and arrived at St. Petersburg the following morning at 
9:00 A.M. Royer, pp. 124-130  
841 RGIA, f. 970, op. 1, d. 991, l. 2-2ob. 
842 RGIA, f. 970, op. 1, d. 991, l. 3. 
843 RGIA, f. 970, op. 1, d. 991, l. 3-3ob. 
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at night, a sine quo non cultural expedition. Although they were happy in St. 
Petersburg, they were homesick and wished return home.844 After fourteen days in St. 
Petersburg, on 20 December, their new journey to Ottoman territory began under the 
guidance of Kırım Giray, a Caucasian who would be their translator.845 They arrived 
at Warsaw and stayed there for four days. They visited the famous Russian 
commander Prince Paskevich, and they watched an opera. Finally, they were 
delivered to the Russian Embassy in Vienna.846 They then arrived at Alexandria via 
Trieste.847   
 
6.2.2. Russian Prisoners of War in the Ottoman Empire  
American missioners who visited the Russian prisoners in Istanbul described 
them, “They were mostly short-bodied, round-faced men, without the slightest 
intellectual capacity; but three or four could read – only one, I think, was ready to 
accept a copy of the Scriptures.”848 
The Russian soldiers who were captured by the Ottoman army either 
experienced harsh conditions at the Tersane-i Amire (Imperial Shipyard) or spent 
their time in the isolated Anatolian town of Kütahya. Those who were captured by 
the allied powers in the Crimean peninsula were also dispatched to Istanbul and 
placed in the Princess Islands. The wounded Russian prisoners were treated in the 
Ottoman capital before they were transferred to France and Britain. The prisoners 
                                               
844 Same document. 
845 The name is rendered as Kerim Girey in the document. Kırım Geray, a characteristic name of the 
members of the dynasty of the Crimean Khanate, was then popularly used by the Caucasians but with 
different pronunciations.  
846 Sbornik izvestii otnosyashchikhsya do nastoyashchei voiny. Politicheskii otdel, vol. IV, p. 164. 
847 BOA HR.MKT, 76-62, 12 Şaban 1270 [10 May 1854]. 
848 McCormick, p. 124. 
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were detained in the port cities. In France, the prisoners were accommodated in 
Toulon and the island of Aix, while in Britain they were placed Plymouth, Sheerness 
and Lewes. Those who were in Plymouth lived in military barracks, while in Lewes 
they were placed in a reformatory. The prisoners in Britain did not cause any public 
disorder. The Finnish prisoners, who were taken at Bomarsund, aroused public 
interest, for they were the first prisoners that the British people had experienced in 40 
years.
849
  
 
6.2.2.1 Number of Russian Prisoners of War 
According to the records of the Russian War Ministry, those who returned 
from captivity were 2 generals, 15 shtab-ofitsers, 166 ober-ofitsers, 6,187 privates, 
and 1,267 non-combatants. A total of 2 officers and 213 privates died in captivity.
850
 
There were also numerous deserters from the Russian ranks who did not wish to 
return to Russia. In particular, Muslims and Poles, who frequently had deserted the 
Russian army, were not prone to return. Thus, it can be safely assumed that allied 
forces captured approximately 8,000 prisoners of war in total.  
The major events that resulted in the capture of the Russian soldiers were the 
amphibious operations of the naval powers in the Baltic and the Black seas. The 
British captured approximately 2000 Finnish and Russian prisoners at Bomarsund. 
There were 51 officers, 28 women and 13 children. British and French forces took 
approximately 1300 men in Kılburun. During the war, the Ottomans captured the 
schooner Alupka, and the British Svyatoi Ioann Predtecha and Svyatoi Nikolai. After 
                                               
849 Milovidov, “Russkie voennoplennye v gody Krymskoi voiny”, pp. 28-36; Dodd, pp. 177, 218. 
850 Milovidov, “Russkie voennoplennye v gody Krymskoi voiny”, p. 29.  
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the battle of Alma, 353 soldiers were taken prisoner, and at Inkerman approximately 
600 soldiers fell into captivity.
851
  
Prisoners of war were divided among the allies; those who captured them also 
retained them. The French and British armies had the larger part the Russian 
prisoners. It is unclear how many of them were captured by the Ottoman army. Yet, 
as the Ottoman army only played a secondary role in the Crimean peninsula and in 
other expeditions such as Kerch and Kılburun, only a small proportion of this 
number was in the hands of the Ottomans.  
There were approximately 10,000 Ottoman captives in Russia, while the 
French and the British prisoners were few when compared with such a number. Thus, 
there was a clear imbalance between the Russian prisoners captured by the Ottomans 
and the Ottoman prisoners in Russian hands. 
 
6.2.2.2 Accommodation of the Russian Prisoners  
Captives were dispatched to and accommodated in three different countries. (I 
have no information whether there were any Russian prisoners in the hands of the 
Sardinians) They were generally hosted in port cities and on islands, i.e., Istanbul in 
the Ottoman Empire, Plymouth, Lewes and Sheerness in Great Britain and Toulon 
and the island of Aix in France. The British official paper mentions about 746 
Russian prisoners in Britain in the spring of 1855. There were 647 Russians, 7 
Tatars, 87 Polish, and 5 Jews.
852
 It was not easy to transfer hundreds of prisoners 
from the Crimea or other theatres of the war to France and Britain. Therefore, a 
                                               
851 Milovidov, “Russkie voennoplennye v gody Krymskoi voiny”, p. 29; Dodd, p. 176.  
852 “War Department, May 29, 1855”, London Gazette, 29 May 1855, no. 21721, pp. 2061-2064. 
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sizeable portion of them was kept in Istanbul, at least for some time. Thus, the 
Ottoman capital provided lodgings and hospitals not only for the allied forces but 
also for the Russian prisoners. Thousands of Russian soldiers experienced an isolated 
life in the Ottoman Empire, i.e., in the Princess Islands, in the State Shipyard and of 
course in several hospitals throughout the Bosphorus.  
The Princess Islands, a traditional destination for the exiles, especially in the 
Byzantine period, were reserved for the POWs of the allied powers. To be sure, it 
was easier to control the captives there. Britain used the islands of Proti (Kınalıada) 
and Antigone (Pyrgos or Burgazada), and the French Prinkipo (Büyükada). The 
Greek monasteries, which had the capacity to host hundreds of Russian soldiers, 
were used to provide accommodations. The Aya Yorgi and Aya Nikola monasteries 
in Prinkipo, for instance, had been reserved for this purpose. The sick prisoners, who 
were captured by the British army, were mainly kept at Kuleli and the British naval 
hospital at Therapia.
853
 
Some of the prisoners taken by the Ottoman forces were accommodated in the 
Imperial Shipyard. McCormick narrates, “[A] long row of barracks [in Kasımpaşa] 
were used for the safe keeping of a portion of the Russian prisoners. I passed by 
these buildings frequently, and always saw the round faces of the captured, peering 
through the upper Windows, and heard them singing in quite merry strain.”854 A 
small number of the captives were sent to the state farm (Çifteler Çiftliği) in Kütahya 
province in Anatolia. In the chaotic environment of war, Russians were the last 
people that the inhabitants of Istanbul wished to see. Relations between the allied 
soldiers and the local population were far from friendly. Çifteler Çiftliği was no 
                                               
853 McCormick, p. 192. 
854 McCormick, pp. 198-199. 
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better for the prisoners. The population of Kütahya hardly welcomed their Russian 
guests, where they lived in difficult conditions.
855
 Some of these prisoners, who were 
employed in agriculture, had conducted espionage activities for the Russians during 
the war.
856
 Therefore, farm work was a punishment for them. Such an experience, 
however, proved unfavorable for the prisoners and far from prestigious for the 
Ottoman government. Consequently, these prisoners (34 men in total) were sent back 
to Istanbul, as they were not treated adequately.
857
  
 
6.2.2.3 The Treatment of the Russian Prisoners 
During the Crimean War, Austrian diplomats were charged with determining 
whether the needs of the Russian prisoners were adequately met.
858
 They were, 
however, criticized for not devoting the necessary attention to the living conditions 
of the Russian prisoners. Anatoliy Demidov, a famous Russian businessman, also 
performed services for Russian prisoners in France, Britain and the Ottoman Empire. 
His activities improved the treatment of the Russian prisoners. Demidov and his 
assistants visited the prisoners, asked their needs, and supplied them with the 
necessary products. Jacques Alleon, a French banker in Istanbul, assisted Demidov in 
his activities in Istanbul.
859
 
                                               
855 BOA A.AMD 69-56.  
856 BOA İ.DH 286-17951, 28 Rebiulevvel 1270.  
857 “…orada kendilerine layıkıyla bakılamadıklarından” BOA A.AMD 69-56. 
858 BOA HR.MKT 89-69, 22 Muharrem 1271.  
859 Jacques Meurant, “Anatole Demidoff pionnier de l’assistance aux prisonniers de guerre”, in 
Préludes et pionniers: les précurseurs de la Croix-Rouge, 1840-1860, edited by Roger 
Durand, Jacques Meurant, Youssef Cassis (Geneva, 1991), pp. 95-117; For the reports prepared by the 
representatives of Demidov in Istanbul, see, “Izvestiya o nashykh plennykh v Konstantinopole”, 
Morskoi sbornik, no. 6 (1856), pp. 127-129. 
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Russian privates were supplied with the daily rations of Ottoman soldiers. 
Officers of course enjoyed better conditions than the rank and file. They were even 
given spirits, despite this not being traditional. This was explained as a 
demonstration of the greatness of the Ottoman state.
 
 
 Butter Coffee Sugar Tea Tobacco 
Bread/ 
Biscuit 
Meal Candle 
Captain 
40 
Dirhem 
5 
Dirhem 
50 
Dirhem 
3 
Dirhem 
50 
Dirhem 
1 /1 
4 plates 
(Morning-
evening) 
Each 
night 1 
Lieutenant 
40 
Dirhem 
5 
Dirhem 
50 
Dirhem 
3 
Dirhem 
50 
Dirhem 
0/2 
4 plates 
(Morning-
evening) 
Each 
night 1 
Rations for the officers
860
 
 
The captives’ journey from the Caucasus to Istanbul was a long one. Many 
were thus exchanged rather than sent to the Ottoman capital.
861
 They were held in the 
fortresses of Kars and Erzurum until the date of their exchange. They were far from 
the control of the central government and were likely subject to more arbitrary 
treatment. The treatment of the captives was influenced by the local commander. 
British officers in Kars claimed that the Ottomans treated the Russian prisoners 
humanely, especially those who were wounded.  
The prisoners could attend religious services. In that respect, the Ottoman 
government supplied “trusted” Orthodox priests.862 Those who died in captivity were 
buried according to their faiths.
863
 Russian captives were able to send letters, 
                                               
860BOA İ.DH., 288-18091, 23 Rebiülâhir 1270.  
    Dirhem: 3.1 gram 
861 BOA HR.MKT 98-73, 17 Rebiülâhir 1271. 
862 BOA HR.MKT 98-24, 14 Rebiülâhir 1271; HR.MKT 96-28, 28 Rebiulevvel 1271. 
863 BOA HR.MKT 87-35, 5 Muharrem 1271.  
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provided they were first read by the Ottoman authorities.
864
 Some of these letters 
were published in the Russian newspapers Journal de St Petersbourg and Russkii 
invalid.
865
  
Generally the bona fides of the Ottoman Empire can be understood from 
official correspondences. When a Cossack captain was sent to Istanbul, the central 
government asked from the local authorities to transfer him “with ultimate peace and 
security” and the prisoner was “not to be injured in any way”.866 Yet, generally 
speaking, the Russians who were under French and British control were satisfied.
867
 
The Ottomans were unable to show the necessary care. French and British prisoners 
of war in Russia, however, were better treated than Ottoman soldiers. They were not 
forced to work, and were given more rations and allowances than their Ottoman 
counterparts. There was a degree of reciprocity in the treatment of the prisoners. The 
Russian prisoners complained of the need of new garments. Some Russian prisoners 
who were healthy worked upon the roads, for which they were allowed a shilling 
sterling each per day.
868
  
For many sections of Ottoman society and irregulars in the Ottoman army, 
there was little distinction between a slave and a prisoner of war. Doctor Sandwith 
claims, “Parties of Bashi-Bozooks were constantly making expeditions over the 
frontier, and every prisoner they took they considered their own property.”869 Not all 
Ottoman subjects were accustomed to the European rules:  
                                               
864 BOA HR.MKT 89-69, 22 Muharrem 1271. 
865 Beslan Abukov, a Russian officer of Circassian origin, was a prisoner of war in Istanbul.  
“Opisanie semi-mesiachnogo plena russkogo ofitsera v Konstantinopole”, Sbornik izvestiy, 
Prilozheniya, vol. 25, pp. 8-10; Russkie plennye v Konstantinopole i na ostrove E (Aix), vo Frantsii, v 
kontse 1854 goda”, Sbornik izvestii, Prilozheniya, vol. 25, pp. 3-4. 
866 BOA HR.MKT 132-79, 6 Cemaziyelevvel 1272 [14 January 1856]. 
867 Milovidov, pp. 32-33.  
868 McCormick, p. 124.  
869 Humpry Sandwith, A Narrative of the Siege of Kars (London, 1856), p. 149.  
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The Turks are sufficiently Europeanized to have partially broken through these 
customs, for I believe all the Russians who fell into their hands during the 
Danubian campaign were duly delivered over to the authorities at 
Constantinople, and afterwards exchanged; but in this remote part of the 
empire [the Caucasus], far removed from European interference, the Osmanlis 
seem to retain this among other of their ancient characteristics.
870
  
 
 
6.2.2.4 Return to Russia 
The prisoners were exchanged throughout the war, as the belligerents were 
sympathetic to the idea of exchange. The number of captives was too small to affect 
the outcome of hostilities; therefore, exchanges were conducted for humanitarian 
rather than strategic considerations. As the Russian prisoners in the hands of the 
Ottomans were much fewer than the Ottomans in Russian hands, the Russian 
prisoners captured by the French army were used to exchange for Ottoman prisoners.  
The Ottoman state was certainly sympathetic to the notion of Muslim prisoners 
remaining in the Ottoman Empire and serving in the Ottoman army. Numerous 
Poles, Jews and some Russians were accepted into the legions of the British army.
871
 
The wage of a soldier in such legions was of course much better than the rations of a 
prisoner. They also enlisted in the Polish legions of the Ottoman army under the 
command of Michał Czajkowski and Adam Zamoyski.872  
 
 
 
                                               
870 Ibid, p.147. 
871 Milovidov, p. 31.  
872 BOA A.MKT.NZD 156-40, 14 Zilkade 1271.  
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6.2.3. Conclusion 
The nature of captivity has changed over time. During the Crimean War, 
modern humanitarian law was not yet fully established, but there was a sort of 
common understanding in Europe regarding the treatment of prisoners. The 
enslavement of prisoners of war had been gradually abandoned as a result of the 
enlightenment and the development of international law in the 18
th
 century. While 
the institution of slavery was practiced by both the Ottoman and Russian societies - 
although the actual practice differed considerably - they had both adopted the 
European tradition by the 18
th
 century. During the Crimean War, prisoners of war 
were no longer slaves appropriated by individuals or the state. Their freedom was 
restricted for the duration of the war. In the Ottoman Empire, which was an ally of 
France and Britain, prisoners had to be treated humanely. Yet rules and actual 
practice were not always compatible.  
Life in Istanbul - the logistical base of the allied armies - was of course not 
easy for the Russian prisoners. It was especially so for those under the control of the 
Ottoman army, as the Ottomans were not in a position to afford to provide satisfying 
conditions for prisoners of war. Therefore, the Russians may not have received all 
necessary care. Conditions were similar for those who were accommodated at 
Kütahya. The Anatolian Muslims were of course not happy to live with the enemy. 
Despite the Russian prisoners faced difficulties, the Ottoman government seemed to 
be doing its best regarding their treatment. However, there are more sources on 
captivity in Russia, and hence many details of the lives of the prisoners in Russian 
during the Crimean War can be explored. Obviously, the Ottoman prisoners were not 
placed on an equal footing with the Europeans. The prisoners of the naval powers 
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also hardly had cordial relations with their Muslim allies. There were thousands of 
Ottoman prisoners in Russia. Many of them died, and some of them did not return. 
However, captivity in Russia generally seems to have been tolerable, especially for 
the European prisoners.  
We do not yet have sufficient information regarding the peculiarities of 
captivity during the Crimean War, especially in the case of the Russians in the 
Ottoman Empire, which obviously demands further research.  
 
6.3. War, Army and Society 
In the Ottoman military studies the impacts of war on the Ottoman individual 
and the Ottoman society have generally been overlooked. By portraying the Ottoman 
society and its army as a united entity committed to the same objective, researchers 
have ignored tensions and problems between the local population and the troops.
873
 
Accordingly, popular assistance (rather than resistance) to the war effort has been 
better analyzed than have the problems associated with the war. A Kurdish or 
Albanian irregular, a wounded Ottoman private, a drunken Ottoman officer, a 
Bulgarian driver or carpenter, and a Muslim villager were all participants in the war. 
The assumption that they all had the same wartime agenda, however, may be an 
illusion about the Ottoman society and an oversimplification of the Crimean War. In 
this chapter, the war experiences of the Ottoman individual (civilian and military) 
                                               
873 One of the authors of the Crimean War claims that the Ottoman state and society shared the same 
perspective towards the war. Besim Özcan, Kırım Savaşı’nda Malî Durum ve Teb’anın Harb Siyaseti 
(Erzurum, 1997), p. 1.  
321 
 
will be discussed with respect to the Danubian front of the Crimean War.
874
 While it 
will mainly concentrate on the Ottoman army and society, the Russian army and the 
Ottoman Orthodox population will also be mentioned when necessary to assess the 
popular view in the Balkans towards the two opposing powers on the Danube. There 
will be a discussion of the daily life of the soldiers to show that the war was not only 
about fights and deaths.  
 
6.3.1. The Ottoman Army and Society 
It is necessary to distinguish the regular and irregular units when assessing the 
fighting performance of the Ottoman army and when explaining the army’s 
relationship with society. Therefore, first, relations between the regular forces and 
the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire will be analyzed, and 
then, the performance of the irregulars on the battlefield and their unlawful acts 
behind the front will be discussed. Finally, the daily life of the Ottoman soldiers will 
be briefly examined.  
 
6.3.1.1 War is a Burden: Supplying the Army 
The Ottoman army was composed of regular units (asâkir-i nizamiye/asâkir-i 
muntazama), auxiliaries, and irregulars (başıbozuk/neferât-ı muvazzafa). Some parts 
of the regular forces were well-trained men referred to as nizam, and the rest were 
less well-trained, or totally untrained, reserve (redif) troops. In peacetime, regular 
                                               
874 In recent years, some literature has emerged on the social aspects of the Crimean War. See, 
Edgerton, Death or Glory; Reid, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire; Badem, The Ottoman Crimean War.  
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units were commissioned throughout the empire as an enforcing and intimidating 
power to exercise the Tanzimat reforms and preserve domestic security. In the 
summer of 1853, when war was already imminent, troops were transferred to the 
army quarters and fortresses in the Balkan and Caucasian frontiers. Volunteers also 
poured into the Ottoman capital and borderlands, similarly to how previous Russo-
Ottoman encounters were carried out.   
During the preparations and during the war itself, the Porte strived to mobilize 
the Ottoman subjects to supply the army and conduct defensive measures. At the 
same time, ironically, the Ottoman government sought to preserve the civilian 
population from any excessive use of force by the military units as it was particularly 
important to protect the reaya to sustain Western support. Thus, the commanders and 
local governors were constantly warned about their treatment of the Christian 
population.    
The transportation of soldiers, ammunitions, guns, and food brought about a 
nationwide mobility and required a tremendous labor force. To be sure, life was 
difficult for the people who were living along the military roads or near the 
battlefields. In addition to the danger of battles, military demands were certainly 
difficult to endure and often exceeded the capabilities of the people. Civilians were 
asked to supply clothing and food, while grain and forage extracted from the local 
population were put into depots. The Porte utilized two basic methods for obtaining 
necessary supplies from the people: encouragement (teşvik) and coercion (tazyik). 
When grain or animals were procured, the officials stated that the bill would 
certainly be paid, but they never clarified the date of payment.
875
 The protection of 
soldiers from hunger and diseases required a well functioning system of logistics 
                                               
875 “The Danubian Provinces”, The Times, 10 September 1853. 
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along with the support of the population. As a result, military units, which lacked 
sufficient food, quartering and transfer, would inevitably be devastated even before 
any contact with the enemy forces. Worse, such troops would, in some instances, 
meet their needs by forcing or threatening the local population. Thus, the failure in 
logistics caused not only military troubles but social problems as well.    
The merchants (or mültezims) supplied the military necessities after an 
agreement with the officials on the amount and price of materials, and the army 
stored the supplies, which would later be allocated to the various units. Meanwhile, 
the corrupt Ottoman bureaucracy brought undesirable outcomes. For example, in 
some cases, the supplies were never sent to their destinations. In other cases, 
materials were insufficiently allocated or were of poor quality. These factors meant 
that the Ottoman privates generally received less food and/or money than what was 
officially stated, while the mültezims or Pashas were making money at the cost of the 
lives of their soldiers. According to Reid, the Ottoman commanders looked at the 
army as a sort of iltizam property.
876
 The scarcity in 1855 in the Fortress of Kars was 
not only a result of the Russian siege but also of the corruptions in the army. In late 
1855, the Ottoman soldiers in the Crimean peninsula were looking for food and 
clothing, and the troops in the town of Gözleve were almost totally forgotten. 
However, the Danubian army was relatively better supplied compared to the 
Ottoman troops in the Caucasus and the Crimea. 
All sections of society participated in the financing of the war, either 
voluntarily or involuntarily. The “iane-i harbiyye”, an extraordinary tax in the form 
of an aid campaign, was one of the most popular concepts during the Crimean 
                                               
876 Reid, pp. 32-33.  
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War.
877
 First, a portion of the salaries of the Ottoman officials was transferred to the 
war account. The local notables likewise “donated” some money for the Ottoman 
war effort. From various cities of the Empire, Muslim and non-Muslim populations 
alike participated in the “iane-i harbiyye”. Some authors have described the iane-i 
harbiyye as a voluntary and popular act.
878
 In fact, however, the means employed by 
the Porte to extract money require further elaboration.  
Several buildings in Istanbul were used as hospitals throughout the war. The 
most famous one was the Selimiye barracks which was used by the British army. The 
French used the Russian Embassy, the summer residence of viceroy of Egypt in 
Kanlıca, the barracks in Ramizçiftlik, and Davudpaşa among many other buildings 
(see, chapter 4.4.). As there were insufficient public buildings for the allied armies, 
many private mansions were rented.
879
 However, the hiring was not necessarily a 
voluntary business.
880
 New hotels and boarding houses were opened every week, 
especially in Pera, but the accommodations were still insufficient.
881
  
In one case, residents of a locality in Istanbul showed their reluctance to rent 
their houses to the French doctors.
882
 In another case, the French demand for using 
the Mevlevihane in Gelibolu as a hospital was rejected by the Sheikh.
883
 The French 
army would use some houses in the town for the sick soldiers until the founding of 
their hospital. The landlords were irregularly paid for their houses and the dwellings 
suffered from serious damages. Worse, some hired houses in Varna were totally 
                                               
877 Badem, pp. 319-321.  
878 Besim Özcan, Kırım Savaşı’nda Malî Durum ve Teb’anın Harb Siyaseti (Erzurum, 1997); Figen 
Taşkın, “Kırım Harbi'nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na Etkileri ve İaşe Sorunu”, Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, Istanbul University. 
879 BOA HR.MKT 94-32; 100-30. 
880 Badem, pp. 330-331.  
881 McCormick, pp. 206-207. 
882 Akyüz, pp. 151-152. 
883 ATASE k. 5, d. 15, f. 26. 
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destroyed after the great fire of 1854.
884
 According to Slade, the best houses in Varna 
were occupied by the allies without any payment to the owners. He further claims 
that the inhabitants were unhappy with the drunkenness of the allied soldiers.
885
 
While the military forces were billeted in the villages on their way to battle, 
there was no reason to think that the villagers welcomed the soldiers with open arms 
and willingly shared their scarce food with these unwanted guests.
886
 The system 
how the Ottoman officials or the soldiers were guest in the Christian villages was 
explained by Cunningham in detail. In this system, the soldiers did not pay for the 
food and the accommodation in both Muslim and non-Muslim settlements.  
With regard to Conak (Konak) or giving quarters to Turks there are no great 
complaints made by the Bulgarian peasants. The person requiring quarters has 
to find the Kiaja of the village (a kind of messenger belonging to the 
Chourbagees) who assigns the quarters and then he gets the provisions required 
various houses in the village. A demand I believe is always made for the 
Barley given to the horses but this is seldom paid by the Turks. All over the 
district I travelled there are no complaint of the Turks ill treating the women 
and if they sometimes lay a whip over the shoulders of the men they must often 
either do this or go without supper. I refer only to the Pashalic of Rustchuk; I 
understand that in the Pashalic of Widdin the Turks often behave very 
barbarously when the peasant knows that the stranger will pay for what he gets 
there is no difficulty made to receive him into the house and to furnish him 
with all he requires, and generally from the house in which he lodges without 
requiring anything from other houses in the village. There would be some 
difficulty in putting an end to the Conak system in the present state of the 
country. In all Turkish villages there are certain “guests houses” to which all 
travelers repair at night fall. The masters of the Guests house has his family 
house or harem near and there supper is prepared and brought into the guests 
house, the master and any other grown up males of the family let down to 
supper along with the strangers. The strangers then sleep in the quests house 
and are free to depart next morning without any charge being made. The master 
of the House does not refuse a backshish and when he knows that he will get it 
he may even cause a dish to be added to the supper. The feed of the horses has 
to be paid for. I believe the village or community pays a certain sum for the 
support of these houses. In Christian villages there is no public house where a 
person can pass the night. In many villages there is a Tavern where wine and 
spirits bread and cheese is sold but there is no accommodation or room for 
sleeping. Therefore until some sort of a Public House is provided in Christian 
                                               
884 BOA MVL 279-54. 
885 Badem, pp. 169-70; Slade, p. 561.  
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village where strangers may sleep and get something to eat the Conak system 
must remain.
887
  
 
 
Obviously, the civilian populace wanted to be away from the troops. 
Accordingly, the villagers living around the British camps in Varna left their 
houses.
888
  
…the peculiarity of the country [the Balkans] was the absence of inhabitants. 
Except those in the service of the commissariat, drivers of mule carts and 
bullock drays, and now and then a wandering Bulgarian, none were to be seen. 
Fear had driven them to desert their homes; and it was not one of the least 
disadvantages attending the armies of the allies that they had to operate in a 
country practically deserted. The want of transport, felt even at Scutari and 
Gallipoli, became a positive evil in Bulgaria.
889
 
 
 
When Mehmed Sadık Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman Cossacks, was 
searching for supplies for his troops, he found many Bulgarian villages deserted as 
the inhabitants had run to the mountains with their livestock.
890
 As population 
movements may have hindered the logistics of the army, there was a clear necessity 
to prevent the villages from being abandoned by convincing the people that their 
lives and property would be secured. In this regard, the arbitrary behavior of 
commanders and local governors needed to be prevented, as an upheaval would be 
the last thing that the Porte wanted in wartime. However, having employed almost all 
regular forces against the enemy, the Ottoman government made concessions with 
respect to domestic security and order.  
                                               
887 TNA FO 195-444, pp. 337-345.  
888 Russell, The War: From the Landing at Gallipoli to the Death of Lord Raglan, p. 94.   
889 Cassell’s Illustrated History of England, vol. IV, p. 177. 
890 “Zapiski Mikhaila Chaikovskogo”, Russkaya starina, 1898, no. 10, p. 205. 
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Agricultural lands were damaged during the war, despite efforts of the 
authorities to prevent and punish soldiers who entered gardens and vineyards.
891
 In 
one case, the British soldiers ruined a vineyard nearby the Selimiye barracks.
892
 In 
the confusion of warfare, though it was difficult to maintain agriculture, farming in 
the vacant lands and preserving the cultivated areas were crucial.
893
 Throughout the 
hostilities, the possibility of prolonging the war made the harvest an even more 
strategic matter. Nevertheless, large territories were left uncultivated, and cultivated 
areas were heavily demolished. Adding to the problems, because the carts and 
animals were assigned to the military service, public access to several materials 
became even more difficult.
894
 Worse still, the storage of agricultural products for the 
army may have led to an increase in the prices of the products. Therefore, the 
Ottoman government tried to constrain grain exportation to prevent shortages and 
rising prices. Meanwhile, the need to supply the allied powers further worsened the 
situation. Fortunately, there was no threat of famine due to the good harvests in the 
Ottoman Empire during the years of war.  
In short, cordial relations between the army and society were the key to the 
military success, and thus, troops and civilians should have protected each other. 
However, the declining living conditions in the Ottoman Empire naturally strained 
the state-society relations during wartime. Some problems erupted in both supplying 
the army and providing domestic security. Fortunately, relative military success and 
a positive international atmosphere disallowed the spread of disturbances. 
                                               
891 ATASE k. 9, d. 5, f. 1/16. 
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6.3.1.2 The Labor Force 
The preparations for war and the war itself necessitated a significant labor 
force. The transfer of ammunitions and supplies, the reparations of the old 
fortifications, and the constructions of the new fortifications could only be handled 
with the assistance of the society. The masters, workers and drivers were in acute 
demand and employed in numerous tasks. The shops in Shumnu were closed on 
certain days so the shopkeepers could assist in military efforts.
895
 The Ottoman army 
had only insufficient number of carts or package animals for the logistical activities. 
Thus, the transporting of supplies and munitions in the Balkans was usually the duty 
of the Bulgarian villagers. Although the military activities occupied most of the time 
of the Bulgarian peasants, the remunerations for their efforts were delayed to an 
unclear future time. Worse still, during the preparations for war in the summer of 
1853, the villagers could not afford the time to harvest their crops, and as a 
consequence, they suffered substantial losses because of the heavy rains in autumn of 
that year.
896
    
While the labor force can be divided into three categories: voluntary, forced 
(angarya) and paid, it is not easy to identify to which category the various workers 
belonged. In this regard, Slade provides some clues. “The inhabitants of a district, for 
example, are invited to build barracks for troops, a village for Caucasian immigrants 
or a lazaretto for cholera suspects. Having completed the work, they press for 
payment, and are put off from month to month with fair words. After a while, 
making a merit of necessity, they renounce their claim, and are rewarded by seeing 
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their ‘patriotism’ and ‘devotion’ duly lauded in the official Gazette.”897 This type of 
response played some role in worsening the relations between the state and society. 
Thus, people were reluctant to work in the fortifications and desertion was common 
among the workers. For example, the governor (kaymakam) of Shumnu was required 
to find new carpenters after the desertion of the previous ones.
898
  
The fortifications in Vidin were jointly repaired by the inhabitants of the town 
and the army. When the war preparations were in progress in Shumnu, people 
voluntarily worked on the fortification of Eski Çengel.899 Workers were also hired at 
a rate of 100 paras to build blockhouses in the redoubts of Shumnu.
900
 There were, 
however, some official complaints concerning the attitudes of residents of Varna 
when works on the fortress was taking place:  
The people of Varna not only abstained from assisting in the fortification 
works, but they also threw away their own garbage in front of the redoubts. 
The Ottoman soldiers had to work for ten days to carry out the rubbish… 
therefore, people of Varna between the ages of fifteen to forty should be 
encouraged to assist in building fortifications in return for the cleaning of their 
own trashes by the Ottoman army …901  
  
   
Obviously, many people did not want to work on the fortifications, and the 
word “encourage” did not always denote that the volunteers actually worked. 
Perhaps a more conciliatory language was preferred in accordance with the 
conjuncture. The Porte avoided liabilities associated with bureaucratic decisions by 
portraying them as the misdeeds of the local governors rather than the malpractices 
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of the central government. For instance, the governors of Varna frequently changed 
apparently because of the widespread complaints. 
The employment of drivers and their carts (arabas) was always on the agenda 
during the war efforts. A rotation of the drivers was considered on the Danubian 
front such that drivers from the north of the Balkans would be sent home on leave 
and new ones from the cities of Edirne, Sofia, Filibe and Nish would be called in to 
replace them.
902
 When 100 drivers were requested by the Ottoman forces at Kalafat, 
the governor of Vidin claimed that the non-Muslim population was already being 
forced to work on many assignments and forcing them to work in Wallachia would 
cause a popular revolt.
903
 Drivers, believing that they would never receive their pay 
and rations, were the most reluctant servants of the army. Dodd confirms that 
because the drivers did not receive payment, they took every opportunity of 
deserting.
904
 The muleteers and drivers in the Caucasus also declined to work for the 
Ottoman army, as they too were irregularly paid.
905
 Ill treatment and being away 
from home during the harvest were also reasons for deserting.  
Furthermore, soldiers sometimes employed drivers without any official orders, 
which negatively affected the logistics, and the “aforesaid people who were thus 
terrified avoided carrying wood, flour and other materials.” Sometimes the Ottoman 
soldiers simply boarded already heavily loaded carts, a behavior that caused many 
animals to perish under such physical duress. Because the carts and animals were so 
horribly abused, the resistance of the peasants to work for the Ottoman army was 
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understandable. To help ease the relations between the drivers and the soldiers, the 
Ottoman troops should have first applied to the officials to use the carts.
906
  
As it was, however, the uneasy relations between the drivers and the soldiers 
never ceased. The reluctant service of the local population can be observed in the 
memoirs of the British soldiers who claimed that inhabitants were unfriendly and 
were not in the mood to cooperate. One reluctant driver, who was forced to work for 
the British army, took off his knife, and finally burnt his cart down.
907
 Another driver 
quickly disappeared as soon as a British soldier entered into the depot. Russell’s 
interpretation of the incident is quite descriptive as he states, “How such clumsy 
bodies move so quickly is miraculous. In our service they are as slow as snails.”908 
Simmons points out the impact of lack of money on the Ottoman logistics, “the army 
begin to want transport, not being able to replace the bullocks, hundreds of which 
have died from a disease which has prevailed amongst them for some time, and the 
civilian drivers and cattle tenders not being paid, fly, so that their places are required 
to be filled up by soldiers, thus diminishing the effective army.”909 The transportation 
of the European armies in the Balkans was no better, “Dreadful work with the 
transport. Arabadys deserting with their oxen, leaving the carts behind. Impossible to 
organize with only one interpreter, who only speaks Italian.”910 
The army-society relations were frequently tense in wartime as evidenced by 
the aforementioned examples between the cart drivers and the soldiers. People tried 
to avoid any material loss and did not want to be separated from their families. 
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Therefore, the Ottoman army, by and large, used forced labor, which resulted in the 
desertion of the workers becoming standard behavior. Nevertheless, not all the 
people were forced or reluctant to work for the army. In fact, for many people, war 
was an opportunity. For example, merchants earned a good deal of money by 
answering the demands of the army. The tradesmen of Istanbul prospered greatly by 
the continuance of the siege of Sevastopol. Minasian, an Armenian who had an 
American passport, kept a shop in Istanbul. Having received a contract from the 
English government for the manufacture of iron stoves, he imported many from the 
United States.
911
 Moreover, the interpreters and servants who worked for the allied 
troops were enthusiastic, and those, who knew some French and British were almost 
all employed. The allied armies also contributed to the commercial booms in 
Istanbul, Varna and Gelibolu, as the soldiers bought eggs, vegetables and chickens 
from the local population when they became bored with the army rations. This 
proved to be a positive effect, as the local population was happy to make a profitable 
trade, and the soldiers were happy to find rare products in wartime. Thus, the 
shopkeepers were not necessarily unhappy with the visitors’ long stay in Istanbul.  
 
6.3.1.3 The Unhappy Encounters: the Civilians and the Soldiers 
Istanbul, Varna and Shumnu were crowded with military camps, and as a 
consequence, contacts in public places between civilians and troops increased, which 
meant that disturbances also increased along with the intensifying relations. For 
example, soldiers in Shumnu who visited the public baths (hamam) caused some 
problems in the downtown area, which resulted in the erection of tents of ablutions 
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(gusul çadırları) in the quarters.912 Nevertheless, as disturbances could not be 
avoided, Ömer Lütfi Pasha issued an order to prevent such undesired relations 
between the military and the civilians. The order stated that if Ottoman soldiers 
“exchanged rude words with the Muslims and non-Muslims in the market places” or 
“dared to clap or deliver a blow” such “undesirable acts” (harekât-ı nâmerziyede) 
would be severely punished. The soldiers were further required “to act with honor 
and not to dare molestation” (ırz ve edebleriyle gezmeleri ve hiçbir tarik ile 
destdirâzlığa cesaret etmemeleri). The Ottoman army command warned the civilians 
as well, stating that disrespectful conduct on the part of the civilians would not be 
tolerated and that those who misbehaved or cursed (muamele-i baride ve şetm) the 
Ottoman soldiers would be arrested.
913
  
After the arrival of the British and French troops, the Ottoman cities hosted 
many adventurers who hardly obeyed the warnings of the Ottoman police. 
Thousands of allied soldiers resided in the Ottoman capital for months with no 
purpose but to wait for their expected campaign to the Crimea. During this time, the 
allied soldiers engaged in many fights, and the streets were terrorized with “the 
perfectly lawless manner the enlightened Allies often treated the unenlightened 
Turks.”914 Contributing to the quarrels and fights was the access the soldiers had to 
cheap alcohol. In Varna, a fight erupted between an Ottoman soldier and a British 
soldier when a gun was accidentally fired.
915
 Such fights were more frequent in 
Istanbul. The Albanians, the Croats and the European soldiers also fought many 
times. One of the major fights in Istanbul was between the French and the Tunisians. 
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These encounters sometimes ended with serious casualties.
916
 The public order failed 
at Pera, where “crimes were committed with impunity in open day; assassinations 
occurred in the middle of the street, and the passer-by went on his way, as if he had 
seen nothing.”917 Among the French soldiers received into the hospitals at Pera, there 
were many who had been wounded in the frequent street quarrels of this suburb. The 
Ottoman police was not capable of stopping the undisciplined activities in the capital. 
The French obtained permission to establish police at Pera which proved to be 
useful. “The Turkish guards stationed at the corners of the streets, saluted the English 
and French officers whenever they passed, and allowed the riotous proceedings of 
the drunken sailors to go unrebuked. The organization of a French police was 
favored, when the treacherous Greeks infesting the city had deliberately murdered 
several sailors and soldiers, and otherwise disturbed the peace.”918  
When the newly established battalions arrived at the battlefield, the old ones 
were weakened and lost their fighting spirit resulting in many soldiers losing their 
lives, suffering serious injuries and being sent back home. Thus, there was immense 
traffic on the highways, a factor that again increased interactions between the 
civilians and the army. Unfortunately, as there are no diaries from soldiers that might 
disclose the many realities of military life during the Crimean War, we cannot fully 
portray the events behind the front especially those that occurred on the military 
highways. The irregulars, however, were the major cause of aggressions behind the 
front, and without sufficient control of the irregular units, the population was not 
safe. In one case, the volunteers from Aleppo acted disorderly on their way to the 
front. The government resolution not only claimed that these troops would be sent 
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back but also warned the local authorities that newly established irregular cavalry 
could be brought to the front only if under strict control.
919
 
Many soldiers found opportunity to desert in the confusion of war. As the 
punishment for desertion was imminent death, it can be argued that, for many of the 
conscripts, the conditions in the army were intolerable. There were claims that 
desertions on the Caucasian front were frequent and that many soldiers who 
attempted to run were shot by court-martial. “This afternoon a poor wretch is caught 
hiding in a cave, previous to making a run, and is brought up, tried by a court-
martial, and shot within an hour of his apprehension. This is the first military 
execution in the army of Kars since the commencement of the war.”920 Some 
deserters crossed enemy lines, while others disappeared with no trace. In some cases, 
the local population offered aid to the deserters. In one case, two young men who 
were convicted of helping some deserters were hanged in the marketplace in the 
Fortress of Kars.
921
 
In this regard, hastily gathered units of the reserve were especially prone to 
desertion. In fact, the establishment of reserve units was a serious handicap for the 
social life and the work force in the countryside, and the petition of the redif soldiers 
serving in the Dardanelles clearly portrayed the discontent. “We left our households 
and properties desolate and in misery … our harvest totally perished in the land, and 
thus there is hardly any crop remaining for the subsistence of our families…”922  
The prisoners are another overlooked aspect of the Crimean War. The Russian 
soldiers captured at the Danubian front were sent either to Istanbul or Kütahya. The 
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diaries of the Russian prisoners indicate that they were not happy about the treatment 
they experienced while imprisoned.
923
 Obviously, the Ottoman society was not very 
sympathetic toward the Russian prisoners, keeping them in strict isolation and 
limiting their contacts with the non-Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire.
924
   
Victims of diseases such as dysentery, diarrhea, fever, cholera, scurvy and 
typhus were more frequent than of the bayonet, sword, and shell during the Crimean 
War. These epidemics, fortunately, did not spread to the civilians, and thus, did not 
have a significant impact on the social sphere.  
The porter and ale sent out for the consumption of the troops could not be 
carried inland for want of carts and horses; the water was bad, and the men 
drank the red wine of the country, and, in consequence, fell victims to disease. 
Diarrhoea, dysentery, cholera, made their appearance in the camps, and the 
graveyards began to fill. Then the air was polluted with horrid exhalations, and 
in addition the men pined for action. So that, although the sites of the camps 
looked healthy, bad management, imperfect food and drink, intemperance, a 
burning sun by day and chilling dews by night, soon reduced the physical and 
moral stamina of the troops.
925
 
 
 
Initially, wounded or sick soldiers were visited by their families or by fellow 
townsmen who would bring food to the hospitals. However, because the food that the 
visitors brought was often not appropriate for the diet of the sick, this practice was 
soon prohibited.
926
 We have no statistics regarding the number of the wounded and 
sick who survived, but we assume that they were not many because of the lack of 
medical staff and the shortage of supplies and materials in the Ottoman Empire. A 
visitor to the Ottoman hospitals in the Crimea well portrayed the insufficient medical 
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care which might also be valid for other Ottoman hospitals: “A number of the 
dilapidated houses in Balaklava composed the only Turkish hospital, and it was said 
that none of the many patients conveyed to the establishment ever came out alive. 
Scarcely any attention was shown the feeble sufferers. Many were carried to the 
miserable hospital on the backs of their comrades.”927 
 
6.3.1.4 Distrust between the Ottoman Army and the Reaya 
Although the Ottoman army enjoyed (voluntary or involuntary) support of the 
Ottoman society in general, there were also many people who collaborated with the 
enemy, particularly the Bulgarians on the banks of the Danube River, the Cossacks in 
Dobruja, and the Kurds and the Armenians in the Caucasus. Some of the Ottoman 
Christians retreated with the Russian army into the Russian frontier lands.
928
 The 
main reason for population movement was the fear of punishment. Russia’s 
encouragements were also instrumental in convincing the Bulgarians to leave their 
fatherland. There was even an article issued for a general amnesty in the Paris Peace 
Treaty to reestablish the previous demographic structure of the region. Nevertheless, 
there were always population movements in the Russo-Ottoman wars that eventually 
culminated in the Muslim expulsion from the Crimea, the Caucasus, and finally the 
Balkans.   
There were likely different underlying factors affecting the popular perception 
as to whether an army was an enemy or a friend. In other words, being subject of a 
state is insufficient to explain the behavior and conduct of the local population. 
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While shared national and religious identities were important, the wartime 
experiences and post-war expectations were sometimes more crucial. The 
expectations regarding the economic, social and political outcomes of war had 
repercussions on the popular perception of the war and on the fighting armies. In this 
regard, the troublesome relationship between the Russian army and its co-religious 
Wallachians is a good example as the Russians’ desire to obtain a legal basis for its 
rising influence over the Ottoman Christians was one of the major causes of the 
Crimean War. However, the Russian logistics, i.e., accommodations, transfers and 
supplies deteriorated the relations between the Russian troops and the local 
population of Wallachia.
929
 The Wallachians who experienced the strict control of 
the Russians between 1848 and 1851, well remembered the unhappy relations. The 
British press portrayed the relations between the Russians and the local population of 
Wallachia in a very gloomy way. “The last accounts from the Danubian Principalities 
give an afflicting description of the condition of the peasants in Wallachia. They are 
in such a state of misery that they have no other resource than death or insurrection 
against the Russians. The exactions of the Russian military authorities are incredible. 
They take from the inhabitants cattle, corn, and all means of existence. The peasants 
are consequently compelled to fly their homes, and the sowing the land is completely 
neglected.”930  
After the departure of the Russian army in the summer of 1854, the Habsburgs 
entered the principalities, and the inhabitants involuntarily received their new 
guests.
931
 In fact, the Ottomans, who had little potential or political will to intervene 
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in the domestic affairs of the principalities, were perceived by the local population 
better than the co-religionists – the Habsburgs and the Russians.  
With the exception of the Cossacks and the Christian irregulars the Ottoman 
army was manned entirely by Muslims, and was fighting for the sake of religion, at 
least in theory. The Ottoman society, however, was certainly more heterogeneous 
than its army. It was not realistic to argue that the Ottoman society, which was 
composed of various religious and ethnic identities, had a unanimous attitude 
towards the Ottoman army. The Christians did not convert immediately in spite of 
the Tanzimat reforms into loyal and trusted subjects. When the depots in Varna set 
on fire on 10 August 1854, the usual suspects were the Greek residents of the city.
932
 
Russell narrates the following: “It is said to have been the work of incendiary 
Greeks, some of whom, who were found with matches on their persons, have been 
arrested.”933 This is a good example regarding the way the Greeks were perceived by 
the allies in wartime. One observer frankly claimed, “With their avowed sympathy 
for Russia, and intense enmity to the Turks, I wondered that they [the Greeks] were 
not expelled from the city [Istanbul].”934 Those people who were called “obscure 
personalities” (meçhulu’l-ahval) and who were not allowed to walk around the 
quarters were most certainly the Christians.
935
 The presence of the Christian notables 
(çorbacıs) who were perverting the people at the front (İfsâd-ı ezhâr-ı ahâliye cüret 
etmekte olan çorbacıların) was observed as inappropriate by the Porte, and thus, it 
was decided that these notables should either be brought into Istanbul or be severely 
warned (tenbihât-ı şedide icrâsı).936  On the other hand, it was not easy to move the 
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Christians away from the Ottoman troops as the Christians were needed for many 
tasks in the Ottoman army. In one case, İlya Efendi, who was a respected scribe 
known for his excellence in the profession, was suspected of working for the 
Russians. The Ottomans, however, were not sure whether it would be better to 
remove him from his post or allow him to remain.
937
  
The Ottoman army was also responsible for preserving domestic security by 
placing battalions throughout the empire. The nizam battalions were used to deter 
and suppress any unrest or upheaval, and the fact that the battalions were called back 
to fight against the enemy resulted in breakdowns in maintaining domestic security. 
Worse still, the police forces were also summoned to the front.
938
 On behalf of the 
police, the irregular forces, particularly the Albanians, were commissioned in the 
countryside. However, the extent to which these hastily collected fresh forces could 
provide order and security was unclear. Thus, it was necessary for the Ottoman 
government to make some concessions in terms of domestic security to strengthen 
the fighting forces at the front.  
Bekir Rüstem Pasha, the governor of Yanya, explained that the Albanian 
soldiers could not maintain order as they were not loyal, and the local people did not 
want them there. Therefore, although the regular forces were required at the front, 
they were also needed in Yanya - a strategic province where there was the possibility 
of an insurgency.
939
The abandonment of Yanya by the regular forces caused tensions 
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between Bekir Rüstem Pasha and Ömer Lütfi Pasha, the commander of the Rumelian 
Army. According to Rüstem Pasha, with no reliable military units, the local Greek 
population would certainly revolt.
940
 And he was right. During the war revolts would 
broke out in Epirus and Thessaly in Rumelia, and Dersim and Cizre in Anatolia. The 
small state of Greece in Morea, under the rule of Bavarian Prince Otto, wanted to 
utilize the international atmosphere and sent some regular and irregular forces to 
Epirus and Thessaly to support the revolts. The revolts in Epirus and Thessaly, 
however, would not have had much effect on the ongoing war as they were far from 
the war theatre. They were suppressed by the allied forces shortly afterwards.
941
 
As a Serbian revolt and the Russian support for such an uprising might have 
caused significant setbacks in the defense of the Balkans, the Ottomans strengthened 
the defense at Vidin to prevent any Russian contact with Serbia. Russia wanted and 
planned to instigate revolts in the Ottoman Balkans. However, such plans were never 
acted upon because Russia did not want to spoil its relations with Austria. According 
to Slade, Russia did try to inflict a revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina. “October, 
1854, a Russian envoy came to Cettigno, and tried without success to induce Prince 
Daniel to organize a Christian insurrection in Bosnia and the Hirzgovin.”942 Actually, 
it is unlikely that Russia organized or assisted in any revolution in the Balkans. In 
this regard, the Greek revolts could not enjoy any real support from Russia.  
The international conjuncture and the course of war did not present an 
available environment for the Russians to apply a policy of nationalities in the 
Ottoman Balkans. Therefore, it is difficult to understand the extent of sympathy 
towards the Russians among the Ottoman Christians during the Crimean War. 
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Nevertheless, there were Bulgarian and Greek voluntary units in the Russian army.
943
 
The fact that some Nekrasov Cossacks, Greeks and Bulgarians worked for the 
Russian military intelligence indicates that the relationship between the Ottoman 
Orthodox subjects and Russia continued during wartime.
 944
 
It was not difficult for Russia to gather intelligence in the Ottoman lands via its 
previously established contacts with the reaya. Those who helped the enemy were 
punished. Some spies were shot, some were sent to forced labor and some were 
deported.
945
 On the other hand, because propaganda was crucial and the Porte did not 
want any negative information dispersed at the front, the spies of the Porte conducted 
public surveys to understand the popular views concerning the war and the state.
946
 
For example, a Greek was arrested for claiming that Ömer Lütfi Pasha was captured 
by the Russians and they would soon arrive at the gates of Istanbul.
947
 It is clear that, 
the population was under surveillance, either open or secret, during the Crimean War 
(see, chapter 6.1.). 
 
6.3.1.5 Failure in Preserving the Public Order: The Başıbozuks (the 
Irregulars) and the Zaptiyes (the Police) 
The Ottoman army possessed irregular detachments as it had in the previous 
Russian wars. However, now the Porte was more reluctant than before to employ 
undisciplined and improbable irregulars as such individuals could easily damage the 
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Ottoman prestige in the eyes of the European powers. Although the officials were 
cautious to prevent any atrocities in transit of irregular forces, the localities were 
clearly terrorized by the irregulars. Russian official documents and newspapers 
always emphasized, and most likely exaggerated, the misdeeds of the Ottoman 
irregulars against the Christian population in the Balkans, thus it is not possible to 
determine the extent of troubles caused by them. The Ottoman government in its 
every act wanted to preserve the affirmative public opinion and political will in 
Europe and therefore did its best to control the irregulars who did not contribute to a 
positive image.  
During the Crimean War the irregulars were referred to in various ways. While 
the Albanian, the Kurd, and the Laz indicated ethnic structures, the Kırcali and the 
Zeybek denoted geographical origins. The most famous expression, however, was an 
umbrella term – the başıbozuk (in English frequently as Bashi-bazouk).948 In the 
official parlance, it is meaningful that the irregulars were generally referred to 
neferat-ı muvazzafa or asakir-i muvazzafa – terms that denotes regular units 
commissioned by the state.
949
 The expressions neferat-ı muvazafa and başıbozuk 
were semantically opposite terms as the latter refers to irregular and unruly troops. 
By preferring the term neferat-ı muvazzafa, the Porte obviously tried to save the 
irregular troops from any negative perceptions.
950
 Moreover, there was a real effort 
to transform them into reliable troops. There was some type of an order, at least on 
paper. The chieftain, who was called the sergerde, commanded a specific number of 
men who were deemed eligible for military service, while those, who were found to 
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forces, Akyüz thinks that he is talking about the regular army – the nizam. Akyüz, pp. 27-28.  
950 Gültekin Yıldız, “Kara Kuvvetleri” in Osmanlı Askerî Tarihi. Kara, Deniz ve Hava Kuvvetleri 
1792-1918 (Istanbul, 2013), p. 43  
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be unfit, were sent back home. A register was kept that was to include the number of 
soldiers and their costs, and they would receive ammunition from the government 
(muvazzaf cephanesi) along with their pay and their rations. These rules were 
applied, for example, to the neferat-ı muvazzafa, who reached Shumnu under the 
command of Kalkandelenli Hasan Ağa.951 Thus, the voluntary troops were similar to 
the regulars, at least on paper, and they could be useful under the command of a 
reliable chief. Even though the Ottoman authorities could not always control the 
irregular troops, they usually made an honest effort toward this end.  
The annihilation of the Janissary corps and the Tanzimat worsened the 
relationship between the Ottoman state and the Muslim population, and Ömer Lütfi 
Pasha brutally suppressed the Bosnian unrest just a few years before the Crimean 
War. Some Muslim communities, including the Bosnians, the Albanians and the 
Kurds, did not want to give conscripts to the regular army. Nevertheless, the war was 
an opportunity for the local notables, and they obviously wanted to exploit the 
circumstances. The formation of a military unit under the command of a local 
chieftain was a traditional method in the Ottoman military system. In this regard, the 
commanders of the forces coming from Kega and Toska were the Albanian beys who 
were approved by the Porte.
952
 Cafer Dem Ağa, an Albanian chieftain, and İzzeddin 
Şir Bey, a Kurdish notable, applied to the Porte with their men to participate in the 
war. Bedirhan Bey’s men, a prominent Kurdish leader who were in exile in Candia, 
were also sent to the Balkans.  However, these chieftains, who actually had less than 
good relations with the central government, perceived the war as an opportunity to 
promote their own interests. They, of course, understood very well that the Tanzimat 
reforms were aimed at decreasing their influence in the localities for the sake of 
                                               
951 ATASE k. 9, d. 5, f. 1/8; k. 4, d. 11, f. 13. 
952 ATASE k. 2, d. 6, f. 15/1; k. 2, d. 7, f. 14/1. 
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centralization and modernization. Nonetheless, centralizing state apparatus never 
terminated the employ of the local chieftains.  
The Ottoman irregulars were in mixed formations such that in addition to 
various ethnic backgrounds there were also Christians.
953
 Furthermore, some 
başıbozuks were well-known criminals,954 and because the başıbozuks were not 
accustomed to the military hierarchy, they were more loyal to their own chieftains 
than to any other commander.
955
 Therefore, they were incapable of showing the 
requisite rigidity and discipline on the battlefield.  
The Ottoman irregulars were approached to and perceived by the Western 
observers in two different ways. Sometimes, their exotic characteristics were 
highlighted. Kara Fatıma Hanım from Maraş was described as the Sheikha or the 
Amazon of the East by contemporary articles and books. On the other hand, from a 
military point of view, the başıbozuks were characterized by their inabilities and 
undisciplined actions on the battlefield. The principal tasks of the başıbozuks were to 
conduct surveillance and fight in minor cavalry skirmishes with enemy forces. Some 
irregular forces that acted independent of the main forces used every opportunity to 
loot the villages and acquired the spoils from the peaceful villagers rather than from 
the enemy.  
A letter sent from the Seraskerlik to the Governor of Yanya and Üsküp during 
the preparations for war, accurately described the problems with employing irregular 
troops. According to the letter, the sergerdes would be required to assure the 
                                               
953 For instance, there were Catholic Albanians among the irregulars. Reid, p. 134; Czajkowski, p. 53.  
954 Mustafa, a Gypsy, was also a convict. Reid, s. 112; RGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 5415 ch. 1,  l. 8-10.   
955 Reid, p. 130.  
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appropriate behavior of the neferât-ı muvazzafa on their way to the front.956  On the 
other hand, the irregular forces were not as well-bred as the regular troops (Asâkir-i 
Nizamiyye-i Şahane gibi terbiye görmüş asâkirden olmadıkları). If unwanted 
incidents occurred regarding the Ottoman Christians or the foreigners, the Ottoman 
state would suffer great damages due to such an awkward situation (şu vakt-i 
nazikte). Therefore, the soldiers should be responsible and decent (kefilli ve râbıtalı), 
and their chiefs should be well selected and tested (mücerreb ve müntehâb ve rabta 
lâyıkıyla muktedir).957  
The alliance of the Porte with the two Christian powers was one of the 
significant characteristics of the Crimean War. In its desire not to anger or upset the 
allied powers, the Porte tried to prevent any possible harm to the Christian 
population. But the Ottoman governors were not always successful in stopping 
atrocities: “Of those Captains, the one who had been guilty of the greatest atrocities 
on the march was the most grave, respectable innocent looking man in appearance of 
the whole file of henchmen, constantly expressing himself as perfectly resigned to 
the Divine Will.”958  
According to the irade of 7 May 1854, any misdeed by the başıbozuks would 
be stopped and the responsible parties would be immediately shot.
959
 Thus, while the 
                                               
956 “...neferât-ı muvazzafiyyenin ber-muceb-i işâr tertibiyle takım takım Şumnu’ya sevkine ve yollarda 
edibâne hareket ve azimet eylemek zımnında sergerdelere tenbihât-ı lâzıme icrâsına...” ATASE k. 6, 
d. 18, f. 1, 1 Ramazan 1269 [8 June 1853]. 
957 “neferât-ı merkûmenin kefilli ve râbıtalı adamlardan tahrîr ve tertîbi ve her bir takıma tayin 
olunacak sergerdelerin dahi her halde mücerreb ve müntehâb ve rabta lâyıkıyla muktedir kimselerden 
nasbı hususlarında fevkelgaye ihtimâm ve dikkat olunması” Same document. 
958 Paton, p. 81. 
959 “…uğur-ı hümâyun-ı saltanat-ı seniyyemde cansiperane ve fedakarane ibrâz-ı hüsn-i hidmet ve 
ızhâr-ı mâye-i sıdk ve istikamet eylemek emel ve arzusuyla bazı taraflardan tahaşşüd ve tecemmü’ 
etmekte olan asâkir-i muvazzafa-ı padişâhânem ki fi’l-asl başıbozuk askeri denmekle maruf ve 
meşhurlardır. Bunlardan bazıları doğrusu güzel hareket etmekte iseler de cümlesi bu suretde 
olmayarak içlerinden bazı hayır ve şerri fark etmeyenleri bu memuriyeti yağmacılığa ve edepsizliğe 
fırsat addiyle gerek esnâ-yı râhde ve gerek bulundukları mahallerde haşerât güruhunun 
mukaddemlerde meluf ve mutad oldukları tarik-i nâmüstakime sülük ve ehl-i İslam ve Hıristiyan 
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Porte, on the one hand, employed irregulars to fight against the enemy, on the other 
hand, used the regular forces against the irregular forces. When the başıbozuks, who 
deserted from the army, and the Tatars from the Dobruja region began terrorizing the 
local population (zulm u teaddi), the regular forces were sent to protect the 
villagers.
960
 A correspondent from The Times reported on how the irregulars were 
punished. “The Bashi-Bazouks continue to give much trouble. A few days since they 
fired on some of the regular cavalry. At Salpiga, not far from Shumla, the troops 
attacked the ruffians, who were greatly superior in number, killed two of the number, 
and brought seven prisoners to Omar Pasha. They were severely flogged, and two of 
them are since dead.” The correspondent continues and gives important details 
regarding the military punishment in the Ottoman army:  
To explain this excessive severity, it must be stated that the General has not the 
power of life and death; there is no court martial capable of inflicting such a 
punishment; and accordingly men are sentenced to such a number of blows as 
will almost certainly produce death. The men in question received 500 blows 
each, administered alternately on the back and belly. Such punishments, 
however, seldom take place, and are only resorted to in cases of extreme 
atrocity.
961
 
 
 
After the alliance with France and Britain, the Porte was more cautious about 
the employment of irregulars. However, a state that wages war under the banner of 
religion (cihad) could not openly declare at reluctance to employ volunteers. The 
commanders of the armies were asked whether they needed auxiliary forces in the 
form of “başıbozuk”, “gönüllü” or “neferât-ı muvazzafa”. Although there was no 
                                                                                                                                     
tebaa-ı Şâhânemin mal ve can ve ırzlarına tasallud ile adâb-ı insaniyet ve hamiyyete ve askerlik 
sıfatına yakışmaz nice nice harekât-ı kabihaya ibtidar ve hengâm-ı muharebede dahi zikri müstehcen 
bir takım fenalıklara ictisar etmekte oldukları anbean istihbar ve tahkiki kılınmakta olup…” Hakkı 
Yapıcı, “Takvim-i Vekayi’de Kırım Harbi 1853-1856”, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Erzurum, 1999, p. 
40.  
960 BOA İ.DH 300-19001. 
961 “(From our own correspondent) Turkey, Constantinople, April 20”, The Times, 3 May 1854. 
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difference between these expressions, they were used in the document as if each term 
represented a different group. If there was no need for such military formations, then 
these volunteers should have been sent home without any offense.  
There were two principal questions in the employment of the başıbozuks. First, 
there was always the possibility of causing disorder. Second, they would demand 
their money. While the regular forces did not revolt when they were not regularly 
paid, these military units would compensate for their losses by taking from the 
civilians. Obviously, the Porte thought that without sufficient control, the volunteer 
units would bring damage rather than profit to the Ottoman war effort, in a 
conjuncture when the Ottomans allied with Christian powers. Stratford Redcliffe also 
regularly warned the Ottoman government against the excesses of the başıbozuks and 
requested that these units be controlled. As a result, the Porte had to concentrate on 
the problems behind the front not only for the sake of its own population but also to 
preserve the valuable friendships with the Western powers.  
Various sources claimed that the başıbozuks also acted shamefully against 
women, but details were not given.
962
 Colonel Neale, the British consul at Varna, 
informs Redcliffe that “the women were dishonored and many of the men and 
children killed” while those, who could escape, fled to the woods.”963 The Ottoman 
officials took some precautions to protect the honor of women.
964
 For example, the 
Primate of Varna warned the women not to go to town when military units were 
there.
965
  
                                               
962 “The Danubian Provinces”, The Times, 10 September 1853. 
963 Badem, p. 420. 
964 “The Danubian Provinces”, The Times, 10 September 1853. 
965 “The Danubian Provinces”, The Times, 10 September 1853. 
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The Times published a letter that was sent by a başıbozuk in July 1854 from the 
banks of the Danube River. It is not clear whether a real başıbozuk wrote the letter or 
a British soldier wanted to express his opinions on behalf of a başıbozuk. In this 
letter, a real or a fictional başıbozuk expressed that they were just the scapegoats of 
any sad consequence, and they wanted their voices to be heard.  
When our Sovereign (the Sultan) in his wisdom declared war against the cursed 
‘Moskova,’ he sent his firman to all parts of his mighty empire to call upon his 
subjects and all true believers to arise and fight for their country and religion. 
All good Moslems arose at the summons, girded on their arms, and flocked 
from Kurdistan, Turkistan, Arabistan – in fact, from all parts of Asia Minor – 
to the seat of war. We had large hearts in our breasts, sharp swords by our 
sides, but little or no money in our pockets; our chiefs had spent what little they 
ever had in giving us arms, horses, &c., to make a good appearance before our 
master, the Sultan. Allah bless him! At first we were treated well, and had food 
given us, and fought and bet the acoursed ‘Moskov’ whenever we had an 
opportunity. By degrees, as war continued and provisions got scarce, we Bashi-
Bazouks, who had come so far, and left our homes, wives, and children, to 
fight for our country, began to be neglected; things got worse and worse, and 
we got less and less to eat. Some among us, who, when pressed by hunger… 
robbed the villages around for food; others sold their horses – as dear to them 
as their children – and bought bread. Things went on in this way for a long 
time; but, wherever there was fighting or hard work there were the Bashi-
Bazouks. We had nobody to look after us, nobody to appeal to, no food, no 
money, and yet we were expected to do everything that those who are fed and 
clothed by the Sultan do and more besides. We are said to have plundered and 
robbed towns; but most of the crime committed were the work of the Albanian 
Bashi-Bazouks, and not of us poor Asiatics. Of late, many of us have been 
taken and beaten to death by sticks for taking bread. 
966
 
 
 
The owner of the letter also expressed his happiness for the French and British 
declarations of war. He stated that they would not suffer from hunger anymore as the 
British were just and generous. However, he was unhappy that although the French 
started to employ the irregular cavalry, the British army did not yet initiate such an 
employment. He declared that they would efficiently serve in the British army. This 
                                               
966 “An Appeal from the Bashi-bazouks. To the Editor of the Times”, The Times, 28 August 1854.  
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letter may be fiction and may be an attempt to generate positive public opinion for 
the establishment of the irregular forces under the command of the British army.  
The başıbozuks in Ereğli of Tekfurdağı caused an upheaval. They fired on 
whom they encountered with, sacked a church, and even to fire a gun over a captain 
of French steamer. The Sublime Porte criticized the local governor for not punishing 
those people.
967 
However, the local governor was only a scapegoat for the central 
government to conciliate the foreign powers. In fact, it is dubious whether the local 
authorities had enough power to suppress such undesirable actions. The unruly deeds 
of the irregulars behind the war can also be explained by their perception of the 
Ottoman Christians or reaya. Slade explains the view of the başıbozuks.  
The stimulus given to the Bashi-bazouk fever of 1854 was a weak deference to 
the popular delusion about the value of such a force. Much mischief, direct and 
indirect, ensued; by the withdrawal of hands from agricultural pursuits, by the 
unsettlement of men’s minds, by idle consumption of rations, and by the 
exasperation often caused by the presence in Christian districts. Fervid 
Moslems, taking words in their literal acceptation, the Bashi-bazouks were not 
always capable of restricting the sense of expression, ‘holy war’. With them, 
non-Mohammedans were all in one category of anathema. They looked to the 
war as a means of reviving their waning dominancy over the rayas: -the latent 
aspiration of the nation.
968
  
 
 
Humpry Sandwith shares Slade’s viewpoint.  
But of the Bashi-Bozooks who have chiefly been employed in the present war, 
the following is only too true a picture: arrived at the scene of conflict, they are 
sent to the outposts; and if the enemy’s frontier is ill defended, woe betide the 
poor villagers, who have to pay heavy contributions in heads, to furnish these 
bravoes with trophies, not to speak of other grievous exactions! If the frontier 
villagers are Christians, albeit subjects of the Sultan, they fare little better than 
foes with these irregulars.
969
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The başıbozuks, however, were not always guilty. At least they were not the 
only responsible party in their deplorable acts. The Porte was in contact with only the 
sergerde, but in many cases those chieftains did not want to allocate the money they 
received to their men. Those who could not receive any pay or rations were forced to 
pillage the villages. Sandwith argued that the volunteers were in a very desperate 
position: “The poor devils themselves are sometimes almost as much to be pitied as 
their victims; they are preyed upon by the Chief who raised them; and who flees 
them of their pay and rations to the utmost extent of human endurance; they have 
often to sell their arms, their spare clothing, and lastly, their horses, to procure the 
necessaries of life.”970  
Charles Cunningham, who was charged by Redcliffe in late 1854 to investigate 
the social situation in the Balkans, gives the following information regarding the 
relations between the Muslim and Christian population.  
My belief, founded on a long residence in Turkey, in that a Turk does not value 
the life of a Christian at all, not so much as he values the life of a dog, nay I 
believe that by many Turks it is considered meritorious and not infamous to 
take the life of a Christian. Persons who have resided in Turkey may say that 
the foregoing is too severe; that they are acquainted with Turks who, far from 
killing a Christian, would not intentionally do him harm. This I freely admit, 
still that same Turk looks on the taking the life of a Christian as a very different 
matter from taking the life of a Musulman. It is only justice to the Turk to add, 
that the Christians of Turkey generally, do not consider it a very serious crime 
to take the life of a Turk. Christians seldom take the lives of Turks because 
punishment is almost certain, Turks often take the lives of Christians because 
impunity is almost certain. When public opinion among the Turks does not 
place the murder of a Christian in the rank of crimes, and the law seldom 
punishes the offence, it is evident that no infamy can, in the opinion of a Turk, 
attach to the murderer of a Christian.
971
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The British and French armies also made plans to utilize the Ottoman 
irregulars.
972
 The Ottomans generally welcomed such offers from the Allied powers 
as the irregulars were perceived as a burden that necessitated control.
973
 General 
Yusuf, a French commander who had war experience in Algeria, and Beatson, a 
British general who commanded an irregular force in India, were commissioned by 
their respective armies to form irregular units. The hasty French initiative failed, 
however, after the unsatisfactory campaign into the interior of Dobruja under the 
command of General Yusuf. The troops of General Beatson trained in Dardanelles 
for months, but after the fall of Sevastopol, peace initiatives accelerated and these 
troops never had an opportunity to demonstrate their battle skills. Nevertheless, the 
British commanders who were charged with the instruction of the başıbozuks saw 
themselves as successful in their training of such savages.
974
  
Actually as the başıbozuk the zaptiye was also paid insufficiently and this 
salary resulted in a corrupt system since the zaptiyes were in search for the 
compensation from the civilian population.  
Insufficient pay – The pay of a mounted Zabtiyie is one hundred and forty 
piasters per month, or Twenty two shillings, for which he must provide his 
horse and arms and feed himself and horse. On my present journey I paid as 
much as for Barley for the feed of one horse morning and evening, and 
nowhere have I paid less than p 3 ½. Therefore supposing the Zabtiyie only to 
pay the lowest rate is required monthly for this horse’s Barley, leaving on 
which to support himself and family for a month. Now this low pay does not 
permit a Zabtiyie to perform his duty faithfully; he cannot live on his pay and 
must seek illegitimate means of supporting himself, among which tribute from 
Robbers and robbery itself may be reckoned. It is true that in the Christian 
villages the Zabtiyie never pays for his own or his horse’s food; the law says he 
should pay for both, but he has not the means to pay were he willing.
975
  
                                               
972 Badem, pp. 257-268.  
973 Redcliffe claims in a letter to the Porte: “Vakıa infak ve idarelerinden aciz olup bir takım âdemlere 
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Charles Cunningham, who was sent by expressed the defects of the zaptiye 
system in details. According to the British observer this system could not be a 
solution for the robberies and murders, but often a reason of such incidents. He 
thinks that only by giving them an adequate pay, a uniform, and by employing 
persons who had no local ties could turn the zaptiyes into an efficient body to 
preserve internal peace. 
All the Zabtiyies belong to the district in which they act, and consequently 
have friends and relations all around, and are frequently connected in 
friendship or interest with the robbers, and therefore will not seize them. When 
it is attempted to appoint strangers as Zabtiyies the members of the Meslise 
[Meclis] are opposed, saying that the natives of the district should be provided 
for. The Zabtiyies have no uniform and therefore on the road cannot be known 
for good or for evil. The Zabtiyie not unfrequently acts the part of the robber, 
stopping passengers and robbing and murdering them; while the robber often 
assumes the part of the Zabtiyie, stopping passengers on the road under pretext 
of examining their Tescarets and then falling on them unawares. The robbers 
also enter the villages under the assumed character of Zabtiyies and obtain 
lodging and food for themselves and horses without payment and happy for the 
villagers if the robbers content themselves with this. …it is generally believed 
that higher officers, even to the Chief of districts prevent robbers from being 
arrested, either directly, by not taking the needful measures, or indirectly, by 
their known indifference. Another great obstacle to the apprehension of robbers 
is the number of districts into which the country is divided, each with its 
separate police and authorities, and the officers of one district not being 
allowed to act in another district. The Zabtiyies of a Pasha can no doubt act all 
over the Pashalic but cannot enter another Pachalic, but the Zabtiyie of a sub-
governor can only act in the sub-district. A robber therefore has only to retire 
into another district after having committed a crime, and he is secure from 
immediate arrest. The Governor of the district wherein the crime was 
committed must write to the Governor of the District into which the criminal 
has retired, the Governor written to seldom takes any trouble in the matter, 
because the crime not having been committed in his district, his reputation does 
not suffer and perhaps he is pleased that an offence has been committed in the 
district of his neighbour. Good protection from arrest & punishment All 
persons with whom I have an opportunity of conversing, Christians and Turks, 
agree that everywhere hereabouts the robbers have protectors in powerful 
Turks both in and out of office, down to common peasants in every town and 
village.
976
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There were different motives to protect the robbers from the punishment. 
However, especially the local Ottoman notables, who were against the Tanzimat 
reforms, protected the criminals. These people were happy with the social and land 
systems, in which they found opportunity to promote their wealth and prosperity. 
Interestingly, the Christian population also considered the Tanzimat as a reason for 
the increase in murders and robberies.  
The motives for giving protection differ in degree, from a partnership with the 
robbers and sharing the plunder, to a mere desire of protecting the Turk from 
being punished for an offence against a Christian, and to hinder the late 
reforms which give protection to Christians from being carried into effect. In 
every Meslise and in every district the person is openly named who is the chief 
protector of robbers. But even when the protectors of robbers are known it 
must still be difficult to ascertain the motives of each person and in what 
degree they are influenced by interest relationships & friendship, or the mere 
hatred of Christians and opposition to reforms for their protection. I consider 
however that all Turks of the old school, that is those opposed to reforms for 
the benefit of the Christians, see these robberies and murders of Christians with 
no unfavourable eye, and if they do not instigate to the committal of these 
crimes, they at least do all in their power to skreen the criminals from arrest 
and punishment. This I believe to be the great difficulty to putting down these 
murders and robberies now so frequent. But besides the mere hatred of 
Christians there is a powerful class of Turks in Bulgaria (and probably all over 
Turkey) who have interested motives for preventing the reforms for the 
protection of the Christians from coming into force. There are the great landed 
proprietors who even now in some instances oblige the Christians to cultivate 
their land, secure their crops without payment. Then there are all the Turks 
(and some Christians also) who are in the habit of taking the ictistams [iltizam] 
or Tiths, who at present profit by the unprotected state of the Christians, taking 
more from them than they are entitled to take and which they will not be able 
to do once the reforms are real.
977
  
 
 
5.3.2. The Daily Life of the Soldier 
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Military life was more than just battles. A British author observed, “Pending 
this interval, employed in organising the army, there were balls, and banquets, and 
reviews to strengthen the alliance. The Sultan did two noticeable acts: he galloped 
his horse twice in public; and he spoke to a Christian woman, Madame de St. 
Arnaud! But this was the showy part of the business; the real work was done quietly, 
in the chambers of the embassy, in the quarters of the generals, and in the councils of 
war and consultation.”978 In Bucharest, officers paid regular visits to the operas, and 
Colonel A. K. Baumgarten expressed his dissatisfaction with the opera in Krayova. 
However, in Bucharest there were good performances. The balls were important for 
amusing the Russian officers in wartime.  
The Russian officers found the balls to be an important form of entertainment 
in wartime. The Russian officers, who were generally accommodated in a house of a 
local notable, were known to dance and play with the young ladies, just as Lev 
Tolstoi did in Simferopol.
979
 In fact, because there was not much action on the 
Danube in 1853 and 1854, the soldiers and officers were, more often than not, idle. 
Tolstoi expressed his disappointment about his experience of war in the Balkans 
stating, “I have remained, and, to speak the truth, the kind of life which I lead here, 
being, as it is, somewhat dissipated, quite idle and very expensive, displeases me 
infinitely.”980 
Gambling became one of the most important ways for the officers to spend 
their time, as did drinking. And both had negative effects on the army, although, in 
general, they were permitted. McCormick, an American observer, noted in his visit 
to Balaklava that “I saw very many poor fellows, so much overcome by excessive 
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drinking, that they could not walk erect.”981 The significance of alcohol in the daily 
life of soldiers and their relations with each other was well portrayed in his words. 
“[T]he party was a compound of the Saxon and the Gallic – the army and the navy – 
a friendly alliance in rum.”982 French and English shops were increasing rapidly 
throughout Pera while there were several English shops in Uskudar, devoted to the 
sale of liquors, and having their patrons a number of the soldiers’ wives.983  
Not much is known about Ottoman daily life, but drinking was certainly one of 
the pastimes of the Ottoman officer, and when compared to the Russian and allied 
armies, the social environment seemed to be a more masculine one. The European 
soldiers declared the importance of coffee and tobacco in the daily life of the 
Ottoman soldier. The laziness and unplanned activities were of their commonly 
complained characteristics by the Europeans. 
 
6.3.3. Conclusion 
There is not yet sufficient research explaining how various communities in the 
Ottoman Empire perceived the Ottoman army, though it was a real dilemma for the 
soldiers who were under the impression they were fighting a holy war against Russia 
while being ordered to treat the Christian population well. The alliance with 
Christian powers made the situation even more complex. The Porte was to provide 
and preserve the sympathy of the reaya and thus hinder the increasing Russian 
influence in the Ottoman domains. The role of public opinion was also important in 
the conduct of war. Because the opinions and attitudes of the population towards the 
                                               
981 McCormick, p. 103.  
982 McCormick, p. 200. 
983 McCormick, p. 189.  
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war were dynamic, it was important to understand the changes in public opinion 
during the war. It was also evident and important to understand that the Ottoman 
government wanted to flourish good relations with the Orthodox population.  
The success of different branches of army on the battlefield and their behaviors 
behind the front considerably varied. The regulars inspired more confidence from 
their commanders than did the irregulars and the reserves, and the relationships 
between the people and the regular armies were consistent with the laws and the 
regulations. However, the disobedient irregulars inflicted great harm and were the 
major causes of murders and robberies, applying their weapons against the civilians 
more frequently than against the enemy forces. While it was not easy for the Porte to 
refuse the crowds who came to fight for religion and state, these crowds brought 
more harm than profit, posing a real dilemma for the Porte. 
The setbacks in the Ottoman logistical system did not only result in military 
problems but paved a way to grave social outcomes. First, they worsened the 
relations between the civilians and the army. Thus the Porte was forced to use 
intermediaries for several services to the army. For example, the mültezims supplied 
the army, while the sergerdes found the başıbozuks to fight. As the Porte dealt only 
with the intermediaries, it turned a deaf ear to the problems of soldiers and peasants 
who suffered from embezzlements.  
Tanzimat might have resolved several legal issues, but it is hard to argue that 
the new regulations were always adequately applied. The conscription and the supply 
systems of the army were both corrupt, and the army and the war were an obvious 
burden for the population. Therefore, people wanted a rapid conclusion to the 
hostilities. The Muslims, who manned the army, were affected by the war more so 
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than other components of the Ottoman society, and the human casualties were 
dramatic for the Ottoman army. As a consequence, only a small number of soldiers 
returned home after the war.  Thus, the social polarization increased, as the Russo-
Ottoman wars had an impact on the revolts of the Balkan Christians. Even the 
immigrant Muslim populations from the Caucasus and the Crimea, after the Russo-
Ottoman wars, may have played a role in the polarization.  
While there were several reasons for the rising interactions between soldiers 
and peasants, not much is, as yet, known about these relations. New studies on the 
conditions of war and military-society relations may provide information on the state 
formation in the Balkans. The identification and interpretations of these relations can 
offer clues to understanding the social and military outcomes of the Tanzimat 
reforms.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In late February 1853, Russian ambassador extraordinary Prince Aleksandr 
Sergeyevich Menshikov, arrived in Istanbul ostensibly to obtain a favorable response 
to the prolonged diplomatic crisis concerning the shrines of the Holy Lands. In fact, 
he had another agenda: the conclusion of a secret treaty with the Ottoman 
government following the example of the Hünkar İskelesi of 1833. This ambitious 
mission was doomed to fail, and having worsened the relationship between the two 
countries, the prince left Istanbul. In the aftermath, Russian troops crossed the River 
Prut into Moldavia and marched toward Bucharest. Nevertheless, Russia declared 
that the invasion of the Principalities was not an act of war but rather ‘a material 
guarantee’ to force the Porte to accept Russian demands. At such an uncertain 
juncture in the summer of 1853, the Ottomans did not hasten to declare war but 
prudently prepared for a possible confrontation. Consequently, from the Russian 
invasion of the Principalities in July 1853 to the Ottoman declaration of war in 
October, there was a tenuous state of neither peace nor war.  
Accordingly, intensive diplomatic activities continued throughout the summer 
of 1853 to bridge the differences between the Russian and the Ottoman claims. The 
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Russian army placed approximately 80,000 men (the Fourth Army and part of the 
Fifth Army) in the Principalities, a number that could easily rise with the transfer of 
the Third Army. Evidently the Ottomans’ failure to accomplish the necessary 
preparations, especially on the Danube, before the commencement of hostilities 
might have caused the Ottomans irreparable damage. Thus, armies, fortifications, 
supply lines and maps of the region were feverishly prepared. Meanwhile, both 
powers established espionage networks around the Danube River to monitor their 
opponent.  
Russia waited for a diplomatic solution even after the outbreak of war, without 
using its army in Bulgaria on account of the probable intervention of France and 
Britain. In the autumn of 1853, a defensive strategy for the Ottomans was 
meaningful, as their war aim was to protect the Ottoman territory rather than to 
advance toward Russia. However, the aim and strategy of the Russian army were 
unclear throughout the war. During the occupation of the Principalities, when the 
Russian army was in a foreign land, there was a situation oscillating between war and 
peace for four months. After the declaration of war, the Russians were reluctant to 
engage any offensive, and another five months were needed to cross the Danube. The 
siege of Silistre was only ten months after the occupation of the Principalities. 
Nicholas I, who planned an occupation of Istanbul, had to be satisfied with a 
diplomatic victory against the Porte in the summer of 1853. In the spring of 1854, 
Russia was completely isolated. The siege of Silistre was the final attempt, but it was 
too late. The allied navies in the Black Sea and the threat of Austrian army in 
Transylvania did not provide Russia with a political atmosphere in which to conduct 
an easy war. The siege of Silistre was soon raised, and the Russian troops retreated to 
protect their own frontier. Menshikov, who failed in his mission at Istanbul, was then 
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to command the Russian army to defend Sevastopol. While Russia had to wage a war 
against France and Britain, the Porte lost its initiative in the war. Subsequently, it 
became a European war rather than a classical Russo-Ottoman confrontation. The 
Ottoman army was reduced somewhat to an auxiliary force. 
The Ottomans had not long fought so well against their colossal neighbor. The 
Ottoman tactics were clear and feasible. It was first necessary to hold strategic 
positions on the right bank and on the islands. Ömer Lütfi Pasha also aimed to 
demoralize the Russians with minor battles. It is not clear whether the Ottomans 
could have succeeded to that extent without the intervention of the Great Powers 
against a more resolute Russian power. However, the Ottoman Danubian army 
showed that they possessed the potential to stop the Russians. In the light of 
documents, it can be claimed that Ottoman government had a clear plan, completely 
realistic, mainly defensive, and successfully practiced in the Danubian front. 
Ottoman army attained its aims on the Danubian front, that’s to say to establish a 
strong defensive line and to discourage Russian forces for a successful offensive. 
The war cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, but failed to resolve 
the Eastern Question. The Eastern Question arose mainly from the strength of Russia 
and the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, combined with the strategic importance of 
the Ottoman territories, especially the Straits, and the fact that they could fall into the 
Russian hands putting Russia in a very strong position and changing the balance of 
power in Europe. The Russian military might soon threaten the Ottoman Empire 
once again. Therefore, in retrospect, it is commonly accepted that the Crimean War 
was unnecessary and useless. However, although the war resolved little, it was 
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waged for something significant. The stakes were high when the European powers 
entered the war.  
Several letters of the commanders to the Seraskerlik (Ministry of War) give 
interesting clues regarding preparations of the Ottoman army as well as its plans and 
expectations. Thus, this study conveys useful information to understand how an 
Ottoman-Russian war transformed into a European one. This study argues that the 
Ottoman government was not as irrational as it has been portrayed and that the 
Ottoman army was better organized than scholars have previously claimed. The 
conduct of diplomacy and the results of battles on the Danube clearly support this 
argument. However, the Ottomans lost their initiative after the allied intervention. 
The Porte also did not have a program and system of crisis management. As the war 
prolonged, the Ottoman army gradually weakened. The British and French, however, 
were better in handling with the wartime problems, and they were able to improve 
the workings of their war machines.  
However, documents do not always utter the truth. They can manipulate the 
reality: the causes and effects of events might be either exaggerated or underrated. 
Strength and aims of an army as well as the losses and failures after a battle are likely 
to be exaggerated if the enemy was the case. Even the failures were written as a 
victory and medals and grants were distributed to the soldiers who showed 
‘extraordinary bravery’. Thus, comparative studies are crucial, if not indispensable, 
for the history of war. Perhaps the most important and reliable source for a historian 
of war is the military reports sent from the front. Such reports include first-hand 
invaluable information on the proceedings of the battles as well as the results of 
them. Both the Ottomans and the Russians overstated the casualties on the ranks of 
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the enemy to show the insignificance of their losses and the success of their fight. 
Sometimes the same battle was portrayed as a victory by both parties. Moreover, 
both sides tended to exaggerate the number of the forces of the enemy. Similarly in 
the Ottoman documents there is a sharp disparity between the Russian and Ottoman 
losses, which also cover the facts. It is interesting to see how the same history 
narrated differently in the official documents and how this affected the history-
writing. As shown for each and every battle on the Danube before the Crimean 
campaign the number of the warring parties, the losses and the results of the battles 
were far from authentic. Therefore, it is necessary to find a balance picture between 
two different stories of the same history looking at the data both sides conveyed. 
British diplomats and officers also inclined to exaggerate their role in the Ottoman 
Empire, probably thinking that would play a role in their future promotions. Thus, 
the accounts of Simmons, Redcliffe or any other British should be read with some 
reservations.  
Although the local population of the Balkans was Ottoman subjects, Russia had 
significant influence on the Christians. These people felt some sympathy for the 
Russian army, and most of them did not necessarily see the invading army as an 
enemy. Thus, there was an asymmetry in explaining the state-society relations. The 
extent and strength of loyalty was never clear. The Crimean War was also an 
encounter between Eastern civilization and the West, which is why it is known as the 
Eastern War. European soldiers, correspondents, merchants, adventurers, and many 
other types of people poured into Ottoman lands to observe the war and the East with 
all its archaic and exotic characteristics. The Ottomans, including Muslims and non-
Muslims, were in contact with such people for more than two years. Thus, mid-
nineteenth century cultural perceptions should be emphasized. For instance, “Lazy, 
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coward Turks” and “filthy towns” were frequent European descriptions of the people 
and places they encountered.  
In fact, updated monographs on the Russo-Ottoman wars are scarce. The 
Ottoman fortifications, particularly at Şumnu, Varna, Silistre, Rusçuk, and Vidin, 
and the Ottoman defense system must be updated to reflect new archival materials 
and archeological findings. Biographies of the 19
th
 century Ottoman commanders, 
about whom little is known, should be researched to adequately evaluate their 
wartime performances. Finally, Ottoman history would benefit from further 
statistical information to supplement outmoded narratives and biographies in locating 
the Ottoman history in a global context.   
Although a substantial literature exists on the Crimean War, many aspects of it 
have been overlooked, particularly related to the Ottoman participation. Ottoman 
public opinion, including both Christian and Muslim views, is an important subject 
for future research. Population movements during the war should be discussed in the 
context of the Russo-Ottoman wars because demographic warfare always existed 
between the rivals. Ottoman logistics also require further elaboration. Hopefully, this 
study raises questions that can inspire considerable future research.  
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